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This	  thesis	  evaluates	  several	  powerful	  arguments	  that	  not	  only	  deny	  that	  brain	  states	  
and	   conscious	   states	   are	   one	   and	   the	   same	   thing,	   but	   also	   claim	   that	   such	   an	   identity	   is	  
unintelligible.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  accounts	  do	  not	  undermine	  physicalism	  because	  they	  don’t	  
provide	   any	   direct	   or	   independent	   justification	   for	   their	   tacit	   assumptions	   about	   a	   link	  
between	  modes	  of	  presentation	  and	  explanation.	  In	  my	  view	  intelligibility	  of	  psychophysical	  
identity	  should	  not	  be	  based	  exclusively	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  meaning.	  The	  main	  concern	  then	  
should	  be	  why	  expect	  that	  fully	  intelligible	  explanation	  must	  be	  based	  on	  the	  descriptions	  of	  
the	   causal	   roles	   as	   modes	   of	   presentation.	   To	   this	   effect	   I	   propose	   that	   we	   examine	  
"psychological	  concepts".	  The	  psychological	  concepts	  are	  concepts	  that	  use	  descriptions	  of	  
the	  functional	  roles	  but	  are	  about	  qualities	  of	  our	  experiences.	  I	  propose	  to	  analyze	  them	  in	  
quality	  space	  models	  in	  order	  to	  unveil	  why	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  expected	  to	  refer	  via	  
descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  or	  functional	  roles.	  	  
The	  quality	  space	  should	  be	  understood	  here	  as	  a	  multidimensional	  space	  consisting	  
of	   several	   axes	   of	   relative	   similarity	   and	   differences	   among	   the	   structures	   of	   ordering	   in	  
different	  modalities	  of	  conscious	  experience.	  On	  my	  proposal	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  axes	  in	  
the	  quality	  space	  consist	  of	  their	  own	  quality	  spaces	  so	  we	  could	  “zoom	  in”	  and	  “zoom	  out”	  
into	   the	  descriptions	  of	   the	   functional	   roles	  and	   see	  more	   clearly	  what	   the	  explanation	  of	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In	   this	   work	   I	   shall	   be	   concerned	   with	   questions	   of	   the	   following	   sort:	   why	   are	  
physical	  states	  of	  the	  brain	  always	  accompanied	  by	  some	  conscious	  states,	  or	  why	  there	   is	  
something	  it	  is	  like	  to	  undergo	  certain	  experiences	  or	  states	  at	  all.	  These	  questions	  capture	  
the	  essence	  of	  the	  famous	  “explanatory	  gap”.	  It	  is	  explicitly	  claimed,	  in	  the	  premises	  of	  some	  
of	   the	   classical	   arguments	   in	   philosophy	   of	   mind,	   that	   we	   will	   never	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	  
understand	   how	   and	   why	   “brain	   states	   give	   rise	   to	   phenomenal	   states”	   even	   if	  
psychophysical	   identity	  were	   true	   (Levine	  1983,	  1993,	  2001).	  Although	   they	   initially	   sound	  
simple	  these	  questions	  are	  by	  no	  means	  easy.	  In	  fact,	  David	  Chalmers	  calls	  these	  issues	  the	  
hard	  problem	  of	   consciousness	   (Chalmers	   1995).	  What	  makes	   this	   problem	   so	  hard	   is	   the	  
fact	  that	  two	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  access	  to	  consciousness	  seem	  incompatible,	  one	  from	  the	  first	  
person	  perspective	  and	  the	  other	  from	  the	  third	  person	  perspective.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  we	  can	  
have	   knowledge	   about	   our	   experiences	   from	   the	   third	   person	   perspective	   but	   that	  would	  
not	  allow	  us	  to	  know	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  undergo	  that	  experience,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Furthermore,	  
to	  some	  philosophers,	  like	  David	  Chalmers	  (Chalmers	  1996)	  or	  Frank	  Jackson	  (Jackson	  1982)	  
this	   incompatibility	   reflects	   a	   much	   deeper	   distinction	   in	   nature.	   They	  maintain	   that	   two	  
epistemic	  perspectives	  of	  consciousness	  are	  anchored	  in	  two	  metaphysically	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  
properties.	  	  
What	   does	   it	   actually	  mean	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   different	  ways	   in	  which	  we	   think	   of	  
consciousness	  seem	  incompatible?	  
On	   the	   one	   hand	   we	   can	   think	   about	   consciousness	   from	   the	   third	   person	  
perspective.	   This	   would	   include	   all	   the	   knowledge	   we	   have	   from	   neuroscience,	   biology,	  
physics,	  medicine,	   cognitive	   science	   and	   the	   like;	   about	   the	  workings	   of	   the	   brain	   and	   its	  
environment.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  we	   can	   think	   about	   consciousness	   from	   the	   first	   person	  
perspective.	  This	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  consciousness	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  that	  it	  looks	  
somehow	  to	  be	  in	  such	  a	  state	  (Nagel	  1974).	  This	  situation	  is	  peculiar	  to	  consciousness	  and	  it	  
is	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   epistemic	   gap.	   This	   gap	   poses	   a	   problem	   to	   some	  
philosophers	  (Jackson	  1982;	  Chalmers	  1996,	  2000,	  2009)	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  what	  we	  
 11 
are	   thinking	   of	   from	   the	   first	   person	   perspective	   and	   from	   the	   third	   person	   perspective	  
cannot	  be	  the	  same	  thing,	  or	  at	   least	   it	  cannot	  be	   intelligible	  how	  they	  could	  be	  the	  same	  
thing	  (Levine	  1983,	  1993,	  2001).	  They	  argue	  that,	  actually,	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  reflects	  a	  much	  
deeper	  gap	  in	  nature	  and	  that	  is	  an	  ontological	  gap.	  Or,	  at	  the	  very	  least	  it	  is	  not	  intelligible	  
as	  how	  these	  two	  distinct	  perspectives	  are	  about	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing;	  such	  a	  position	  is	  
known	  as	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  (Levine	  1983).	  	  	  
In	   arguing	   against	   the	   ontological	   gap,	   some	   philosophers,	   such	   as	   Joseph	   Levine	  
(Levine	   1983,	   1993,	   2001),	   argue	   that	   drawing	   metaphysical	   conclusions	   from	   epistemic	  
premises	   is	  not	   justified	   in	  this	  case	  and	  that	  we	  cannot	   infer	  the	  ontological	  gap	  from	  the	  
mere	  existence	  of	  the	  epistemic	  gap.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  by	  
no	   means	   leads	   to	   the	   metaphysical	   conclusion	   that	   these	   two	   ways	   of	   thinking	   about	  
consciousness	   reflect	   two	  metaphysically	   distinct	   kinds	   of	   properties.	   However,	   he	   claims,	  
this	  should	  not	  put	  at	  ease	  the	  philosophers	  who	  maintain	  that	  these	  two	  ways	  of	  thinking	  
about	   consciousness	   are	   basically	   about	   one	   and	   the	   same	   thing,	   because	   even	   if	   it	  were	  
true	  that	  it	  is	  about	  the	  same	  thing,	  we	  can’t	  really	  understand	  how	  this	  could	  be.	  This	  is	  the	  
explanatory	  gap	  problem	  (Levine	  1983).	  	  
In	  this	  work,	  among	  other	  things,	   I	  urge	  to	  make	  a	  sharper	  distinction	  between	  the	  
epistemic	   gap	   and	   the	   explanatory	   gap.	   The	  mere	   existence	  of	   the	   epistemic	   gap	   is	   not	   a	  
reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  it	  is	  not	  explicable.	  Perhaps	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  to	  have	  the	  same	  
pattern	   of	   explanation	   of	   the	   epistemic	   gap	   in	   a	   way	   some	   philosophers	   such	   as	   Levine,	  
Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	  would	  argue	  we	  should	  but,	  rather,	  that	  an	  explanation	  might	  come	  
from	  a	  source	  other	  than	  the	  analysis	  of	  meaning.	  I	  argue	  in	  chapters	  four	  and	  five	  that	  the	  
intelligibility	   of	   explanation	   of	   the	   psychophysical	   identity	   follows	   a	   constraint	   of	   the	  
vagueness	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	  and	  in	  principle	  cannot	  come	  directly	  from	  the	  identity	  
alone.	   Apart	   from	   that,	   proper	   identities	   are	   not	   in	   fact	   explanatory	   (Block	   and	   Stalnaker	  
1999;	  Papineau	  2002).	  Their	  purpose	  is	  to	  transfer	  explanatory	  and	  causal	  force	  onto	  some	  
further	  properties	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999).	  David	  Papineau	  (Papineau	  2002)	  argues	  that	  
psychophysical	   identity1	   is	   non-­‐explanatory,	   as	   all	   proper	   identities	   are,	   but	   that	   this	   does	  
                                                
1	  The	  claim	  that	  mental	  states	  and	  brain	  states	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing.	   I	  will	  come	  to	  this	   issue	   in	  short	  
while	  below,	  when	  I	  will	  be	  discussing	  the	  causal	  argument	  for	  physicalism.	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not	  mean	  that	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  cannot	  be	  explained.	  This	  position	  will	  be	  the	  main	  topic	  
of	   the	   third	   and	   the	   fourth	   chapters,	   so	   I	   will	   not	   pursue	   it	   right	   now.	   What	   is	   really	  
important	  to	  emphasize	  here	  is	  that	  the	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  and	  the	  
explanatory	  gap	  is	  very	  important	  because	  it	  minimizes	  confusion	  about	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  
explaining	   psychophysical	   identity.	   This	   distinction	   allows	   for	   claiming	   that	   there	   is	   an	  
epistemic	  gap	  but	  no	  explanatory	  gap.	  	  
	  These	  are	  all	  very	  complicated	  issues	  and	  I	  will	  be	  discussing	  them	  in	  much	  greater	  
detail	  in	  chapters	  four	  and	  five.	  	  
How	  to	  formulate	  physicalism	  
However,	  before	  we	  get	   into	  considering	   the	  arguments	   for	   these	  claims	  we	  need	  to	  
ask	  ourselves	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  these	  two	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  
consciousness	  could	  be	  about	  the	  same	  thing?	  I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  very	  good	  reason	  to	  maintain	  
that	   they	   are	   about	   the	   same	   thing.	   I	   refer	   here	   to	   Papineau’s	   causal	   argument	   for	  
physicalism	   (Papineau	   2002).	   I	   think	   we	   need	   not	   examine	   each	   individual	   variety	   of	  
physicalism	  and	  then	  pick	  the	  most	  suitable	  candidate.	  To	  do	  such	  a	  thing	  we	  would	  need	  to	  
set	  the	  criteria	  for	  what	  we	  are	   looking	  for	  etc.,	  which	  sounds	  circular	  and	  unpromising	  on	  
the	  face	  of	  it2.	  A	  better	  way	  is	  to	  see	  what	  the	  most	  basic	  assumptions	  about	  consciousness	  
that	   we	   are	   allowed	   to	   make	   are	   and	   then	   just	   to	   draw	   the	   consequences	   from	   them.	   I	  
propose	  we	  do	  exactly	  that.	  Papineau’s	  causal	  argument	  for	  physicalism	  goes	  like	  this:	  
“1.	  Conscious	  mental	  occurrences	  have	  physical	  effects.	  
2.	  All	  physical	  effects	  are	  fully	  caused	  by	  purely	  physical	  histories.	  
3.	  The	  physical	  effects	  of	  conscious	  causes	  are	  not	  always	  overdetermined	  by	  distinct	  causes.	  
4.	  Therefore,	  physicalism	  is	  true”	  (Papineau	  2002,	  pp.	  17-­‐18).	  
                                                
	  
2	   It	   is	   perhaps	   circular	   because	  we	   start	  with	   the	  question	   ”what	   is	   physicalism”	   and	  we	   try	   to	   answer	   it	   by	  
asking	  what	  are	  the	  criteria	  for	  something	  to	  be	  physicalism.	  To	  know	  such	  criteria	  we	  need	  to	  know	  what	  
phyiscalism	  is	  beforehand.	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This	  argument	  brilliantly	  and	  elegantly	  encapsulates	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  physicalism.	  At	  
first	   pass	   premises	   1.	   and	   2.	   alone	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   some	   physical	   effects,	   say	   our	  
behaviour,	   could	  have	   two	  distinct	   causes.	  Premise	  1.	   acknowledges	   the	   causal	  efficacy	  of	  
qualia.	  Premise	  2.	   is	  what	  Papineau	  calls	   the	  “completeness	  of	  physics”	   thesis	   ”	   (Papineau	  
2002,	  p.	  17).	  The	  purpose	  of	  “the	  completeness	  of	  physics”	  thesis	  is	  to	  assure	  that	  all	  causes	  
are	   physical	   causes.	   Finally,	   the	   premise	   3.	   expresses	   the	   fact	   that	   certain	   effects	   are	   not	  
caused	  by	   distinct	   causes,	   namely:	   the	   physical	   causes	   and	   the	   conscious	   causes.	   In	   other	  
words,	   the	   premise	   3.	   prevents	   overdetermination.	   Although	   overdetermination	   does	   not	  
sound	  so	  odd	  in	  other	  domains,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  consciousness	  it	  seems	  very	  strange.	  Consider	  
this	  example:	  a	  man	  dies	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  being	  struck	  by	  lightning	  and	  being	  shot	  by	  a	  
gun	  bullet	  simultaneously.	  It	  is	  perfectly	  intelligible	  to	  think	  that	  his	  death	  could	  be	  an	  effect	  
of	  two	  causes:	   lightning	  and	  a	   lethal	  bullet	  wound,	  or	  at	   least	  that	  these	  two	  causes	  might	  
have	  been	  a	   cause	  of	  his	  death	   individually/independently.	   In	  other	  words,	   he	   could	  have	  
died	  even	  if	  one	  of	  the	  causes	  was	  absent.	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mental	  causation	  things	  
do	  not	   seem	  so	   straightforward.	   It	  does	   sound	  odd	   to	   say,	   for	  example,	   that	  my	  pain	  qua	  
mental	  state	  caused	  me	  to	  move	  my	  hand	  and	  that	  my	  pain	  qua	  brain	  state	  caused	  me	  to	  
move	  my	  hand	  simultaneously.	  Or,	  to	  make	  it	  even	  more	  queer,	  consider	  this:	   I	  moved	  my	  
hand	  because	  I	  felt	  pain	  qua	  mental	  state	  but	  I	  would	  not	  have	  moved	  it	  if	  it	  had	  been	  pain	  
qua	  brain	  state,	  or	  I	  moved	  my	  hand	  because	  I	  felt	  pain	  qua	  brain	  state	  but	  I	  would	  not	  have	  
moved	   it	   if	   it	   had	  been	  pain	  qua	  mental	   state.	   To	  prevent	   such	  odd	   situations	  we	  need	  a	  
premise	  that	  would	  constrain	  overdetermination.	  	  
	  If	  conscious	  and	  physical	  causes	  are	  not	  distinct,	  as	  the	  premise	  3.	  claims,	  then	  the	  
only	  remaining	  possibility	  is	  to	  conclude	  that	  conscious	  and	  physical	  causes	  are	  identical.	  In	  
this	   way	   we	   directly	   get	   the	   most	   plausible	   characterization	   of	   physicalism,	   in	   which	   a	  
discussion	  of	  other	  varieties	  of	  physicalism	  plays	  no	  significant	  role.	  	  
The	   causal	   argument	   can	   be	   rephrased	   so	   it	   could	   generate	   the	   same	   strong	  
conclusion	  even	  on	  very	  different	  accounts	  of	  causation.	  However,	  by	  modifying	  some	  of	  the	  
premises	   accordingly	   we	   get	   the	   same	   conclusion	   even	   on	   very	   different	   account	   of	  
causation.	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What	  is	  more	  important	  is	  the	  question:	  what	  do	  we	  get	  when	  some	  or	  all	  premises	  
of	  the	  argument	  are	  denied?	  So	  let’s	  briefly	  walk	  through	  some	  attempts	  to	  refute	  each	  one	  
of	  them	  and	  see	  whether	  these	  attempts	  bear	  any	  plausibility.	  	  
Denying	   premise	   1.	   amounts	   to	   saying	   that	   conscious	   states	   don’t	   have	   physical	  
effects.	   A	   classic	   example	   of	   this	   position	   is	   epiphenomenalism.	   On	   this	   view	   conscious	  
causes	  exist	  alongside	  physical	   causes	  but	  have	  no	  effect	  on	   them.	  Perhaps	   they	  can	  have	  
some	  effects	  on	  other	  conscious	  states,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  change	  much	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  
main	  point	  of	  this	  approach.	  Jackson	  (Jackson	  1982)	  argued	  that	  if	  conscious	  states	  exist,	  and	  
have	  no	  causal	  effects	  on	  the	  brain,	  then	  consciousness	  is	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  these	  brain	  states,	  
i.e.	   consciousness	   is	   epiphenomenal.	  However,	   if	   physical	  world	   is	   causally	   closed3,	   then	  a	  
very	  important	  question	  arises:	  can	  science	  afford	  to	  keep	  these	  “causal	  danglers”?	  I	  will	  be	  
discussing	  epiphenomenalism	  in	  the	  light	  of	  an	  inconsistency	  objection	  in	  the	  third	  chapter.	  
It	   suffices	   to	   say,	   for	   the	   time	   being,	   that	   it	   does	   not	   seem	   coherent	   to	   hold	   both	   that	  
epiphenomenalism	   is	   true	   and	   that	  mental	   causes	   are	   physically	   inefficacious,	   because	   in	  
that	  case	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  detect	  them.	  Although	  epiphenomenalism	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  
conceptually	   coherent	   position,	   it	   cannot	   accommodate	   any	   kind	   of	   empirical	   testing	   in	  
principle.	   In	   addition	   to	   that	   epiphenomenalism	   leaves	   causal	   danglers	   which	   in	   effect	  
renders	  the	  position	  implausible.	  	  
Premise	   2.,	   the	   completeness	   of	   physics	   thesis,	   seems	   harder	   to	   challenge	   as	   it	  
depends	  on	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  notion	  “physics”.	  Complete	  physics	  can’t	  be	  something	  
that	  is	  being	  currently	  studied	  at	  universities	  and	  in	  school	  textbooks	  nor	  can	  it	  be	  a	  future	  
physics	   in	   its	   ideal	   state.	   The	   former	   is	   obviously	  wrong	   because	   current	   physics	   is	   by	   no	  
means	  complete.	  The	  latter	  is	  also	  wrong	  understanding	  of	  “complete	  physics”	  because	  we	  
don’t	  know	  yet	  whether	  it	  will	  be	  complete	  ever	  and	  how	  this	  completeness	  should	  look	  like.	  
So	  what	   is	   it	   then?	   Papineau	   (Papineau	   2002,	   p.	   41)	   argues	   that	   instead	  of	   asking	  what	   a	  
complete	   physics	   would	   include	  we	   should	   ask	  what	   it	   wouldn’t	   include.	   	   That	   is	   a	  more	  
important	  question	  as	  we	  might	  never	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  what	  a	  complete	  physics	  will	  
consist	  of.	  Instead,	  we	  could	  define	  the	  completeness	  of	  physics	  in	  terms	  which	  have	  nothing	  
                                                
3	  The	  completeness	  of	  physics	  thesis.	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to	  do	  with	  mentally	   identifiable	  entities.	  The	  mental,	   in	  this	  sense,	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  
realm	  that	  can	  be	  identified	  via	  some	  distinct	  way	  of	  picking	  out	   its	  properties4.	  So	  we	  can	  
say	  that	  the	  physical	  is	  everything	  that	  is	  not	  mentally-­‐identifiable.	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  may	  not	  
know	   everything	   about	   physics	   but	   still	   be	   able	   to	   generate	   the	   same	   conclusion	   of	   the	  
causal	  argument.	  	  
Papineau	  (Papineau	  2002,	  p.	  41)	  argues	  further	  that	  the	  notion	  “physics”	  should	  also	  
be	  something	  non-­‐biologically	  identifiable.	  In	  this	  way	  we	  get	  a	  stronger	  premise	  which	  can	  
be	   thought	   of	   as	   rendering	   the	   realm	   of	   physical	   as	   something	   that	   might	   be	   called	  
“inanimate”	  and,	  again,	  generate	  the	  same	  conclusion	  that	  mental	  and	  physical	  causes	  are	  
one	  and	  the	  same	  thing.	  	  
Denying	  the	  premise	  3.	   is	  a	  tricky	  business	  because	  it	  would	  imply	  that	  two	  distinct	  
causes	   simultaneously	   could	   have	   the	   same	   effect.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   physical	   effects	   of	  
conscious	  causes	  are	  always	  overdetermined.	  Some	  philosophers	  argue	  that	  such	  a	  setting	  is	  
not	   implausible	  because	  perhaps	  that	   is	   the	  way	  nature	  or	  evolution	  make	   it	  sure	  that	  the	  
effect	   really	   takes	  place.	   It	   is	   like	  belt	  and	  braces	  principle	   (Mellor	  1995).	  But	   this	  position	  
seems	  to	  generate	  more	  problems	  than	  solutions.	  For	  example,	  now	  we	  have	  to	  explain	  why	  
are	   particular	   distinct	   causes	   always	   accompanied	   by	   each	   other	   or	  why	  would	   particular	  
effect	   require	  particular	  combination	  of	  distinct	  causes,	  which	  brings	  us	  back	  at	  where	  we	  
started.	  In	  this	  sense	  accepting	  overdetermination	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  lead	  anywhere.	  	  
After	   having	   considered	   possible	   refutations	   of	   all	   three	   premises	   we	   are	   now	   in	   a	  
position	  to	  state	  the	  causal	  argument	  as	  follows:	  	  
“5.	  Conscious	  causes	  have	  inanimate	  effects.	  	  
6.	  Inanimate	  effects	  always	  have	  full	  inanimate	  causes.	  	  
7.	   So	   conscious	   properties	   must	   be	   identical	   with	   (or	   realized	   by)	   inanimate	   properties”	  
(Papineau	  2002,	  p.	  42).	  	  	  
                                                
4	  Details	  of	  such	  a	  way	  should	  not	  concern	  us	  here,	  because	  the	  argument	  will	  generate	  the	  same	  conclusion	  
nevertheless.	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In	  this	  way,	  as	  I	  said	  earlier,	  we	  get	  the	  same	  conclusion	  with	  both	  weaker	  and	  stronger	  
definitions	  of	  the	  notion	  “physics”.	  The	  really	  important	  point,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  conclusion	  
that	   mental	   and	   physical	   causes	   are	   identical,	   is	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   premise	   1.	   says	   that	  
mental	   causes	   have	   inanimate	   effects.	   If	   physical/inanimate	   effects	   can	   only	   have	  
physical/inanimate	   causal	   histories,	   then	  we	   have	   no	   choice	   but	   to	   conclude	   that	  mental	  
causes	  and	  physical/inanimate	  causes	  are	  the	  same	  thing.	  We	  can	  say	  that	  on	  this	  account	  
physicalism	  can	  be	   formulated	  as	   the	   identity	   thesis	  according	   to	  which	  mental	  properties	  
are	  identical	  with	  physical	  properties	  or	  some	  higher	  order	  physically	  realized	  properties.	  	  
I	  am	  very	  much	   inclined	  to	   think	   that	   this	  characterisation	  of	  physicalism	   is	   the	  most	  
plausible	  one	  and	  that	  the	  causal	  argument	  is	  really	  hard	  to	  refute.	  We	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  first	  
chapter	  how	  different	  views	  about	  what	  physicalism	  should	  be	  committed	  to	  determine	  how	  
do	  we	  formulate	  it	  as	  a	  general	  ontological	  thesis.	  And	  I	  will	  also	  be	  defending	  this	  version	  of	  
physicalism	  throughout	  my	  dissertation.	  	  
Indeed,	  in	  principle,	  we	  have	  no	  a	  priori	  or	  ideological	  reasons	  to	  be	  physicalists,	  and	  
perhaps	  some	  other	  doctrines	  are	  better	  suited	  for	  explaining	  the	  epistemic	  gap.	  However,	  
when	  confronted	  with	  the	  causal	  argument	  we	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  accept	  physicalism	  as	  
an	   identity	   thesis.	   All	   we	   need	   to	   do	   is	   to	   isolate	   the	   most	   basic	   and	   fundamental	  
assumptions	  about	  consciousness	  and	  then	  the	  right	  characterization	  shows	  itself.	  This	  is	  the	  
main	   reason	   why	   I	   did	   not	   include	   any	   preliminary	   considerations	   about	   varieties	   of	  
physicalism	  in	  the	  introduction.	  	  	  
Having	   settled	   the	   issue	   of	   how	   to	   formulate	   physicalism	   and	   how	   it	   is	   to	   be	  
understood	  and	  defended	  I	  think	  we	  can	  now	  proceed	  with	  laying	  out	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  
dissertation.	   Before	   doing	   so,	   I	   need	   to	   say	   something	   about	  my	   general	   approach	   in	   the	  
thesis.	  	  
Overall	  approach	  
As	   the	   title	   of	   my	   dissertation	   suggests,	   I	   should	   be	   mainly	   concerned	   with	   the	  
question	   as	   to	   how	  neuroscience	  might	   contribute	   to	   the	   solution	   of	   the	   explanatory	   gap	  
problem.	  However,	   I	   discuss	   that	  particular	   issue	   right	   at	   the	   very	  end.	   I	   decided	   to	   apply	  
such	   a	   strategy	   because	   these	   issues	   are	   very	   complicated	   and	   I	   wanted	   to	   build	   up	   and	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branch	   out	   towards	   my	   key	   argument	   very	   carefully	   and	   gradually.	   I	   believe	   such	   an	  
approach	  will	  also	  help	  present	  the	  ideas	  in	  the	  most	  systematic	  way.	  	  
In	  my	  dissertation	  I	  have	  decided	  to	  follow	  a	  specific	  strategy	  of	  laying	  out	  ideas	  and	  
positions.	  I	  start	  with	  some	  of	  the	  classical	  arguments	  in	  this	  area	  and	  present	  them	  in	  their	  
generic	  form,	  without	  much	  commenting	  or	  discussing	  at	  first.	  I	  think	  this	  is	  very	  important	  
for	  understanding	  correctly	  what	  are	  the	  original	  claims	  in	  those	  arguments.	  In	  focusing	  on	  
the	   details	   of	   some	   the	   central	   arguments	   in	   this	   area	   I	   develop	   my	   own	   position	   and	  
arguments	  steadily	  along	  the	  way.	  That	   is	  why	   I	  don't	  offer	  any	  substantial	  criticism	  of	  the	  
anti-­‐physicalist	   argument	   until	   chapters	   three,	   four	   and	   five.	   I	   begin	   developing	   my	   own	  
position	   in	   chapter	   three,	  where	   I	   present	   the	  phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	  and	   I	   discuss	  
several	  issues	  that	  are	  of	  central	  importance	  for	  the	  proper	  understanding	  of	  psychophysical	  
identity.	  Finally	   in	  the	  chapter	  five,	   I	  analyze	  the	  vagueness	  constraint	   for	  the	  phenomenal	  
concepts	   and	   the	   role	   a	   study	   of	   psychological	   concepts	   can	   have	   in	   understanding	   and	  
explaining	  away	  the	  intuition	  of	  distinctness.	  	  
In	   this	   thesis,	   I	  have	   tried	  especially	  hard	   to	  avoid	   long	  historical	  expositions	  of	   the	  
problems	  or	  arguments	  because	  the	  key	  problems	  in	  this	  area	  did	  not	  change	  over	  time	  in	  a	  
way	   that	  would	   significantly	   affect	   our	   understanding	   of	   them.	   Historical	   or	   chronological	  
considerations	  can	  often	  be	  very	  useful	  for	  understanding	  of	  some	  problems	  but	  not	  in	  the	  
case	   of	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   problem.	   I	   rather	   focus	   on	   contemporary	   debates	   and	  
arguments	  and	  sketch	  the	  theoretical	  positions	  directly	  from	  there.	  For	  example,	  the	  mere	  
fact	   that	   Frank	   Jackson	   has	   changed	   his	  mind	   about	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   Knowledge	  
Argument	   (Jackson	   1982)	   adds	   nothing	   to	   the	   plausibility	   or	   persuasiveness	   of	   his	   new	  
position.	   In	   fact,	   different	   persons	   might	   have	   come	   up	   with	   the	   arguments,	   and	   the	  
arguments	  would	  remain	  as	  plausible	  as	  they	  are	  now.	  	  
However,	   the	   fact	   that	   I	   kept	   philosophical/conceptual	   issues	   apart	   from	   the	  
empirical	   issues	  until	   the	  very	  end	  should	  not	  prevent	  me	  from	  stating	  briefly	  at	  this	  point	  
what	   are	  my	   general	   ideas	   about	   the	   relation	   between	  what	   neuroscience	   can	   say	   about	  
consciousness	  and	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem.	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   any	   theoretical	   resources	   from	  neuroscience	   cannot	   directly	   solve	   the	  
explanatory	  gap	  problem	  because	  of	  the	  constraints	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  vagueness	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of	  phenomenal	  concepts5.	  Namely,	  given	  that	  phenomenal	  concepts6	  refer	  directly,	  not	  via	  
descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  have	  a	  priori	  connections	  with	  the	  material	  
properties,	  we	  should	  conclude	  they	  are	  vague.	  This	  means	  that	  we	  cannot	  use	  any	  sort	  of	  
empirical	   methods	   to	   study	   phenomenal	   consciousness	   directly.	   A	   proper	   way	   in	   which	  
empirical	   evidence	   from	  neuroscience,	   cognitive	   science	  and	  psychology	   can	  help	  us	   solve	  
the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem	  is	  through	  studying	  “psychological	  concepts”	  in	  the	  framework	  
of	   quality	   space.	   The	   psychological	   concepts	   are	   concepts	   that	   use	   descriptions	   of	   the	  
functional	   roles	   as	   modes	   of	   presentation	   and	   the	   details	   of	   their	   workings	   are	   not	  
necessarily	  set	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  the	  natural	  kind	  concepts.	  I	  propose	  to	  analyze	  them	  in	  
quality	  space	  models	  in	  order	  to	  unveil	  why	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  expected	  to	  refer	  via	  
descriptions	   of	   the	   causal	   or	   functional	   roles.	   The	   expectation	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	  
should	  refer	  via	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal,	  or	  the	  functional	  roles,	  is	  what	  I	  think	  lies	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  the	  “intuition	  of	  distinctness”	  (Papineau	  2002).	  Given	  that	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  
vague	  in	  their	  very	  nature	  and	  that	  there	  is	  no	  available	  scheme	  of	  the	  descriptions	  of	  their	  
causal	  or	  functional	  roles	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  to	  find	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  central	  
question	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem,	  i.e.	  why	  certain	  phenomenal	  states	  are	  associated	  
with	  certain	  neural	  states	  or	  any	  states	  at	  all	  for	  that	  matter,	  directly	  in	  the	  psychophysical	  
identity,	   as	   some	   philosophers	   think	   we	   can	   in	   the	   case	   of	   natural	   kinds	   (Chalmers	   and	  
Jackson	   2001).	   I	   urge	   that	  we	  need	   an	   independent	   account,	   external	   to	   the	   phenomenal	  
concept	  semantics	  to	  explain	  this	  situation.	  Such	  an	  account	  is	  the	  quality	  space	  model.	  The	  
quality	  space	  should	  be	  understood	  here	  as	  a	  multidimensional	  space	  consisting	  of	  several	  
axes	   of	   relative	   similarity	   and	   differences	   among	   the	   structures	   of	   ordering	   in	   different	  
modalities	  of	  conscious	  experience.	  The	  important	  thing	  about	  the	  quality	  space	  is	  to	  discern	  
which	  axes	  and	  which	  modalities	  should	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  quality	  space.	  On	  my	  proposal	  
it	   is	  possible	  that	  some	  axes	   in	  the	  quality	  space	  consist	  of	  their	  own	  quality	  spaces	  so	  we	  
could	  “zoom	  in”	  and	  “zoom	  out”	  into	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  functional	  roles	  and	  see	  more	  
                                                
5	  This	  will	  be	  a	  major	  topic	  in	  the	  fifth	  chapter.	  
	  
6	  Concepts	  of	  consciousness	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective,	  or	  concepts	  of	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  undergo	  certain	  
experience.	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clearly	  what	  the	  explanation	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  consciousness	  looks	  like	  when	  thought	  of	  
in	  terms	  of	  psychological	  concepts.	  	  
	  
Dissertation’s	  structure	  
Now	  it	  is	  time	  to	  say	  briefly	  what	  my	  topics	  will	  be	  and	  what	  will	  be	  going	  on	  in	  each	  
chapter	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  Apart	  from	  that	  I	  also	  need	  to	  say	  why	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  discuss	  
the	  arguments	  and	  problems	  presented	  in	  the	  chapters.	  	  
In	  the	  first	  chapter	  I	  start	  off	  with	  Nagel’s	  (Nagel	  1974)	  account	  of	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  
(section	   1.1).	   His	   account	   is	   very	   important	   for	   the	   discussions	   in	   philosophy	   of	   mind	   in	  
general	   and	   especially	   for	   the	   debates	   about	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   problem	   because	   he	  
introduces	  for	  the	  first	  time	  a	  notion	  “what	  it	  is	  like”	  of	  experience	  which	  later	  on	  transforms	  
into	  a	  technical	  term	  “qualia”7.	  His	  paper	  “What	   is	   it	   like	  to	  be	  a	  bat”	  (Nagle	  1974)	  plays	  a	  
central	  role	  for	  two	  main	  reasons:	  the	  first	  is	  that	  he	  introduces	  the	  epistemic	  gap,	  and	  the	  
second	  is	  that	  he	  provides	  a	  version	  of	  a	  proto-­‐knowledge	  argument.	  
The	   next	   section	   (section	   1.2.)	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   is	   on	   the	   Knowledge	   Argument	  
(Jackson	  1982).	  As	  already	  mentioned	  earlier	  the	  basic	  idea	  behind	  the	  Knowledge	  Argument	  
is	   that	   we	   cannot	   know	   or	   infer	   phenomenal	   facts	   from	   the	   physical	   facts,	   because	   the	  
phenomenal	   is	   epistemically	   very	   peculiar.	   It	   is	   accessible	   only	   through	   the	   first	   person	  
perspective.	   Jackson	  provides	   three	   thought	  experiments	   to	  corroborate	   this	  claim,	  one	  of	  
which	   includes	   the	  now	   famous	  Mary,	   a	  brilliant	  neuroscientist	  who	   is	   confined	   in	  a	  black	  
and	  white	  room	  and	  knows	  everything	  physical	  (biological	  and	  neurological	  as	  well)	  there	  is	  
to	  know	  about	  colour	  vision	  but	  still	  learns	  something	  new	  after	  being	  released.	  	  
In	   the	   section	   1.3.	   of	   the	   first	   chapter	   I	   present	   Kripke’s	   modal	   argument	   against	  
materialism	  (Kripke	  1980).	  	  
Blumenfeld	  formulates	  Kripke’s	  argument	  as	  follows:	  
                                                
7	  “Qualia”	  is	  a	  plural.	  The	  singular	  version	  of	  the	  term	  is	  “quale”.	  
 20 
“8.	  Identity	  statements	  whose	  terms	  are	  both	  rigid	  designators	  have	  to	  be	  necessarily	  true	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  true.	  
9.	  'My	  pain'	  and	  'my	  brain's	  C-­‐fibre	  stimulation'	  are	  rigid	  designators.	  
10.	  Therefore,	  'My	  pain	  is	  my	  brain's	  C-­‐fibre	  stimulation'	  has	  to	  be	  necessarily	  true	  in	  order	  
to	  be	  true.	  
11.	  But	  'My	  pain	  is	  my	  brain's	  C-­‐fibre	  stimulation'	  is	  not	  necessarily	  true.	  
12.	  Therefore,	   'My	  pain	   is	  my	  brain's	  C-­‐fibre	  stimulation'	   is	  not	  true.”	  (Blumenfeld	  1975,	  p.	  
151)	  
An	   important	   point	   in	   Kripke’s	   argument	   is	   the	   inference	   from	   conceivability	   to	  
metaphysical	   possibility,	   which	   will	   play	   the	   central	   role	   in	   Levine’s	   account	   of	   the	  
explanatory	  gap.	  This	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  consider	  his	  argument	  in	  the	  first	  
place.	   The	   entailment	   from	   conceivability	   to	   metaphysical	   possibility	   is	   also	   the	   common	  
target	  for	  the	  defence	  of	  physicalism.	  	  
In	  section	  1.4.	  and	  its	  subsections	  1.4.1,	  1.4.2	  and	  1.4.3	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  
the	   zombie	   argument	   (subsection	   1.4.1),	   its	   structure	   and	   notions	   of	   supervenience	   and	  
necessity	  employed	  in	  it	  (subsection	  1.4.2)	  and	  finally	  the	  argument	  from	  supervenience	  for	  
the	  ontological	  gap	  (subsection	  1.4.3)	  by	  David	  Chalmers	  (Chalmers	  1996).	  Both	  the	  zombie	  
and	   the	   supervenience	   arguments	   are	   very	   important	   because	   they	   try	   to	   justify	   the	  
entailment	   from	   conceivability	   to	   metaphysical	   possibility	   in	   the	   modal	   argument	   on	   the	  
ground	   of	   our	   modal	   intuitions	   and	   to	   establish	   property	   dualism.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   also	  
discuss	  varieties	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  zombie	  and	  the	  supervenience	  arguments	  and	  I	  briefly	  
portray	  other	  positions	   in	  philosophy	  of	  mind.	   I	  do	  that	  by	  considering	  what	  consequences	  
we	   get	   when	   denying	   particular	   premises	   in	   Chalmers’s	   arguments.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   also	  
discuss	  different	  understandings	  of	  necessity	  which	  are	  essential	   for	   the	  debate	  about	   the	  
explanatory	  gap	  problem.	  	  
In	  the	  section	  1.5.	  I	  present	  one	  of	  the	  most	  technically	  complicated	  accounts	  in	  this	  
area,	  namely,	   the	   two-­‐dimensional	   (2-­‐D)	   argument	   (Chalmers	  1996,	  2009).	  Chalmers’s	  2-­‐D	  
account	  is	  tremendously	  important	  for	  the	  defence	  of	  conceivability	  arguments	  because	  it	  is	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the	   most	   elaborated	   attempt	   to	   defend	   entailment	   from	   conceivability	   to	   metaphysical	  
possibility.	  I	  rehearse	  the	  zombie	  argument	  and	  the	  modal	  argument	  in	  the	  2-­‐D	  framework.	  
In	  that	  section	  I	  also	  discuss	  a	  distinction	  between	  primary	  and	  secondary	  intensions	  which	  is	  
very	  important	  for	  understanding	  Levine’s	  account	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  (Levine	  2001).	  	  
Chapter	  two	  is	  completely	  devoted	  to	  laying	  out	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  account	  (Levine	  
1983,	  1993,	  2001).	  In	  the	  section	  2.1	  I	  discuss	  the	  key	  notions	  such	  as	  thick	  and	  thin	  concepts	  
and	   modes	   of	   presentation.	   These	   issues	   are	   essential	   for	   Levine’s	   account	   of	   the	  
explanatory	  gap	  and	  for	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts,	  which	  I	  discuss	  in	  the	  third	  chapter.	  The	  
issue	  of	  modes	  of	  presentation	  is	  central	  to	  my	  overall	  approach,	  as	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  in	  the	  
fourth	  and	  fifth	  chapters.	  In	  the	  section	  2.2	  I	  discuss	  a	  relation	  between	  ascriptive	  and	  non-­‐
ascriptive	   modes	   of	   presentation	   and	   their	   relations	   with	   apriority	   and	   necessity.	   In	   the	  
section	   2.3	   I	   discuss	   notions	   of	   “thick	   “	   and	   “thin”	   conceivability.	   These	   issues	   are	   very	  
important	   for	   Levine’s	   account	   to	  work	   because	   they	   are	   supposed	   to	   stop	   the	   inference	  
from	   conceivability	   to	   metaphysical	   possibility.	   In	   the	   section	   2.4.	   I	   examine	   notions	   of	  
“gappy”	   and	   “non-­‐gappy”	   identities	   as	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   the	   considerations	   about	  
thick	  and	  thin	  conceivability.	  The	  next	  issue	  that	  follows	  it	  is	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  explanations	  
which	  I	  discuss	  in	  the	  section	  2.5.	  This	  issue	  plays	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  my	  discussion	  and	  will	  
be	  one	  of	  the	  major	  topics	  in	  chapters	  four	  and	  five.	  Finally	  in	  the	  last	  section	  2.6.	  I	  examine	  
some	  problematic	  issues	  with	  Levine’s	  account	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  and	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  
the	  next	  chapter	  which	  is	  about	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  	  
The	   first	   section	   (section	   3.1)	   in	   the	   third	   chapter	   is	   about	   Loar’s	   account	   of	   the	  
recognitional	  phenomenal	   concepts	   (Loar	  2002).	   I	  examine	  some	  of	   the	  main	  points	  of	  his	  
account.	   I	   have	   chosen	   to	   start	  with	   Loar	  because	  he	   lays	  out	   a	   foundation	   for	   the	  whole	  
strategy	   by	   setting	   phenomenal	   concepts	   aside	   from	   other	   sorts	   of	   concepts.	   One	   of	   the	  
main	  tenets	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  phenomenal	  concepts	  refer	  directly	  so	  are	  irreducible	  in	  
that	  sense	  but,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  guarantee	  a	  posteriori	  necessary	  status	  of	  psychophysical	  
identity.	  The	  next	  section	  3.2	   is	  about	  Tye’s	  account	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	  (Tye	  2003).	   I	  
chose	   Tye’s	   account	   because	   it	   nicely	   develops	   the	   other	   main	   features	   of	   phenomenal	  
concepts	   and	   provides	   a	   good	   criticism	   of	   the	   early	   Loar’s	   account.	   In	   the	   section	   3.3	   I	  
present	  and	  discuss	  indexical-­‐quotational	  and	  perceptual	  varieties	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  
The	   perceptual	   variety	   is,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   the	   most	   advanced	   account	   of	   phenomenal	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concepts.	  In	  the	  section	  3.4	  I	  discuss	  the	  inconsistency	  objection	  to	  the	  Knowledge	  Argument	  
and	   argue	   that	   one	   cannot	   hold	   phenomenal	   properties	   causally	   inefficacious	   and	  
epiphenomenalism	  true.	  If	  they	  were	  causally	  inefficacious	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  detect	  
them	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  main	  idea	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  first	  premise	  of	  the	  
causal	  argument8.	  Section	  3.5	  and	  its	  subsections	  3.5.1	  and	  3.5.2.	  is	  about	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
difficult	   issues	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  strategy.	   I	  start	   in	  subsection	  3.5.1	  by	  examining	  the	  so-­‐
called	  ”Max	  Black’s	  objection”	  and	  associated	   issues	  of	  modes	  of	  presentation.	   In	  the	  next	  
subsection	   3.5.2	   I	   discuss	   another	   really	   important	   issue	   with	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	  
strategy,	   that	   is,	   whether	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   physically	   explicable	   and	   if	   they	   are	  
whether	  they	  can	  explain	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  	  
In	   chapter	   four	   I	   develop	   my	   key	   argument.	   In	   the	   section	   4.1	   I	   rehearse	   the	  
arguments	  for	  the	  ontological	  gap	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  pinpoint	  my	  main	  points.	  In	  section	  
4.2.	  I	  discuss	  intuitions	  underlying	  the	  conceivability	  arguments	  and	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  In	  
the	  next	  section	  4.3	   I	  provide	  another	  take	  on	  the	   issue	  of	   intelligibility	  of	  explanations.	   In	  
sections	   4.4	   and	   4.5	   I	   analyze	   the	   brute	   disagreement	   about	   tacit	   assumptions	   in	   the	  
conceivability	  arguments	  and	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  last	  section	  4.6	  I	  discuss	  the	  
role	  of	  a	  priori	  derivation	  in	  intelligibility	  of	  explanations.	  	  
The	  main	  topic	  of	  the	  fifth	  chapter	  is	  vagueness	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	  and	  ways	  in	  
which	  voluptuous	  empirical	  research	  can	  be	  used	  in	  solving	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem.	  In	  
the	   first	  section	  5.1	   I	  discuss	  vagueness	  constraint	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	   In	   the	  section	  
5.2.	  I	  analyze	  intuition	  of	  distinctness	  in	  the	  light	  of	  vagueness	  constraint.	  In	  sections	  5.3	  and	  
5.4	   I	   examine	   Clark’s	   (Clark	   2000)	   and	   Rosenthal’s	   (Rosenthal	   2010)	   accounts	   of	   a	   quality	  
space	   that	   is	   of	   central	   importance	   for	   studying	   intuition	   of	   distinctness.	   Finally,	   in	   the	  
section	  5.5	  I	  present	  my	  account	  of	  the	  quality	  space	  for	  pain.	  	  
In	  the	  last	  chapter	  six	  I	  give	  concluding	  remarks	  and	  sum	  up	  my	  whole	  approach.	  	  
	  
                                                





1.1 Arguments	  against	  physicalism	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  shall	  examine	  several	  classical	  arguments	  that	  try	  to	  establish	  either	  the	  
falsity	   of	   physicalism	   or	   its	   inherent	   epistemological	   inadequacy.	   The	   objective	   of	   these	  
considerations	   is	   to	  set	  up	  a	  stage	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem.	   It	   is	  of	  
crucial	  importance	  to	  clear	  up	  the	  basic	  terminology,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  
in	  the	  arguments	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  properly	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  To	  do	  so,	  I	  
need	  to	  rehearse	  arguments	  that	  are	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  ontological	  gap	  positions9,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  account	  of	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  position	  (Nagel	  1974).	  I	  won’t	  be	  giving	  any	  comprehensive	  
criticism	  of	  these	  arguments	  at	  this	  stage	  because	  I	  want	  to	  present	  the	  original	  arguments	  
in	   their	   pure	   form.	   This	   tactics	   is	   very	   important	   for	   my	   overall	   approach	   because	   I	   am	  
developing	  my	  own	  position	  steadily	  throughout	  the	  chapters	  and	  directly	  from	  the	  analysis	  
of	   the	   arguments.	   Chapters	   three,	   four	   and	   five	   are	   all	   about	   my	   own	   arguments	   and	  
position	  regarding	  these	  problems.	  Chapter	  two	  is	  exclusively	  dedicated	  to	  analyzing	  Levine’s	  





                                                
9	   Kripke’s	   modal	   argument	   (Kripke	   1980),	   Chalmers’s	   supervenience	   argument	   (Chalmers	   1996)	   and	   two-­‐




1.2 Nagel’s	  Account	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   We	  are	  in	  the	  same	  position	  towards	  psychophysical	  
identity	  as	  ancient	  Greek	  philosophers	  would	  have	  been	  towards	  the	  claim	  that	  matter	  is	  
energy,	  although	  it	  is	  true,	  they	  could	  not	  understand	  it,	  for	  the	  conceptual	  reasons	  
	  	  
Let’s	  begin	  with	  the	  Nagel’s	  account.	  In	  its	  core	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem	  is	  based	  
on	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  “what	  is	  it	   like”	  aspect	  of	  experience	  (Nagel	  1974)	  is	  left	  out	  from	  an	  
empirical	  explanation	  of	  phenomenal	  consciousness	   (Levine	  1983,	  2001).	  According	   to	   this	  
view	   there	   is	   an	   unbridgeable	   gap	   in	   our	   understanding	   of	   phenomenal	   consciousness,	  
because	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   any	   empirical	   theory	   of	   phenomenal	   consciousness	   leaves	   out	  
qualia10,	  which	  in	  effect	  makes	  the	  psychophysical	  identity	  unintelligible	  even	  if	  it	  were	  true.	  
In	  order	  to	  clarify	  all	  of	  these	  claims	  and	  terms	  let	  us	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  arguments	  
corroborating	   them	   and	   then	   try	   to	   pinpoint	   their	   common	   underlying	   assumptions.	  
Strategically,	  the	  best	  starting	  point	  would	  be	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  “what	  is	  it	  like”	  aspect	  of	  
experience.	   This	   term	   has	   been	   introduced	   by	   Thomas	   Nagel	   in	   his	   now	   classical	   paper	  
“What	  is	  it	  like	  to	  be	  a	  bat”	  (Nagel	  1974).	  Nagel	  famously	  claimed	  that	  there	  is	  an	  unjustified	  
use	  of	  analogies	  and	  paradigms	  from	  empirical	  sciences,	  especially	  the	  computer	  or	  artificial	  
intelligence	  paradigm,	   in	   the	  reductive	  strategies	  of	  explaining	  consciousness.	  What	  makes	  
them	   unjustified	   is	   that	   the	   attempts	   of	   psychophysical	   reduction	   through	   identity	   of	   the	  
type	  H2O=Water,	  or	  comparison	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  brain	  with	  the	  hardware	  and	  the	  software,	  
do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  that	  what	  is	  to	  be	  reduced	  is	  unique	  in	  many	  ways.	  On	  his	  account,	  
                                                
10	  “Qualia”	  or	  “quale”	  as	  a	  singular,	  are	  technical	  terms	  denoting	  the	  “what	  it	  is	  like”	  aspect	  of	  experience.	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although	  physical	  structure	  or	  functional	  organization	  may	  vary	  from	  organism	  to	  organism,	  
the	   very	   “fact	   that	   an	   organism	   has	   conscious	   experiences	   at	   all,	   means	   that	   there	   is	  
something	   it	   is	   like	   to	   be	   that	   organism”	   (Nagel	   1974,	   p.	   436).	   He	   calls	   this	   feature	   “the	  
subjective	  character	  of	  experience”.	  We	  may	  put	  it	  more	  formally	  and	  clearly	  in	  the	  following	  
way:	  
Subjective	  character	  of	  experience	  (SCE):	  An	  organism	  has	  conscious	  mental	  states	  iff	  
there	   is	   something	   that	   it	   is	   like	   to	   be	   that	   organism,	   for	   that	   organism	   (Ibid,	   p.	   346).	   He	  
claims	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  SCE	  is	  logically	  compatible	  with	  all	  the	  reductive	  analyses	  of	  the	  
mental	  in	  his	  time,	  because	  it	  cannot	  be	  captured	  by	  any	  of	  them.	  When	  considered	  in	  terms	  
of	   contemporary	   taxonomy,	   Nagel’s	   move	   can	   refute	   only	   type	   A	   materialism	   (Chalmers	  
2003),	   as	   its	   proponents	   claim	   that	   there	   is	   only	   one	   kind	   of	   property	   in	   the	   world	   and	  
therefore	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  concept	  to	  pick	  them	  out.	  However,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  chapter	  
on	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategies,	   this	   claim	   should	   not	   worry	   a	   type	   B	   materialist	  
(Ibid.)	  because	  they	  may	  also	  maintain	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  property	  in	  the	  world	  
that	  is	  picked	  out	  by	  two	  distinct	  modes	  of	  presentation11.	  	  
This	   point	   alone	   is	   the	  most	   important	   for	   the	   knowledge	   argument	   because	   on	   a	  
different	   reading	   it	   says	   that	   undergoing	   certain	   experiences	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	  
directly	  conceptualizing	  them	  and,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  it’s	  also	  very	  important	  for	  the	  conceptual	  
dualist	  account	  of	  phenomenal	  concept.	  This	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  SCE	  is	  not	  
analyzable	   in	   terms	   of	   functional	   or	   intentional	   states	   because	   we	   could	   ascribe	   mental	  
states	  to	  the	  robots	  or	  automata	  that	  behaved	  like	  humans	  although	  experienced	  nothing.	  In	  
other	  words,	  any	  form	  of	  the	  explanatory	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  functional	  states	  does	  not	  allow	  
for	  a	  differentiation	  between	  creatures	  with	  SCE	  and	  creatures	  without	  SCE.	  On	   the	  other	  
hand,	  Nagel	   claims	   that	   if	   there	   could	  be	   robots	   complex	  enough	   to	  behave	   like	   a	  person	  
they	  might	  have	  SCE,	  but	  their	  SCE	  could	  not	  be	  discovered	  merely	  by	  analyzing	  the	  concept	  
of	  experience	  (Nagel	  1974,	  p.	  436,	  footnote	  2).	  He	  goes	  even	  further	  in	  claiming	  that	  SCE	  is	  
not	   analyzable	   even	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   causal	   role	   of	   experiences	   in	   connection	   to	   typical	  
human	  behavior	  for	  the	  same	  reasons.	  Therefore,	  he	  concludes,	  without	  an	  account	  of	  what	  
                                                
11	  Cf.	  (Papineau	  2002).	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the	  subjectivity	  of	  experience	  is,	  we	  would	  not	  know	  what	  is	  required	  for	  a	  physicalist	  theory	  
of	  consciousness.	  In	  order	  to	  elaborate	  this	  idea	  let	  us	  look	  back	  at	  the	  difference	  between	  
the	   body-­‐mind	   problem	   and	   the	   examples	   of	   successful	   reductive	   explanations	   in	   natural	  
sciences	  mentioned	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   this	  section.	  The	  problem	  with	   the	  SCE	   is	   that	  SCE	  
features	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  reduction	   in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  these	  features	  can	  be	  
excluded	   from	   the	   reductive	   explanation	   of	   the	   ordinary,	   objective/empirical	   phenomena.	  
For	  example,	  certainly	  it	  is	  like	  something	  to	  see	  the	  rainbow	  or	  to	  feel	  gravity	  pull,	  i.e.	  one’s	  
own	  weight,	  but	  this	   feature	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  rainbow,	  say,	  does	  not	   figure	  anyhow	  in	  
the	  physical	  explanation	  of	  rainbow,	  because	  it	  can	  be	  eliminated	  from	  the	  explanation	  just	  
by	   showing	   what	   effects	   the	   actual	   rainbow	   has	   on	   our	   minds.	   This	   fact	   that	   the	   SCE	   is	  
bonded	  to	  the	  point	  of	  view	  amounts	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  conception	  of	  subjective	  
and	  objective	  which	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  problem.	  In	  another	  words,	  to	  observe	  SCE	  is	  to	  
have	   SCE.	   If	   there	   is	   no	   intermediary	   epistemic	   instance	   between	   the	   observer	   and	   the	  
phenomenon	  then	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  we	  can	  overcome	  the	  conceptual	  barrier,	  because	  the	  
SCE	  is	  not	  objectively	  available,	  i.e.	  it	  is	  not	  available	  from	  the	  third	  person	  perspective.	  	  
To	  illustrate	  this	  idea	  more	  vividly	  Nagel	  introduces	  an	  analogy	  with	  bats.	  They	  seem	  
to	  be	  suitable	  candidates	  for	  the	  analogy,	  because	  they	  are	  phylogenetically	  close	  enough	  to	  
us,	   humans,	   but	   with	   a	   fundamentally	   different	   sensory	   system.	   They	   perceive	   the	  
surrounding	  world	  by	  echo-­‐location,	  so	  it	   is	  difficult	  to	  compare	  their	  phenomenology	  with	  
our	  phenomenology.	  Although	  we	  could	  ascribe	  some	  kind	  of	  mental	  states	  to	  them,	  based	  
on	  what	  we	  know	  about	  the	  physics	  of	  sound	  waves,	  namely,	  knowledge	  of	  how	  sonar	  works	  
as	  well	   as	   some	  neuroscience	   concerning	   both	   human	   and	   bat	   brains,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	  
what	   it	   is	   like	  subjectively	  to	  be	  a	  bat	   is	  nothing	  we	  can	  experience	  or	   imagine.	  Even	   if	  we	  
were	  able	  to	   imagine,	   in	  staggering	  detail,	  what	   it	  would	  be	   like	  to	  be	  a	  bat,	   it	  would	  only	  
help	  us	  understand	  what	   it	  would	  be	   like	   for	  us,	  as	  humans,	   to	  be	  a	  bat.	  Nagel	  makes	  this	  
claim	  more	  firmly	  by	  suggesting	  that	  even	  if	   it	  were	  possible	  to	  suddenly	  or	  gradually	  alter	  
our	  physical	  and	  neurological	  structure	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  extrapolate	  what	  it	  would	  be	  like	  to	  be	  a	  
bat.	  This	  analogy	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  more	  formal	  epistemic	  claim	  about	  the	  relation	  between	  
facts	  and	  conceptual	   schemes	  or	  systems	  of	   representations,	  as	  Nagel	   (Nagel	  1974,	  p.441)	  
puts	   it.	   This	   claim,	   that	   there	   are	   facts	   of	   which	   humans	   will	   never	   possess	   respective	  
concepts	  or	  which	  will	  remain	  incomprehensible,	  simply	  because	  our	  physical	  structure	  does	  
not	  allow	  us	  to	  operate	  with	  concepts	  of	  the	  requisite	  type,	  is	  of	  central	  importance	  to	  the	  
 27 
account.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  merely	  because	  our	  ability	  to	  comprehend	  it	  is	  limited	  
by	   our	   finite	   nature.	   For	   example,	   transfinite	   numbers	   would	   have	   still	   existed	   and	   they	  
would	   have	   been	   comprehendible	   even	   if	   there	   were	   no	   one	   to	   discover	   them	   or	   to	  
comprehend	  them.	  This	  is	  so	  because	  the	  ability	  to	  comprehend	  certain	  facts	  and	  to	  utilize	  
them	   conceptually	   in	   a	   theory	   is	   ontologically	   tied	   to	   the	   respective	   point	   of	   view.	  
Furthermore,	  to	  have	  this	  unique	  and	  ineffable	  point	  of	  view	  is	  to	  have	  a	  respective	  physical	  
structure.	   That	   is	   the	   reason	   why	   humans	   will	   never	   know	   what	   it	   is	   like	   to	   be	   a	   bat,	  
according	  to	  Nagel.	  However,	   it	   is	  also	   important	  to	  note	  that	  our	   inability	  to	  comprehend	  
facts	  that	  are	  beyond	  our	  conceptual	  grasp	  does	  not	  prevent	  us	  from	  being	  able	  to	  state	  or	  
recognize	  their	  existence.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  thesis	  the	  `Experiential	  Thesis’	  (ET).	  Nagel	  explains	  it	  
more	  clearly	  in	  the	  footnote	  (Nagel	  1974,	  p.442,	  footnote	  8).	  He	  says	  that	  ET,	  as	  formulated	  
above,	   is	   not	   merely	   the	   epistemological	   issue	   but	   rather	   a	   more	   fundamental	   issue	  
according	  to	  which	  even	  to	  form	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  SCE	  of	  a	  given	  creature,	  one	  must	  adopt	  
a	  point	  of	  view	  of	  that	  creature.	  And	  if	  physicalism	  is	  true,	  taking	  up	  a	  point	  of	  view	  requires	  
having	  a	  respective	  physical	  or	  functional	  structure.	  This	  means	  that	  we	  can	  know	  something	  
about	   the	   SCE	   of	   a	   relevantly	   similar	   creature,	   just	   by	   drawing	   analogy	   with	   our	   own	  
experience,	   for	   example.	   This	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   problem.	   However,	   a	   problem	   does	  
emerge	  when	  one	  tries	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  SCE	  which	  is	  not	  her/his	  own.	  As	  
noted	  from	  the	  ET,	  to	  have	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  relevant	  SCE	  one	  must	  assume	  the	  point	  of	  
view	  of	  that	  SCE.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  SCE	  cannot	  be	  studied	  objectively	  because	  the	  facts,	  
and	  therefore	  conceptions,	  about	  SCE	  are	  only	  subjectively	  accessible.	  	  
However,	   Nagel	   claims	   that	   this	   is	   not	   an	   argument	   against	   reduction	   in	   general,	  
because	   for	   example	   a	   Martian	   scientist	   with	   no	   knowledge	   or	   understanding	   of	   visual	  
perception	   could	   be	   able	   to	   understand	   lightning	   or	   the	   rainbow,	   because	   understanding	  
these	  phenomena	  does	  not	  require	  the	  ET.	  This	   is	  so	  because	  the	  concepts	  that	  we	  use	  to	  
pick	  out	   things	   like	   lightning	  or	   the	   rainbow	  are	   tied	   to	  a	  particular	  point	  of	  view,	  but	   the	  
objective	  nature	  of	   those	   things	   is	   external	   to	  any	  point	  of	   view	   (Nagel	  1974,	  p.	   443).	   For	  
example,	  lightning	  has	  an	  objective	  character	  that	  is	  not	  exhausted	  by	  its	  visual	  appearance,	  
whereas	  the	  SCE	  is	  the	  appearance	  itself.	  The	  truly	  successful	  reduction	  can	  only	  work	  if	  the	  
species-­‐specific	  viewpoint	  is	  omitted	  from	  what	  is	  to	  be	  reduced	  (Nagel	  1974,	  p.	  445).	  This	  is	  
one	   of	   the	   central	   theses	   of	   Nagel’s	   argument.	   According	   to	   this	   thesis	   the	  what-­‐it-­‐is-­‐like	  
aspect	  of	  experience	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  experience.	  Nagel	  concludes	  that	  physicalism	  is	  most	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probably	   true,	  because	   its	   central	  hypothesis	   is	   rather	   clear:	  mental	   states	  are	  part	  of	   the	  
physical	  world	  and	  therefore	  they	  must	  be	  explicable	  in	  empirical	  terms.	  The	  only	  thing	  that	  
we	   lack	   at	   the	   current	   level	   of	   understanding	   is	   how	   this	   hypothesis	   could	   be	   intelligible.	  
Nagel	  uses	  another	  analogy	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point:	  we	  are	  in	  the	  same	  position	  towards	  the	  
thesis	  mental	  states	  are	  brain	  states	  as	  pre-­‐Socratic	  philosophers	  would	  have	  been	  towards	  
the	   thesis	   that	  matter	   is	   energy,	   the	   latter	   thesis	   is	   true	   but	   the	   pre-­‐Socratics	   lacked	   the	  
relevant	  conceptual	  framework	  to	  fully	  understand	  the	  thesis.	  	  
Now,	   the	   central	   problem	   of	   this	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   concepts	   of	   an	  
objective/empirical	   theory	   of	   consciousness	   cannot	   refer	   to	   the	   phenomenal	   properties	  
because	   a	   conception	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   properties	   is	   only	   possible	   through	   direct	  
acquaintance	  or	  undergoing	  of	  them,	  whereas	  objective	  conceptions	  operate	  independently	  
from	   an	   epistemic	   perspective.	   A	   further	   step	   towards	   articulating	   the	   explanatory	   gap	  
would	   be	   to	   claim	   that	   given	   the	   fundamentally	   different	   ways	   phenomenal	   and	   physical	  
concepts	  work,	  an	  empirical	  theory	  of	  consciousness	  leaves	  out	  the	  what-­‐is-­‐it-­‐like	  aspect	  of	  
consciousness,	  and	  therefore	  there	  is	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  	  
This	   is	   one	   of	   the	   crucial	   points	   that	   underlies	   the	   knowledge	   argument	   and	   the	  
conceivability	  argument.	  I	  elaborate	  on	  this	  point	  below.	  	  
The	  knowledge	  argument	  relies	  on	  this	  assumption	  thereby	  claiming	  that	  knowledge	  
of	  all	  the	  physical	  facts	  does	  not	  entail	  knowledge	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  facts,	  for	  if	  it	  did,	  then	  
Mary	  would	  not	  have	  learned	  anything	  upon	  her	  release.	  However,	  this	  point	  can	  be	  read	  in	  
a	   slightly	   different	   way.	   It	   might	   mean	   that	   if	   a	   conception	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   is	  
experientially	   dependent	   then	   of	   course	   it	   is	   not	   contained	   or	   inferable	   from	   the	   body	   of	  
physical	   information.	   If	   this	   is	   so,	   then	   the	   only	   problem	   we	   have	   left	   is	   to	   show	   how	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  might	  pick	  out	  physical	  properties,	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around,	  because	  
if	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  different	  from	  physical	  concepts,	  then	  it	  should	  not	  be	  expected	  
that	  they	  pick	  out	  their	  referents	  by	  the	  causal	  role	  they	  play	  but	  rather	  in	  a	  direct	  way12.	  In	  
this	  manner,	  we	  can	  concede	  that	  there	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  concepts,	  which	  are	  picking	  out	  the	  
same	  properties,	  one	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  the	  properties	  play	  and	  the	  other	  one	   in	  
                                                
12	  For	  the	  details	  of	  this	  account	  see	  Papineau	  (2002).	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terms	   of	   their	   experiential	   quality.	   Let’s	   follow	   Papineau	   (Papineau	   2002)	   and	   call	   this	  
position	  “conceptual	  dualism”.	  	  This	  point	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  much	  greater	  detail	  when	  we	  
come	   to	   the	   exposition	   of	   Papineau’s	   account	   of	   phenomenal	   concept	   in	   the	   following	  
chapters.	  	  
The	  conceivability	  argument	  also	  hinges	  upon	  Nagel’s	  point	  in	  a	  very	  important	  way.	  
Namely,	  because	  of	  the	  way	  phenomenal	  concepts	  pick	  out	  their	  referents,	  a	  misdescription	  
as	   a	   way	   of	   explaining	   away	   the	   seeming	   contingency	   of	   the	   psychophysical	   identity	   is	  
precluded.	  What	  appears	  as	  pain,	   is	  pain.	  We	  will	   come	   to	   this	  point	   very	   shortly	  and	   see	  
how	  the	  same	  conceptual	  dualism	  strategy	  applies	  to	  the	  conceivability	  argument.	  	  
1.3 The	  knowledge	  argument	  
	  
Phenomenal	  facts	  are	  neither	  contained	  nor	  inferable	  from	  the	  body	  of	  physical	  information	  
	  
Although	  the	  basic	  idea	  behind	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem	  seems	  very	  simple,	  i.e.	  
we	   cannot	   understand	   how	   phenomenal	   consciousness	   could	   be	   explained	   in	   terms	   of	  
neuroscience,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   refined	   in	   order	   to	   see	   what	   makes	   it	   so	   compelling.	   After	  
having	   introduced	  one	  of	   the	  basic	  claims	  upon	  which	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem	  relies,	  
that	   is	   the	   idea	   of	   leaving	   out	   the	   “what	   is	   it	   like”	   of	   experiences	   from	   the	   physicalist	  
explanation	  of	   consciousness,	  we	  need	   to	  move	  on	  and	  examine	   the	  arguments	   that	   start	  
with	   this	  premise	  and	   lead	   to	  ontological	   claims	  about	  phenomenal	  properties.	   Therefore,	  
the	  next	   step	  would	  be	   to	  present	  and	  analyze	   the	   famous	  Knowledge	  Argument	   (Jackson	  
1982,	  1986).	  	  
The	   starting	   premise	   of	   Jackson’s	   argument	   is	   the	   claim	   that	   no	   amount	   of	   purely	  
physical	   information	   could	   say	   anything	   about	   qualia.	   His	   reading	   of	   the	   notion	   “physical	  
information”	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   central	   to	   the	   argument	   and,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   to	   the	  
understanding	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem.	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He	  develops	  three	  different	  arguments	   in	  order	  to	  show	  how	  his	  own	  account	  fit	   in	  
with	  the	  “qualia	  freak”	   intuitions	  as	  he	  calls	  them,	   i.e.	   intuitions	  that	  qualia	  are	   left	  out	  by	  
any	  kind	  of	  physical	  or	  neuroscientific	  theory	  of	  consciousness.	  	  
The	  Knowledge	  Argument,	  as	  it	  is	  commonly	  known,	  relies	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  not	  only	  
are	  qualia	  not	  included	  in	  the	  physical	  information	  about	  the	  universe,	  but	  the	  information	  
about	  qualia	  is	  not	  even	  inferable	  from	  the	  physical	  information.	  	  
He	   develops	   two	   thought	   experiments	   to	   corroborate	   this	   claim.	   The	   first	   one	  
involves	  a	  person,	  Fred,	  who	  is	  able	  to	  discriminate	  an	  additional	  shade	  of	  red	  color	  that	  no	  
one	  else	  except	  him	  can	  discriminate.	  Jackson	  calls	  them	  red1	  and	  red2.	  To	  Fred,	  say	  red2	  is	  
so	  distinct	  from	  red1	  as	  yellow	  and	  blue	  are	  distinct	  to	  all	  the	  other	  people.	  In	  a	  sense,	  it	  is	  
not	  just	  a	  shade	  of	  red	  color	  to	  Fred	  but	  a	  completely	  different	  color.	  Furthermore,	  he	  also	  
has	   different	   sensory	   and	   phenomenal	   experiences	   of	   red2.	   He	   has	   tried	   many	   times	   to	  
teach	  his	  friends	  about	  the	  different	  shade	  of	  red	  but	  he	  always	  failed	  because	  everyone	  else	  
lacks	   both	   sensory	   and	   phenomenal	   discriminatory	   ability.	   In	   a	   way,	   Fred	   is	   in	   a	   same	  
position	   as	   a	   sighted	   person	  within	   a	   blind	   community;	   he	   can	   never	   convince	   the	   others	  
that	  he	  actually	  has	  another	   sense.	  Although	  he	  avoids	  pits,	  ditches	  and	  all	   kinds	  of	  other	  
obstacles,	   for	   the	   blind	   community	   he	   is	   just	   a	   skilled	   blind	   man.	   In	   a	   sense,	   Fred’s	  
experiences	  of	  red2	  are	  ineffable.	  	  
However,	  the	  question	  immediately	  arises:	  what	  kind	  of	  experience	  Fred	  has	  when	  he	  
sees	  red2.	  What	  is	  it	  like	  for	  Fred	  to	  see	  red2?	  
Imagine	   after	   Fred’s	   death,	   his	   visual	   system,	   including	   eyes,	   optic	   nerve,	   and	   the	  
whole	  brain,	  were	  preserved,	  and	  some	  kind	  of	  keen	  neuroscientific	  research	  group	  wanted	  
to	  answer	  these	  questions	  by	  performing	  all	  kinds	  of	  empirical	  experiments	  on	  it.	  First,	  they	  
discovered	  that	  there	  are	  some	  additional	  cones	  in	  Fred’s	  retina	  that	  respond	  to	  the	  light	  of	  
the	   wavelength	   that	   was	   assumed	   to	   correspond	   to	   that	   of	   red2.	   Or	   that	   he	   has	   normal	  
cones,	  but	  they	  respond	  to	  certain	  wavelengths	  that	  make	  no	  difference	  to	  the	  cones	  of	  a	  
normal	  perceiver.	  Now	  imagine	  this	  research	  group	  was	  so	  advanced	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  
replicate	  Fred’s	  physiology	  in	  everybody	  else,	  or	  to	  transplant	  his	  optical	  system	  to	  someone	  
else.	  They	  performed	  thorough	  tests	  and	  experiments	  on	  people	  with	  replicated	  physiology	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and	   transplanted	  optical	   system	  but	  no	  one	   in	  both	  groups	  could	  have	  discriminated	   red1	  
from	  red2.	  	  
Here	  comes	  the	  crucial	  point	  of	  the	  thought	  experiment:	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  that	  they	  
knew	  all	   the	  physical	   information	   about	   Fred,	   and	   if	   physicalism	   is	   true,	   they	   should	  have	  
known	  that	  ex	  hypothesi,	  and	  yet,	  they	  could	  not	  know	  what	  is	  it	  like	  for	  Fred	  to	  discriminate	  
between	  red1	  and	  red2?	  	  
The	   answer	   imposes	   itself	   for	   Jackson.	   Physicalism	   is	   incomplete	   for	   it	   leaves	  
something	  out	  (Jackson	  1982,	  1986).	  	  
Before	   trying	   to	   formalize	   this	   argument	   let	   us	   have	   a	   look	   at	   another	   take	  of	   this	  
argument.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  the	  brilliant	  neuroscientist	  Mary	  thought	  experiment.	  	  
The	  scenario	   includes	  Mary,	  a	  neuroscientist	  who	  learns	  about	  the	  neurophysiology	  
of	  color	  vision	  while	  confined	  in	  a	  black	  and	  white	  room,	  through	  black	  and	  white	  television	  
and	  books.	  Of	  course,	  there	   is	  nothing	  wrong	  with	  her	  visual	  system,	  and	  she	   learns	  about	  
wavelengths	  of	  light	  and	  about	  retina	  and	  optic	  nerve,	  about	  utterances	  of	  color	  notions,	  she	  
also	   learns	   that	   sky	   is	   blue,	   grass	   is	   green	   and	   roses	   are	   red.	   The	   point	   is	   that	   she	   learns	  
everything	  there	   is	  to	  know	  about	  physiology	  of	  color	  vision	  without	  being	  able	  to	  actually	  
experience	  color	  as	  everybody	  else.	  Now	   Jackson	  asks	  a	  question:	  what	  will	  happen	  when	  
she	   is	   released	   from	   the	   black	   and	   white	   room	   (Jackson	   1982,	   p	   130)?	   Will	   she	   learn	  
something	  new	  after	  finally	  seeing	  the	  colors?	  Jackson	  claims	  that	  it	  seems	  obvious	  that	  she	  
will	  learn	  something	  new	  from	  her	  own	  newly	  acquired	  experiences.	  If	  she	  learns	  something	  
new,	   Jackson	   concludes,	   then	   physicalism	   is	   false	   (ibid.).	   This	   conclusion	   is	   based	   on	   the	  
premise	  that	  if	  physicalism	  is	  true	  then	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  have	  all	  the	  physical	  information	  
about	   color	   vision	   without	   having	   all	   the	   information	   about	   color	   vision.	   If	   she	   learns	  
something	  new	  then	  having	  all	  the	  physical	  information	  does	  not	  include	  all	  there	  is	  to	  know	  
about	   color	   vision.	   But	   ex	   hypothesi	   she	   should	   have	   known	   everything	   there	   is	   to	   know	  
about	   color	   vision.	   Therefore,	  what	   she	   learns	   from	  her	   own	   first	   person	  perspective,	   her	  
qualia,	   is	   left	   out	   from	   the	   physical	   information	   she	   acquired	   beforehand.	   Of	   course,	   the	  
same	  argument	  applies	  to	  other	  bodily	  sensations	  that	  are	  said	  to	  have	  qualia,	  like	  olfactory,	  
gustatory,	  auditory,	  etc.	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The	  argument	  is	  formalized	  as	  follows:	  
“13.	   Mary	   (before	   her	   release)	   knows	   everything	   physical	   there	   is	   to	   know	   about	   other	  
people;	  
14.	  Mary	  (before	  her	  release)	  doesn’t	  know	  everything	  there	  is	  to	  know	  about	  other	  people	  
(because	  she	  learns	  something	  about	  them	  on	  her	  release);	  
Therefore,	  	  
15.	   There	   are	   truths	   about	   other	   people	   (and	   herself)	  which	   escape	   the	   physicalist	   story”	  
(Jackson	  1986,	  p.	  293).	  
One	  of	  the	  responses	  to	  this	  argument	  was	  that	  Mary	  did	  not	   learn	  a	  new	  fact,	  but	  
that	   she	   learned	   the	  old	   facts	   in	   a	   new	  mode	  of	   presentation,	   namely	   from	  her	   own	   first	  
person	   perspective	   (Churchland	   1985,	   Jackson	   1986).	   Since	   ex	   hypothesi	   she	   should	   have	  
known	   everything	   about	   colour	   vision	   if	   physicalism	  was	   true,	   it	   seems	   rather	   obvious	   to	  
Jackson	   that	  whatever	   knowledge	   she	   gains,	   it	   is	   not	   about	   anything	   physical.	   This	   line	   of	  
reasoning	  seems	  impenetrable.	  However,	  nothing	  in	  this	  argument	  compels	  us	  to	  conclude	  
that	  whatever	  new	  she	  learns	  is	  based	  on	  a	  metaphysically	  distinct	  property.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  
in	   the	   third	   chapter,	   the	   Knowledge	   Argument	   actually	   helps	   to	   establish	   conceptual	  
dualism,	   a	   doctrine	  which	   acknowledges	   the	   epistemic	   gap	   but	   denies	   that	   there	   are	   two	  
metaphysically	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  properties.	  	  
In	  order	   to	   fortify	  his	   account	   further,	   Jackson	  analyzes	  his	  own	  argument	   through	  
the	   so-­‐called	  modal	  argument	   (Jackson	  1982,	  p	  130).	   It	   is	   claimed	  by	   the	  modal	  argument	  
that	   no	   amount	   of	   physical	   information	   would	   logically	   entail	   knowledge	   of	   other	  minds.	  
Given	   this	   premise	   then	   there	   is	   no	   contradiction	   in	   conceiving	   a	   possible	  world	   in	  which	  
creatures	   exactly	   like	   us,	   humans,	   in	   all	   functional	   and	   physical	   respects,	   would	   not	   have	  
mental	  states,	  in	  other	  words,	  they	  would	  lack	  qualia.	  If	  we	  and	  our	  functional	  and	  physical	  
duplicates	  were	  alike	   in	  all	  respects	  but	  they	  lacked	  something	  that	  we	  have	  in	  addition	  to	  
functional	   states	   and	   physical	   history,	   then	   whatever	   they	   lacked	   is	   not	   functional	   or	  
physical.	   Again,	   this	   argument	   holds	   because	  ex	   hypothesi	   if	   physical	   information	   explains	  
everything	   there	   is	   to	   be	   explained	   about	   sensory	   states	   and	   mental	   states,	   then	   the	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possibility	   of	   such	   creatures	  would	   have	   been	   a	   contradiction.	   Hence,	   physicalism	   is	   false	  
(Ibid.).	  	  
In	   order	   to	   back	   up	   the	   modal	   argument	   from	   the	   objection	   that	   physicalism	   is	  
envisaged	   to	   be	   a	   contingent	   theory,	   so	   that	  modal	   intuitions	   should	   be	   restricted	   to	   the	  
actual	   world	   and	   the	   similar	   possible	   worlds,	   Jackson	   points	   out	   that	   even	   in	   such	   a	  
restricted	  modal	   topography	   the	   knowledge	   argument	   holds,	   because	   even	   knowledge	   of	  
other	  minds	  is	  not	  entailed	  from	  the	  physical	  information.	  	  
At	  this	  point	   it	   is	  very	   important	  to	  note	  the	  difference	  between	  Nagel’s	  “what	   is	   it	  
like	   to	  be”	  account	   (Nagel	   1974)	   and	   the	  Knowledge	  Argument.	  Although	  both	  arguments	  
make	  very	  similar	  claims,	   i.e.	   that	  qualia	  are	   left	  out	   from	  the	  physical	   story,	  Nagel	  argues	  
that	  if	  we	  come	  up	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  know	  what	  is	  it	  like	  
for	   others	   to	   undergo	   or	   to	   have	   mental	   states,	   so	   although	   it	   would	   not	   help	   us	   to	  
overcome	   the	   point	   of	   view	   barrier	  we	  would	   know	  more	   about	   qualia	   and	   still	  maintain	  
physicalism	  as	  true,	  whereas	  Jackson	  claims	  that	  physical	  information	  does	  not	  provide	  even	  
logical	   entailment	   of	   qualia.	   Clearly,	   Jackson’s	   argument	  makes	   a	  more	   severe	   impact	   on	  
physicalism	  because	  it	  follows	  from	  it	  that	  even	  if	  we	  would	  have	  developed	  some	  theory	  of	  
the	   phenomenal	   we	   would	   never	   know	   more	   about	   mental	   life	   in	   terms	   of	   physical	  
information.	  Of	   course,	   physicalists	   cannot	   concede	  on	   this	   because	   they	   actually	  want	   to	  
explain	  qualia	  in	  terms	  of	  physical	  information.	  	  
Now,	  in	  order	  to	  reconcile	  materialist	  intuitions	  with	  the	  severe	  consequences	  of	  the	  
knowledge	   argument,	   Jackson	   embraces	   epiphenomenalism,	   an	   ontological	   position	  
according	  to	  which	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  totally	  functionally	  and	  causally	  inefficacious	  
towards	   the	   physical	   properties,	   but	   they	   may	   be	   efficacious	   towards	   other	   phenomenal	  
properties.	  Recently	  Jackson	  has	  assumed	  more	  consequent	  ontological	  position	  (Chalmers	  
and	  Jackson	  2001),	  which	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  knowledge	  argument,	  a	  form	  of	  dualism,	  
i.e.	  the	  property	  dualism,	  but	  we	  shall	  come	  to	  this	  point	  later	  on	  when	  discussing	  the	  two-­‐
dimensional	   modal	   framework.	   Let	   us	   now	   work	   out	   reasons	   for	   assuming	  
epiphenomenalism	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  knowledge	  argument.	  	  
In	  arguing	   for	   the	  epiphenomenalism	  Jackson	  makes	   it	  very	  clear	  why	   it	   is	   the	  only	  
reasonable	   position	   if	   we	   want	   to	   maintain	   physicalism	   as	   a	   true	   theory	   and	   still	   being	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confronted	   with	   the	   devastating	   consequences	   of	   the	   knowledge	   argument.	   Namely,	   if	  
qualia	   are	   totally	   functionally	   and	   causally	   inefficacious	   towards	   physical	   properties	   and	  
physicalism	  is	  true,	  then	  qualia	  must	  be	  some	  by-­‐product	  of	  certain	  brain	  processes	  that	  are	  
efficacious	  towards	  physical	  properties.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  point	  he	  analyzes	  a	  physical	  trait	  of	  
having	   a	  warm	   and	   heavy	   coat	   for	   the	   survival	   in	   the	   Arctic	  within	   a	   theory	   of	   evolution.	  
According	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  evolution,	  say,	  polar	  bears	  have	  developed	  a	  thick	  coat	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  survive	  in	  the	  very	  cold	  polar	  environment.	  Now,	  a	  thick	  and	  warm	  coat	  is	  also	  heavy,	  so	  
one	  might	  analyze	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  polar	  bear’s	  coat	  in	  such	  terms	  as	  if	  the	  heavy	  coat	  
was	   conductive	   for	   survival	   (Jackson	   1982,	   p.	   134).	   This	   line	   of	   thinking	   seems	   obviously	  
wrong,	  because	  it	  is	  the	  thick	  and	  warm	  coat	  that	  is	  conductive	  for	  survival,	  and	  its	  heaviness	  
is	  a	  by-­‐product	  that	  actually	  slows	  the	  animal	  down,	  and	  thus	  is	  not	  conductive	  for	  survival.	  
However,	   benefits	   of	   having	   a	   thick	   and	   warm	   coat	   in	   evolutionary	   terms	   outweigh	  
disadvantages	  of	  having	  a	  heavy	  coat.	  Having	  this	  analogy	   in	  mind,	   Jackson	  claims	  that	  we	  
are	  in	  a	  same	  position	  towards	  qualia	  as	  we	  are	  towards	  heaviness	  of	  the	  polar	  bear’s	  coat.	  
Qulia,	   although	   functionally	   and	   causally	   inefficacious,	   are	   epiphenomena	   of	   some	  
efficacious	  brain	  processes.	   Jackson’s	  point	  here	   is	   if	  we	   try	   to	   analyze	  phenomena	   in	   the	  
terms	  of	  causality,	  it	  might	  turn	  out	  that	  we	  connected	  wrong	  causes	  and	  effects	  in	  the	  first	  
place.	  He	  concludes	   the	   that	  qualia	  do	  not	  cause	  anything	  physical,	  but	  are	  caused	  by	   the	  
physical	  (Jackson	  1982,	  p.	  134)	  	  
	  
1.4 Kripke’s	  modal	  argument	  
	  
Identities	  if	  true	  at	  all,	  must	  be	  necessarily	  true.	  Psychophysical	  identity	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  
necessary	  true;	  therefore,	  it	  is	  necessary	  false.	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   see	  more	   clearly	   how	   the	   conceivability	   arguments	   pose	   problems	   for	  
physicalism	  and	  get	  some	  handle	  on	  modal	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem,	  
we	  need	  to	  rehears	  Kripke’s	  modal	  argument	  in	  some	  detail.	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Kripke	   (Kripke	  1980)	   says	   that	   identity	   statements	   if	   true	   at	   all,	  must	   be	  necessary	  
true.	  This	  means	  that	  terms	  flanking	  the	  identity	  sign	  must	  pick	  out	  the	  same	  thing	  in	  every	  
situation,	  imaginary	  or	  actual.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  must	  pick	  out	  the	  same	  thing	  at	  all	  possible	  
worlds13.	  According	  to	  Kripke,	  terms	  that	  pick	  out	  the	  same	  thing	  in	  all	  possible	  worlds	  are	  
called	  “rigid	  designators”.	  They	  are	  called	  “rigid	  designators”	  because	  they	  refer	   rigidly-­‐i.e.	  
they	   pick	   out	   the	   same	   thing	   at	   all	   possible	  worlds.	   The	   original	   class	   of	   rigid	   designators	  
comes	   from	  Kripke’s	   theory	  of	  proper	  names.	   In	  criticizing	  descriptivist	   theory	  of	  meaning,	  
which	  I	  won’t	  be	  discussing	  here	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  avoiding	  unnecessary	  detours,	  Kripke	  argues	  
that	   proper	   names	   don’t	   refer	   via	   descriptions,	   but	   directly.	   The	   reference	   in	   this	   case	   is	  
fixed	  by	  an	  act	  of	  “baptism”.	  The	  natural	  kind	  terms,	  in	  his	  view,	  are	  also	  rigid	  designators	  as	  
well	  as	  terms	  such	  as	  “pain”.	  Although	  he	  treats	  natural	  kind	  terms	  as	  names,	  he	  maintains	  
that	   basically	   in	   that	   case	   names	   are	   equivalent	   to	   descriptions.	   The	   reference	   of	   natural	  
kind	   terms	   is	   fixed	   by	   a	   contingent	   property	   that	   we	   causally	   associate	   with	   term,	   which	  
guaranties	  its	  a	  posteriori	  status.	  However,	  what	  guaranties	  the	  necessary	  status	  of	  identities	  
is	  not	  a	  direct	  link	  between	  two	  names,	  but	  rather	  a	  link	  between	  an	  object	  and	  itself.	  	  
	  In	  Kripke’s	  view,	  some	  identity	  statements	  seem	  to	  be	  contingent,	  we	  can	  conceive	  
of	  their	  falling	  apart.	  For	  example,	  it	  seems	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  statements	  like	  “Water	  is	  H2O”	  
or	   “Heat	   is	   molecular	  motion”	   something	   else	   than	   H2O	   or	  molecular	  motion	   could	   have	  
been	  water	  and	  heat	   respectively.	   This	  pattern	  of	   reasoning	   should	  be	  applicable	   to	   cases	  
such	   as	   “pain	   is	   the	   C-­‐fibre	   firing”.	   After	   all,	   both	   kinds	   of	   cases	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	   a	  
posteriori	   necessary.	   But	   if	   such	   dissociations	   are	   conceivable	   then	   these	   terms	   pick	   out	  
different	  things	  at	  different	  worlds.	  If	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  the	  identity	  statement	  is	  not	  necessary	  
according	  to	  Kripke.	  However,	  he	  claims	  that	  this	   is	  merely	  apparent	  contingency,	  because	  
identity	  statements	  like	  “Water	  is	  H2O”	  or	  “Heat	  is	  molecular	  motion”	  use	  rigid	  designators,	  
thus	   must	   be	   necessary.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   “water”	   and	   “heat”	   the	   apparent	   contingency	   is	  
explained	   away	   as	   a	   misdescription.	   What	   we	   are	   conceiving	   of	   when	   thinking	   about	  
statements	  like	  “heat	  is	  not	  molecular	  motion”	  is	  not	  that	  something	  else	  than	  the	  motion	  of	  
                                                
13	   The	   notion	   “possible	   world”	   denotes	  ways	   in	   which	   the	  world	  might	   have	   been.	   This	   includes	   the	   actual	  
world	  as	  one	  of	   the	  possible	  worlds,	  but	   in	   that	   case	   it	   is	   centered.	   I	  won’t	  be	  engaging	   in	  discussion	  on	  
different	  views	  about	  possible	  worlds	   in	   this	  project,	  simply	  because	   it	   is	  out	  of	  scope	  of	   this	  work	  and	   it	  
would	  not	  change	  much	  in	  my	  discussions.	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molecules	   is	  heat,	  but	  rather	  that	  something	  else	  than	  the	  motion	  of	  molecules	  produce	  a	  
sensation	   of	   heat.	   Indeed,	   there	   could	   be	   creatures	   so	   different	   from	   us	   whose	   sensory	  
system	  reacts	  to	  something	  else	  than	  motion	  of	  molecules	  as	  heat.	  But	  if	  “heat	  is	  molecular	  
motion”	  is	  necessary,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  conceivable	  that	  something	  else	  than	  molecular	  motion	  
could	   be	   heat,	   because	   both	   “heat”	   and	   “molecular	  motion”	   are	   rigid	   designators	   and	   as	  
such	  must	  always	  pick	  out	  the	  same	  thing.	  In	  this	  case	  we	  are	  conflating	  a	  term	  that	  is	  really	  
contingent,	   i.e.	   that	   something	   else	   than	   the	  motion	   of	  molecules	   could	   have	   produced	   a	  
sensation	  of	  heat,	  with	  the	  necessary	  statement	  that	  heat	  is	  molecular	  motion.	  	  
On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  properties	   these	  descriptions	   invoke,	   are	  only	   contingently	  
associated	  with	  the	  terms.	  For	  example,	  the	  reference	  of	  “heat”	  is	  fixed	  by	  a	  description	  that	  
we	  treat	  as	  a	  name:	  “molecular	  motion”,	  but	  it	  has	  a	  property	  of	  causing	  heat	  sensation	  only	  
contingently,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   that	   something	   other	   than	  molecular	  motion	   could	   have	   been	  
causing	   the	   sensation	  of	  heat.	  Given	   that	  properties	  are	  only	   contingently	  associated	  with	  
the	  term,	  it	  allows	  for	  a	  misdescription	  of	  a	  counterfactual	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  property	  does	  
not	  satisfy	  a	  description.	  For	  example,	  a	  world	   in	  which	  heat	   is	  not	  molecular	  motion	  does	  
not	  seem	  conceivable,	  whereas	  in	  fact	  this	  statement	  only	  claims	  that	  something	  other	  than	  
molecular	  motion	  could	  have	  caused	  a	  sensation	  of	  heat.	  	  
On	  this	  account	  natural	  kinds	  terms14	  refer	  via	  a	  contingent	  property	  because	  it	  might	  
have	   turned	   out	   that	   water	   were	   not	   H2O	   or	   that	   it	   had	   some	   different	   macro-­‐physical	  
properties	   than	   odourless,	   transparent,	   etc.	   However,	   since	   it	   might	   have	   turned	   out	  
otherwise,	  Kripke	  argues,	  although	  a	  posteriori,	   it	   is	  a	  necessary	   identity,	  because	  then	  the	  
whole	  world	  would	  have	   turned	  out	  otherwise.	   The	   fact	   that	   terms	   refer	   via	   a	   contingent	  
property	   is	   essential	   for	   Kripke’s	   argument	   against	  materialism,	   because	   it	   actually	  makes	  
these	  a	  posteriori	   identities	  appear	  contingent	  whereas	   in	   fact	   they	  are	  necessary	  and	   the	  
sense	  of	  contingency	  is	  explained	  away	  as	  a	  misdescription.	  	  
The	   argument	   actually	   starts	   from	   the	   claim	   to	  which	  materialism	   is	   committed:	   if	  
true	   at	   all,	   psychophysical	   identity	  must	   be	   necessary	   true,	   in	   other	  words,	   a	   situation	   in	  
which	  it	  comes	  apart	  should	  not	  be	  possible.	  Then	  the	  first	  claim	  comes	  into	  play	  and	  states	  
                                                
14	  Terms	  like:	  water,	  heat,	  molecular	  motion,	  H2O,	  mean	  kinetic	  energy,	  etc.	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that	   the	   psychophysical	   identity’s	   coming	   apart	   is	   conceivable.	   Note	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
natural	  kind	  identities	  first	  premise	  is	  the	  same,	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  something	  other	  than	  
molecular	  motion	  causes	   sensation	  of	  heat,	  because	  concept	  of	  heat	   refers	  via	   contingent	  
property,	  so	  it	  might	  have	  turned	  out	  that	  really	  something	  other	  than	  mean	  kinetic	  energy	  
were	   causing	   heat	   sensations	   in	   humans,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   that	   heat	   is	   not	  molecular	  
motion.	   However,	   as	   we	   discern	   that	   truly	   necessary	   and	   contingent	   statements	   are	  
conflated	  here,	  we	  classify	  it	  as	  a	  misdescription	  and	  conclude	  that	  actually	  such	  a	  situation	  
is	   not	   even	   conceivable.	   Such	   a	   pattern	   of	   analysis	   is	   not	   available	   for	   the	   psychophysical	  
identity.	  	  
Kripke	   argues	   that	   this	   pattern	   of	   analysis	   is	   not	   applicable	   to	   “pain=C-­‐fibre	   firing”	  
case.	  If	  we	  assume	  that	  “pain=C-­‐fibre	  firing”	  is	  an	  a	  posteriori	  necessary	  statement	  of	  exactly	  
the	  same	  type	  as	  “heat”	  and	  “water”	  cases,	  then	  “pain”	  and	  “C-­‐fibre	  firing”	  have	  to	  rigidly	  
designate	   as	  well.	   However,	   argues	   Kripke,	   there	   is	   no	   contingent	   property	   that	   fixes	   the	  
reference	  of	  “pain”	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  “heat”	  or	  “water”,	  so	  what	  appears	  contingent	  in	  the	  
case	   of	   “pain”	   is	   in	   fact	   contingent.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   “pain”	   we	   cannot	   account	   for	   a	  
misdescription	   in	   explaining	   away	   it	   seeming	   contingency.	   So	   if	   “pain=C-­‐fibre	   firing”	   is	  
conceivably	  false,	  it	  is	  false.	  Therefore	  concludes	  Kripke,	  “pain”	  and	  “C-­‐fibre	  firing”	  cannot	  be	  
identical.	  	  
As	  we	  recall	  Blumenfeld’s	  formalisation	  of	  the	  argument:	  
“8.	  Identity	  statements	  whose	  terms	  are	  both	  rigid	  designators	  have	  to	  be	  necessarily	  true	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  true.	  
'8.	  My	  pain'	  and	  'my	  brain's	  C-­‐fibre	  stimulation'	  are	  rigid	  designators.	  
10.	  Therefore,	  'My	  pain	  is	  my	  brain's	  C-­‐fibre	  stimulation'	  has	  to	  be	  necessarily	  true	  in	  order	  
to	  be	  true.	  
11.	  But	  'My	  pain	  is	  my	  brain's	  C-­‐fibre	  stimulation'	  is	  not	  necessarily	  true.	  
12.	  Therefore,	   'My	  pain	   is	  my	  brain's	  C-­‐fibre	  stimulation'	   is	  not	  true.”	  (Blumenfeld	  1975,	  p.	  
151)	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   It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  for	  Kripke	  conceivability	  entails	  possibility.	  To	  put	  
it	  in	  more	  technical	  terms,	  for	  Kripke	  conceivability	  entails	  metaphysical	  possibility.	  So	  if	  an	  
identity	   statement	   containing	   rigid	   designators	   is	   conceivably	   false,	   it	   is	   necessary	   false.	   If	  
“My	   pain≠C-­‐fibre	   stimulation”	   is	   metaphysically	   possible	   then	   psychophysical	   identity	   is	  
necessary	  false.	  
The	   common	   strategy	   in	   attacking	  Kripke’s	  modal	   argument	   is	   denying	   the	   inference	  
from	   conceivability	   to	   metaphysical	   possibility.	   For	   instance,	   Christopher	   Hill	   (Hill	   1995)	  
urges	  that	  when	  we	  are	  conceiving	  of	  psychophysical	  identity’s	  falling	  apart	  we	  employ	  two	  
very	   different	   and	   distinct	   imaginative	   faculties.	   Hill	   alludes	   to	  Nagel’s	   (Nagel	   1974)	   often	  
neglected	  point	  about	  perceptual	  and	  sympathetic	  imagination.	  Nagel	  claims	  that	  when	  we	  
are	   imagining	   something	   perceptually	   we	   put	   ourselves	   in	   a	   state	   resembling	   the	   one	   in	  
which	   we	   would	   be	   when	   perceiving	   it.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   when	   imagining	   something	  
sympathetically	   we	   put	   ourselves	   in	   a	   conscious	   state	   resembling	   the	   thing	   itself	   (Nagel	  
1974,	   pp.	   445-­‐6,	   footnote	   11).	  Nagel	   explicitly	  writes:	   “Where	   the	   imagination	   of	   physical	  
features	  is	  perceptual	  and	  the	  imagination	  of	  mental	  features	  is	  sympathetic,	  it	  appears	  to	  us	  
that	  we	   can	   imagine	  any	  experience	  occurring	  without	   its	   associated	  brain	   state,	   and	   vice	  
versa.	  The	  relation	  between	  them	  will	  appear	  contingent	  even	  if	  it	  is	  necessary,	  because	  of	  
the	  independence	  of	  the	  disparate	  types	  of	   imagination.”	  (Nagel	   ibid.)	  Now,	  Hill	   (Hill	  1995)	  
and	   Hill	   and	   McLaughlin	   (Hill	   and	   McLaughlin	   1999)	   claim	   that	   even	   if	   perceptual	   and	  
sympathetic	   imagination	   independently	   from	   each	   other	   were	   reliable	   guides	   to	  
conceivability	  their	  joint	  exercise	  can	  be	  extremely	  unreliable.	  Hill	  calls	  this	  sort	  of	  conflating	  
“Cartesian	   intuitions”.	  He	  maintains	   that	  Cartesian	   intuitions	  are	  not	   reliable	  guide	   for	   the	  
entailment	  from	  conceivability	  to	  metaphysical	  possibility.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Joseph	  Levine	  (Levine	  1983,	  1993,	  2001)	  argues	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  
conceivability	  in	  Kripke’s	  argument	  does	  not	  justify	  inference	  to	  metaphysical	  possibility.	  He	  
says	  that	  the	  conceivability	  arguments	  only	  manage	  to	  establish	  epistemic	  possibility.	  Levine	  
thinks	   he	   saves	   physicalism	   in	   this	   way	   but	   at	   the	   price	   of	   an	   explanatory	   gap.	   I	   will	   be	  
discussing	   Levine’s	   account	   of	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   so	   I	   leave	   the	  
comments	  for	  then.	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In	  response	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  criticism	  David	  Chalmers	  (Chalmers	  1996,	  2009;	  Chalmers	  
and	  Jackson	  2000)	  offers	  much	  more	  elaborated	  accounts	  of	   the	  modal	  argument	   (zombie	  
argument)	   and	   of	   the	   inference	   from	   conceivability	   to	   possibility	   (two-­‐dimensional	  
argument).	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  I	  will	  be	  discussing	  Chalmers’	  accounts	  of	  the	  argument	  
and	  the	  inference	  from	  conceivability	  to	  possibility.	  	  
1.5 The	  argument	  from	  supervenience	  for	  the	  ontological	  gap	  	  
	  
If	  the	  phenomenal	  is	  not	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical,	  and	  the	  physical	  domain	  is	  
causally	  closed,	  then	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  distinct	  properties	  from	  the	  physical	  
properties.	  
We	  can	  think	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  supervenience	  as	  a	  two-­‐step	  argument	  consisting	  
of	  two	  separate	  arguments.	  The	  first	  argument	  establishes	  that	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  
not	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical	  properties,	  and	  the	  second	  argument	  uses	  this	  conclusion	  
as	  one	  of	  the	  premises	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  thesis	  about	  the	  causal	  closure	  of	  the	  physical	  
to	  establish	  that	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  metaphysically	  distinct	  properties	  of	  the	  world.	  
The	  first	  one	  is	  better	  known	  as	  the	  zombie	  argument	  and	  the	  second	  one	  as	  the	  argument	  
from	  supervenience.	  	  
Let’s	   do	   this	   step	   by	   step.	   After	   laying	   out	   his	   supervenience	   argument	   and	  
concluding	  that	  property	  dualism	  must	  be	  true,	  Chalmers	  argues	  that	  natural	  supervenience	  
better	  describes	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  phenomenal	  and	  the	  physical,	  and	  leaves	  room	  for	  
the	   law-­‐like	   descriptions	   that	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	   discovered	   by	   researching	   the	   so	   called	  
neural	  correlates	  of	  consciousness.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  go	  into	  the	  details	  of	  these	  further	  
claims	   because	   rehearsing	   the	   core	   arguments	   will	   suffice	   for	   setting	   up	   the	   stage	   for	  
executing	  my	  key	  argument.	   Let’s	   go	  now	   into	  details	  of	  both	   zombie	  and	  argument	   from	  
supervenience.	  	  
The	   zombie	   argument	   can	   be	   formalized	   as	   follows	   (where	   “P”	   represents	   a	  
conjunction	  of	  all	  physical	  facts	  and	  “Q”	  represents	  any	  phenomenal	  fact):	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13.	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  conceivable;”	  
14.	  If	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  conceivable,	  then	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  possible;	  
15.	  If	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  possible,	  materialism	  is	  false;	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
16.	  Therefore,	  materialism	  is	  false.	  
	  
17.	  The	  supervenience	  argument	  can	  be	  formalized	  as	  follows:	  
18.	  The	  fact	  that	  conscious	  experience	  exists	  is	  a	  positive	  fact;	  
19.	  Conscious	  experience	  is	  not	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical;	  
20.	  If	  there	  are	  positive	  facts	  that	  are	  not	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical	  facts,	  then	  
physicalism	  is	  false;	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
21.	  Therefore,	  physicalism	  is	  false	  and	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  further	  properties	  of	  the	  
world.	  
Let	  us	  clarify	  each	  one	  of	  the	  steps	  of	  these	  arguments.	  I	  shall	  begin	  with	  the	  zombie	  
argument.	  
	  
1.5.1 The	  zombie	  argument	  
The	  first	  premise	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  there	  is	  an	  exact	  physical	  duplicate	  
of	   a	  human	  being	   that	   lacks	  phenomenal	   consciousness.	   The	   second	  premise	  goes	   further	  
and	  states	  that	  if	  such	  a	  situation	  is	  conceivable,	  it	  is	  possible.	  And	  finally	  the	  third	  premise	  
establishes	   that	   if	   an	   exact	   physical	   duplicate	   of	   a	   conscious	   being	   without	   phenomenal	  
consciousness	  whatsoever	  were	  possible,	  then	  materialism	  fails.	  The	  conclusion	  in	  the	  fourth	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step	  follows	  by	  modus	  ponens.	  Each	  one	  of	  the	  three	  premises	  in	  this	  argument	  is	  possible	  
to	   challenge,	   and	   depending	   on	   which	   premise	   one	   argues	   against,	   one	   can	   distinguish	  
among	  several	  standard	  positions	   in	  philosophy	  of	  mind.	   It	   is	   fairly	  easy	  to	  see	  what	   is	  the	  
weakest	  point	   in	  the	  argument,	  which	  of	  course	  has	  been	  widely	  debated.	   It	   is	   the	  second	  
premise,	  the	  entailment	  from	  conceivability	  to	  possibility.	  We	  will	  come	  to	  this	  issue	  shortly.	  	  
Those	   who	   deny	   the	   first	   premise	   usually	   embrace	   eliminativism,	   or	   analytic	  
functionalism.	  Basically,	  to	  deny	  the	  first	  premise	  means	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  
phenomenal	   consciousness	   does	   not	   exist	   and	   that	   the	  whole	   zombie	   paradigm	   does	   not	  
make	  sense,	  or	  to	  claim	  that	  consciousness	  exists	  but	  that	  zombies	  are	  not	  conceivable,	  thus	  
not	  possible	  in	  any	  sense.	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  it	  seems	  that	  consciousness	  exists,	  and	  there	  are	  
only	   few	   philosophers	   who	   maintain	   the	   view	   that	   consciousness	   does	   not	   exist	   (most	  
prominently	  Dennett	  1992,	  Churchland	  1992	  and	  Churchland	  1989).	  	  
The	   main	   line	   of	   argumentation	   assumed	   by	   most	   of	   the	   proponents	   of	   the	  
eliminativist	   strategy	   is	   to	   criticize	   folk	   psychological	   characterization	   of	   consciousness	   as	  
misleading.	  Furthermore,	  they	  usually	  claim	  not	  only	  that	  folk	  psychology	  misdescribes	  our	  
experiences,	   but	   further	   that	   the	   development	   of	   neuroscience	  will	   remove	   any	   sense	   of	  
puzzlement	  about	  how	  consciousness	  can	  be	  physical.	  	  
Analytic	  functionalism	  claims	  that	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  give	  topic	  neutral	  descriptions	  
of	   the	   causal	   roles	   concepts	   normally	   play	   in	   a	   theory	   then	   we	   can	   a	   priori	   translate	  
mentalistic	   or	   phenomenal	   concepts	   into	   physical	   concepts.	   On	   their	   view	   then,	   if	   Mary	  
knew	  all	  the	  physical	  facts	  she	  would	  have	  known	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  see	  red	  colour.	  The	  most	  
prominent	  proponent	  of	  this	  view	  is	  David	  Lewis	  (Lewis	  1972).	  	  
Denying	  second	  and	  third	  premises	  has	  become	  the	  mainstream	  strategy.	  Chalmers	  
calls	  it	  type	  B	  materialism.	  What	  all	  approaches	  in	  this	  group	  have	  in	  common	  according	  to	  
Chalmers	  is	  that	  they	  all	  admit	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  
We	  will	  not	  go	   into	   the	  details	  of	  all	  of	   them,	   it	  will	   suffice	  only	   to	  present	   those	   that	  are	  
relevant	   to	  my	   key	   argument.	   There	   are	   several	   varieties	   of	   this	   strategy,	   some	   of	   which	  
include	  analyses	  of	  the	  inference	  from	  conceivability	  to	  possibility	  purely	  in	  epistemic	  terms	  
(Hill	   1997;	   Ballog	   1999;	   etc.),	   involving	   analyses	   of	   the	   notions	   of	   conceivability	   and	  
imaginability	  as	  two	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  cognitive	  faculties	  that	  are	  employed	   in	  conceiving	  of	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zombies,	   one	   leading	   to	   epistemic	   and	   the	   other	   leading	   to	   metaphysical	   possibility	  
respectively,	  but	  they	  cannot	  be	  used	  jointly	  as	  it	  seems	  from	  Chalmers’	  outline.	  	  
Chalmers,	  however,	  argues	  that	  those	  who	  want	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  second	  premise	  
must	  be	  committed	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  “the	  strong	  metaphysical	  necessity”,	  which	  of	  course	  he	  
discards	  as	  implausible.	  Chalmers	  introduces	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  strong	  metaphysical	  necessity	  
(Chalmers	   1996,	   pp.	   136-­‐138)	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	  weak	  metaphysical	   necessity,	   which	   is	   a	  
standard	   Kripkean	   view	   on	   a	   posteriori	   necessity.	   The	   strong	   metaphysical	   necessity	   in	  
Chalmers’s	   terms	   rests	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   there	   could	   be	   propositions	   that	   are	  
conceivable	  but	  there	  is	  no	  metaphysically	  possible	  world	  in	  which	  they	  were	  true.	  According	  
to	  this	  view	  a	  proposition	   is	  conceivable	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  strongest	   logical	  strictures	  
but	  metaphysically	  impossible	  nevertheless.	  What	  distinguishes	  this	  notion	  of	  metaphysical	  
necessity	  from	  the	  standard	  Kripkean	  notion	  of	  a	  posteriori	  necessity	  is	  that	  whereas	  on	  the	  
Kripkean	   view	   a	   proposition	   is	   considered	   as	   conceivable	   according	   to	   its	   secondary	  
intension15	  but	  then	  discarded	  as	  misdescription,	  and	  thus	  ultimately	  impossible;	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   strong	   metaphysical	   necessity,	   a	   proposition	   is	   conceivable,	   correctly	   and	   coherently	  
described,	  but	  still	  metaphysically	  impossible.	  This	  view	  seems	  implausible	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it.	  
Chalmers’s	  refutation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  such	  a	  strong	  metaphysical	  constraint	  would	  
limit	  a	  space	  of	  possible	  worlds	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  set	  of	  metaphysically	  possible	  worlds	  
would	  be	  smaller	   than	  the	  set	  of	   logically	  possible	  worlds,	  so	   it	  would	  appear	  that	   if	   there	  
are	  worlds	   that	  are	   logically	  possible,	  but	  metaphysically	   impossible,	   then	  we	  would	  never	  
know	  about	  them.	  Chalmers’s	  refutation	  of	  this	  position	  seems	  impeccable;	  however,	  no	  one	  
actually	  argues	  for	  the	  strong	  metaphysical	  necessity.	  Chalmers	  probably	  presumes	  that	  to	  
deny	   that	   zombies	   are	   metaphysically	   possible	   is	   to	   deny	   that	   primary	   and	   secondary	  
intensions	  of	   phenomenal	   concepts	  do	  not	   coincide	   and	   the	  only	  way	   to	  back	  up	   such	  an	  
assumption	   would	   be	   to	   embrace	   the	   strong	  metaphysical	   necessity.	   As	   we	   shall	   see,	   an	  
attack	  to	  the	  second	  premise	  of	  the	  zombie	  argument	  does	  not	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  such	  a	  bizarre	  
metaphysical	  assumption.	  
                                                
15 I shall explain the distinction between primary and secondary intensions in a short while, in the section on 
two-dimensional argument.  
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  One	   of	   the	  most	   prominent	  manoeuvres	  within	   this	   approach	   is	   of	   course	   Joseph	  
Levine’s	   (Levine	   1983,	   1993,	   1998,	   2001,	   2006)	   famous	   explanatory	   gap	   account.	  We	  will	  
discuss	  it	  in	  much	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  second	  chapter.	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say,	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  
that	  Levine	  denies	  entailment	  from	  conceivability	  to	  metaphysical	  possibility,	  and	  argues	  for	  
the	   entailment	   from	   conceivability	   to	   epistemic	   possibility	   thus	   allegedly	   saving	   the	  
physicalism	   but	   at	   the	   price	   of	   the	   epistemic	   gap.	   We	   will	   discuss	   this	   position	   very	  
thoroughly	   in	   chapter	   two.	   Finally,	   challenging	   the	   second	   and	   third	   premises	   together	  
presupposes	  something	  like	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  Let’s	  just	  mention	  the	  main	  idea	  
behind	   this	   approach	   at	   this	   point,	   as	   it	   will	   be	   discussed	   at	   length	   in	   chapter	   three.	  
Proponents	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	   claim	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	  
indeed	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  concepts	  whose	  semantics	  is	  based	  on	  direct	  acquaintance	  with	  the	  
phenomenal	  properties	  or	  on	  the	  direct	  reference	  (that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  descriptions	  of	  
the	   causal	   roles	   phenomenal	   properties	   normally	   play).	   The	  manoeuvre	   is	   straightforward	  
with	  all	  versions	  of	  the	  conceivability	  arguments:	  Mary	  does	  learn	  something	  new	  upon	  her	  
release,	  but	   the	   fact	   that	   she	   learns	   something	  new	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   she	   learns	  about	  
some	   new,	   further	   property	   of	   the	   world,	   but	   merely	   that	   she	   acquires	   a	   new	   mode	   of	  
presentation	   of	   an	   old	   property.	   As	   for	   the	   zombies,	   they	   claim	   that	   zombies	   are	  
conceivable,	   perhaps	   even	   possible,	   but	   their	   possibility	   does	   not	   put	   into	   jeopardy	  
materialism	   because	   the	   possibility	   of	   zombies	   only	   shows	   that	   they	   haven’t	   acquired	   a	  
requisite	  kind	  of	  concepts.	  	  This	  is	  a	  general	  outline	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  and	  
it	   is	   very	   crude.	   It	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   greater	   detail	   in	   its	   subtleties	   in	   chapter	   three.	  
Phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	   is	  very	   important	  for	  my	  key	  argument	  as	   I	  am	  arguing	  from	  
that	  perspective	  all	  along.	  	  
Of	   course,	   the	   conclusion	   in	   point	   35.	   can’t	   be	   denied	   if	   one	   accepts	   all	   three	  
premises	   as	   it	   follows	   by	   modus	   ponens,	   one	   of	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   logical	  
reasoning.	  Basically,	  if	  one	  accepts	  premise	  33.,	  one	  cannot	  avoid	  accepting	  the	  conclusion	  in	  
the	  step	  4.	   I	  will	  be	  arguing	  against	  the	  premise	  33.	  and	  I	  will	  be	  defending	  the	  perceptual	  




1.5.2 Structure	  of	  the	  zombie	  argument	  and	  notions	  of	  supervenience	  and	  necessity	  
	  
Basically,	   what	   the	   zombie	   argument	   shows	   is	   that	   the	   supervenience	   thesis,	  
according	  to	  which	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  dependent	  on	  physical	  properties,	  does	  not	  
hold.	   Of	   course,	   the	   argument	   starts	   with	   the	   thesis	   to	   which	   a	   materialist	   must	   be	  
committed.	   The	  materialist’s	   commitment	   can	   be	   expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   global,	   local	   and	  
logical	   supervenience,	   according	   to	   Chalmers.	   Supervenience	   is	   a	   dependency	   relation	  
according	   to	  which	  higher-­‐level	  properties	  depend	  on	   the	   lower	   level	  properties	   in	   such	  a	  
way	   that	   the	   variations	   of	   the	   lower	   level	   properties	   must	   be	   followed	   by	   the	   law-­‐like	  
variation	  of	  the	  higher-­‐level	  properties.	  The	  supervenience	  thesis	  in	  its	  general	  formulation	  
reads:	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   without	   physical	   difference.	   Or	   as	   it	   is	   generally	   put	   in	   the	  
debates	   in	   philosophy	   of	   mind:	   there	   is	   no	   phenomenal	   difference	   without	   physical	  
difference.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  materialism,	  or	  shall	  we	  say	  the	  psychophysical	  supervenience16,	  
were	   true,	   then	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   physical	   properties	   remained	   the	   same	   whereas	  
phenomenal	  properties	  completely	  were	  lacking	  should	  not	  be	  possible.	  	  
Now,	  the	  superveneince	  relation	  can	  take	  several	  forms,	  depending	  on	  the	  modal	  or	  
epistemic	  perspective.	   If	  we	   think	  about	   it	   in	   terms	  of	  possible	  worlds	   that	  determine	   the	  
meaning	  of	  a	  term,	  then	  we	  have	  a	  global	  supervenience,	  which	  formally	  can	  be	  expressed	  
as	  follows:	  for	  any	  two	  possible	  worlds	  w1	  and	  w2	  and	  kinds	  of	  properties	  A	  and	  B:	  A	  kind	  of	  
properties	  supervenes	  globally	  on	  B	  kind	  of	  properties	  iff	  possible	  worlds	  w1	  and	  w2	  do	  not	  
differ	   in	   their	  B	  properties,	   then	   they	   do	   not	   differ	   in	   their	  A	   properties.	   That	   is	   to	   say	  B	  
properties	  supervene	  on	  A	  properties	   iff	  the	  A	  facts	  determine	  the	  B	  facts	  about	  the	  entire	  
world.	   The	   “world”	  here	   is	   to	  be	  understood	  as	   an	  entire	  universe,	  which	  of	   course	   could	  
have	   turned	   out	   otherwise,	   that	   is	   the	   entire	   universe	   corresponds	   here	   to	   a	   notion	   of	   a	  
“possible	  world”.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   we	   have	   a	   local	   supervenience:	   A	   properties	   of	   an	   individual	  
determine	   B	   properties	   of	   that	   individual.	   That	   is	   to	   say:	   if	   any	   two	   individuals	   x	   and	   y	  
                                                
16	  Supervenience	  can	  take	  many	  forms,	  in	  aesthetics,	  economics,	  etc.	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instantiate	   the	   A	   properties,	   they	   instantiate	   the	   B	   properties.	   In	   another	   words,	   local	  
supervenience	   on	   the	   physical	   fails	   when	   a	   supervenient	   property	   is	   context	   or	   an	  
environment	  dependant.	  	  
It	  seems	  rather	  clear	  that	  local	  supervenience	  implies	  global	  supervenience,	  but	  not	  
the	  other	  way	  around.	  Chalmers’s	  illustration	  for	  this	  claim	  involves	  the	  biological	  properties	  
that	  supervene	  globally	  on	  the	  physical.	   It	  seems	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  two	  worlds	  that	  
are	   indiscernible	   in	   their	   physical	   properties	   will	   also	   be	   indiscernible	   in	   their	   biological	  
properties.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   local	   supervenience	   might	   fail	   in	   this	   case	   because	   two	  
organisms	  might	  differ	  in	  some	  biological	  properties,	  for	  example	  one	  is	  fitter	  than	  the	  other,	  
due	  to	  some	  context	  dependencies,	  like	  immediate	  environment	  or	  personal	  history	  of	  that	  
organism.	   So,	   if	   two	   organisms	   are	   indiscernible	   locally	   they	   are	   certainly	   indiscernible	  
globally,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  
Chalmers’s	   zombie	   argument	   is	   based	   on	   the	   global	   supervenience,	   but	   it	   can	   be	  
applied	   to	   local	   superveneince	   as	   easily.	   This	   is	   because	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   if	   consciousness	  
supervenes	  at	   all,	   it	   supervenes	   locally	   and	  contexts	  and	  histories	  of	  organisms	  would	  not	  
matter	  that	  much	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  their	  particular	  experiences.	  	  
Now	  comes	  the	  really	  crucial	  account	  of	  supervenience.	  It	  is	  the	  distinction	  between	  
logical	  and	  natural	  supervenience.	  Chalmers	  needs	   logical	  supervenience	  to	  run	  his	  zombie	  
argument	  through.	  With	  the	  logical	  supervenience	  the	  notion	  of	  supervenience	  is	  spelled	  out	  
in	  terms	  of	  meaning.	  We	  can	  say	  that	  B-­‐properties	  supervene	  logically	  on	  A-­‐properties	  if	  no	  
two	  logically	  possible	  situations	  are	   identical	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  A-­‐properties	  but	  distinct	  
with	   respect	   to	   their	   B-­‐properties.	   It	   seems	   rather	   clear	   that	   the	   logical	   supervenience	  
connects	  supervenience	  and	  necessity.	   It	   is	  very	   important	   to	  note	   that	   the	  constraints	  on	  
logical	  supervenience	  are	  mainly	  conceptual.	  For	  example,	  a	  world	  that	  contains	  male	  vixens	  
is	   conceptually	   incoherent	   and	   therefore	   impossible,	   whereas	   a	   world	   containing	   flying	  
telephones	   seems	   possible	   because	   there	   is	   no	   obvious	   incoherence	   in	   the	   idea	   of	   flying	  
telephones	   and	   given	   that	   our	  world	  might	   have	   turned	  out	   otherwise,	   it	   seems	  possible.	  
Given	  that	  logical	  supervenience	  is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  logically	  possible	  worlds,	   it	  makes	  it	  
completely	  transparent	  that	  when	  evaluating	  a	  statement	  in	  terms	  of	  logical	  supervenience	  
a	   mere	   lack	   of	   contradiction	   or	   incoherence	   would	   make	   a	   statement	   metaphysically	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possible,	   according	   to	   Chalmers.	   Furthermore,	   Chalmers	   claims	   that	   if	   the	   B-­‐properties	  
logically	   supervene	   on	   the	   A-­‐properties,	   then	   the	   A-­‐properties	   entail	   the	   B-­‐properties.	   A	  
corollary	  of	  this	  would	  be	  that	  if	  A-­‐facts	  logically	  supervene	  on	  the	  B-­‐facts,	  then	  it	  should	  be	  
impossible	  for	  the	  B-­‐facts	  to	  hold	  without	  the	  A-­‐facts	  holding.	  	  
Before	   proceeding	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   there	   could	   be	   a	   supervenience	   relation	  
without	   logical	   supervenience.	   Chalmers	   calls	   it	   “natural	   supervenience”	   or	   as	   it	   is	  
sometimes	  called	  in	  the	  literature	  the	  “nomological	  supervenience”.	  It	  is	  a	  weaker	  variety	  of	  
supervenience	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	   systematic	   correlation	   between	   two	   properties	   in	   the	  
natural	  world,	  that	  is,	  a	  world	  that	  does	  not	  violate	  any	  law	  of	  nature.	  He	  claims	  that	  natural	  
supervenience	   holds	   when	   two	   situations,	   that	   could	   occur	   in	   nature,	   with	   a	   certain	  
distribution	  of	  A	   properties	   have	   the	   same	  distribution	  of	  B	  properties.	   In	   another	  words,	  
natural	   supervenience	   applies	   when	   A-­‐facts	   naturally	   necessitate	   B-­‐facts.	   Basically,	   this	  
variety	  of	  supervenience	  is	  a	  relation	  between	  two	  occurring	  properties	  according	  to	  which,	  
say,	   A	   properties	   systematically	   and	   lawfully	   accompany	   B	   properties.	   For	   example,	  
biological	   facts	   do	   supervene	   on	   the	   physical	   facts	   naturally,	   but	   also	   logically.	   It	   is	  
conceivable	  and	  thus	  possible	  that	  the	  actual	  world	  could	  have	  turned	  out	  differently,	  but	  in	  
that	  case	  totally	  different	  laws	  of	  nature	  would	  apply	  and	  if	  that	  would	  be	  the	  case	  then	  the	  
dependency	   would	   hold	   as	   necessary.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   indiscernible	   duplicate	   of	   our	  
world	  in	  respect	  to	  all	  physical	  properties	  has	  to	  be	  indiscernible	  exactly	  in	  the	  same	  way	  in	  
respect	   to	   the	   biological	   properties.	   Chalmers	   puts	   it	   in	   yet	   another	   way:	   B-­‐properties	  
supervene	   naturally	   on	   A-­‐properties	   if	   any	   two	   naturally	   possible	   situations	   with	  
indiscernible	   A-­‐properties	   have	   indiscernible	   B-­‐properties.	   A	   naturally	   possible	   situation	   is	  
one	   that	   could	   actually	   occur	   in	   nature,	  without	   violating	   any	   natural	   laws.	  A	   supervenes	  
nomologically	  on	  B,	  when	  for	  all	  objects	  x	  and	  y	  and	  all	  possible	  worlds	  wi	  where	  our	  laws	  of	  
nature	   apply,	   if	   x	   at	  w1	   and	   y	   at	  w2	   are	   indiscernible	   in	   their	  A-­‐properties,	   they	   are	   also	  
indiscernible	  in	  their	  B-­‐properties.	  	  
One	  can	  think	  about	  natural	  supervenience	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  logical	  supervenience	  
implies	  natural	  supervenience,	  but	  not	  vice	  versa.	   I	   think	   it	   is	  easy	  to	  see	  why	  that	   is	  so.	   If	  
property	  A	  is	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  property	  B,	  the	  dependency,	  although	  spelled	  out	  in	  
terms	  of	  meaning,	  has	  to	  maintain	  a	   lawful	  form,	  otherwise	   it	  would	  be	  incomprehensible.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  with	  the	  example	  of	  biological	  properties	  and	  physical	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properties,	  nomological	  or	  correlational	  dependency	  is	  not	  spelled	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  meaning	  
and	  thus	  does	  not	  hold	  necessary.	  Chalmers	  needs	  natural	  supervenience	  in	  part	  to	  describe	  
his	   ontological	   position,	   i.e.	   property	   dualism.	   Now	   after	   the	   requisite	   notions	   for	  
understanding	  Chalmers’s	  account	  have	  been	  explained,	  let’s	  turn	  to	  his	  critical	  move	  in	  the	  
argument.	   That	   is	   the	   link	   between	   supervenience	   and	   necessity	   and	   establishing	   that	  
phenomenal	   is	   not	   logically	   supervenient	   on	   the	   physical.	   Here	   we	   have	   a	   link	   between	  
supervenience	  and	  necessity.	  	  
Chalmers	  holds	  that	  higher	  level	  properties,	  or	  for	  that	  matter	  higher	  level	  facts,	  have	  
to	   necessary	   logically	   supervene	   on	   the	   respective	   lower	   level	   properties	   or	   facts	   for	   an	  
explanation	   to	   be	   successful.	   He	   claims	   that	   there	   are	   basically	   three	   methods	   for	  
establishing	   logical	   necessity,	   it	   is	   through	   conceivability,	   epistemology	  and	  analysis.	  More	  
importantly	  he	  uses	  these	  three	  approaches	  in	  arguing	  against	  logical	  supervenience	  of	  the	  
phenomenal	   on	   the	   physical	   in	   all	   five	   of	   his	   arguments.	   Not	   all	   five	   arguments	   will	   be	  
rehearsed	  here	  because	  original	  versions	  of	  some	  of	  them	  are	  already	  presented	  or	  will	  be	  
presented	   in	  great	  detail17.	  We	   just	  need	  a	  basic	   conceptual	   framework	   to	  understand	  his	  
account.	  	  
The	   conceivability	   approach	   relies	   on	   the	   claim	   that	   if	   the	   A	   properties	   logically	  
supervene	  on	  the	  B	  properties	  at	  all,	  then	  instantiation	  of	  B	  properties	  without	  instantiation	  
of	  A	  properties	  should	  not	  be	  possible.	  	  
Epistemologically,	  if	  the	  A	  facts	  logically	  supervene	  on	  the	  B	  facts	  at	  all,	  then	  knowing	  
B	   facts	   would	   a	   priori	   imply	   knowing	   A	   facts,	   at	   least	   through	   the	   primary	   intension,	  
Chalmers	  claims.	  	  
Logical	   supervenience	  holds	   iff	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	   intensions	  of	   the	  B-­‐properties	   in	  
sufficient	  detail	  enables	  one	  to	  infer	  that	  B-­‐statements	  follow	  from	  A-­‐statements	  in	  virtue	  of	  
these	  intensions	  alone.	  	  
                                                
17	  I	  refer	  here	  to:	  Kripke’s	  modal	  argument,	  the	  knowledge	  argument	  and	  two-­‐dimensional	  argument.	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Clearly	   Chalmers’s	   strategy	   now	   becomes	   much	   more	   apparent.	   Conceivability	  
approach	  is	  behind	  his	  zombie	  argument.	  Epistemological	  approach	  supports	  the	  knowledge	  
argument	  and	  finally	  method	  of	  analysis	  is	  employed	  in	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  argument.	  	  
It	   is	  clear	  by	  now	  that	  entire	  Chalmers’s	  strategy	  hinges	  upon	  two	  crucial	  points:	  a)	  
the	   link	   between	   conceivability	   and	   metaphysical	   possibility,	   b)	   on	   his	   account	   of	   the	  
phenomenal	  concept	  semantics,	  that	  is	  on	  the	  reference	  via	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles.	  
In	  the	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  I	  will	  be	  challenging	  both	  points	  b)	  and	  c).	  
Let’s	  consider	  the	  inference	  from	  logical	  possibility	  to	  metaphysical	  possibility	   in	  his	  
argument.	  Obviously,	  mere	  lack	  of	  incoherence	  or	  contradiction	  in	  conceiving	  of	  a	  situation	  
suffices	   only	   for	   establishing	   logical	   possibility.	   Some	   further	   means	   are	   required	   for	  
establishing	  metaphysical	  possibility.	  Let’s	  remind	  ourselves	  that	  logical	  possibility	  concerns	  
only	  the	  primary	  intension,	  that	  is,	  a	  priori	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  reference	  is	  fixed	  in	  the	  
actual	   world;	   whereas	   metaphysical	   possibility	   relies	   on	   the	   secondary	   intension,	   thus	  
depending	   on	   a	   posteriori	   analysis	   of	   counterfactually	   fixed	   reference.	   It	   is	   a	   posteriori	  
because	   it	  depends	  on	  how	  the	  reference	   is	  fixed	  according	  to	  primary	   intension,	  which	  of	  
course	   can	   only	   be	   determined	   a	   posteriori.	   This	   is	   the	   point	   where	   two-­‐dimensional	  
semantics	   steps	   in,	   and	   it	  will	   be	   thoroughly	   discussed	   in	   the	   section	   on	   two-­‐dimensional	  
argument.	  Let’s	  just	  see	  now	  how	  the	  whole	  story	  is	  integrated	  here.	  According	  to	  the	  two-­‐
dimensional	   analysis,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   natural	   kinds	   like	   “water”	   and	   “H2O”	   their	   secondary	  
intensions	  are	  the	  same	  although	  their	  primary	   intensions	  are	  different.	  The	  fact	  that	  their	  
primary	   intensions	   are	   different	  makes	   it	   logically	   possible	   that	   “water”	   is	   not	   “H2O”,	   it	   is	  
coherently	  conceivable	  that	  something	  else	  could	  have	  played	  the	  role	  of	  “water”.	  However,	  
given	  that	  according	  to	  their	  secondary	  intensions	  both	  concepts	  pick	  out	  the	  same	  thing,	  it	  
reflects	  our	  knowledge	  about	  how	  the	  reference	  is	  fixed	  according	  to	  the	  primary	  intension,	  
i.e.	  it	  reflects	  our	  a	  posteriori	  knowledge,	  and	  makes	  the	  situation	  metaphysically	  necessary.	  
To	  be	  precise,	  what	  makes	  it	  metaphysically	  necessary	  is	  that	  when	  we	  consider	  a	  statement	  
like	  “water	   is	  H2O”	  and	   look	  at	   its	  primary	   intension	  we	  can	  see	  that	  primary	   intensions	  of	  
the	   concept	   “water”	   and	   the	   concept	   “H2O”	   are	   different,	   they	   both	   say	   whatever	   plays	  
“watery”	   role	   is	   “water”	  or	   ”H2O”.	  We	  say	   then	   that	   it	   is	   logically	  possible	   that	   something	  
other	  than	  “water”	  might	  have	  played	  the	  “watery”	  role	  because,	  after	  all,	  the	  whole	  world	  
might	  have	  turned	  out	  differently.	  However,	  when	  we	  look	  at	  their	  secondary	  intensions	  we	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can	   see	   that	   both	   concepts	   play	   the	   same	   causal	   role,	   thus	   they	   both	   pick	   out	   the	   same	  
thing.	  So	  when	  considered	  through	  possible	  worlds	  the	  statement	  “water	   is	  H2O”	  will	  be	  a	  
posteriori	  necessary	  because	  it	  is	  metaphysically	  impossible	  that	  “water	  is	  not	  H2O”.	  
Contrary	   to	   the	   case	   of	   natural	   kinds,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   zombies	   no	   such	   thing	   as	  
discarding	  a	  counterfactual	  situation	  as	  a	  misdescription	  is	  available,	  because	  what	  feels	  as	  
pain	  is	  pain,	  and	  it	  can	  not	  be	  something	  else.	  It	  is	  or	  it	  is	  not	  pain.	  If	  it	  were	  logically	  possible	  
that	  “C-­‐fibers	  firing”	  occurs	  without	  pain,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  metaphysically	  possible	  that	  “C-­‐
fibers	  firing	  occurs	  without	  pain”	  straight	  off.	  The	  argument	  goes	  through	  in	  establishing	  that	  
the	  phenomenal	  does	  not	  logically	  supervene	  on	  the	  physical	  with	  metaphysical	  necessity.	  	  
Chalmers’s	   departure	   from	   Kripke’s	   modal	   argument	   is	   hopefully	   apparent	   now.	  
Kripke	   sets	   up	   the	   argument	   in	   terms	   of	   essential	   properties	  whereas	   Chalmers	   bases	   his	  
arguments	  on	  meaning.	  Of	  course,	  meaning	  based	  supervenience	  avoids	  few	  of	  the	  pitfalls	  
of	   the	   Kripkean	   approach,	   most	   notably	   the	   objection	   that	   essential	   properties	   as	   rigid	  
designators	   involve	   arbitrariness	   to	   a	   certain	   degree.	   However,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   meaning	  
based	   refutation	   of	   physicalism	   that	   relies	   on	   the	   supervenience	   characterization	   actually	  
stand	   less	   chances	   than	   Kripke’s	   identity	   based	   characterization.	   Naturally,	   one	   does	   not	  
have	  to	  accept	  essential	  property	  route	  in	  rigidifying	  phenomenal	  concepts	  but	  instead	  one	  
could	  ground	   the	   identity	   claim	  on	  meaning	  as	  well,	   as	   it	  will	  be	   shown	   in	   the	  chapter	  on	  
phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  	  
Furthermore,	   Chalmers	  holds	   that	  materialism	  defined	  as	   a	  psychophysical	   identity	  
thesis,	  as	  it	  is	  assumed	  in	  Kripke’s	  argument,	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  metaphysical	  necessity	  
as	   the	   supervenience	  argument	  does.	  Chalmers	  maintains	   that	   truly	   reductive	  explanation	  
requires	   a	   logical	   supervenience	   relation,	   and	   if	   that	   is	   so,	   then	   the	   materialist	   must	   be	  
committed	   to	   the	   thesis	   according	   to	  which	  phenomenal	   concepts	  have	   to	  be	  a	  posteriori	  
and	  to	  have	  necessary	  primary	  intension,	  which	  means	  it	  has	  to	  be	  a	  priori.	  We	  will	  come	  to	  
this	  issue	  later	  on	  in	  the	  discussion.	  	  
However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   supervenience	   based	   characterization	   of	  
physicalism	   implies	   that	   if	   the	   phenomenal	   is	   supervenient	   on	   the	   physical	   (regardless	   of	  
whether	  it	  is	  global	  or	  local)	  it	  has	  to	  be	  necessarily	  supervenient,	  that	  is,	  it	  has	  to	  supervene	  
logically.	   If	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   there	   were	   physical	   properties	   whereas	   phenomenal	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properties	  were	  completely	  lacking	  is	  coherently	  conceivable,	  then	  it	  is	  logically	  possible	  that	  
the	  phenomenal	  is	  not	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical.	  Chalmers	  holds	  that	  if	  such	  a	  situation	  
is	   logically	   possible,	   then	   it	   is	  metaphysically	   possible,	   thus	  making	   physicalism	   necessary	  
false.	  The	  step	  from	  logical	  possibility	  to	  metaphysical	  possibility	  here	  might	  seem	  dubious,	  
but	   Chalmers	   fortifies	   it	   with	   the	   two-­‐dimensional	   semantics.	  We	   will	   come	   to	   this	   issue	  
shortly.	  The	  main	  reason	  why	  the	  zombie	  argument	  goes	  through	  in	  the	  case	  of	  phenomenal	  
properties	  and	  breaks	  down	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds,	  according	  to	  Chalmers,	  is	  because	  
of	  the	  assumption	  that	  conceptual	  semantics	  is	  based	  on	  the	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles	  of	  
the	  properties	  they	  refer	  to.	  So	  whereas	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds	  one	  can	  admit	  that	  it	  is	  
logically	  possible	  that	  “water”	  is	  not	  “H2O”	  but	  something	  else,	  say	  “XYZ”,	  because	  the	  actual	  
world	  might	  have	  turned	  out	  differently,	  the	  counterfactual	  situation	  in	  which	  “water”	  were	  
not	   “H2O”	   is	   discarded	   as	   a	  misdescription,	   thus	  making	   it	  metaphysically	   impossible	   that	  
“water”	  is	  something	  else	  than	  “H2O”.	  Let	  me	  clarify	  this.	  One	  can	  discard	  a	  counterfactual	  
situation	  in	  which	  “water”	  were	  not	  “H2O”	  as	  a	  misdecription	  because	  we	  get	  to	  know	  what	  
plays	   the	   causal	   role	   of	   “water”	   through	   the	   third	   person	   perspective,	   because	   for	   all	  we	  
know	  something	  else	  indeed	  could	  play	  that	  role.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  in	  
pain,	   is	   characterized	   by	   that	   very	   feeling	   of	  what	   it	   is	   actually	   like	   to	   be	   in	   that	   state.	   In	  
other	   words,	   we	   get	   to	   know	   about	   these	   properties	   only	   through	   the	   first	   person	  
perspective.	  If	  something	  looks	  like	  pain	  and	  feels	  like	  pain	  then	  it	  must	  be	  pain.	  It	  is	  due	  to	  
this	   feature	   of	   phenomenal	   knowledge	   that	   we	   cannot	   discard	   the	   logical	   possibility	   of	  
zombies	  as	  a	  misdescription,	  and	  it	  is	  because	  of	  this	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  the	  
argument	  goes	  through	  to	  metaphysical	  possibility.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  third	  chapter,	  that	  
doesn’t	  have	  to	  be	  the	  case	  with	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  More	  on	  that	  will	  be	  said	  then.	  	  
Let’s	  just	  briefly	  review	  the	  argument	  from	  supervenience	  as	  it	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  a	  





1.5.3 The	  supervenience	  argument	  
	  
Let’s	   remind	   ourselves	   on	   the	   formal	   supervenience	   argument	   from	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	  
section.	  	  
20.	  The	  fact	  that	  conscious	  experience	  exists	  is	  a	  positive	  fact;	  
21.	  Conscious	  experience	  is	  not	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical;	  
22.	  If	  there	  are	  positive	  facts	  that	  are	  not	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical	  facts,	  then	  
physicalism	  is	  false;	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
23.	  Therefore,	  physicalism	  is	  false	  and	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  further	  properties	  of	  the	  
world.	  
Once	  premise	  21.	  is	  established	  in	  the	  zombie	  argument,	  Chalmers	  has	  an	  open	  road	  
to	   cast	   the	   argument	   from	   supervenience.	   The	   first	   premise	   is	   granted	   by	   the	   mere	  
immediacy	  of	  the	  first	  person	  experience.	  Chalmers	  even	  says	  that	  we	  could	  doubt	  about	  the	  
existence	   of	   other	   minds,	   but	   one	   thing	   that	   is	   for	   sure	   is	   the	   unmediated	   intimate	  
acquaintance	  with	  our	  own	  experience.	  
Again,	  as	  with	  the	  zombie	  argument,	  some	  of	  the	  premises	   in	  the	  argument	  can	  be	  
challenged,	   and	   have	   been	   challenged,	   but	   the	   conclusion	   cannot	   be	   questioned	   if	   one	  
accepts	  all	  the	  premises.	  Clearly,	  denying	  the	  first	  premise	  commits	  one	  to	  eliminativism.	  We	  
won’t	   be	   spending	   much	   time	   here	   on	   this	   approach	   as	   it	   was	   already	   outlined	   in	   the	  
previous	  subsection.	  	  
My	  route	  shall	  be	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  zombie	  argument	  to	  argue	  against	  premise	  21.	  The	  
approach	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  pursue	  here	  shall	  be	  twofold.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  
from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  a	  la	  Papineau,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  that	  arguments	  for	  both	  ontological	  and	  explanatory	  gap	  positions	  in	  
fact	   exemplify	   a	   case	   of	   brute	   disagreement	   no	   argument	   could	   help	   overcome.	   It	   rather	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seems	  that	  the	  dispute	  is	  about	  the	  clash	  of	  intuitions	  and	  that	  only	  an	  account	  of	  how	  we	  
connect	   psychological	   concepts	   and	   phenomenal	   concepts	   can	   help	   us	   understand	   the	  
perplexity	  of	   the	  problem.	  But	  before	   I	   can	  begin	   laying	  out	  my	  key	  argument	  some	  more	  
exegetical	  work	  needs	  to	  be	  done.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   technical	   subtleties	   of	   the	   metaphysical	   and	  
epistemological	  assumptions	   involved	  in	  the	  zombie/supervenience	  argument	  we	  will	  need	  
to	  rehearse	  and	  analyze	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  argument.	  Let’s	  turn	  now	  to	  this	  issue.	  	  
	   	  
1.6 The	  2-­‐D	  argument	  
As	  we	  probably	  know	  by	  now,	  the	  conceivability	  argument	  starts	  with	  the	  thesis	   to	  
which	  a	  materialist	  must	  be	  committed:	   if	  the	  mental	  states	  supervene	  on	  the	  brain	  states	  
(P⇒Q),	  then	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  there	  are	  brain	  states	  without	  mental	  states	  should	  not	  be	  
possible.	   This	   is	   so	   because,	   according	   to	   Kripke	   (Kripke	   1980),	   all	   identity	   statements	  
involving	   rigid	   designators,	   if	   true	   at	   all,	  must	   be	   necessary	   true.	   After	   having	   established	  
what	  a	  materialist	  is	  committed	  to,	  the	  argument	  departs	  from	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  situation	  in	  
which	   the	   brain	   states	   take	   place	   but	   phenomenal	   states	   are	   lacking	   altogether	   is	  
conceivable.	  It	  is	  argued,	  then,	  if	  such	  a	  situation	  is	  conceivable,	  it	  is	  possible.	  Finally,	  if	  such	  
a	   situation	   is	   possible,	   then	  materialism	   is	   false,	   because	   as	  we	   recall	   identity	  has	   to	  hold	  
necessarily	  in	  order	  to	  be	  true.	  	  
Now,	  how	  do	  we	  come	  from	  a	  purely	  epistemic	  claim	  about	  what	   is	  conceivable	  to	  
the	  modal	  claim	  about	  what	  is	  possible?	  	  
According	   to	   Kripke,	   the	   only	   thing	   we	   need	   to	   make	   this	   step	   is	   a	   lack	   of	  
contradiction	   in	   conceiving	   such	   a	   situation.	   This	   principle	   has	  often	  been	   criticized	   in	   the	  
case	   of	   zombies.	   Now	   the	   famous	   example	   with	   the	   natural	   kind	   terms	   comes	   into	   play.	  
Namely,	  there	  is	  no	  contradiction	  in	  conceiving	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  water	  is	  not	  H2O	  either.	  
However,	   because	   “water”	   rigidly	   designates	   H2O,	   the	   argument	   actually	   shows	   that,	  
although	   conceivable,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   that	  water	   is	   not	   H2O.	   How	   does	   this	   step	   of	   the	  
inference	  work?	   Since	   it	   is	   an	   empirical	   discovery	   that	  water	   is	   H2O,	   the	   reference	   of	   the	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identity	  statement	  is	  not	  fixed	  a	  priori.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  our	  world	  might	  
have	   been	   different,	   so	   water	   might	   have	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   something	   else	   in	   our	   world	  
(depending	  on	  the	  actual	  empirical	  discovery).	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  our	  knowledge	  
that	  would	  contradict	  the	  conceivability	  of	  the	  claim	  “water	   is	  something	  other	  than	  H2O”.	  
Just	  to	  give	  a	  contrastive	  example,	  given	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  triangle,	  a	  geometrical	  figure	  that	  
has	   three	   angles,	   it	   is	   neither	  a	  priori	   conceivable	   nor	   possible	   for	   a	   triangle	   to	   have	   four	  
angles.	  	  
Why	  does	  this	  step	  from	  conceivability	  to	  metaphysical	  possibility	  break	  down	  in	  the	  
case	   of	   “water⇒H2O”?	  According	   to	   Kripke,	   it	   is	   because	   the	   reference	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  
water	  is	  fixed	  to	  its	  microphysical	  structure,	  which	  in	  our	  world	  is	  H2O.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  
it	  turned	  out	  that	  the	  microphysical	  structure	  of	  water	  in	  our	  actual	  world	  was	  not	  H2O	  but	  
something	  else,	  say	  XYZ,	  then	  the	  reference	  of	  “water”	  would	  be	  fixed	  to	  XYZ	  in	  the	  actual	  
world.	   According	   to	   Kripke,	   rigid	   designation	   of	   natural	   kind	   terms	   is	   always	   tied	   to	  
microphysical	   structure.	  This,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  means	   that	  whatever	  we	  discover	  at	   the	  
microphysical	  level	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  water,	  fixes	  the	  reference	  of	  “water”.	  In	  a	  sense,	  it	  is	  
not	   the	   empirical	   discovery	   that	   fixes	   the	   reference,	   because	   the	   reference	   is	   fixed	  
beforehand,	  but	  whatever	  we	  believe	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  water.	  This	  is	  how	  rigid	  designation	  
of	   the	   natural	   kind	   terms	   actually	   works	   according	   to	   Kripke.	   	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   only	  
conceivable	  that	  water	  might	  not	  have	  been	  H2O,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  possible.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  
some	  counterfactual	  world	  at	  which	  water	  is	  not	  H2O,	  was	  actual,	  then	  “water	  is	  H2O”	  would	  
be	  false	  considered	  from	  that	  world.	  And	  this	  is	  where	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  semantics	  steps	  
in.	   According	   to	   Chalmers’s	   interpretation	   of	   two-­‐dimensionalism,	   concepts	   have	   two	  
intensions,	  which	  are	  functions	  from	  truth	  conditions	  to	  possible	  worlds	  and	  vice	  versa.	  The	  
intension	   that	   goes	   from	   the	   truth	   conditions	   in	   the	   actual	   world	   to	   the	   counterfactual	  
worlds	  is	  the	  primary	  intention.	  The	  primary	  intension	  tells	  us	  what	  fixes	  the	  reference	  in	  the	  
actual	  world.	  The	  secondary	   intension	  goes	  from	  possible	  worlds	  to	  truth	  conditions	   in	  the	  
actual	  world	   and	   tells	   us	   how	   the	   reference	   in	   the	   counterfactual	  world	   is	   fixed.	   In	   other	  
words,	  a	  term	  S	  is	  verified	  in	  some	  possible	  world	  W	  considered	  as	  actual,	   if	  and	  only	  if	   its	  
primary	  intension	  is	  true	  at	  W.	  A	  term	  S	  is	  satisfied	  in	  some	  possible	  world	  if	  and	  only	  if	  its	  
secondary	  intension	  is	  true	  there.	  The	  two-­‐dimensional	  semantics	  is	  here	  employed	  to	  show	  
why	   the	   step	   from	   conceivability	   to	   metaphysical	   possibility	   in	   the	   case	   of	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phenomenal/physical	  works	  and	  why	  it	  breaks	  down	  in	  the	  case	  of	  water/H2O.	  Let’s	  have	  a	  
closer	  look	  at	  what	  is	  going	  on	  here.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   utilize	   his	   interpretation	   of	   two-­‐dimensional	   semantics,	   Chalmers	  
distinguishes	   several	   kinds	  of	   conceivability.	   Conceivability	   is	   here	   to	  be	  understood	  as	   an	  
epistemic	  notion.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  what	  he	  calls	  “prima	  facie	  conceivability”,	  which	  requires	  
that	  the	  subject	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  rule	  out	  a	  hypothesis	  solely	  by	  a	  priori	  reasoning.	  The	  
second	   one	   is	   ideal	   conceivability	   which	   goes	   a	   bit	   further	   in	   trying	   to	   abstract	   from	   the	  
cognitive	   capacities	   of	   a	   subject,	   and	   claims	   that	   a	   hypothesis	   is	   ideally	   conceivable	   if	   it	  
cannot	  be	  ruled	  out	  a	  priori	  even	  on	  ideal	  rational	  reflection	  (Chalmers	  2009).	  	  
	  	   The	  opposite	  case	  from	  these	  two	  is	  the	  already	  mentioned	  example	  with	  a	  triangle	  -­‐	  
given	  the	  definition	  of	  triangles	  as	  geometrical	  bodies	  with	  three	  angles,	  conceivability	  of	  the	  
triangles	  with	  four	  angles	  is	  ruled	  out	  a	  priori.	  	  
These	  two	  kinds	  of	  conceivability	  are	  examples	  of	  negative	  conceivability.	  However,	  
there	   is	   also	   a	   positive	   conceivability.	   This	   sort	   is	   best	   known	   from	   Descartes’s	   thought	  
experiments	  (Descartes	  1996).	  Positive	  prima	  facie	  conceivability	  is	  the	  case	  when	  a	  subject	  
can	  imagine	  a	  situation	  that	  she	  takes	  to	  be	  coherent	  and	  as	  the	  one	  in	  which	  the	  hypothesis	  
is	  the	  case.	  As	  with	  negative	  conceivability,	  here	  we	  also	  have	   ideal	  positive	  conceivability.	  
We	   say	   that	   a	   situation	   is	   ideally	   positively	   conceivable	   if	   its	   prima	   facie	   positive	  
conceivability	  cannot	  be	  defeated.	  	  
However,	   the	   most	   important	   kinds	   of	   conceivability	   according	   to	   Chalmers	   are	  
primary	   and	   secondary	   conceivability.	   These	   two	   kinds	   of	   conceivability	   can	   be	   based	   on	  
either	  positive	  or	  negative	  conceivability.	  What	  distinguishes	   them	   is	  not	   just	  an	  epistemic	  
perspective	   or	   cognitive	   capacities,	   but	   also	   a	   sense	   in	   which	   we	   say	   something	   is	  
conceivable.	  So,	  we	  say,	  for	  example,	  that	  “water	  is	  not	  H2O”	  is	  primary	  conceivable,	  exactly	  
as	   it	   is	  stated,	  that	   is,	   that	  water	   is	  actually	  NOT	  H2O	  (which	   in	  Kripkean	  terms	  means	  that	  
the	  whole	  world	   is	   otherwise,	   not	   just	  water	   and	  H2O),	  whereas	   in	   the	   case	   of	   secondary	  
possibility	   we	   take	   a	   sense	   of	   conceivable	   in	   which	   “water	   is	   not	   H2O”	   merely	   seems	  
conceivable	   but	   is	   not	   conceivable.	   An	   example	   for	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   we	   think	   of	   the	  
secondary	  conceivability	   is	  to	  say	  that	  when	  we	  say	  “water	   is	  not	  H2O”	  we	  only	  mean	  that	  
watery	  stuff	  (that	  seems	  like	  water)	  is	  not	  H2O,	  but	  water	  as	  we	  know	  it	  is	  still	  H2O.	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When	  we	  look	  at	  the	  distinction	  between	  primary	  and	  secondary	  conceivability	  in	  the	  
light	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  a	  priori	  and	  the	  a	  posteriori	  knowledge,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  
primary	  conceivability	  can	  only	  be	  made	  plausible	   in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  a	  priori.	   	  That	   is,	  a	  
hypothesis	   is	   primary	   conceivable	   if	   it	   cannot	   be	   ruled	   out	   purely	   on	   a	   priori	   reasoning,	  
without	  any	  reference	  to	  empirical	  or	  extra-­‐linguistic	  knowledge.	  	  
So	  what	  is	  the	  link	  between	  primary	  and	  secondary	  conceivability	  on	  the	  one	  side	  and	  
metaphysical	  possibility	  on	  the	  other?	  	  
The	  primary	  intension	  of	  the	  sentence	  “water	  is	  not	  H2O”	  (¬S	  hereafter)	  is	  true	  at	  the	  
counterfactual	   world	  W	   considered	   as	   actual,	   and	   its	   secondary	   intension	   at	  W1,	   say	   our	  
world	   considered	   as	   counterfactual,	   is	   false,	   because	   at	   our	  world	  water	   is	  H2O.	   To	   put	   it	  
differently,	   a	   world	   verifies	   S	   iff	   its	   primary	   intension	   is	   true	   at	   that	   world,	   and	   a	   world	  
satisfies	  S	  iff	  its	  secondary	  intension	  is	  true	  there	  considered	  from	  the	  actual	  world.	  	  
So,	   in	   order	   to	   prove	   that	   these	   steps	   of	   inference	   in	   the	   conceivability	   argument	  
follow	   a	   priori,	   Chalmers’s	   reasoning	   is	   based	   on	   the	   distinction	   between	   primary	  
conceivability	  and	  possibility	  and	  secondary	  conceivability	  and	  possibility.	  So	  how	  does	  this	  
work?	  We	   said	   that,	   for	   example,	   water	   is	   not	   H2O	   is	   primary	   conceivable	   and	   therefore	  
primary	  possible	  because	  “water	  is	  H2O”	  is	  not	  an	  a	  priori	  truth.	  Knowledge	  of	  “water	  is	  H2O”	  
is	  not	  based	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms,	  linguistic	  rules,	  etc,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  empirical	  discovery,	  
which	  we	  then	  employ	  to	  understand	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms.	  So,	  for	  all	  we	  know	  water	  might	  
have	  been	  something	  other	  than	  H2O	  in	  our	  world.	  Unlike	  the	  case	  of	  a	  triangle,	  wherein	  a	  
four-­‐angled	   triangle	   is	   simply	   incoherent	   even	   to	   conceive	   of,	   because	   if	   we	   grasped	   the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  concept	  “triangle”,	  we	  know,	  without	  any	  reference	  to	  extra-­‐linguistic	  or	  to	  
empirical	  knowledge,	  that	  a	  four	  angle	  triangle	  is	  an	  incoherent	  concept,	  and	  therefore	  not	  
possible.	  So	  when	  we	  say	  “water	  is	  not	  H2O”	  is	  possible,	  it	  only	  means	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  
in	  our	  knowledge	  that	  would	  contradict	  to	  this	  statement	  prima	  facie,	  in	  a	  sense,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  
statement	   about	   just	   water	   and	   H2O,	   but	   the	   statement	   about	   the	   whole	   world	   and	   its	  
nomological	   structure.	   Now,	   Chalmers	   wants	   to	   show	   that	   if	   we	   apply	   the	   conceivability	  
argument	  to	  the	  case	  of	  water/H2O,	  what	  is	  actually	  claimed	  simply	  leads	  to	  inconsistency,	  
by	  showing	  that	  although	  in	  the	  case	  of	  water/H2O	  the	  statement	  “water	  is	  not	  H2O”	  is	  prima	  
facie	  conceivable,	  thus	  primary	  possible,	   it	   is	  not	  conceivable	  and	  therefore	  not	  possible	   in	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the	  sense	  in	  which	  water	  is	  still	  H2O	  and	  there	  is	  some	  watery	  stuff	  that	  has	  the	  same	  macro	  
properties	   of	   water,	   but	   which	   is	   not	   H2O,	   that	   is	   “water	   is	   not	   H2O”	   is	   not	   secondary	  
possible.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   primary	   possibility,	   if	   water	  was	   not	   H2O	   but	   otherwise,	   then	   as	  
Kripke	  puts	   it,	   the	  whole	  world	  would	  be	  otherwise	  and	  the	  statement	  “water	   is	  not	  H2O”	  
would	  be	  true.	  This	  is	  why	  two-­‐dimensional	  analysis	  comes	  very	  handy	  in	  these	  complicated	  
cases.	   We	   need	   the	   secondary	   possibility	   to	   see	   what	   is	   going	   on	   with	   the	   secondary	  
intension	  considered	  from	  some	  centred	  world.	  	  
Let	  us	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  argument	  with	  natural	  kinds	  like	  water	  and	  H2O.	  Let	  W	  be	  
the	  proposition	  that	  water	  is	  not	  H2O.	  
24.	  W	  is	  conceivable;	  
This	  premise	  says	  that	  prima	  facie	   (it	  could	  not	  be	  ruled	  out	  a	  priori)	   it	   is	  conceivable	  that	  
water	  is	  not	  H2O.	  
25.	  If	  W	  is	  conceivable,	  W	  is	  1-­‐	  possible;	  
This	  premise	  says	  that	  if	  the	  statement	  is	  prima	  facie	  conceivable,	  then	  it	  is	  primary	  possible.	  	  
26.	  If	  W	  is	  1-­‐	  possible,	  then	  W	  is	  2-­‐possible;	  
This	  premise	  says	  that	   if	   the	  proposition	  “water	   is	  not	  H2O”	  were	  primary	  possible,	   then	   it	  
would	  be	  secondary	  possible,	  which	  doesn’t	  follow	  in	  this	  case.	  	  
Whereas	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   phenomenal/neurobiological	   the	   argument	   goes	   right	  
through,	   from	   primary	   possibility	   to	   secondary	   possibility,	   and	   given	   the	   physicalist	  
commitment	  thesis,	  the	  conclusion	  is	  not	  compatible	  with	  it	  -­‐	  therefore	  physicalism	  is	  false.	  	  
Let	  us	  have	  that	  argument	  formalized	  as	  well:	  
27.	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  conceivable;	  
28.	  If	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  conceivable,	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  1-­‐	  possible;	  
29.	  If	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  1-­‐	  possible,	  then	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  2-­‐possible;	  
30.	  If	  (P&¬Q)	  is	  2-­‐possible,	  materialism	  is	  false;	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31.	  Therefore,	  materialism	  is	  false.	  	  
So	  what	  is	  going	  on	  here	  compared	  to	  the	  water/H2O	  case?	  The	  argument	  here	  says	  
that	   if	   a	   hypothesis	   is	   conceivable	   then	   it	   is	   primary	   possible,	   in	   another	   words	   it	   is	   not	  
possible	   to	   rule	  out	   that	  hypothesis	   solely	  on	   the	  ground	  of	  a	  priori	   reasoning.	   This	   is	   the	  
point	  where	  epistemic	  and	  modal	  principles	  meet,	  because	  if	  a	  conceived	  hypothesis	  is	  not	  
possible	  to	  rule	  out	  a	  priori,	  then	  it	  is	  possible.	  This	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  primary	  possibility,	  or	  
the	  link	  between	  conceivability	  and	  possibility	  in	  Kripkean	  terms,	  which	  has	  been	  criticized	  in	  
particular	   for	   this	   step.	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	   block	   these	   principle	   objection,	   Chalmers	   goes	  
further	   in	  claiming	  that	  although	  the	  statement	  “water	   is	  not	  H2O”	  is	  primary	  possible,	  the	  
identity	  of	  water	  with	  H2O	  is	  established	  only	  a	  posteriori;	  however,	  once	  established	  as	  an	  
identity	   it	   holds	   necessary.	   We	   might	   say	   that	   there	   are	   no	   a	   priori	   reasons	   that	   would	  
contradict	  to	  conceiving	  of	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  water	  is	  not	  H2O	  in	  a	  strict	  sense	  (something	  
other	  than	  H2O	  plays	  the	  water	  role)	  -­‐	  this	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  primary	  possibility	  –	  but	  it	  is	  not	  
possible	   that	  water	   is	  H2O	   in	   the	   actual	  world	   and	   yet	   something	   else	   in	   a	   counterfactual	  
world	   -­‐	   this	   is	   the	   sense	   of	   the	   secondary	   possibility.	   This	   distinction	   clearly	   shows	   that	  
primary	   conceivability	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   secondary	   possibility	   in	   the	   case	   of	   “water	   is	   not	  
H2O”.	   However,	   “water	   is	   not	   H2O”	   is	   compatible	   with	   the	   inferences	   from	   primary	  
conceivability	   to	   primary	   possibility	   and	   from	   secondary	   conceivability	   to	   secondary	  
possibility.	  	  
The	  argument	  against	  the	  identity	  of	  water	  and	  H2O	  breaks	  down	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
the	   inference	   from	  primary	   conceivability	   to	   secondary	   possibility,	   because	   the	   statement	  
has	   the	   primary	   and	   secondary	   intensions	   that	   do	   not	   coincide.	   In	   other	   words	   it	   is	   not	  
coherent	   to	   think	   of	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   a	   world	  W1	   verifies	   the	   statement’s	   primary	  
intension	  and	  a	  world	  W2	  satisfies	  its	  secondary	  intension,	  given	  that	  they	  are	  separated	  (do	  
not	  coincide),	  that	  is	  it	   is	  not	  coherent	  to	  hold	  that	  water	  at	  W1	  is	  H2O	  and	  water	  at	  W2	  is	  
XYZ,	  since	  “water	  is	  H2O”	  is	  verified	  at	  W1	  (is	  necessarily	  true)	  it	  cannot	  be	  XYZ.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  phenomenal/neurobiological	   the	  primary	  and	  secondary	   intensions	  of	  
the	  statement	  do	  coincide,	  which	  in	  effect	  allows	  for	  the	  inference	  from	  primary	  possibility	  
to	  secondary	  conceivability,	  and	  further	  to	  secondary	  possibility.	  This	  is	  so	  because,	  as	  Kripke	  
noted,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  phenomenal/neurobiological	   there	   is	  no	   strong	  dissociation	  between	  
appearance	  and	  reality,	  to	  paraphrase	  him:	  pain	  is	  identified	  with	  its	  immediate	  quality.	  To	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put	  it	  into	  more	  technical	  terms,	  dissociations	  between	  water	  and	  H2O,	  or	  between	  heat	  and	  
molecular	  motion,	   seem	  conceivable,	   but	   they	   are	  only	  primary	   conceivable,	   thus	  primary	  
possible,	   because	   their	   meanings	   have	   two	   modal	   dimensions,	   one	   that	   goes	   from	   the	  
possible	  world	  to	  truth	  values	  or	  primary	  intension,	  which	  tells	  us	  what	  plays	  the	  water	  role	  
in	  the	  centred	  world;	  and	  the	  other	  intension	  that	  goes	  from	  truth	  values	  to	  possible	  worlds	  
or	   the	   secondary	   intension.	   Now,	   since	   in	   the	   case	   of	   natural	   kind	   terms,	   primary	   and	  
secondary	  intensions	  do	  not	  coincide,	  it	  is	  because	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  learn	  about	  their	  
primary	   intensions	   (objective,	   third	   person	   perspective),	   in	   the	   case	   of	   phenomenal	  
consciousness	   primary	   and	   secondary	   intensions	   collapse	   into	   one,	   because	   of	   the	  
immediacy	  of	  phenomenal	  knowledge	  which	  dissolves	  the	  distinction	  between	  appearance	  
and	  reality,	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  whatever	  properties	  of	  our	  experience	  appear	  to	  us,	  they	  are	  not	  
merely	  appearing,	  they	  are	  real.	  Remember	  Nagel’s	  account	  (Nagel	  1974).	  	  	  
What	   is	   going	   on	   in	   the	   case	   of	   phenomenal/neurobiological	   is	   that	   it	   seems	   that	  
both	  W1	  and	  W2	  verify	  the	  statement.	   In	  a	  sense	  primary	  and	  secondary	   intensions	  of	  the	  
statement	  “the	  phenomenal	  is	  not	  neurobiological”	  seem	  to	  coincide.	  That	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  
the	   two-­‐dimensional	   argument	   in	   this	   case	   goes	   through	   from	   primary	   possibility	   to	  
secondary	   conceivability	   and	   further	   to	   secondary	   possibility.	   This	   argument	   structure	  
purports	  to	  be	  saying	  that	  both	  statements	  -­‐	  “pain=C	  fiber	  firing”	  and	  “C	  fiber	  firing≠pain”-­‐	  
seem	  to	  be	  true,	  which	  is	  a	  contradiction.	  	  
To	  put	   it	   in	   other	  words,	   in	   the	   case	  of	   natural	   kind	   terms,	   like	   “water”	   or	   “heat”,	  
there	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  dissociation	  between	  what	  is	  just	  an	  appearance	  and	  what	  is	  real,	  
i.e.	  we	  can	   imagine	  that	  something	  might	   look	   like	  water	  or	  heat	  whereas	   in	   fact	   it	   is	  not.	  
Since	  the	  identity	  statement	  	  “water	  is	  H2O”	  is	  not	  based	  on	  a	  priori	  knowledge,	  there	  is	  no	  a	  
priori	   contradiction	   in	   conceiving	  of	   a	   situation	   in	  which	  water	   is	   not	  H2O,	   and	   thus	   if	   the	  
hypothesis	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out	  a	  priori,	  then	  it	  is	  possible.	  What	  makes	  it	  break	  down	  is	  the	  
fact	  that	  given	  the	  a	  posteriori	  necessity	  of	  the	  identity	  statement	  	  “water	  is	  H2O”,	  it	   is	  not	  
possible	  that	  water	  is	  something	  else	  at	  W2	  and	  still	  H2O	  at	  W1.	  However,	  what	  is	  possible	  is	  
that	   if	  water	  was	  something	  else	   in	   the	  actual	   	   (centred)	  world,	   then	   its	  primary	   intension	  
would	  be	  fixed	  to	  whatever	  that	  “something	  else”	  is,	  to	  whatever	  plays	  the	  water	  role	  in	  the	  
counterfactual	  scenario.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  statement	  “water	  is	  not	  H2O”	  would	  be	  true	  in	  the	  
actual	  world.	  But	   this	  only	  means	   that	   the	  whole	  world	  would	  be	  otherwise.	  This	  makes	  a	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strong	   case,	   then,	   that	   primary	   and	   secondary	   intensions	   of	   phenomenal	   terms	  do	   in	   fact	  
coincide.	   This	   in	   effect	   makes	   the	   two-­‐dimensional	   argument	   involving	   the	  
phenomenal/neurobiological	   to	   go	   through	   to	   the	   secondary	   possibility,	   which	   ultimately	  
means	  that	  physicalism	  leads	  to	  contradiction,	  assuming	  that	  the	  primary	  and	  the	  secondary	  
intensions	  of	  phenomenal	  terms	  coincide.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  we	  started	  off	  with	  Nagel’s	  account	  of	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  and	  proto-­‐
knowledge	   argument	   (Nagel	   1974).	   We	   examined	   issues	   of	   subjective	   and	   objective	  
knowledge	  and	   its	  role	   in	  determining	  modal	  and	  ontological	  status	  of	  a	  statement	  (Kripke	  
1980).	  We	  also	  saw	  how	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  according	  to	  some	  philosophers	  (Jackson	  1982,	  
1986)	  generates	  very	  serious	  metaphysical	  problems.	  We	  saw	  that	  these	  accounts	  need	  to	  
be	   backed	   up	   by	   considerations	   about	   the	   inference	   from	   conceivability	   to	   metaphysical	  
possibility	  and	  about	  two-­‐dimensional	  modal	  semantics	  (Chalmers	  1996,	  2009).	  	  In	  the	  next	  
chapter	  I	  will	  be	  considering	  in	  great	  detail	  Levine’s	  account	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  (Levine	  
1983,	   1993,	   2001)	   that	   utilizes	   the	   distinctions	   and	   arguments	   presented	   in	   this	   chapter.	  
After	  that	  I	  will	  be	  presenting	  and	  discussing	  my	  own	  account	  of	  the	  problem,	  starting	  from	  











2. CHAPTER	  2	  
	  
2.1 The	  explanatory	  gap	  account	  
	  
“On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  have	  excellent	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  
conscious	  experience	  must	  be	  reducible,	  in	  the	  requisite	  sense,	  to	  a	  physical	  
phenomenon,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  don't	  see	  how	  it	  could	  be.”	  (Levine	  2001,	  p.	  175).	  
	  
As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   anti-­‐physicalist	   conceivability	  
arguments	   force	   us	   to	   face	   serious	   metaphysical	   consequences	   if	   we	   accept	   all	   their	  
premises.	   Nagel’s	   account	   (Nagel	   1974)	   was	   just	   an	   outline	   of	   the	   knowledge	   argument	  
(Jackson	  1982,	  1986).	  Jackson	  argued	  further	  that	  from	  the	  body	  of	  physical	  facts	  one	  cannot	  
infer	  phenomenal	  facts,	  and	  that,	  therefore,	  phenomenal	  facts	  are	  not	  physical	  facts.	  Both	  of	  
these	   two	   accounts	   presuppose	   that	   the	   conceptualizations	   available	   for	   the	  
neurophysiological	   and	   the	   phenomenal	   domains	   respectively	   are	   at	   the	   very	   least	  
incompatible.	  This	  roughly	  means	  that	  concepts	  that	  we	  use	  to	  grasp	  the	  neurophysiological	  
properties	  leave	  out	  some	  of	  the	  crucial	  or	  defining	  features	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  properties.	  
It	  is	  the	  “what	  is	  it	  likeness”	  of	  experience	  from	  the	  experiencer’s	  point	  of	  view.	  In	  the	  first	  
chapter,	   we	   had	   an	   opportunity	   to	   follow	   this	   line	   of	   reasoning	   in	   an	   ascending	   order	   of	  
complexity	  from	  Nagel	  (Nagel	  1974),	  Kripke’s	  identity	  based	  modal	  argument	  (Kripke	  1980),	  
Jackson’s	  knowledge	  argument	  (Jackson	  1982,	  1986),	  Chalmers’s	  zombie	  argument	  and	  the	  
argument	  for	  property	  dualism	  (Chalmers	  1996)	  to	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  argument	  (Chalmers	  
2009).	   Now	   the	   time	   has	   come	   to	   examine	   some	   of	   the	   central	   assumptions	   in	   all	   these	  
arguments,	   namely	   the	   incompatibility	   of	   phenomenal	   and	   physical	   concepts,	   and	   the	  
consequences	   of	   these	   arguments.	   At	   its	   core	   the	   problem	  we	   are	   about	   to	   tackle	   is	   that	  
“…we	   have	   excellent	   reasons	   for	   thinking	   that	   mental	   phenomena,	   including	   conscious	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experience,	  must	  be	  a	  species	  of	  physical/natural	  phenomena.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  also	  
have	   excellent	   reasons	   for	   thinking	   conscious	   experience	   cannot	   be	   captured	   in	  
physical/natural	  terms”	  (Levine	  2001,	  pp.	  9–10).	  Levine	  powerfully	  argues	  that	  although	  the	  
entailment	  from	  conceivability	  to	  metaphysical	  possibility	  of	  zombies	  cannot	  be	  established,	  
materialism	  is	  still	  not	  off	  the	  hook	  because	  this	  claim	  needs	  a	  further	  argument	  that	  would	  
explain	  how	  the	  same	  property	  can	   instantiate	  two	  semantically	  different	  concepts.	   In	  this	  
chapter	   I	   lay	  out	  his	   account	   along	  with	   the	   technical/conceptual	   apparatus	   it	   rests	   upon.	  
This	  whole	  chapter	  is	  devoted	  solely	  to	  laying	  out	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  account	  and	  therefore	  
it	   is	  shorter	  than	  the	  other	  chapters.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  chapter	  I	  will	  re-­‐examine	  the	  whole	  
account	  and	  provide	  a	  criticism	  of	  it.	  After	  that	  in	  the	  third	  chapter	  I	  pave	  the	  way	  to	  my	  own	  
position	  by	  assessing	  some	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  responses	  to	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  	  
Let’s	  turn	  now	  to	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  account.	   I	  start	  off	   laying	  it	  out	  by	  examining	  
some	  technical	  terms	  Levine	  (2001)	  has	  introduced.	  The	  first	  on	  our	  agenda	  is	  the	  difference	  
between	   “thick”	   and	   “thin”	  modes	   of	   presentation	   and	   “thick”	   and	   “thin”	   concepts.	   After	  
that	   I	   will	   be	   examining	   notions	   of	   “thick”	   and	   “thin”	   conceivability,	   ascriptive	   and	   non-­‐
ascriptive	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  then	  gappy	  and	  non-­‐gappy	  identities,	  and	  finally	  in	  the	  last	  
section	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  explanations.	  
Let’s	  begin	  with	  “thick”	  and	  “thin”	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  	  
	  
2.2 Thick	  and	  thin	  concepts	  and	  modes	  of	  presentations	  
To	   understand	   this	   idea	   one	  must	   realize	   that	   the	  ways	   in	   which	  we	   conceptually	  
grasp	  properties	  determine	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  explanation	  of	  a	  given	  phenomenon	  works.	  
One	  can	  think	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  think	  about	  content	  of	  our	  experience	  as	  modes	  of	  
presentation	  (Levine	  2001,	  p.	  8).	  Levine	  claims	  that	  this	  point	  becomes	  really	  obvious	  when	  
one	  considers	   the	  modes	  of	  presentation	   that	  are	  employed	  when	  we	   think	  about	  natural	  
kinds	  and	  about	  qualities	  of	  our	  own	  experiences.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds	  the	  mode	  of	  
presentation	   is	   representationally	   “thin”,	   i.e.	   our	   cognitive	   relation	   to	   the	   content	   of	  
experience	   of	   a	   natural	   kind	   bears	   nothing	   substantial	   or	   determinate	   apart	   from	   the	  
informational	  presentation	  and	  perhaps	  relation	  to	  other	  presentationally	  “thin”	  properties.	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Take	  for	  example	  a	  concept	  of	  a	  cat.	  There	  are	  two	  things	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  mode	  of	  
presentation	  here.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  a	  mental	  symbol	  “cat”	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
there	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  a	  nomic	  relation	  between	  that	  symbol	  and	  a	  property	  of	  being	  a	  cat.	  
Obviously,	   the	  symbol	   “cat”	  plays	   some	  cognitive	   role,	  but	   that	   is	  not	  determinate	   for	   the	  
content	   of	   a	   concept	   of	   cat.	   What	   is	   more	   important	   for	   the	   content	   of	   a	   natural	   kind	  
concept	  is	  its	  relation	  to	  “cathood”.	  In	  this	  sense,	  there	  is	  nothing	  substantial	  or	  determinate	  
about	   our	   cognitive	   relation	   with	   natural	   kinds	   concepts	   and	   that	   is	   why	   they	   are	  
presentationally	  “thin”.	  	  
Contrary	   to	   this,	  our	  cognitive	   relation	   to	   the	  content	  of	  phenomenal	  experience	   is	  
substantive	   and	   determinate,	   so	   in	   this	   sense	   it	   is	   presentationally	   “thick”.	   In	   a	   way,	   the	  
experience	   itself	   serves	   as	   its	   own	   mode	   of	   presentation	   in	   this	   case,	   for	   if	   it	   were	   not	  
present	   the	   relevant	   conception	   could	   not	   be	   formed.	   This	   is	   what	   is	  meant	   by	   the	   term	  
“substantive”.	   To	   say	   that	   a	  mode	   of	   presentation	   is	   determinate,	  means	   that	   it	   presents	  
certain	   and	   specific	   quality	   in	   its	   own	   right.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   “thick”	  modes	   of	   presentation	  
cognitive	   significance	   is	  more	   relevant	   for	   the	   content	   of	   a	   concept	   than	   the	   information	  
about	   the	   relation	   of	   a	   property	   it	   represents	  with	   other	   properties.	   Having	   distinguished	  
“thin”	   and	   “thick”	  modes	   of	   presentation	  we	   can	   say	   now	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	  
“thick”	  concepts	  because	  they	  rely	  on	  the	  “thick”	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
natural	   kind	  concepts	  are	   “thin”	   concepts	  because	   they	  are	  based	  on	   the	  “thin”	  modes	  of	  
presentation.	  That	  is,	  our	  cognitive	  access	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  a	  situation	  is	  not	  in	  any	  
significant	  way	   tied	   to	   the	  experience	  of	   that	   situation.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   in	   the	   case	  of	  
psychophysical	  identity	  our	  cognitive	  access	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  side	  plays	  a	  significant	  part	  
of	  the	  concept	  of	  experience.	  In	  this	  case	  we	  have	  a	  “thick”	  concept.	  	  
	   The	   difference	   between	   thick	   and	   thin	   concepts	   in	   Levine	   comes	   down	   to	   this:	   the	  
semantics	  of	  the	  thick	  concepts	  is	  determined	  by	  modes	  of	  presentation	  wherein	  a	  state	  or	  a	  
quality	   presents	   itself	   regardless	   of	   the	   nomic	   relations	   a	   given	   property	  might	   have	  with	  
other	   properties.	   In	   other	   words,	   one	   could	   have	   a	   thick	   concept	   of	   experience	   without	  
knowing	  anything	  about	  the	  nomic	  or	  causal	  relations	  of	  the	  property	  it	  picks	  out	  with	  other	  
properties.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   one	   could	   have	   a	   thin	   concept	   without	   having	   the	  
determinate	  and	  substantial	  cognitive	  access	  to	  the	  content	  of	  a	  thin	  concept.	  This	  situation	  
plays	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  all	  arguments	  and	  accounts	  presented	  so	  far.	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   What	   is	  meant	   by	   the	   claim	   that	   the	  physicalist	   explanation	   leaves	  out	   something	   is	  
that	   the	   two	   ways	   in	   which	   thin	   and	   thick	   concepts	   are	   determined	   seem	   incompatible.	  
Natural	   kind	   concepts	   are	   based	   on	   the	   descriptions	   of	   the	   causal	   or	   nomic	   roles	   their	  
referents	  play,	  whereas	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  based	  on	  the	  immediate	  and	  determinate	  
quality	  of	  experience	  that	  in	  a	  sense	  presents	  itself.	  	  
Why	  should	  this	  be	  a	  problem?	  	  
Levine	  holds	  that	  the	  problem	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  the	  plausible	  explanations	  
could	  be	  that	  these	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  pick	  out	  properties	  reflect	  the	  metaphysical	  gap	  
between	   the	   phenomenal	   and	   the	   physical	   properties.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   given	   that	   we	  
have	  very	  good	   reasons	   to	  believe	   that	  materialism	   is	   true	  based	  on	   the	  causal	  argument,	  
the	   incompatibility	   of	   thick	   and	   thin	   concepts	   render	   the	   psychophysical	   identity	  
unintelligible	  even	  if	  it	  were	  true.	  We	  will	  come	  to	  this	  point	  very	  soon.	  Let’s	  continue	  with	  
laying	  out	  Levine’s	  account.	  	  
	  	  
2.3 Ascriptive	  and	  non-­‐ascriptive	  modes	  of	  presentation	  and	  apriority	  and	  necessity	  
Our	   next	   issues	   are	   the	  modal	   and	   epistemological	   aspects	   of	   the	   explanatory	   gap	  
problem.	  Levine’s	  idea	  about	  the	  relation	  between	  these	  two	  notions	  can	  best	  be	  articulated	  
through	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  conceivability	  arguments.	  	  
Starting	   off	   with	   the	   terminological	   clarifications	   about	   what	   is	   meant	   by	  
“metaphysically	   possible”	   or	   “logically	   possible”,	   Levine	   (Levine	   2001,	   p.	   40)	   argues	   that	  
there	   is	   no	   real	   distinction	  between	   them.	   For	   him	   the	   logically	   possible	   is	  metaphysically	  
possible,	   or	   just	   plainly	   possible.	   Instead	   of	   that	   he	   introduces	   the	   distinction	   between	  
logically/metaphysically	   possible	   and	   conceptually	   possible.	   The	   crucial	   distinction	   here	   is	  
between	   “situations”	   and	   our	   modal	   judgments	   about	   them.	   The	   modal	   status	   of	   a	  
“situation”	  is	  mind	  independent,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  they	  could	  be	  metaphysically	  possible	  without	  
us	  knowing	  about	  it.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  a	  “situation’s”	  modal	  status	  is	  dependent	  on	  
our	  judgements	  then	  it	  is	  conceptually	  possible.	  This	  point	  will	  come	  very	  handy	  later	  on	  in	  
presenting	  Levine’s	  account	  of	  what	  follows	  from	  the	  conceivability	  arguments.	  Suffice	  it	  say	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that	   it	   obviously	   follows	   from	   these	   considerations	   that	   a	   “situation”	   cannot	   be	  
metaphysically	   necessary	   without	   being	   conceptually	   necessary.	   Before	   laying	   the	   whole	  
account	   out,	   we	   must	   explore	   what	   Levine	   takes	   the	   connection	   between	   the	  
epistemological	  and	  metaphysical	  sides	  of	  modality	  to	  be.	  	  
These	  distinctions	  are	  based	  on	  the	  dependency	  of	  our	  modal	  judgements	  upon	  our	  
epistemic	   situation.	   For	   example,	   someone	   could	  be	   in	   a	  position	   to	   judge	   it	   as	  necessary	  
that	   H2O	   contains	   hydrogen	   and	   that	  water	   contains	   hydrogen.	   But	   someone	   else	  who	   is	  
ignorant	  of	  the	  chemical	  composition	  of	  water	  would	  not	  judge	  it	  as	  necessary,	  because	  that	  
person	   would	   not	   know	   the	   relevant	   description	   of	   the	   causal	   roles	   under	   which	   both	  
“water”	  and	  “H2O”	  pick	  out	   the	  same	   thing,	   that	   is	   she	  would	  be	  unaware	  of	   the	  bridging	  
claim	  that	  “water=H2O”.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  our	  judgements	  about	  factual	  and	  modal	  descriptions	  
of	  the	  situations	  are	  relative	  to	  the	  representations	  that	  we	  use	  to	  pick	  those	  situations	  out.	  
Naturally,	  a	  “situation”	  in	  this	  context	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  “an	  object	  instantiating	  one	  or	  more	  
properties	   or	   an	   ordered	   n-­‐tuple	   of	   objects	   that	   serve	   as	   the	   truth	   conditions	   for	   a	  
statement”	   (Levine	  2001,	  p.	  40),	   that	   is,	  a	  “situation”	  allows	  us	  to	  evaluate	  a	  statement	  as	  
true	  or	  false.	  Now	  comes	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  argumentation.	  It	  is	  the	  relation	  between	  
conceptual	  possibility	  and	  metaphysical	  possibility.	  A	  situation	  S,	  is	  conceptually	  possible,	  iff	  
when	  thought	  of	  under	  the	  representation	  R,	  it	  is	  possible.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  situation	  S’	  
is	  metaphysically	  possible	  iff	  S’	  is	  conceptually	  possible	  under	  representation	  R	  and	  it	  is	  not	  a	  
priori	  that	  not-­‐R	  (Levine	  2001,	  p.	  40).	  A	  simple	  principle	  then	  follows,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  description	  
of	   a	   situation	   according	   to	   which	   the	   situation	   is	   conceptually	   impossible,	   then	   it	   is	  
metaphysically	  impossible	  (Levine	  2001,	  p.	  46).	  	  
Let	  me	  clarify	  a	  very	   important	  point	  about	  a	  priority	  and	  necessity	   in	   this	  context.	  
Consider	  a	  statement	  “Water	  contains	  hydrogen”.	  To	  render	  this	  statement	  necessary,	  three	  
crucial	   requirements	  must	  be	  met.	   First,	   that	   the	   statement	   “H2O	   contains	  hydrogen”	   is	  a	  
priori,	  i.e.	  that	  its	  truth	  or	  falsity	  can	  be	  evaluated	  solely	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
terms	  involved.	  Second,	  that	  there	  is	  an	  empirically	  discoverable	  fact,	  thus	  a	  posteriori,	  that	  
water	   is	   H2O.	   Finally,	   the	   third	   requirement	   is	   that	   the	   statement	   picks	   out	   a	   situation	   in	  
which	   water	   contains	   H2O.	   Based	   on	   these	   preliminaries	   we	   evaluate	   a	   statement	   as	  
necessary	   even	   if	   it	   is	  a	  posteriori.	   That	   is,	   to	   render	   an	  a	  posteriori	   statement	  necessary,	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there	  has	  to	  be	  an	  a	  priori	  description	  from	  which	  that	  statement	  can	  be	  derived.	  This	  is	  so	  
at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds.	  	  
In	  a	  sense	  each	  statement	  that	  is	  metaphysically	  necessary	  must	  be	  also	  conceptually	  
necessary,	  and	  if	  a	  statement	  is	  conceptually	  impossible	  it	  is	  metaphysically	  impossible.	  Thus	  
far	  this	  seems	  obvious.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  statement	  that	  is	  metaphysically	  impossible	  is	  
not	  necessarily	  conceptually	  impossible	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  water/H2O.	  That	  is	  to	  
say,	   if	   a	   situation	   is	   conceptually	   possible	   that	   fact	   alone	   does	   not	   justify	   entailment	   to	  
metaphysical	  possibility.	  Basically,	  this	  point	  follows	  from	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  only	  way	  we	  can	  
evaluate	   a	   situation’s	   modal	   status	   is	   through	   a	   representation	   of	   the	   given	   situation.	   In	  
Levine’s	   view	   (Levine	   2001,	   p.	   46),	   the	   fact	   that	   conceptual	   possibility	   does	   not	   entail	  
metaphysical	   possibility	   is	   exemplified	   by	   all	   cases	   of	  a	   posteriori	   necessity.	   If	   physicalism	  
were	  true	  it	  should	  also	  fall	  in	  this	  category.	  	  
So	  how	  does	  this	  account	  relate	  to	  conceptual	  and	  metaphysical	  necessity?	  Basically,	  
this	  account	  comes	  down	  to	  two-­‐dimensional	  semantics.	  What	  is	  conceptually	  possible	  is	  in	  
Chalmers’s	  lingo	  1-­‐possible	  and	  what	  is	  metaphysically	  possible	  is	  2-­‐possible	  with	  Chalmers.	  
What	  happens	  in	  Levine’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  conceivability	  arguments	  is	  not	  much	  different	  from	  
the	  two-­‐dimensional	  analysis,	  at	   least	   in	   terms	  of	  basic	  conceptual	  assumptions.	  The	  point	  
where	   Levine	   departs	   from	   the	   standard	   interpretation	   of	   the	   conceivability	   arguments	   is	  
with	  the	  epistemic	  assumptions.	  Namely,	  Levine	  claims	  that	  unlike	  the	   identities	  of	  natural	  
kinds,	   wherein	   our	   epistemic	   situation	   is	   “thin”,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   phenomenal	   concepts	   our	  
epistemic	  situation	  is	  “thick”	  which	  makes	  the	  psychophysical	  identity	  a	  gappy	  identity.	  I	  will	  
explain	  what	  a	  “gappy”	  identity	  is	  in	  a	  moment.	  Before	  that	  I	  just	  need	  to	  crudely	  elaborate	  
on	   Levine’s	   departure	   from	   the	   standard	   interpretation	   of	   the	   conceivability	   arguments.	  
Because	   if	   the	   “thick”	   concepts	   are	   not	   based	   on	   the	  modes	   of	   presentation	   that	   involve	  
nomic	   or	   causal	   relations	   between	   properties,	   then	   it	   is	   possible	   in	   principle	   that	   a	  
characterization	  of	  a	  counterfactual	  situation	  containing	  “thick”	  concepts	  might	  be	  missing	  
some	  relevant	  description,	   i.e.	  a	  description	  that	  could	  render	   the	  counterfactual	  situation	  
metaphysically	   impossible.	   This	   in	   fact	   leads	  only	   to	   the	   conceptual	  possibility	  of	   zombies.	  
Because	   the	   “thick”	   concepts	   are	   flanking	   on	   the	   one	   side	   of	   the	   psychophysical	   identity,	  
that	  kind	  of	  identity	  is	  “gappy”.	  It	  is	  very	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  very	  same	  assumption	  
about	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   that	   supports	   the	   metaphysical	   and	   anti-­‐materialist	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conclusions	   of	   the	   conceivability	   arguments	   is	   employed	   here	   to	   block	   the	   inference	   to	  
metaphysical	   possibility.	   We	   will	   see	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   how	   the	   notion	   of	   “thick”	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  is	  employed	  in	  some	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  and	  successful	  responses	  
to	  the	  epistemic	  and	  the	  ontological	  gaps,	  namely	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  	  
Another	  way	  of	  explicating	  this	  view	  is	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  
conceptual	   content	   can	   be	   determined.	   Namely,	   Levine	   (Levine	   2001,	   p.	   54)	   distinguishes	  
between	   ascriptive	   and	   non-­‐ascriptive	   modes	   of	   presentation.	   Ascriptive	   modes	   of	  
presentation	  are	  those	  we	  are	  already	  familiar	  with	  from	  Kripke	  and	  Chalmers’s	  versions	  of	  
the	  conceivability	  argument.	  According	  to	  ascriptivists	  the	  concepts	  pick	  out	  their	  referents	  
via	  the	  descriptions	  of	  their	  standard	  causal	  or	  functional	  roles.	  To	  put	  it	  into	  more	  technical	  
terms,	   a	   concept’s	   primary	   intension	   bears	   almost	   no	   cognitive	   significance;	   it	   is	   almost	  
entirely	   based	   on	   the	   symbols	   and	   their	   relations.	   The	   point	   that	   clearly	   distinguishes	  
between	   ascriptivists	   and	   non-­‐ascriptivists	   is	   that	   whereas	   ascriptivist	   believes	   that	   the	   a	  
priori	   knowledge	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   having	   enough	   information	   about	   the	   causal	   or	   functional	  
roles	  properties	  normally	  play,	  a	  non-­‐ascriptivist	  maintains	   that	  a	  priori	   knowledge	  cannot	  
be	  founded	  in	  such	  a	  way.	  	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  non-­‐ascriptive	  mode	  of	  presentation	  works	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  
the	   content	   of	   a	   concept	   is	   determined	  by	   the	   formal	   relations	   a	   given	  property	   has	  with	  
other	  properties.	  
	  
2.4 Thick	  and	  thin	  conceivability	  	  
Let’s	   turn	   our	   attention	   now	   to	   rather	   technical	   aspects	   of	   the	   explanatory	   gap	  
account.	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  conceivability	  argument	  only	  establishes	  an	  epistemic	  possibility	  
of	  counterfactual	  scenarios	  has	  been	  a	  subject	  of	  many	  vigorous	  debates	  over	   the	  years18.	  
For	   the	   purpose	   of	   current	   work	   and	   sake	   of	   brevity	   we	   won’t	   go	   into	   details	   of	   these	  
                                                
18 Cf.	  (Chalmers	  &	  Jackson	  2001),	  (Block	  &	  Stalnaker	  1999),	  (Stoljar	  2000,	  2001),	  (Levine	  1998,	  2001),	  (Balog	  
1999),	  (Hill	  1997),	  etc. 
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debates.	   However	   the	   argument	   that	   separates	   the	   epistemic	   possibility	   from	   the	  
metaphysical	  one	  needs	  to	  be	  rehearsed.	  	  
	   This	  issue	  is	  of	  central	  importance	  to	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  argument	  and	  now	  we	  will	  
consider	   it	   in	  some	  detail.	  We	  have	  seen	   in	  the	  contrasting	  cases	  of	  natural	  kind	   identities	  
that	   the	   conceivability	   argument	   breaks	   down	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   entailment	   from	  
conceivability	   to	   possibility	   and	   that	   it	   goes	   right	   through	   in	   the	  qualia	   case.	  According	   to	  
Levine’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  argument,	  it	  is	  so	  because	  metaphysical	  possibility	  relies	  upon	  
conceptual	   possibility.	   Namely,	   we	   get	   to	   the	   metaphysical	   possibility	   not	   directly	   from	  
conceivability	   but	   through	   conceptual	   possibility	   first.	   The	   notion	   of	   conceptual	   possibility	  
only	   requires	   that	   a	   counterfactual	   situation	   that	   we	   are	   conceiving	   of	   should	   not	   be	  
inconsistently	   inferable	   from	   the	   situation	   we	   start	   with.	   If	   a	   situation	   is	   conceptually	  
possible,	   it	   is	   metaphysically	   possible	   as	   well	   (Levine	   1998,	   p.	   454).	   Since	   there	   is	   no	  
inconsistency	   in	   conceiving	   of	   a	   situation	   “brain	   state	   B	   but	   not	   quale	   M”	   it	   is	   then	  
conceptually	   possible	   that	   “brain	   state	   B	   but	   not	   quale	  M”,	   and	   if	   this	   is	   conceptually	  
possible	  then	  it	  is	  metaphysically	  possible.	  This	  is	  the	  standard	  “metaphysical	  reading”	  of	  the	  
explanatory	  gap	  according	   to	   Levine.	   	  What	  he	  needs	  now	   is	  a	  move	   that	  undermines	   the	  
inferential	   link	   between	   conceptual	   and	   metaphysical	   possibility,	   thus	   establishing	   only	  
epistemic	  possibility	  of	  counterfactual	  cases	  of	  qualia.	  Levine	  argues	  that	  there	  could	  be	  two	  
ways	   to	   understand	   the	   inferential	   link,	   by	   analyzing	   the	   ways	   concepts	   connect	   to	   their	  
referents,	  or	  the	  concept’s	  modes	  of	  presentation	  (Levine	  1998,	  pp.	  457-­‐8).	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  
they	  could	  involve	  ascriptive	  modes	  of	  presentation	  and	  on	  the	  other	  non-­‐ascriptive	  modes	  
of	   presentation	   (Levine	   1998,	   2001).	   Ascriptive	   modes	   of	   presentation	   are,	   normally,	  
involved	   in	  standard	  cases	  of	  natural	  kind	   identity,	  wherein	  we	  have	  two	  distinct	  concepts	  
that	  pick	  out	   the	  same	  thing.	  This	  case	   involves	  ascription	  of	  properties	   to	   the	  referent	  by	  
way	   of	   instantiating	   the	   properties	   that	   are	   referred	   to;	   for	   example,	   the	   causal	   roles	   of	  
water.	  The	  non-­‐ascriptive	  mode	  of	  presentation	  uses	  other	  methods.	  The	  crucial	  difference	  
between	  the	  two	  is	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ascriptive	  mode	  the	  properties	  are	  only	  contingently	  
related	  to	  each	  other,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  cognitively	  represented.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
non-­‐ascriptive	   mode	   properties	   are	   related	   in	   some	   other	   way	   and	   not	   necessarily	  
cognitively	   represented.	   According	   to	   Levine,	   we	   only	   need	   non-­‐ascriptive	   modes	   of	  
presentation	   to	   undermine	   the	   link	   between	   conceptual	   possibility	   and	   metaphysical	  
possibility	   in	   the	   case	   of	   zombies	   (Levine	   1998,	   2001),	   because	   if	   they	   are	   non-­‐ascriptive	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then	   we	   cannot	   know	   whether	   something	   is	   missing	   from	   the	   zombie	   description	   and	  
therefore	   allowing	   for	   the	   inconsistent	   description	   of	   zombies.	   In	   other	   words,	   non-­‐
ascriptive	   modes	   of	   presentation	   undermine	   the	   inference	   from	   conceptual	   possibility	   to	  
metaphysical	  possibility.	  	  	  
To	   see	   more	   clearly	   how	   this	   blocking	   works	   let’s	   consider	   it	   in	   terms	   of	  
conceivability.	  Levine	  distinguishes	  two	  grades	  of	  conceivability:	  thin	  and	  thick	  conceivability	  
(Levine	   1998,	   p.	   468;	   2001).	   A	   thinly	   conceivable	   situation	   is	   based	   on	   a	   plain	   conceptual	  
possibility,	   i.e.	   a	   situation	   is	   thinly	   conceivable	   iff	   it	   is	  not	   inconsistent	   to	   infer	   it	   from	   the	  
actual	   situation.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   situation	   is	   thickly	   conceivable	   if	   it	   is	   conceptually	  
possible	   and	   if	   any	   inference	   from	   its	   conceptual	   possibility	   to	  metaphysical	   possibility	   is	  
based	   on	   gappy	   identities.	   In	   this	   way	   the	   link	   between	   conceivability	   and	   metaphysical	  
possibility	  is	  undermined.	  	  
This	  view	  is	  unfortunate	  for	  the	  materialists	  because	  it	   implies	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  
defend	   materialism	   is	   by	   conceding	   on	   the	   gappy	   psychophysical	   identity.	   On	   the	   other	  
hand,	   to	   say	   that	  a	   situation	   is	  epistemically	  possible	   is	   to	   say	   that	   there	   is	  nothing	   in	  our	  
knowledge	  that	  would	  make	  it	  metaphysically	  impossible.	  	  
2.5 Gappy	  and	  non-­‐gappy	  identities	  
The	   point	   of	   gappy	   and	   non-­‐gappy	   identities	   comes	   down	   to	   this:	   gappy	   identities	  
require	  some	  explanation	  of	  how	  these	  two	  concepts	  pick	  out	  the	  same	  property.	  Non-­‐gappy	  
identities	   imply	  distinct	  properties.	   If	   zombies	  are	   conceivable	   then	   it	   is	   so	  because	  either	  
psychophysical	  identity	  is	  a	  gappy	  identity	  or	  there	  is	  no	  identity	  after	  all.	  Now	  how	  does	  this	  
stop	   the	   flow	   from	   conceptual	   possibility	   to	  metaphysical	   possibility?	   In	   the	   natural	   kinds	  
cases	  a	  situation	  can	  be	  conceptually	  possible	  but	  metaphysically	  impossible	  nevertheless.	  If	  
we	  want	  to	  break	  the	  inference	  from	  conceptual	  possibility	  to	  metaphysical	  possibility	  in	  the	  
case	   of	   qualia,	   we	   need	   to	   use	   gappy	   identities	   and	   claim	   that	   proper	   identities	   need	   no	  
explanation	  of	  their	  truthfulness.	  However,	   it	   is	  because	  of	  this	  manoeuvre	  that	  we	  need	  a	  
further	   explanation	   of	   how	   the	   two	   distinct	   concepts	   pick	   out	   the	   same	   property.	   This	   is	  
what	  is	  meant	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  EG	  saves	  materialism	  from	  the	  metaphysical	  consequences	  
of	  conceivability	  arguments	  but	  at	  the	  price	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	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Levine	   claims	   that	   there	   are	   two	   main	   aspects	   of	   the	   EG.	   One	   involving	  
incompatibility	   of	   thick	   and	   thin	   concepts	   and	   the	   other	   involving	   gappiness	   of	   the	  
psychophysical	   identity,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   further	   request	   for	   an	  
explanation.	   My	   idea	   is	   that	   gappiness	   in	   Levine’s	   case	   is	   actually	   based	   on	   the	  
incompatibility	  of	  thick	  and	  thin	  concepts	  which	  in	  effect	  dissolves	  very	  easily	  when	  treated	  
with	  Papineau-­‐style	  phenomenal	  concept	  semantics.	  	  
2.6 Intelligibility	  of	  explanations	  
The	   explanatory	   gap	   argument	   is	   supposed	   to	   show	   that	   the	   metaphysical	  
conclusions	  standardly	  drawn	  from	  the	  conceivability	  arguments	  do	  not	  hold	  but	  at	  the	  price	  
of	   the	   explanatory	   gap.	   To	   elaborate	   on	   this	   point	   Levine	   (Levine	   2001)	   distinguishes	  
between	   two	  aspects	  of	  an	  explanation:	   the	  metaphysical	  explanation,	  according	   to	  which	  
we	  explain	  property	  A	  in	  virtue	  of	  property	  B,	  and	  an	  epistemological	  explanation,	  which	  is	  
supposed	  to	  explain	  why	  property	  A	  is	  explicable	  in	  virtue	  of	  property	  B.	  In	  another	  words,	  
epistemological	  explanation	  makes	  it	   intelligible	  why	  given	  B	  there	  is	  A.	  They	  are	  of	  course	  
interconnected	   and	   interdependent,	   but	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   note	   that	   they	   are	   not	   the	   same	  
thing.	   For	   example,	   if	   one	   were	   to	   try	   explaining	   my	   visual	   experience	   of	   a	   red	   tomato	  
metaphysically,	  the	  explanation	  would	  appeal	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  at	  certain	  point	  in	  time	  t,	  when	  
I	   had	   an	   experience	   S,	   my	   brain	   was	   occupying	   a	   state	   B	   at	   t.	   However,	   to	   make	   this	  
explanation	  intelligible	  we	  need	  a	  theory	  of	  realization	  that	  would	  tell	  us	  how	  B	  realizes	  A,	  
according	  to	  Levine.	  	  
There	   is	  another	  aspect	  of	   the	  explanatory	  gap,	  which	  concerns	  mainly	  the	   issue	  of	  
explanations	   and	   identities.	   Take,	   for	   example,	   our	   contrasting	   cases	   of	   natural	   kinds	   and	  
phenomenal	   kinds.	   Levine	   (Levine	   2001,	   2006)	   agrees	   that	   proper	   identities	   need	   no	  
additional	   or	   further	   explanations.	   If	   being	   in	   a	   brain	   state	  B	   were	   the	   same	   as	   having	   a	  
“reddish”	   quale	   Q,	   then	   it	   doesn’t	   make	   much	   sense	   to	   ask	   what	   makes	   this	   identity	  
statement	  true.	  However,	  it	  is	  legitimate	  to	  ask	  why	  given	  brain	  state	  B	  there	  is	  the	  quale	  Q.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  can	  take	  only	  two	  routes	  according	  to	  
Levine	  (Levine	  2001,	  p.	  81).	  One	  way	  to	  explain	  it	  is	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  basic	  or	  fundamental	  
law;	  the	  other	  way	  is	  through	  the	  identity	  premise	  itself.	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Let’s	  turn	  our	  attention	  now	  to	  the	   issue	  of	  explanation	   in	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  and	  
try	  to	  connect	  the	  notions	  elaborated	  above.	  	  
Levine	  (Levine	  1983,	  p.	  357)	  argues	  that	  even	  if	  we	  succeeded	  in	  explaining	  the	  causal	  
or	  functional	  roles	  of	  qualia,	  there	  is	  still	  the	  qualitative	  character	  of	  our	  sensory	  experiences	  
that	  is	  left	  out	  by	  this	  sort	  of	  explanation.	  For	  a	  property	  to	  be	  left	  out	  from	  a	  theory	  mean	  
that	   the	   theory	   cannot	   refer	   to	   these	   properties	   (Levine	   1993,	   p.	   121).	   Unlike	   cases	   of	  
identities	   of	   natural	   kinds,	   like	  water	   and	   H2O	   or	   heat	   and	  molecular	  motions,	  wherein	   a	  
requirement	   for	   further	   explanation	   does	   not	   seem	   intelligible,	   because	   the	   seeming	  
contingency	  can	  be	  explained	  away	  by	  either	  deriving	  the	   identity	  from	  more	  fundamental	  
statements	   or	   dismissed	   as	   a	  misdescription,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   qualia	   this	   requirement	   does	  
make	  very	  much	  sense.	  Levine	  (1999)	  holds	  that	  most	  of	  the	  natural	  kind	  identities	  are	  not	  
self-­‐evidently	   explicable	   either,	   and	   that	   we	   can	   legitimately	   ask	   for	   further	   explanation.	  
However,	  after	  providing	  the	  descriptions	  from	  which	  the	  natural	  kinds	  flanking	  the	  identity	  
statement	  are	  derived,	  we	  come	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  request	  for	  further	  explanation	  is	  just	  a	  
request	  for	  a	  justification.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  the	  qualia	  case	  no	  derivation	  seems	  possible	  
and	  the	  puzzlement	  about	  how	  qualia	  and	  brain	  processes	  could	  be	  identical	  deepens	  even	  
more	  as	  we	  add	  refinement	  to	  our	  concepts	  of	  qualia	  or	  of	  brain	  processes.	  Levine	  holds	  that	  
it	  is	  so	  because	  the	  psychophysical	  identity	  is	  a	  “gappy	  identity”	  (Levine	  1998,	  1999,	  2001).	  A	  
gappy	   identity	   is	   an	   identity	   statement	   which	   makes	   it	   intelligible	   to	   request	   for	   further	  
explanation.	  Of	  course,	  non-­‐gappy	  identity	  is	  the	  one	  for	  which	  it	  is	  not	  intelligible	  to	  require	  
further	  explanation.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  point	  let’s	  compare	  two	  cases	  of	  identity.	  One	  involving	  
the	  boiling	  point	  of	  water	  and	  the	  other	   involving	  the	  presence	  of	   the	  reddish	  quale.	  Let’s	  
start	  with	  the	  boiling	  point	  of	  water:	  
32. “H O molecules exert vapor pressure P at kinetic energy E; 
33. At sea level exerting vapor pressure P causes molecules to rapidly escape into air; 
34. Rapidly escaping into air is boiling; 
35. 100°C is kinetic energy E; 
36. Water is H O; 
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37. Water boils at 100°C at sea level.” (Levine 1999, p.4) 
This	  is	  clearly	  the	  case	  of	  a	  non-­‐gappy	  identity	  according	  to	  Levine.	  One	  can	  legitimately	  
ask	  why	  36.	  is	  true,	  but	  once	  we	  provide	  enough	  details	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  of	  water,	  or	  we	  
fill	  in	  the	  microphysical	  description	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  water,	  it	  seizes	  to	  make	  sense	  to	  ask	  
for	   further	   explanation.	   In	   a	   sense,	   scheme	   of	   the	   causal	   roles	   of	   water	   and	   sufficiently	  
refined	  microphysical	   description	   exhaust	   all	   there	   is	   about	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   natural	  
kinds	  identity.	  We	  are	  not	  left	  with	  a	  sense	  that	  something	  is	  missing.	  It	  is,	  however,	  crucial	  
to	  note	  that	  in	  this	  example	  36.	  serves	  as	  a	  binding	  point	  for	  the	  reference	  of	  water	  and	  H20	  
in	  the	  explanation.	  It	  identifies	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained	  with	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  
describable	  in	  terms	  of	  microphysics.	  It	  enables	  36.	  to	  be	  derivable	  from	  the	  combination	  of	  
statements	   that	   are	   either	   a	   priori	   or	   are	   descriptions	   of	   the	   underlying	   microphysical	  
phenomena,	  which	   in	   effect	  makes	   it	   unintelligible	   to	   ask	   for	   further	   explanation	   of	   36.’s	  
truth.	   Furthermore,	   if	   we	   try	   to	   abstract	   the	   formal	   structure	   of	   the	   derivation,	   it	   comes	  
down	  to	  this:	  
38. “Water is the stuff that manifests the “watery” properties; 
39. H O manifests “watery” properties; 
40. Water is H O.” (Levine 1999, p. 5) 
It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   premise	   38.	   is	   analytic	   and	   that	   the	   characterization	   of	  
properties	  in	  question	  is	  given	  in	  “topic	  neutral”	  terms.	  To	  say	  that	  premise	  38.	  is	  analytic	  in	  
this	  context	  means	  that	  one	  can	  know	  it	   is	   true	  solely	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  knowing	  what	  the	  
terms	   involved	   mean.	   “Topic	   neutral”	   here	   means	   simply	   that	   the	   terms	   that	   pick	   out	  
properties	  in	  question	  do	  not	  contain	  any	  vocabulary	  that	  is	  not	  contained	  in	  the	  theory	  that	  
does	  the	  explaining.	  These	  two	  features	  of	  the	  binding	  premise	  are	  crucial	  for	  the	  derivation,	  
because	  ultimately,	  the	  explaining	  of	  the	  identity	  must	  end	  up	  either	  with	  the	  fundamental	  
law	   or	   it	   has	   to	   be	   derived	   for	   the	   identity	   premise	   itself,	   otherwise	   it	   would	   not	   be	   an	  
explanation	  at	  all.	  Let’s	  now	  consider	  the	  case	  of	  reddish	  quale.	  
	  
41. “S occupies brain state B; 
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42. Occupying brain state B is to experience a reddish quale; 
43. S is experiencing a reddish quale.“ (Ibid) 
	  
In	  this	  case	  we	  have	  a	  gappy	  identity.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  detail	  that	  we	  could	  
stack	  in	  between	  41.	  and	  42.	  it	  still	  makes	  sense	  to	  ask	  why	  is	  42.	  true.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  the	  
nature	   of	   the	   binding	   premise	   42.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   premise	   38.	   enables	   the	   macro	  
phenomenon	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  microphysical	   descriptions	   or	   to	   the	   combination	   of	   analytic	  
statements.	   Premise	   42.,	   however,	   considered	   as	   a	   binding	   premise,	   the	   premise	   that	   is	  
supposed	   to	   identify	   the	   phenomenon	   that	   is	   to	   be	   explained	   with	   the	   microphysical	  
description	   or	   with	   a	   combination	   of	   analytic	   statements,	   is	   not	   derivable	   from	   the	  
combinations	  of	  analytic	  definitions.	  Let’s	  have	  a	  look	  at	  what	  would	  formal	  structure	  of	  the	  
derivation	  look	  like	  in	  this	  case.	  	  
44. “Qualitative state R is the state that plays causal role C; 
45. Brain state B plays causal role C; 
46. Brain state B is qualitative state R. (Levine 1999, p. 6) 
Here,	  the	  premise	  44.	  should	  be	  analytic	  for	  the	  derivation	  to	  work.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  
analytic,	   although	   it	  may	   be	   that	   some	   qualitative	   states	   play	   certain	   causal	   or	   functional	  
roles,	  but	  even	   if	   they	  do	   it	   is	  not	   the	  conceptual	   truth.	   In	   Levine’s	   terms	   the	  premise	  44.	  
that	   is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  binding	  premise	  is	  actually	  an	  example	  of	  a	  gappy	  identity.	   It	   is	   in	  
fact	  in	  need	  of	  further	  explanation.	  It	  just	  seems	  coherently	  conceivable	  that	  there	  could	  be	  
a	  conscious	  experience	  that	  does	  not	  play	  the	  typical	  causal	  or	  functional	  role	  for	  the	  related	  
state.	  No	  other	  corroboration	  for	  the	  assumptions	  is	  provided.	  	  
	  Now	   we	   come	   to	   the	   crucial	   point	   of	   the	   account.	   Given	   that	   it	   is	   coherently	  
conceivable	  that	  qualia	  could	  not	  play	  their	  typical	  causal	  or	  functional	  roles,	  this	  only	  shows	  
that	  the	  claims	  about	  their	  typical	  causal	  or	  functional	  roles	  are	  not	  analytic,	  which	  suffices	  
only	   for	   establishing	   the	   explanatory	   gap.	   The	   conceivability	   argument	   itself	   does	   not	  
demonstrate	   the	  metaphysical	  possibility	  of	   causal	  or	   functional	  dissociations.	  To	  establish	  
metaphysical	  possibility	  in	  the	  conceivability	  argument	  a	  new	  argument	  would	  be	  required.	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Now	  it	  becomes	  clearer	  what	  it	  means	  for	  the	  physicalist	  explanation	  of	  phenomenal	  
consciousness	   to	   leave	   out	   something.	   Namely,	   physical-­‐empirical	   explanations	   are	  
supposed	   to	  use	   “thin”	   concepts	  whose	   semantics	   is	   based	  on	   the	  modes	  of	   presentation	  
that	  bear	  very	  little	  on	  the	  cognitive	  significance	  in	  picking	  out	  their	  referents.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand	  phenomenal	   concepts	  almost	  entirely	  depend	  on	   the	  “thick”	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  
wherein	   a	   property	   basically	   presents	   itself	   and	   the	   mode	   of	   presentation	   is	   almost	  
exhausted	   in	   the	   cognitive	   significance.	   “Thin”	   concepts	   leave	   out	   the	   content	   of	   “thick”	  
concepts.	  More	  importantly,	  “thin”	  concepts	  cannot	  include	  the	  content	  of	  “thick”	  concepts	  
in	  principle.	  	  
Why	  should	  this	  be	  a	  problem?	  Well,	  that	  is	  exactly	  Levine’s	  point.	  This	  situation	  does	  
not	  create	  a	  metaphysical	  problem	  because	  it	  is	  perfectly	  reasonable	  that	  the	  same	  property	  
can	  be	  picked	  out	  in	  two	  different	  ways.	  For	  example,	  we	  can	  conceptualize	  our	  experiences	  
in	  terms	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  brain	  states	  or	  properties	  normally	  play	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
in	   terms	   of	   picking	   out	   their	   immediate	   qualities.	   However,	   claims	   Levine,	   this	   creates	   an	  
epistemological	  problem	  because	  why	  the	  content	  of	  a	  particular	  “thick”	  concept	   is	  as	   it	   is	  
not	   intelligible,	   given	   the	   content	   of	   a	   respective	   “thin”	   concept	   and	   also	   given	   that	   both	  
concepts	  pick	  out	  the	  same	  thing.	  Furthermore,	  exactly	  because	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  
“thick”	   and	   the	   “thin”	   concepts,	   the	   conceivability	   arguments	   fail	   to	   establish	   the	  
metaphysical	   possibility	   of	   counterfactual	   causal,	   supervenience	   dissociations	   or	   causal	   or	  
functional	   inversions.	   This	   according	   to	   Levine	   is	   the	   price	   physicalists	   have	   to	   pay	   if	   they	  
were	  to	  avoid	  the	  metaphysical	  consequences	  of	  the	  conceivability	  arguments.	  	  
2.7 Intelligibility	  of	  explanations	  and	  causal	  efficacy	  	  
The	  EG	  revolves	  around	  the	  notion	  of	  gappy	  identity.	  There	  are	  two	  main	  aspects	  of	  
the	  problem	  based	  on	  this	  notion.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Levine	  claims	  that	  given	  that	  gappiness	  
of	   the	   psychophysical	   identity	   stems	   from	   the	   incompatibility	   of	   thick	   and	   thin	   concepts	  
flanking	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  identity	  statement	  it	  is	  mysterious	  how	  that	  identity	  could	  be	  true.	  
It	   is	   so	   because	   thin	   concepts	   can	   be	   formed	   and	   applied	   even	   without	   the	   cognitive	  
significance	   that	   is	  essential	   for	   the	   thick	   concepts.	  Thick	   concepts	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  are	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formed	  and	  applied	  regardless	  of	  the	  descriptions	  of	  nomic	  relations	  of	  the	  properties	  they	  
are	  picking	  out	  and	  other	  properties.	   So	  even	   if	  both	  kinds	  of	   concept	  had	  picked	  out	   the	  
same	  property	   it	   remains	  mysterious	  how	  that	  could	  be	   true.	  The	  other	  aspect	   is	   that	   the	  
gappiness	   of	   the	   psychophysical	   identity	   prevents	   the	   inference	   from	   conceivability	   to	  
metaphysical	  possibility.	  	  
This	   second	   aspect	   seems	   more	   problematic	   to	   me.	   It	   concerns	   the	   explanations.	  
According	   to	   Levine	   gappiness	   of	   psychophysical	   identity	   stems	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
bridging	   premise	   in	   the	   identity	   statement	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	   identify	   the	   explanandum	  
with	   the	   explanans	   is	   in	   fact	   in	   need	   of	   further	   explanation	   because	   it	   cannot	   be	   derived	  
from	  a	  set	  of	  fundamental	  a	  priori	  claims	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds.	  Having	  this	  in	  mind	  
then,	   in	  his	  view,	  the	  conceivability	  of	  zombies	  is	  another	  manifestation	  of	  the	  explanatory	  
gap.	  This	  latter	  case	  seems	  rather	  weaker	  than	  the	  former	  reading.	  It	  seems	  rather	  elliptical,	  
because	  we	   start	   off	  without	   knowing	  whether	   the	   physical	   and	   the	   phenomenal	   are	   the	  
same	  and	  then	  we	  wonder	  how	  it	  could	  be	  that	  they	  are	  the	  same.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
natural	  kinds	  we	  know	  that	  the	  bridging	  premise	  is	  true	  and	  it	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  a	  set	  of	  a	  
priori	  claims	  or	  fundamental	  claims.	  That	  seems	  odd.	  	  	  
Let’s	  consider	  the	  options	  here.	  If	  phenomenal	  properties	  were	  causally	  inefficacious	  
then	   there	   is	   no	   way	   for	   us	   to	   know	   about	   them	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   This	   is	   the	   standard	  
inconsistency	   objection	   against	   epiphenomenalism.	   That	   is	   fine.	   Even	   if	  we	   consider	   them	  
metaphysically	  distinct	   from	  physical	  properties	  and	  still	  having	  causal	   force	  then	  we	  must	  
allow	  for	  a	  situation	   in	  which	  non-­‐physical	  causes	  have	  physical	  effects.	   Just	  by	  adding	  the	  
third	  premise	  of	   the	  causal	  argument,	   i.e.	  physical	  effects	  are	  not	  always	  overdetermined,	  
we	  still	  end	  up	  with	  the	  same	  conclusion,	  namely	  physical	  and	  phenomenal	  causes	  are	  the	  
same.	  If	  they	  were	  the	  same	  as	  physical	  properties	  and	  still	  had	  physical	  effects	  then	  what	  is	  
a	  source	  of	  bewilderment?	  What	  is	  left	  unexplained	  then?	  	  
My	  point	  here	  is	  that	  Levine	  cannot	  hold	  both	  that	  physicalism	  is	  true	  and	  that	  there	  
is	  an	  explanatory	  gap.	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  we	  take	  efficacious	  phenomenal	  properties	  to	  
be	   fundamental	   and	   metaphysically	   distinct	   as	   in	   Chalmers’s	   sense	   or	   the	   same	   kind	   of	  
properties	  but	  differently	  conceptualized,	  we	  get	  the	  same	  conclusion	  when	  run	  through	  the	  
causal	   argument.	   Assuming	   otherwise	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   justified.	   It	   seems	   rather	   that	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these	  assumptions	  are	  intuition	  driven,	  and	  that	  the	  underlying	  intuitions	  are	  in	  fact	  in	  need	  
of	  an	  explanation.	  	  
If	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   then,	   if	   one	   wants	   to	  maintain	   physicalism,	   one	  must	   embrace	  
conceptual	  dualism.	  	  
This	   idea	  will	  be	  thoroughly	  discussed	   in	  chapters	  three	  and	  four.	  Let’s	  turn	  now	  to	  
the	  most	  powerful	  responses	  to	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  will	  start	  
off	  with	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  inconsistency	  objection	  to	  the	  knowledge	  argument	  and	  about	  
what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  its	  major	  contribution	  in	  weakening	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  argument.	  After	  
that,	  I	  will	  be	  examining	  the	  so	  called	  “phenomenal	  concept	  strategy”	  (Stoljar	  2005)	  in	  great	  
detail.	  I	  will	  skip	  other	  responses	  to	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem,	  such	  as	  eliminativism,	  or	  
higher	  order	  thought	  (HOT)	  theories.	  Eliminativism	  will	  be	  omitted	  because	  I	  am	  assuming	  a	  
qualia	  realist	  position.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  won’t	  be	  discussing	  the	  HOT	  and	  other	  varieties	  
of	   this	   approach	   simply	   because	   the	   format	   of	   this	   dissertation	   does	   not	   allow	   me	   to	  












3. CHAPTER	  3	  
3.1 Phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  
	  
“The	  reference-­‐fixing	  property	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  theoretical	  concept	  is	  identical	  with	  
the	  property	  to	  which	  the	  concept	  refers.	  “	  (Hill	  and	  McLaughlin	  1999,	  p.	  452)	  
	  
In	   our	   discussion	   so	   far	   I	   have	   analyzed	   and	   presented	   several	   key	   arguments	   and	  
notions	   about	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   problem.	   In	   the	   first	   chapter	   I	   have	   discussed	   the	  
standard	   anti-­‐physicalist	   conceivability	   arguments	   (Nagel’s	   subjectivity	   objection,	   Kripke’s	  
modal	  argument,	  the	  zombie	  argument,	  the	  knowledge	  argument	  and	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  
argument).	   In	   the	  second	  chapter	   I	  have	  analyzed	  Levine’s	  account	  of	   the	  explanatory	  gap	  
problem	   (Levine	   1983,	   1993,	   2001).	   The	   analysis	   has	   teased	   out	   two	   key	   areas	   of	   the	  
problem	  that	  require	  the	  most	  of	  the	  physicalist’s	  attention.	  These	  are	  the	  entailment	  from	  
conceivability	   to	   metaphysical	   possibility	   and	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   explanation	   of	   the	  
psychophysical	   identity.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	  would	   like	   to	  discuss	   the	  most	  attractive	  and	   the	  
most	  successful	  response	  to	  all	  these	  arguments,	  an	  approach	  that	  has	  several	  varieties	  but	  
which	  is	  commonly	  known	  as	  “the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy”	  (Stoljar	  2005).	  	  
In	   its	   most	   general	   articulation	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	   explains	   the	  
seeming	   contingency	   of	   psychophysical	   identity	   by	   appealing	   to	   a	   special	   nature	   of	  
phenomenal	   concepts,	   i.e.	  by	  a	   special	  way	  we	   think	  about	  our	  experiences	   from	   the	   first	  
person	  perspective.	  According	  to	  the	  strategy,	  phenomenal	  concepts	  pick	  out	  their	  referents	  
directly,	  their	  modes	  of	  presentation	  are	  substantive	  and	  determinate.	  In	  this	  sense,	  they	  are	  
unique,	  irreducible	  concepts.	  Furthermore,	  there	  are	  no	  a	  priori	  reasons	  of	  why	  phenomenal	  
concepts	  and	  physical	   concepts	   cannot	   refer	   to	   the	   same	   thing.	  According	   to	   this	   strategy	  
psychophysical	  identity	  is	  necessary	  and	  a	  posteriori.	  	  
In	   the	   following	   sections	   I	   discuss	   several	   accounts	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concept,	  
which	   culminate	   with	   Papineau’s	   account	   of	   the	   perceptual	   phenomenal	   concepts.	   After	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that,	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  I	  analyze	  several	  key	  issues	  connected	  with	  the	  phenomenal	  
concept	  strategy	  and	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem,	  i.e.	  I	  discuss	  the	  “Max	  Black’s	  objection”	  
to	  psychophysical	  identity	  which	  claims	  that	  distinct	  modes	  of	  presentation	  of	  the	  concepts	  
flanking	   the	   identity	   sign	   require	   some	  distinct	  properties	   in	  virtue	  of	  which	  concepts	  pick	  
out	   their	   referents.	  The	  other	  major	   issue	   is	   the	  explanatory	  adequacy	  of	   the	  phenomenal	  
concept	  strategy,	   that	   is,	   if	  phenomenal	  concepts	  explain	  the	  epistemic	  gap,	   then	  they	  are	  
not	  physically	  explicable	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  
I	   now	   turn	   to	   discussing	   some	   of	   the	  major	   accounts	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	  
strategy.	  	  
3.2 Loar’s	  account	  of	  the	  recognitional	  phenomenal	  concepts	  
Unlike	  physical	  concepts	  that	  pick	  out	  their	  referents	  via	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles,	  
phenomenal	  concepts,	  according	  to	  Loar	  (Loar	  2002),	  pick	  out	  their	  referents	  directly,	  as	   it	  
were,	  by	  using	  perceptual	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  In	  Loar’s	  view,	  natural	  kinds	  concepts	  pick	  
out	   their	   referents	  via	  contingent	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  phenomenal	  
concepts	   refer	   directly	   without	   relying	   on	   the	   contingent	   modes	   of	   presentation.	   The	  
phenomenal	  property	  presents	   itself	   in	   its	  own	  right.	  To	  get	   this	  point	  across	  he	  considers	  
two	  examples.	  The	  first	  example	  involves	  a	  person,	  call	  him	  Max,	  who	  knows	  that	  the	  glass	  in	  
front	  of	  him	  contains	  certain	  chemical	  compound,	  say	   ,	  without	  knowing	  that	  it	  
is	   alcohol.	   Furthermore,	   he	   might	   even	   lack	   a	   concept	   “alcohol”	   altogether.	   What	   would	  
happen	  after	  he	  learns	  the	  concept	  “alcohol”	  or	  after	  being	  told	  that	  glass	  of	   is	  
actually	  a	  glass	  of	  alcohol?	  Loar	  claims	  that	  Max	  would	  learn	  a	  new	  fact.	  He	  maintains	  that	  if	  
we	  followed	  the	  reasoning	  from	  the	  knowledge	  argument	   it	  would	  turn	  out	  that	  alcohol	   is	  
not	   .	  It	  is	  not	  that	  difficult	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  this	  conclusion.	  It	  is	  
of	  course	  the	  fact	  that	  both	   and	  alcohol	  use	  contingent	  modes	  of	  presentation	  
to	   connect	   to	   their	   referent	   so	   given	   that	   the	   identity	   of	   and	   alcohol	   is	   a	  
posteriori	  we	  explain	  away	  how	  it	  is	  that	  Max	  learns	  a	  new	  fact	  and	  why	  learning	  a	  new	  fact	  
in	  this	  case	  does	  not	   imply	   introducing	  a	  new	  property.	   In	  other	  words,	  we	  use	  contingent	  
modes	   of	   presentation	   as	   a	   base	   for	   explaining	   how	   the	   same	   property	   instantiates	   two	  
different	  concepts.	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The	   second	   example	   involves	  Margot,	   who	   learns	   that	   there	   is	   an	   element	   in	   the	  
periodic	  table	  called	  Au	  with	  the	  atomic	  number	  79	  that	  people	  use	  to	  decorate	  themselves.	  
However,	  Margot	   has	   never	   seen	   gold	   and	   cannot	   identify	   it	   visually.	   Once	   she	   is	   shown	  
several	   objects	  made	   out	   of	   gold	   and	   is	   told	   that	   those	   are	   samples	   of	  Au	   she	   obviously	  
learns	  a	  new	   fact.	   If	   the	  knowledge	  argument	  had	  a	  universal	   validity	   it	  would	   follow	   that	  
gold	  is	  not	  Au,	  which	  is	  obviously	  false.	  	  
These	  two	  cases	  unveil	  a	  few	  very	  important	  points	  about	  the	  knowledge	  argument.	  
The	   Max	   case	   shows	   that	   one	   and	   the	   same	   thing	   can	   be	   picked	   out	   by	   two	   different	  
concepts	  without	  any	  gap	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  that	  could	  be,	  if	  we	  accept	  that	  both	  
concepts	   use	   contingent	   modes	   of	   presentation.	   The	   Margot	   case	   shows	   that	   the	   visual	  
experience	  in	  the	  type	  demonstrative	  form	  and	  under	  an	  opaque	  context	  also	  relies	  on	  the	  
contingency	   that	   is	   crucial	   for	   the	  point	   that	   the	   same	  property	   can	  be	  picked	  out	  by	   two	  
different	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  element	  is	  picked	  out	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  via	  
description	  of	   the	  causal/functional	   roles	   it	   standardly	  plays,	  and	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  via	  a	  
type	   demonstrative	   that	   also	   relies	   on	   the	   contingent	  mode	   of	   presentation:	   that	   type	   of	  
experience.	  	  	  
Now	  consider	  the	  knowledge	  argument.	  Let’s	  assume	  that	  upon	  release	  Mary	  indeed	  
learns	   something	   new19.	   It	   can’t	   be	   that	   she	   learns	   some	   old	   fact	   under	   a	   different	  
contingent	  mode	  of	  presentation	   like	   in	  Max’s	  case,	  because	  she	  does	  not	   learn	   it	  under	  a	  
contingent	   mode	   of	   presentation.	   Put	   into	   philosophical	   jargon,	   she	   learns	   a	   new	   fact	  
simpliciter.	   Her	   knowledge	   about	   the	   new	   fact	   is	  more	   intimate	   and	   direct	   so	   there	   is	   no	  
contingency	   in	   her	   knowledge	   about	   her	   phenomenal	   experiences	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	  
explain	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  does	  learn	  something	  new.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  physicalisim	  is	  in	  
trouble	  because	   if	  an	   identity	   statement	   is	   to	  be	  considered	  as	   true	  and	  based	  on	  distinct	  
conceptual	  semantics,	  then	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  concepts	  flanking	  the	  identity	  sign	  has	  to	  be	  
                                                
19 I would like to thank Rob Templing to reminding me of the distinction made in the literature according to 
which the knowledge argument equivocates on the two different sense of the term “fact”: “fact” as “an item 
of knowledge” and “fact” as “a truth about the world”. The point is that physicalism is only committed to 
making claims about “all facts” in the latter sense, but the knowledge argument only proposes a new fact in 
the former sense. This is a brilliant point but I shall skip it here because discussing such fine distinctions 
would require considerably more space than I have in this dissertation and, on the other hand, my analysis 
here won’t be affected significantly by a lack of such discussion. 
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based	  on	  the	  contingent	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  This	  is	  what	  Loar	  calls	  the	  semantic	  premise	  
and	  of	  course	  we	  know	  it	  from	  the	  preceding	  discussions	  on	  the	  epistemological	  and	  modal	  
aspects	   of	   conceptual	   semantics,	   i.e.	   from	   the	   discussions	   about	   the	   relation	   between	  
apriority/aposteriority	  and	  necessity.	  As	  we	  recall,	  the	  standard	  anti-­‐materialist	  view	  in	  this	  
matter	   rests	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   necessity	   of	  a	   posteriori	   statements	   stems	   from	   the	  
binding	   topic	   neutral	   premise	   that	   identifies	   explanans	   and	   explanandum	   in	   a	  meta	   claim	  
that	   enables	   us	   to	   evaluate	   necessity	   of	   even	   a	   posteriori	   identities	   based	   on	   some	  
underlying	  a	  priori	  claim.	  I	  shall	  be	  discussing	  this	  issue	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  
the	  next	  chapter	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Block	  and	  Stalnaker’s	  	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999)	  
criticism	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  and	  reductive	  explanations.	  	  
As	  we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapters	   there	   are	   two	   crucial	   claims	   lurking	   in	  
here.	   Loar	   rightly	   identifies	   them	   as	   the	   claim	   of	   distinct	   conceptual	   semantics	   (or	   in	   his	  
terminology:	   “conceptually	   independent	   concepts”	   (Loar	   2002,	   p.	   299))	   and	   a	   semantic	  
premise.	  His	  strategy	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  distinct	  conceptual	  semantics	  premise	  and	  to	  deny	  the	  
semantic	   premise.	   Denying	   the	   semantics	   premise	   comes	   down	   to	   this:	   if	   an	   identity	  
statement	  consisted	  of	  two	  conceptions,	  one	  of	  which	  picked	  out	  its	  referents	  via	  contingent	  
modes	  of	  presentation,	  and	  the	  other	  conception	  directly,	  but	  both	  conceptions	  referred	  to	  
the	  same	  property,	  then	  basically	  the	  knowledge	  argument	  and	  the	  conceivability	  arguments	  
would	  be	  ineffective	  and	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  physicalism	  would	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  distinct	  
conceptual	  semantics.	  In	  other	  words:	  if	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts	  picked	  out	  their	  referents	  
in	  a	  direct	  way,	  that	  is,	  not	  via	  contingent	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  and	  yet	  had	  independent	  
semantics	   from	   the	   natural	   kinds	   concepts,	   so	   that	   Mary’s	   history	   is	   coherent,	   then	  
physicalism	  would	  be	  compatible	  with	   the	  knowledge	  argument.	  However,	   there	  seems	  to	  
be	  only	  one	  thing	   in	  here,	  not	  two	  as	  Loar	  seems	  to	  distinguish.	  The	  fact	  that	  phenomenal	  
concepts	  pick	  out	  their	  referents	  directly,	  not	  via	  contingent	  modes	  of	  presentation	  means	  
that	  their	  semantics	  are	  conceptually	  independent	  from	  the	  natural	  kinds	  concepts.	  So	  this	  is	  
the	  problem	  we	  started	  with.	  Let’s	  see	  how	  Loar	  further	  develops	  his	  account.	  	  
To	   do	   so,	   let’s	   consider	   in	   some	   detail	   the	   semantics	   of	   the	   phenomena	   concept	  
proposed	   by	   Loar.	   He	   claims	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   recognitional	   concepts.	   They	  
have	   the	   form:	  x	   is	  one	  of	   that	  kind.	   This	   form	  also	   renders	   them	  as	   type	  demonstratives.	  
They	   are	   couched	   in	   a	   disposition	   to	   classify	   objects,	   events	   and	   situations	   through	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perceptual	   discriminations	   (Loar	   2002,	   p.	   298).	  We	   acquire	   phenomenal	   concepts	   directly	  
from	   our	   experience	   but	   we	   can	   also	   apply	   them	   to	   other	   situations	   or	   we	   can	  
project/ascribe	  them	  to	  others.	  For	  example	  we	  say:	  she	  has	  that	  kind	  of	  experience.	  We	  are	  
able	   to	  do	   this	   because	  phenomenal	   recognitional	   concepts	   are	  based	  on	   the	  dispositions	  
that	  are	  connected	  with	  the	  capacities	  to	  form	  images	  about	  an	  identifiable	  kind	  even	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	   the	  currently	  perceived	   instance	   (Loar	  2002,	  p.	  298).	  Furthermore,	   recognitinal	  
concepts	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  broader	  conceptual	  background	  of	  other	  discriminations.	  For	  
example,	  one	  can	  utter	   the	   following	  claim:	   “a	  physical	  object	  of	  THAT	  kind”,	  but	  also	   the	  
following:	  “an	  internal	  state	  of	  THAT	  kind”.	  	  
But	  let’s	  go	  step	  by	  step	  here.	  In	  order	  to	  fully	  appreciate	  this	  idea	  let’s	  consider	  the	  
following:	   a	   person	   goes	   into	   a	   desert	   and	   encounters	   a	   plant	   that	   she	   hasn’t	   seen	   ever	  
before.	  She	  doesn’t	  know	  the	  name	  of	   the	  plant	  but	   she	   is	  nevertheless	  able	   to	  apply	   the	  
demonstrative	   concept	   of	   that	   plant	   on	   any	   future	   encounters	  with	   another	   plant	   of	   that	  
kind.	  For	  example,	  she	  might	  say,	  “Oh,	  this	  is	  that	  kind	  of	  plant”.	  She	  might	  be	  able	  to	  do	  all	  
this	  without	  actually	  having	  a	  name	  for	  it.	  This	  example	  unveils	  a	  very	  important	  trait	  of	  the	  
recognitional	  concepts,	   that	   is,	   that	   the	  concept	  can	  be	  applied	  without	  actually	  having	  an	  
instance	  that	  was	  responsible	  for	  forming	  the	  concept.	  One	  has	  to	  distinguish	  phenomenal	  
recognitional	   concepts	   from	   the	   other	   forms	   of	   recognitional	   concepts.	   For	   example,	   a	  
person	   can	   learn	   about	   the	   chemical	   composition	   of	   porcelain	   and	   its	   causal/functional	  
relations	  with	  other	  compositions	  or	  objects	  without	  being	  able	  to	  recognize	  it	  visually.	  That	  
is	   to	   say,	   after	   learning	   how	   to	   recognize	   porcelain	   visually,	   she	   acquires	   a	   recognitional	  
concept	  under	  contingent	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  By	  contrast	  the	  phenomenal	  recognitional	  
concept	   is	   recognitional	   in	   its	   core	   as	   Loar	   puts	   it	   (Loar	   2002,	   p.	   298),	   i.e.	   even	  when	  we	  
acquire	  it,	   it	   is	  recognitional.	   In	  another	  words,	  they	  do	  not	  need	  to	  contain	  a	  reference	  to	  
some	  past	  instances	  of	  the	  experience	  that	  was	  responsible	  for	  forming	  a	  given	  concept.	  
Finally,	   the	   phenomenal	   recognitional	   concepts	   are	   perspectival.	   This	   means	   that	  
they	  are	  in	  part	  individuated	  by	  their	  own	  constitutive	  perspective.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  
could	   apply	   these	   concepts	   even	   outside	   their	   constitutive	   perspective.	   For	   example,	   a	  
person	  sees	  a	   four-­‐legged	  creature	   from	  up	  close	  and	   forms	  a	   recognitional	  concept	   these	  
creatures	   1.	   Suppose	   then	   she	   sees	   some	   creatures	   in	   the	   distance,	   but	   she	   is	   not	   sure	  
whether	  those	  creatures	  are	  the	  same	  kind	  as	  the	  ones	  she	  saw	  from	  up	  close,	  so	  she	  calls	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them	  these	  creatures	  2.	  These	  two	  concepts	  are	  a	  priori	  independent,	  one	  cannot	  infer	  one	  
from	  the	  other.	  	  	  
Phenomenal	   recognitional	  concepts,	  according	   to	  Loar,	  pick	  out	   the	   internal	  neuro-­‐
functional	   properties	   of	   the	   brain.	   We	   deploy	   them	   when	   thinking	   phenomenologically	  
about	  our	  experiences,	  but	  under	  physical/functional	  descriptions.	  So	  it	  seems,	  argues	  Loar,	  
that	   there	   are	   no	   prima	   facie	   reasons	   nor	   available	   philosophical	   arguments	   against	   the	  
claim	   that	   phenomenal	   recognitional	   concepts	   pick	   out	   those	   internal	   neuro-­‐functional	  
properties	  in	  the	  way	  other	  than	  the	  contingent	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  	  
The	  question	  immediately	  arises:	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  give	  some	  plausible	  argument	  that	  
would	   account	   for	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   and	   the	   natural	   kinds	  
concepts?	   	  A	  physicalist	  would	  normally	   say	   that	   there	   is	   no	   implausibility	   involved	   in	   the	  
assumption	   that	   the	   truth	   conditions	   for	   both	   phenomenal	   concept	   and	   a	   natural	   kinds	  
concept	  could	  be	  the	  same	  and	  as	  long	  as	  their	  truth	  or	  falsity	  can	  be	  known	  a	  posteriori.	  For	  
example,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  nothing	  prima	  facie	  wrong	  with	  the	  claims	  that	  “the	  state	  A	  feels	  
like	   that”	   and	   “the	   state	   A	   has	   physical/functional	   property	   P”	   share	   the	   same	   truth	  
conditions.	   	   There	   is	   nothing	   wrong	   in	   here	   because	   if	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   refer	  
directly,	   unmediated	   by	   the	   contingent	  modes	   of	   presentation,	   then	   the	   truth	   conditions	  
that	  determine	  any	  counterfactual	  situation	  are	  satisfied	  by	  the	  physical	  property	  picked	  out	  
by	  both	   the	  phenomenal	   concept	   and	   the	  physical	   concept.	   Someone	  might	  object	   that	   if	  
both	  concepts	  rigidly	  designate	  a	  single	  property,	   then	   it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	   they	  are	  a	  
priori	  inter-­‐derivable,	  that	  is,	  one	  should	  be	  able	  to	  derive	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  from	  the	  
physical	  concept	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Loar’s	  response	  is	  that	  this	  objection	  conflates	  two	  senses	  of	  
rigid	  designation	  here.	   In	  one	  sense	   rigid	  designation	  means	  something	   like:	   “captures	   the	  
essence	  of…”,	  which	  basically	  means	  refers	  directly	  and	  unmediated.	  The	  other	  sense	  reads:	  
“be	   conceptually	   interderivable	   with	   some	   theoretical	   predicate	   that	   reveals	   the	   internal	  
structure	  of	  the	  designated	  property”	  (Loar	  2002,	  p.	  300).	  	  
	  
However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  not	  all	  self-­‐directed	  recognitional	  concepts	  are	  
phenomenal	  concepts.	   Loar	   lists	   two	  examples	   for	   this	  distinction	   (Loar	  2002,	  p.	  300).	  The	  
first	   one	   involves	   cramps,	   involuntary	   muscle	   contractions,	   and	   the	   second	   one	   involves	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cases	  of	  blindsight,	  a	  phenomenal	  blindness	  in	  restricted	  retinal	  areas.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  cramps,	  
there	   is	   a	   self-­‐directed	   recognitional	   concept,	   but	   there	   is	   no	   phenomenal	   quality	   to	   be	  
picked	  out.	  The	  cramps	  are	  only	  muscle	  contractions,	  which	  have	  characteristic	  feel,	  but	  they	  
are	  not	  feelings	  themselves.	  As	  Loar	  puts	  it	  (Loar	  2002,	  p.	  300)	  we	  can	  have	  a	  recognitional	  
concept	  of	  a	  cramp	  but	  it	  won’t	  be	  a	  phenomenal	  concept	  for	  it	  does	  not	  pick	  out	  any	  quality	  
associated	   with	   the	   muscle	   contraction.	   Of	   course	   we	   use	   a	   phenomenal	   mode	   of	  
presentation	  as	  he	  calls	  it	  to	  refer	  to	  that	  feel.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  blindsight	  wherein	  people	  are	  
able	   to	   “guess”	  with	  high	  accuracy	  what	   is	   in	   the	  blind	   field,	  although	  consciously	  blind	   in	  
this	   visual	   region,	   we	   have	   a	   self-­‐directed	   recognitional	   concept	   that	   picks	   out	   a	   “blank”	  
phenomenal	   concept.	   Phenomenal	   concepts	   on	   this	   proposal	   are	   a	   subclass	   of	   the	   self-­‐
directed	  recognitional	  concepts.	  	  
Having	   characterized	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   in	   this	   way,	   the	   question	  
immediately	   arises:	   if	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   a	   kind	   of	   self-­‐directed	   recognitional	  
concepts,	  then	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  ascribe	  them	  to	  others?	  	  
Loar	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  if	  one	  considers	  the	  fact	  that	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  
demonstratives	   that	   obtain	   their	   reference	   from	   one’s	   own	   case	   of	   actually	   or	   possibly	  
having	   an	   experience	   of	   a	   requisite	   type.	   So	   when	   we	   ascribe	   phenomenal	   states	   to	   the	  
others	  we	  use	  the	  demonstrative	  of	  the	  following	  form:	  x	  has	  an	  experience	  of	  that	  type	  or	  x	  
has	   a	   state	   of	   that	   sort.	   We	   project	   to	   others	   a	   recognitional	   phenomenal	   concept	   that	  
actually	  refers	  to	  our	  own	  specific	  physical	  state.	  Having	  said	  this,	  another	  possible	  objection	  
arises.	   The	   other	   person’s	   physical	   assembly	  may	   differ	   greatly	   or	   slightly	   from	  ours,	   how	  
does	   the	   self-­‐directed	   recognitional	   concept	   account	   for	   the	  phenomenal	   difference	   given	  
the	   physical	   difference?	   Loar’s	   response	   is	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   type	  
demonstratives,	   so	   on	   his	   view	   physicalism	   implies	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   pick	   out	  
physical	  ordering,	  ordering	  of	  the	  physical	  states,	  rather	  than	  particular	  physical	  states.	  We	  
get	   phenomenal	   concepts	   from	   our	   own	   perspective,	   remember	   they	   are	   essentially	  
perspectival,	  and	  we	  then	  apply	  them	  to	  our	  own	  states	  or	  to	  the	  states	  of	  others	  even	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  the	  instance	  that	  was	  responsible	  for	  their	  forming.	  If	  we	  were	  not	  able	  to	  ascribe	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  to	  others	  then	  it	  would	  be	  so	  because	  we	  were	  not	  able	  to	  apply	  them	  
in	   our	   own	   case	   without	   their	   original	   instance	   or	   as	   Loar	   puts	   it	   “they	   can	   be	   ascribed	  
beyond	  their	  constitutive	  perspective”	  (Loar	  2002,	  p.	  303).	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Finally,	   the	  problem	  with	   the	  explanations	  and	  a	  priori/a	  posteriori	   knowledge	   that	  
we	  already	  characterized	  in	  the	  second	  chapter	  rears	  its	  head	  again	  in	  here.	  Namely,	  when	  
explaining	   some	   natural	   kinds	   phenomenon	   in	   physical	   or	   functional	   terms,	   we	   basically	  
analyze	   it	   in	   terms	   of	   descriptions	   of	   its	   causal	   or	   nomic	   roles	   and	   then	   show	   that	   the	  
physical	  or	  functional	  theory	  a	  priori	  implies	  that	  these	  roles	  are	  realized	  (Loar	  2002,	  p.	  304).	  
However,	  if	  phenomenal	  concepts	  were	  conceptually	  independent	  then	  it	  seems	  impossible	  
to	  account	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  because	  no	  a	  priori	  analysis	  is	  available	  in	  
this	  case.	  Loar’s	   response	   is	   that	   like	   in	   the	  other	  cases	  of	  combining	  a	  demonstrative	  and	  
concepts	  that	  are	  based	  on	  the	  contingent	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  recall	  the	  “
/alcohol”	   case,	   do	   not	   generate	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   (Loar	   2002,	   p.	   304).	   Why	   should	   it	  
generate	   a	   gap	   in	   this	   case?	   Loar	   thinks	   that	   phenomenal	   recognitional	   concepts	   are	   not	  
different	   from	   the	   other	   demonstrative	   recognitional	   concepts.	   He	   claims	   that	   identity	  
statements	  that	  consist	  of	  the	  recognitional	  phenomenal	  concept	  and	  a	  physical	  concept	  are	  
expected	  to	  be	  explanatory,	  but	  they	  are	  not.	  He	  claims	  that	  this	  is	  a	  wrong	  expectation.	  The	  
intuition	   that	   such	   statements	  ought	   to	  be	  explanatory	   is	  misguiding.	   This	   intuition	   in	   fact	  
makes	   it	   really	   difficult	   to	   see	   that	   there	   is	   only	   one	   property	   there	   picked	   out	   in	   two	  
different	  modes	   of	   presentation.	   However,	   although	   the	   psychophysical	   identity	   involving	  
recognitional	   phenomenal	   concepts	   and	   physical	   concepts	   is	   not	   explanatory	   in	   itself,	   the	  
sense	   of	   puzzlement	   about	   how	   it	   could	   be	   true	   disappears	   once	   we	   realize	   the	   same	  
property	   can	   be	   picked	   out	   in	   two	   distinct	   ways.	   Loar	   claims	   that	   the	   complete	   physical	  
description	  indeed	  leaves	  out	  a	  subjective	  conceptions	  of	  experience,	  not	  because	  it	  cannot	  
fully	  characterize	  those	  states,	  but	  simply	  because	   it	  does	  not	  employ	  them	  directly	   like	   in	  
the	  case	  of	  contingent	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  	  
Now	   that	  we	  have	  discussed	   Loar’s	   account	  of	   a	   recognitional	   concept	   let’s	  have	  a	  
look	  at	  another	  version	  of	  the	  same	  variety	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  semantics,	  namely	  
Tye’s	  account	  of	  the	  recognitional	  concept	  (Tye	  2003).	  	  
	  
 84 
3.3 Tye’s	  account	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  
Tye	   (Tye	   2003,	   p.	   98)	   suggests	   that	   proper	   phenomenal	   concepts	   have	   to	   be	  
distinguished	   from	   the	   other	   sorts	   of	   concepts.	   They	   are	   a	   kind	   of	   recognitional	   concepts	  
exemplified	   in	   the	   following	   case:	   I	   could	  have	   a	   thought	   that	  water	   is	  wet	   and	   recognise	  
that	   I	   am	   having	   this	   thought	   and	   the	   act	   of	   recognizing	   the	   thought	   is	   the	   same	   as	   the	  
thought	   “water	   is	   wet”,	   it	   doesn’t	   add	   something	   to	   the	   original	   thought.	   The	   very	   same	  
applies	   to	   phenomenal	   concepts.	   They	   are	   not	   derivable	   or	   inferable	   from	   some	   other	  
concepts.	   Introspection	   is	   a	   reliable	   guide	   for	   capturing	   a	   phenomenal	   character	   and	  
applying	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  appropriately.	  	  
The	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	   is	   pretty	   straightforward	   in	   answering	   three	   major	  
physicalist	  worries.	  The	  conceivability	  of	  zombies	  poses	  no	  threat	  to	  physicalism	  if	  we	  accept	  
that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   concepts	   from	   physical	   concepts.	   It	   is	  
conceivable	   that	   there	   could	   be	   a	   creature	   physically	   indistinguishable	   from	   me	   but	   still	  
lacking	  phenomenal	   experiences;	   however,	   that	   is	   not	   different	   from	   the	  other	   kinds	   of	  a	  
posteriori	   necessary	   identities,	   like	   “water=XYZ”	   or	   that	   I	   am	   not	   Daniel,	   etc.	   The	   second	  
worry	  is	  the	  knowledge	  argument.	  Consider	  this,	  if	  phenomenal	  concepts	  were	  not	  different	  
from	  the	  physical	  concepts,	  Mary	  would	  have	  known	  what	   is	   it	   like	  to	  see	  red	  colour	  even	  
before	   her	   release.	   Once	   we	   realize	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   different	   from	   the	  
physical	  concepts	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  Mary	  learns	  something	  new	  upon	  release.	  However,	  
we	   need	   to	   be	   extra	   cautious	   here	   not	   to	   characterize	   phenomenal	   concepts	   as	  
demonstratives	  that	  utilize	  physical	  sortals.	  For	  example,	  imagine	  Mary	  was	  even	  equipped	  
with	  a	  cerebroscope,	  a	  device	  that	  enables	  one	  to	  when	  that	  other	  people	  are	  undergoing	  
certain	  experiences	  just	  by	  pointing	  the	  device	  towards	  their	  heads,	  and	  when	  she	  uses	  it	  to	  
look	   in	   Mortimer’s	   head	   she	   sees	   and	   recognizes	   a	   physical	   state	   that	   corresponds	   to	  
Mortimer’s	   seeing	   red.	  However,	   she	   doesn’t	   acquire	   a	   phenomenal	   concept	   because	   she	  
needs	   to	  be	  able	   to	  make	  a	  “significant”	  discovery	  when	  she	  herself	   sees	  a	   ripe	   tomato	   in	  
order	  to	  have	  a	  proper	  phenomenal	  concept	  (Tye	  2003,	  pp.	  92-­‐3).	  	  
Finally,	  the	  third	  worry	   is	  about	  the	   intelligibility	  of	  explanations.	  To	  remove	  this	  worry	  
there	   should	   be	   no	   physical	   concept	   that	   is	   a	   priori	   co-­‐referential	   with	   a	   phenomenal	  
concept.	  To	  appreciate	  this	  constraint	  consider	  the	  following	  example	  of	  an	  explanation:	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47. “Pain* is the F 
48. Physical state so-and-so is present  
49. Physical state so-and-so is the F 
50. Therefore Pain* is present.” (Tye 2003, p. 93) 
“Pain*”	   in	   this	   argument	   represents	   an	   essence	   of	   an	   unpleasant	   phenomenal	  
character	  of	  pain	  and	  “F”	  is	  a	  physical	  predicate.	  The	  second	  and	  third	  premises	  are	  clearly	  
empirical	   ones.	   The	   first	   premise	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   a	   priori.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   then	   the	  
conclusion	   in	   50.	   would	   follow	   even	   if	   the	   first	   premise	   was	   not	   necessary	   a	   priori.	   This	  
clearly	   shows	   that	   an	   explanation	   using	   phenomenal	   concept	   flanking	   one	   side	   of	   the	  
identity	   statement	   needs	   no	   further	   explanation	   because	   the	   premise	   47.	   is	   knowable	   to	  
anyone	  who	  possess	  the	  concept	  “pain*”	  	  
So	  for	  a	  true	  physicalist	  theory	  of	  consciousness	  phenomenal	  concepts	  ought	  to	  meet	  
three	  major	   requirements:	  a)	   they	  have	   to	   refer	   to	  physical	  properties	  but	  not	  be	  physical	  
concepts,	  b)	  this,	  however,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  demonstratives	  that	  utilize	  physical	  
sortals,	  and	  c)	  they	  must	  not	  have	  a	  priori	  associated	  co-­‐referential	  physical	  concepts.	  For	  if	  
they	  had	  a	  priori	  associated	  co-­‐referential	  physical	  concepts	  then	  their	  reference	  would	  be	  
fixed	  rigidly	  and	  we	  would	  end	  up	  with	  the	  same	  problem	  again	  (Tye	  2003,	  p.	  93).	  	  	  
To	  get	  the	  point	  about	  the	  imagery	  feature	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	  across	  consider	  
this	  example:	  	  
51.	  “the	  visual	  experience	  of	  red=	  brain	  state	  B”	  (Tye	  2003,	  p.	  100).	  	  
The	  standard	  anti-­‐materialist	  view	  on	  this	  example	  is	  that	  when	  we	  think	  about	  the	  
left	  hand	  side	  of	  the	  identity	  statement	  we	  normally	  conceive	  its	  referent	  as	  triggering	  some	  
image	   of	   “red”	   in	   us.	   So	   if	   the	   identity	   is	   true	   at	   all,	   conceiving	   of	   or	   undergoing	   a	   “red”	  
experience	  triggers	  the	  brain	  state	  B.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  
of	   the	   identity,	  nothing	   like	   that	  happens.	  Conceiving	  of	  a	  brain	   state	  B	  does	  not	   trigger	  a	  
“red”	  image.	  So	  on	  the	  standard	  view	  this	  seems	  puzzling.	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However,	  on	  the	  account	  of	  phenomenal	  concept	   just	  presented,	  this	  example	  only	  
shows	   that	   there	   is	   a	  huge	  difference	   in	   the	   functioning	  of	   these	   two	  concepts	  but	  not	   in	  
their	   referent.	   According	   to	   Tye’s	   proposal,	   phenomenal	   concepts	   refer	   via	   causal	  
connections	   they	   have	   with	   their	   referents	   (Tye	   2003,	   p.	   97).	   On	   this	   account	   it	   seems	  
possible	   for	   a	   concept	   to	   refer	   to	   a	   phenomenal	   quality	   without	   being	   a	   phenomenal	  
concept.	  For	  example,	   imagine	  a	  neuroscientist	  Fred	   in	  the	  future,	  say	   in	  the	  22nd	  century,	  
who	  has	  a	  sensory	  impediment	  and	  is	  unable	  to	  feel	  pain,	  say	  he	  suffers	  from	  the	  congenital	  
analgesia	   (Grahek	  2007).	  However,	   in	  his	   time	   the	   technology	  has	  advanced	   that	  much	   so	  
they	  have	  cerebroscopes	  20.	  When	   looking	  through	  the	  cerebroscope	   into	  someone’s	  brain	  
Fred	  will	  be	  able	  to	  form	  a	  concept	  that	  refers	  directly	  to	  the	  brain	  state	  of	  a	  person	  who	  has	  
no	  defects	  or	  impediments	  in	  their	  pain	  experience.	  Although	  Fred	  will	  be	  able	  to	  feel	  what	  
that	  other	  person	  feels	  when	  in	  pain	  and	  his	  concept	  of	  the	  other	  person’s	  experience	  will	  
refer	  directly	  to	  her	  experience,	  he	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  acquire	  a	  phenomenal	  concept.	  He	  will	  
not	  possess	  a	  proper	  phenomenal	  concept	  because	  he	  will	  not	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  what	  
is	   it	   like	   to	   have	   that	   experience.	   The	   upshot	   of	   this	   scenario	   is	   that	   one	   cannot	   have	   a	  
phenomenal	   concept	  without	   knowing	  what	   is	   it	   like	   to	   undergo	   certain	   experiences	   (Tye	  
2003,	   p.	   98).	   It	   also	   follows	   from	   this	   example	   that	   no	   a	   priori	   analysis	   of	   the	   concept	  
“phenomenal	   concept”	   is	   possible,	   i.e.	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   conceptually	   irreducible.	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  question	  about	  how	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  function	  does	  not	  make	  
much	  sense.	  For	  if	  such	  a	  question	  were	  meaningful,	  Mary	  would	  not	  have	  learned	  anything	  
new	  upon	  release,	  she	  would	  be	  able	  to	  infer	  the	  phenomenal	  facts	  from	  the	  physical	  facts.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  question	  what	  makes	  a	  certain	  phenomenal	  concept	  a	  phenomenal	  
concept	   makes	   perfect	   sense.	   Tye	   maintains	   that	   some	   characterisation	   of	   phenomenal	  
concepts	   is	   possible	   to	   give.	   For	   example,	   a)	   they	   make	   marks	   in	   memory	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
undergoing	  certain	  experiences,	  b)	  they	  can	  trigger	  some	  mental	  images	  in	  response	  to	  some	  
cognitive	  tasks,	  and	  c)	  they	  enable	  concept	  possessors	  to	  discriminate	  between	  phenomenal	  
qualities	   that	   the	  concept	   refers	   to,	  directly	  and	   in	   introspection	   (Tye	  2003,	  p.	  99).	   	   These	  
three	   features	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	  what	   distinguishes	   phenomenal	   concepts	  
from	  other	  psychological	  concepts.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  reason	  why	  Fred	  the	  future	  neuroscientist	  
                                                
20 See the above explanation of the device 
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cannot	   have	   a	   phenomenal	   concept	   of	   another	   person’s	   experiences	   and	   this	   why	   Mary	  
learns	  something	  new	  upon	  her	  release.	  	  
What	   binds	   these	   three	   crucial	   features	   of	   phenomenal	   concepts	   together	   is	   the	  
assumption	  that	  there	  is	  an	  a	  priori	  link	  between	  the	  concept	  possession	  and	  knowing	  what	  
is	   it	   like	  and	  other	  relevant	  cognitive	  abilities,	  such	  as	  recreating	  an	  image	  of	  experience	  in	  
memory,	   etc	   (Tye	   2003,	   p	   99).	   To	  make	   the	   proposal	  more	   picturesque	   Tye	   (Tye	   2003,	   p.	  
101)	   suggests	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   should	   be	   thought	   of	   in	   two	   different	  ways.	   For	  
example,	   imagine	  an	  explorer	  who	  discovers	  a	  new	  species	  of	  animal	  and	  still	  hasn’t	  got	  a	  
name	  for	  it.	  He	  might	  take	  a	  photo	  of	  it	  assign	  it	  a	  name	  and	  file	  it.	  Next	  time	  he	  wants	  to	  
talk	  about	  the	  animal	  he	  takes	  out	  the	  photo	  and	  shows	   it	   to	  his	  colleagues.	  The	  name	  on	  
the	  picture	  refers	  to	  a	  species	  of	  animal	  whereas	  picture	  refers	  to	  a	  particular	  animal,	  i.e.	  a	  
token	  of	  a	  type.	  Another	  way	  to	  make	  this	  point	  is	  to	  imagine	  the	  same	  explorer	  in	  the	  same	  
situation,	  but	  instead	  of	  taking	  a	  photo	  he	  carves	  a	  replica	  of	  an	  animal	  in	  the	  wood.	  On	  later	  
occasions	   he	   uses	   the	   replica	   both	   to	   refer	   to	   a	   type	   (species)	   and	   to	   a	   token	   (particular	  
animal).	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  concept,	  argues	  Tye.	  Instead	  of	  an	  animal	  and	  
a	   photograph	  we	   have	   a	   “phenomena	   character	   detector”	   in	   our	   heads,	   that	   is	   set	   up	   to	  
recognize	   phenomenal	   qualities	   of	   our	   experience	   that	   occupy	   the	   focus	   of	   our	   attention	  
(Tye	  2003,	  p.	  102).	  	  
Now	  when	  the	  stage	  is	  set,	  by	  discussing	  basic	  ideas	  behind	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  
strategy,	   let’s	   consider	   its	   most	   advanced	   varieties	   which	   will	   tease	   out	   the	   major	  
shortcomings	   of	   the	   recognitional	   	   phenomenal	   concepts.	   After	   that	  we	  will	   be	  discussing	  
some	  of	  the	  central	  issues	  of	  the	  strategy.	  	  
3.4 Indexical-­‐quotational	  and	  perceptual	  accounts	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  sections	  one	  of	  the	  most	  promising	  routes	  to	  answer	  
the	  worries	  raised	  by	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem	  is	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	   In	  
this	   section	   I	   will	   be	   examining	   the	   indexical-­‐quotational	   and	   perceptual	   variety	   of	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  and	  I	  will	  show	  why	  it	  is	  better	  off	  than	  other	  accounts	  of	  phenomenal	  
concepts.	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The	  explanatory	   gap	  account	  posits	   a	  problem	   for	  physicalism	  by	   claiming	   that	   the	  
peculiar	  way	  we	   have	   an	   epistemic	   access	   to	   phenomenal	   states	   determines	   the	  way	  we	  
explain	  and	  conceptualize	  phenomenal	  experiences.	  Namely,	  it	  makes	  it	  seem	  unintelligible	  
how	   causal	   or	   functional	   explanation	   of	   phenomenal	   consciousness	   could	   be	   true.	   The	  
argument	   provided	   in	   support	   of	   this	   claim,	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   preceding	   sections,	  
establishes	  that	  justification	  of	  the	  identity	  statements	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds	  relies	  on	  
the	  topic	  neutral	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  properties	  usually	  play,	  and	  ends	  up	  with	  
the	  self-­‐evident	  truths	  (Levine	  1993,	  1998,	  2001).	  However,	  this	  structure	  of	  an	  explanation	  
would	   not	   work	   in	   the	   case	   of	   psychophysical	   identity	   because	   either	   the	   topic	   neutral	  
description	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  is	  not	  available	  in	  these	  cases	  or	  the	  justification	  does	  not	  end	  
up	  with	  the	  self-­‐evident	  truths.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  topic	  neutral	  description	  of	  the	  
causal/functional	  roles	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  states	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  give	  because	  it	  is	  difficult	  
to	   see	   how	   phenomenal	   concepts	   would	   refer	   via	   a	   description.	   This	   is	   the	   point	   where	  
phenomenal	  concept	  strategies	  step	  in.	  Namely,	  proponents	  of	  this	  strategy	  concede	  on	  the	  
claim	  that	   there	   is	  a	  problem	   if	  we	  expect	  phenomenal	  concepts	   to	   refer	  via	  a	  description	  
and	   if	   they	   do	   not	   refer	   in	   that	  way.	  However,	   once	  we	   recognize	   the	   special	   features	   of	  
phenomenal	   concepts,	   such	  as	  direct	   reference	  and	   realize	   their	   kinship	   to	   the	  perceptual	  
concepts	  and	  demonstrative	  concepts,	  then	  it	  becomes	  clear	  how	  this	  strategy	  addresses	  the	  
main	  difficulty	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem.	  	  
Let’s	  elaborate	  on	  these	  claims.	  	  
Papineau	  (Papineau	  2002)	  develops	  an	  account	  of	  indexical-­‐quotational	  phenomenal	  
concepts	   and,	   later	   on,	   an	   improved	   account	   of	   nondemonstrative	   phenomenal	   concepts	  
(Papineau	  2007).	  On	  his	  view	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts	  refer	  in	  a	  direct	  way	  by	  picking	  out	  
their	  referents	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  immediate	  quality	  or	  “the	  feel”	  of	  experience,	  in	  another	  
words	  by	  indexing	  the	  requisite	  experience,	  or	  by	  “quoting”	  it	  by	  recreating	  it	  in	  imagination.	  
In	  this	  way	  the	  structure	  of	  reference	  of	  phenomenal	  concept	  takes	  up	  the	  following	  form:	  
the	   experience:__.	   The	   underlined	   space	   is	   then	   filled	   either	   with	   currently	   undergoing	  
experience	   or	   by	   some	   past	   experience	   recreated	   in	   imagination.	   Understanding	  
phenomenal	   concepts	   in	   this	   way	   then	   justifies	   the	   claim	   that	   phenomenal	   and	   physical	  
concepts	   although	   referring	   in	   two	   fundamentally	   different	   ways	   still	   pick	   out	   the	   same	  
property,	  one	   in	   terms	  of	   its	   causal	   roles	   the	  other	  one	  directly	   in	   terms	  of	   its	   immediate	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quality.	   Papineau	   calls	   this	   position	   conceptual	   dualism;	   that	   is,	   there	   is	   only	   one	   kind	   of	  
property	  ontologically	  but	  two	  different	  ways	  of	  how	  we	  grasp	  them	  conceptually.	  In	  other	  
words,	  ontological	  monism	  and	  conceptual	  dualism	  are	  two	  compatible	  doctrines	  about	  the	  
world.	  	  
On	  Papineau’s	   view,	   this	   variety	  of	   the	  phenomenal	   concept	  does	  not	  only	   answer	  
the	  worries	   raised	  by	   the	   knowledge	  argument	   and	  by	   the	   conceivability	   argument,	   but	   it	  
also	  explains	  why	  dualist	   intuitions	   seem	  so	  compelling.	   	   Furthermore,	   this	  account	  of	   the	  
phenomenal	   concept	   does	   indeed	   answer	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   argument	   in	   a	   way	   that	  
Levine	   exactly	   requires	   (Levine	   1983,	   1993,	   2001).	   Namely,	   Papineau’s	   account	   of	  
phenomenal	   concept	  meets	   two	  main	   requirements	   for	   closing	   the	  gap:	  1)	   it	  does	  explain	  
away	  why	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  psychophysical	  identity	  leaves	  us	  with	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  and	  
2)	   it	   shows	   that	   justification	  of	   the	  psychophysical	   identity	  does	  not	  have	   to	   rely	  on	   the	  a	  
priori	  analysis	  of	  meaning	  21.	  Let	  me	  expend	  a	  bit	  here	  on	  both	  points.	  	  
As	  we	   have	   seen	   from	   the	   example	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   explanation	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
natural	  kinds	  identities,	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  identity	  claim	  does	  not	  show	  why	  for	  example	  
water	   is	  H2O,	  because	   if	   they	  are	   identical	  then	   it	  doesn’t	  make	  sense	  to	  ask	  why	  they	  are	  
identical.	  In	  another	  words,	  if	  someone	  understands	  what	  identity	  is,	  then	  the	  question	  why	  
A	   is	   identical	   to	   B	   doesn’t	  make	   sense.	   This	   is	  what	   being	   identical	  means.	   It	   is	   especially	  
clear	   in	   the	   case	  of	   proper	  names	   in	   Kripke’s	   theory	  of	  meaning.	   If	   Cicero	   is	   Tully,	   then	   it	  
doesn’t	  make	  sense	  to	  ask	  why	  Cicero	   is	  Tully.	  There	  are	  only	  two	  names	  that	  denote	  one	  
and	  the	  same	  person,	  because	  according	   to	  Kripke,	  proper	  names	  refer	  directly.	  The	  same	  
point	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  physical	  and	  phenomenal	  concepts,	  argues	  Papineau.	  We	  have	  one	  
property	   that	   is	   referred	   to	   in	   two	   different	   ways.	   One	   is	   by	   picking	   it	   out	   directly	  
(phenomenal	  concept)	  the	  other	  one	  by	  describing	  causal	  or	  functional	  roles	  given	  property	  
may	   play	   (physical	   concept).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   justification	   of	   the	   natural	   kinds	  
identities	  tells	  us	  why,	  for	  example,	  water	  has	  some	  further	  properties	  like	  being	  odourless,	  
tasteless,	  colourless,	  etc.	  Once	  it	  is	  established	  that	  a	  statement	  is	  an	  identity	  statement,	  it	  
ceases	  to	  make	  sense	  to	  ask	  why	  its	  constituents	  are	  identical.	  We	  will	  come	  to	  this	  issue	  in	  
                                                
21 I shall be discussing this issue much more thoroughly in the next chapter 
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the	   next	   chapters	   when	   we	   will	   be	   discussing	   in	   greater	   detail	   the	   difference	   between	  
natural	   kinds	   and	  psychophysical	   explanations,	   especially	   Block	   and	   Stalnaker‘s	   (Block	   and	  
Stalnaker	  1999)	  analysis	  of	  the	  reductive	  explanations.	  	  
	  Let’s	   return	  now	   to	   the	   issues	   from	   the	  beginning	  of	   this	   section.	   It	   has	  been	   said	  
that	  conceptual	  dualism	  (Papineau’s	  account	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts)	  and	  property	  dualism	  
claim	  that	  phenomenal	  concepts	  refer	  in	  a	  direct	  way	  and	  not	  by	  picking	  out	  causal	  roles	  of	  
the	  properties.	  The	  conceptual	  dualism	  claims	  there	  is	  only	  one	  property	  under	  two	  distinct	  
modes	  of	  presentation,	  whereas	  property	  dualism	  claims	   there	  are	   in	   fact	   two	  properties.	  
Papineau	   provides	   	   independent	   argument	   that	   corroborates	   this	   idea.	   It	   is	   the	   causal	  
argument	  for	  physicalism.	  	  As	  we	  recall	  from	  the	  introduction,	  the	  argument	  goes	  like	  this:	  	  	  
1.	  Conscious	  mental	  occurrences	  have	  physical	  effects.	  
2.	  All	  physical	  effects	  are	  fully	  caused	  by	  purely	  physical	  histories.	  
3.	  The	  physical	  effects	  of	  conscious	  causes	  aren’t	  always	  overdetermined	  by	  distinct	  causes.	  
4.	  Therefore,	  materialism	  is	  true.	  	  (Papineau	  2002,	  pp.	  17-­‐18)	  
This	   argument	   brilliantly	   and	   elegantly	   encapsulates	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   physicalism.	  
Premise	  3.	   in	  this	  argument	  guarantees	   (by	  preventing	  overdetermination)	  that	  the	  effects	  
of	   conscious	   and	   physical	   causes	   are	   not	   distinct	   causes.	   Premise	   1.	   claims	   that	   certain	  
effects	   have	   conscious	   causes.	   The	   premise	   2.	   claims	   that	   certain	   effects	   have	   physical	  
causes.	  If	  conscious	  and	  physical	  causes	  are	  not	  distinct,	  as	  the	  premise	  3.	  claims,	  then	  the	  
only	  reaming	  possibility	  is	  to	  conclude	  that	  conscious	  and	  physical	  causes	  are	  identical.	  	  
Consider	   one	   more	   time	   the	   knowledge	   argument.	   If	   Mary	   learns	   something	   new	  
upon	  her	  release	  then	  the	  knowledge	  she	  acquires	  is	  about	  some	  properties	  that	  are	  distinct	  
from	  physical	  properties,	  for	   if	  they	  were	  not	  distinct	  she	  would	  have	  known	  them	  already	  
before	  the	  release,	  wherein	  she	  knew	  all	  the	  physical	  facts.	  This	  is	  Jackson’s	  reasoning	  about	  
the	  knowledge	  argument,	  which	  Chalmers	  also	  adopts	  in	  his	  work.	  However,	  there	  is	  nothing	  
in	  the	  knowledge	  argument	  that	  justifies	  this	  intuition.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  rather	  seems	  as	  if	  
the	   intuition	  of	  distinctness	  of	  properties	   stems	   from	  what	  Papineau	  calls	   the	  antipathetic	  
fallacy.	   Papineau	   argues	   that	   the	   two	   ways	   in	   which	   we	   acquire	   knowledge	   about	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experiences,	  namely	  the	  first	  person	  and	  the	  third	  person,	  fuel	  the	  intuition	  that	  there	  must	  
be	  to	  distinct	  properties.	  It	  seems	  as	  if	  the	  first	  person	  perspective	  involves	  the	  experience	  
itself	  whereas	  the	  third	  person	  perspective	   leaves	  out	  this	  very	  experience.	  He	  calls	   it	   that	  
way	   because	   it	   seems	   that	   in	   arguing	   against	   materialism	   people	   just	   fail	   to	   ascribe	   two	  
distinct	  modes	   of	   presentation	   to	   the	   one	   and	   the	   same	   property	   and	   instead	   claim	   that	  
there	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  properties.	  In	  coining	  this	  name	  he	  draws	  on	  what	  is	  known	  in	  poetry	  
as	  the	  “pathetic	  fallacy”,	  that	  is,	  a	  fallacy	  of	  ascribing	  human	  feelings,	  beliefs	  or	  attitudes	  to	  
the	   natural	   phenomena.	   For	   example,	   we	   find	   the	   “pathetic	   fallacy”	   in	   these	   sorts	   of	  
statements:	  “gloomy	  forest”,	  “punishing	  sun”,	  etc.	  	  
However,	  isn’t	  it	  equally	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  Mary	  does	  in	  fact	  learn	  something	  
new,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  add	  anything	  to	  the	  ontology?	  Doesn’t	  it	  seem	  even	  more	  plausible	  that	  
she	   rather	   acquires	   a	   new	   concept,	   which	   refers	   to	   the	   same	   property	   as	   her	   material	  
concepts	  but	  under	  a	  different	  mode	  of	  presentation?	  It	  seems	  as	  if	  she	  does.	  Even	  Jackson	  
changed	  his	  mind	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  knowledge	  argument.	  He	  now	  claims	  that	  
the	   knowledge	   argument	  does	  not	   show	   that	  what	  Mary	   learns	  upon	   release	   implies	   that	  
there	  is	  a	  distinct	  property,	  but	  rather	  that	  what	  she	  acquires	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  
representationalism	  about	  sensory	  experience.	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  this	  point	  in	  the	  following	  
sections	  on	  the	  inconsistency	  objection.	  	  
Let’s	  return	  now	  to	  the	  semantics	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   develop	   the	   structure	   of	   reference	   on	   his	   account	   of	   phenomenal	  
concepts,	   Papineau	   analyzes	   two	   kin	   sorts	   of	   concepts:	   perceptual	   and	   phenomenal	  
concepts.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  perceptual	  concepts	  are	  those	  of	  the	  sensory	  experiences.	  They	  
are	   like	   sensory	   templates	   that	   perhaps	   even	   animals	   have,	   and	   are	   ready	   to	   be	   used	   in	  
situations	  that	  trigger	  the	  requisite	  experience.	  Loar	  would	  probably	  call	  them	  recognitional	  
concepts.	  The	  latter	  sort	  seems	  to	  be	  unique	  only	  to	  the	  linguistic	  creatures.	  Let’s	  elaborate	  
on	  all	  of	  these	  distinctions.	  
Although	  perceptual	   concepts	   in	   their	   linguistic	   form	  do	  contain	   the	  demonstrative	  
“that”,	   and	   thus	   can	   refer	   to	   different	   things	   at	   different	   times,	   it	   would	   be	   wrong	   to	  
categorize	   them	   as	   demonstratives	   because	   one	  might	   use	   the	   same	   linguistic	   expression	  
(demonstrative	   formula)	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   same	   thing	   every	   time	   one	   encounters	   the	   same	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thing.	  Papineau	  gives	  an	  example	  of	  a	  bird	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  a	  garden.	  First	  time	  he	  sees	  it	  he	  
might	  say,	  ”Oh,	  I	  like	  the	  song	  of	  that	  bird”.	  Next	  time	  he	  sees	  it	  he	  still	  doesn’t	  know	  what	  
kind	   of	   a	   bird	   it	   is	   or	   he	   doesn’t	   have	   a	   name	   for	   it,	   he	   would	   then	   use	   the	   perceptual	  
concept	   stored	   in	   his	  memory	   from	   the	   previous	   encounter	  with	   the	   bird	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  
same	  bird,	  but	  still	  using	  the	  demonstrative	  linguistic	  form.	  He	  would	  say,	  “Oh,	  look	  here	  is	  
that	  bird	  again”.	  He	  perhaps	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  categorize	  or	  name	  it	  explicitly,	  but	  he	  will	  
be	  able	  to	  refer	  to	  it	  by	  using	  a	  perceptual	  concept	  which	  is	  formed	  by	  attaching	  distinctive	  
information	   about	   the	   perceptible	   item	   (a	   bird	   in	   this	   case)	   to	   the	   sensory	   template.	   The	  
upshot	  of	  this	  idea	  is	  that	  although	  perceptual	  concepts	  may	  take	  up	  the	  linguistic	  form	  of	  a	  
demonstrative	   they	   should	   not	   be	   considered	   as	   demonstratives	   because	   the	   perceptual	  
concept	   itself	   is	   like	   a	   stored	   template	   of	   the	   sensory	   experience	   that	   can	   be	   reactivated	  
every	  time	  an	  agent	  undergoes	  the	  requisite	  experience.	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  stored	  template	  will	  
be	   “activated”	  by	   the	  experience	   it	   refers	   to.	  However,	   the	  question	  about	  how	  we	  know	  
whether	   these	   sensory	   templates	   refer	   to	  a	   type	  or	  a	   token	  arises	   straight	  off.	  Papineau’s	  
answer	  fits	  plausibly	  to	  the	  whole	  theory.	  He	  says	  that	   if	   it	   is	  a	  particular	  bird	  that	  triggers	  
some	  template	  then	  the	  template	  refers	  to	  a	  token,	  if	  ANY	  bird	  of	  the	  species	  activates	  some	  
template	  then	  it	  refers	  to	  a	  type.	  This	  question	  emphasizes	  some	  inevitable	  difficulties	  with	  
the	   recognitional	   account	   of	   perceptual	   concepts,	   namely,	   that	   it	   does	   not	   provide	  
sufficiently	   fine-­‐grained	   referential	   distinctions	   that	   are	   required	   for	   different	   contexts.	  
Purely	  recognitional	  account	  of	  perceptual	  concept	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  misrecognition,	  that	  is	  
it	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  a	  sensory	  template	  to	  be	  misapplied.	  It	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  cases	  in	  
which,	   for	   example,	   two	   persons	  might	   have	   the	   same	   sensory	   template	   but	   one	   person	  
thinking	   about	   a	   type	   and	   the	   other	   person	   thinking	   about	   a	   token.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  
Papineau’s	  version	  of	  the	  perceptual	  concept	  shifts	  the	  focus	  from	  the	  use	  to	  the	  function	  of	  
the	  concept.	  The	  gist	  of	  this	  idea	  is	  that	  what	  determines	  the	  semantics	  of	  a	  concept	  is	  not	  
how	  it	  is	  applied	  across	  different	  contexts,	  but	  rather	  what	  kind	  of	  information	  is	  attached	  to	  
the	   sensory	   template.	   So	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  origin	  of	  a	  perceptual	   concept	  and	   the	  kind	  of	  
information	  that	  gets	  attached	  to	  it	  determines	  how	  it	  refers	  in	  different	  contexts.	  One	  can	  
think	  of	  attaching	  the	  information	  to	  the	  sensory	  template	  as	  filling	  the	  “slots”.	  For	  example,	  
on	  an	  encounter	  with	  a	  bird	  with	  a	  missing	  claw	  a	  subject	  stores	  that	   information	   in	  some	  
“slot”	  of	  the	  sensory	  template.	  Next	  time	  the	  subject	  encounters	  that	  bird	  she	  will	  apply	  the	  
perceptual	   concept	   to	   that	   particular	   bird,	   not	   to	   the	   whole	   species.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	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when	  she	  sees	  any	  bird	  eating	  seeds,	  she	  would	  store	  that	  information	  in	  the	  template	  and	  
apply	  it	  to	  the	  whole	  species.	  The	  main	  point	  to	  be	  noted	  here	  is	  that	  a	  perceptual	  concept	  
normally	  refers	  to	  its	  origin,	  but	  not	  to	  whatever	  we	  believe	  it	  fits.	  	  
Papineau	  says	  that	  the	  reason	  why	  we	  use	  nondemonstrative	  perceptual	  concepts	  in	  
the	  demonstrative	  linguistic	  form	  is	  because	  sometimes	  we	  simply	  don’t	  have	  a	  name	  for	  the	  
thing	  we	  are	  referring	  to.	  However,	  on	  this	  account	  when	  the	  thing	  that	  we	  want	  to	  refer	  to	  
by	  using	  nondemonstrative	  perceptual	  concept	   is	  not	  present,	  we	  find	  ourselves	  unable	  to	  
convey	  the	  thought.	  This	  is	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  perceptual	  concepts	  are	  stored	  
sensory	  templates.	  They	  are	  set	  up	  on	  the	  first	  encounter	  with	  their	  referents	  and	  they	  can	  
be	  reactivated	  on	  every	  other	  encounter.	  However,	  they	  can	  also	  be	  reactivated	  even	  in	  the	  
absence	   of	   the	   relevant	   experience.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   that	   exemplifies	   earlier	   mentioned	  
recreation	   of	   a	   perceptual	   concept	   in	   imagination.	  We	  might	   reasonably	   assume	   that	   we	  
share	   this	   concepts	   of	   this	   kind	   with	   other	   animals,	   and	   that	   their	   purpose	   is	   to	   guide	  
creatures	   in	   everyday	   survival.	   By	   the	   same	   token,	   we	   can	   assume	   that	   various	   bits	   of	  
information	   about	   the	   referent	  will	   be	   attached	   to	   these	   templates	   and	  will	   be	   activated	  
when	  the	  template	  is	  activated	  in	  both	  encountering	  the	  referent	  or	  imaginatively	  recreating	  
it.	  This	  function	  of	  carrying	  information	  and	  adding	  new	  features	  to	  the	  template	  is	  critical	  in	  
distinguishing	   perceptual	   concepts	   from	   demonstratives,	   because	   demonstratives	   don’t	  
carry	  or	  add	  such	  information.	  They	  only	  refer	  to	  the	  item	  in	  a	  given	  context	  independently	  
from	  the	  previous	  encounters.	  However,	  these	  repositories	  of	  information	  that	  are	  attached	  
to	  the	  sensory	  template	  actually	  enable	  perceptual	  concepts	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  things	   in	  
different	   contexts.	   In	   a	   word,	   this	   amounts	   to	   showing	   that	   the	   function	   of	   a	   perceptual	  
concept	  is	  to	  accumulate	  information	  about	  the	  item	  that	  was	  responsible	  for	  its	  formation.	  
Now,	  given	  that	  the	  function	  of	  a	  perceptual	  concept	  is	  understood	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  becomes	  
clear	  how	  this	  account	  allows	  for	  a	  misapplication	  of	  a	  concept.	  	  
Understood	   in	   this	  way,	   perceptual	   concepts	   shift	   the	   focus	   of	   reference	   from	   the	  
phenomenal	  nature	  to	  the	  cognitive	  function.	  That	  is,	  instead	  of	  capturing	  whatever	  it	  is	  like	  
to	  have	  an	  experience,	  their	  semantics	  is	  now	  turned	  towards	  how	  we	  form	  concepts	  of	  our	  
own	  experiences	  that	  guide	  us	  in	  everyday	  situations.	  In	  this	  way	  a	  phenomenal	  concept	  is	  
partially	   constituted	   by	   the	   “what-­‐is-­‐it-­‐likeness”	   of	   experience.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  understood	  in	  this	  way	  adds	  another	  important	  dimension	  to	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the	  approach,	  namely	  the	  empirical	  commitment.	  Of	  course,	  according	  to	  this	  strategy	  the	  
phenomenal	   concept	   is	   experience	   dependant,	   that	   is,	   their	   acquisition	   depends	   on	  
undergoing	  the	  requisite	  kind	  of	  experience.	  Mary	  needs	  to	  see	  the	  red	  colour	  on	  her	  own	  in	  
order	   to	   have	   a	   concept	   of	   what	   is	   it	   like	   to	   see	   the	   red	   colour.	   This	   is	   where	   the	  
inconsistency	  objection	  steps	  in.	  I	  will	  be	  discussing	  this	  idea	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  Let’s	  stick	  a	  
bit	  longer	  with	  the	  semantics	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept.	  	  
The	   same	   idea	   about	   activating	   attached	   bits	   of	   information	   in	   the	   slots	   of	   the	  
sensory	   template	   either	   by	   actually	   perceiving	   an	   item	   that	   formed	   that	   template	   or	  
recreating	   it	   in	   imagination,	  applies	   to	   the	  concepts	   that	  allow	  us	   to	   think	  or	   to	   refer	   to	  a	  
perceptible	   item	   even	   when	   it	   is	   not	   actually	   perceived	   or	   recreated	   in	   imagination.	  
Papineau	   calls	   these	   concepts:	  perceptually	   derived	   concepts.	  When	   a	   sensory	   template	   is	  
formed,	  along	  with	  the	  slots	  for	  information	  about	  the	  referent,	  some	  other	  “file”	  is	  opened	  
that	   shares	   some	   of	   the	   slots	   but	   that	   is	   not	   activated	   by	   a	   perceptible	   item	   or	   by	   a	  
imaginatively	   recreated	   perceptible	   item.	   To	   put	   it	   differently,	   these	   perceptually	   derived	  
concepts	  allow	  us	  to	  think	  about	  perceptible	  items	  even	  when	  they	  are	  not	  actually	  present,	  
both	  in	  experience	  and	  in	  imagination.	  	  
Finally	  we	  come	  to	  Papineau’s	  improved	  account	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  	  
Phenomenal	   concept,	   according	   to	   Papineau,	   is	   a	   special	   case	   of	   a	   perceptual	  
concept.	   One	   can	   think	   of	   the	   concept	   as	   a	   sensory	   template	   deployed	   to	   think	   about	  
experiences	   themselves,	   not	   about	   objects	   of	   experience.	   We	   explained	   earlier	   how	   it	   is	  
possible	  that	  perceptual	  concepts	  can	  refer	  to	  types	  and	  tokens.	   It	  was	  said	  that	  when	  the	  
slot	  of	  a	  sensory	  template	  is	  filled	  with	  the	  species	  specific	  information	  then	  the	  perceptual	  
concept	   refers	   to	   a	   type.	  When	   it	   is	   filled	  with	   the	   individual	   specific	   information	   then	   it	  
refers	  to	  a	  token.	  The	  same	  line	  of	  thought	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  When	  a	  
perceptual	  concept	  is	  deploying	  experience	  specific	  information	  then	  we	  have	  a	  phenomenal	  
concept.	   However,	   the	   referential	   distinction	   between	   types	   and	   tokens	   of	   experience	  
cannot	   be	   made	   in	   the	   case	   of	   phenomenal	   concepts.	   It	   rather	   seems	   as	   if	   phenomenal	  
concepts	  always	   refer	  only	   to	   types	  of	  experience.	  Whenever	  we	   try	   to	   refer	   to	  particular	  
experiences	   we	   find	   ourselves	   deploying	   some	   more	   sophisticated	   concepts	   that	   are	  
referring	   perhaps	   via	   a	   description.	   The	   upshot	   of	   this	   idea	   is	   that	   we	   can	   think	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phenomenally	  about	  experiences	  and	  then	  we	  are	  deploying	  some	  basic	  perceptual	  concept	  
in	   combination	   with	   some	   more	   sophisticated	   concept	   that	   refer	   via	   descriptions	   to	  
particular	  experiences.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  can	  think	  phenomenally	  with	  experiences	  by	  
deploying	  a	  perceptual	  concept.	  	  
In	   the	   following	   sections	   I	  will	   be	   examining	   several	   key	   issues	   of	   the	   phenomenal	  
concept	   strategy	   and	   thus	   setting	   up	   the	   stage	   for	   the	   next	   chapter	   wherein	   I	   will	   be	  
presenting	  my	  key	  argument	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  is	  the	  right	  
approach	   to	   solving	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   problem.	   In	   addition,	   I	   will	   be	   considering	   some	  
epistemological	  issues	  of	  explanations	  of	  natural	  kind	  identities	  and	  psychophysical	  identities	  
in	  the	  framework	  of	  criticisms	  of	  a	  priori	  physicalism	  and	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  
Block/Stalnaker	  and	  Chalmers/Jackson.	  
Let’s	  see	  now	  whether	  there	  is	  some	  independent	  argument	  for	  conceptual	  dualism	  
apart	  from	  the	  corroboration	  it	  gets	  from	  the	  causal	  argument	  for	  physicalism.	  	  
3.5 The	  inconsistency	  objection	  and	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  
	   As	  we	  recall	  from	  the	  first	  chapter	  the	  knowledge	  argument	  revolves	  around	  the	  idea	  
that	   either	   Mary	   learns	   something	   new	   upon	   her	   release	   or	   not,	   and	   if	   she	   does	   learn	  
something	   new	   then	   the	   knowledge	   she	   gains	   is	   of	   a	   different	   kind	   then	   the	   knowledge	  
about	  the	  physical	  basis	  of	  colour	  vision.	  For	  if	  that	  knowledge	  were	  not	  of	  a	  different	  kind,	  
she	  would	  have	  known	  or	  have	  been	  able	  to	  infer	  it	  from	  the	  body	  of	  physical	  information.	  
This	  is	  then	  taken	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  in	  an	  argument	  that	  claims	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  learns	  
something	  is	  strong	  evidence	  that	  phenomenal	  properties	  exist,	  but	  since	  she	  did	  not	  know	  
those	   facts	   or	  was	   not	   able	   to	   infer	   them	   from	   the	   physical	   facts	  while	   still	   in	   the	   room,	  
indicates	  that	  they	  are	  causally	  inert,	  so	  epiphenomenalism	  must	  be	  true.	  	  
	   I	   think	   the	   knowledge	   argument	   does	   not	   show	   any	   of	   that	   without	   introducing	  
tacitly	  some	  additional	  assumptions.	   I	  particularly	  have	   in	  mind	  the	  assumptions	  about	  the	  
modes	  of	  presentation	  of	  natural	  kinds	  concepts	  and	  concepts	  of	   the	  experience	   from	  the	  
first-­‐person	  perspective.	   It	  seems	  that	   Jackson	  and	  others	  believe(d)	  both	  a)	   that	  concepts	  
picking	  out	  physical	  properties	  use	  only	  modes	  of	  presentation	  based	  on	  the	  descriptions	  of	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the	   causal	   roles	   properties	   normally	   play,	   and	   b)	   that	   the	   difference	   in	   modes	   of	  
presentation	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  difference	  in	  properties.	  	  
	   In	   this	   section	   I	   would	   like	   to	   argue	   against	   both	   of	   these	   assumptions	   and	  
furthermore	  to	  prove	  that	  if	  she	  were	  not	  able	  to	  learn	  anything	  new	  it	  would	  pose	  a	  much	  
more	   severe	   problem	   for	   both	   materialists	   and	   anti-­‐materialists.	   In	   the	   years	   after	   the	  
Knowledge	  Argument	  had	  been	  published	  several	  other	  arguments	  against	  it	  also	  appeared.	  
I	  refer	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  arguments	  by	  Campbell	  (Campbell	  2003),	  Watkins	  (Watkins	  1989),	  
Stjernberg	  (Stjernberg	  1999)	  that	  focus	  mainly	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  epiphenomenalism	  and	  the	  
claim	  that	  Mary	  learns	  something	  new	  are	  mutually	  exclusive.	  The	  general	  structure	  of	  these	  
argument	  goes	  roughly	  like	  this:	  if	  she	  were	  able	  to	  learn	  something	  new	  then	  it	  means	  that	  
phenomenal	   properties	   were	   causally	   efficacious,	   and	   thus	   epiphenomenalism	   cannot	   be	  
true.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   if	   epiphenomenalism	  were	   true	   she	   should	   not	   be	   able	   to	   learn	  
something	  new,	  as	  phenomenal	  properties	  then	  would	  not	  have	  any	  effects,	  and	  therefore	  
we	   could	   not	   know	   about	   them.	   This	   obviously	   isn’t	   enough	   to	   block	   the	   Knowledge	  
Argument	   completely,	   but	   it	   makes	   a	   very	   good	   point	   upon	   which	   I	   want	   to	   build	   my	  
argument	  in	  this	  section.	  In	  particular,	  the	  point	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  for	  in	  this	  section	  is	  that	  this	  
kind	  of	  analysis	  of	  the	  Knowledge	  Argument	  makes	  a	  good	  case	  for	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  
strategy.	  	  
	   In	  most	  of	  these	  arguments	  it	   is	  argued	  that	  the	  Knowledge	  Argument	  fails	  to	  show	  
that	  epiphenomenalism	   is	   true	  although	   it	   is	   conceded	   that	   the	  argument	  establishes	   that	  
qualia	   are	   non-­‐physical	   (Campbell	   2003).	   In	   other	   words,	   if	   epiphenomenalism	  were	   true	  
then	  Mary	  should	  not	  have	  learned	  anything	  new	  upon	  her	  release,	  because	  if	  phenomenal	  
properties	  were	   causally	   inefficacious	   then	  we	  would	  not	   be	   able	   to	   detect	   them,	   neither	  
from	   the	   first	   person	   perspective	   nor	   from	   the	   third	   person	   perspective.	  However,	   in	   this	  
case	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   epiphenomenalism	  would	   not	  make	   any	   sense	   because	   it	   does	   not	  
prove	  that	  phenomenal	  properties	  exist	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  only	  remaining	  backup	  for	  the	  
claim	   that	   she	   learns	   something	   new	   stems	   from	   our	   intuition	   that	   she	   “must”	   learn	  
something	   new;	   it	   seems	   so	   obvious	   that	   she	   learns	   something	   new.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  
what	   is	   the	  use	  of	   a	   theory	   that	   is	  not	   able	   to	  detect	   the	   relevant	  properties	  by	   failing	   to	  
bring	   them	   into	   nomic	   relations	   with	   other	   properties	   from	   the	   same	   plain	   or	   physical	  
properties?	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   It	  is	  also	  claimed	  by	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  inconsistency	  objection	  that	  although	  the	  
Knowledge	   Argument	   fails	   to	   prove	   the	   truth	   of	   epiphenomenalism	   while	   holding	  
phenomenal	  properties	  causally	  inert,	  it	  succeeds	  in	  showing	  that	  they	  are	  not	  physical.	  The	  
argument	   itself	   does	   not	   show	   that	   they	   are	   not	   physical	   without	   an	   additional	   tacit	  
assumption	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   refer	   only	   via	   descriptions	   of	   the	   causal	   roles.	   The	  
whole	  fourth	  chapter	  will	  be	  devoted	  to	  this	  issue,	  so	  I	  won’t	  be	  discussing	  it	  at	  length	  here.	  	  
	   I	   think	   that	   the	   materialists	   must	   be	   committed	   to	   the	   view	   that	   Mary	   learns	  
something	   new	   upon	   her	   release	   because	   if	   she	   hadn’t	   learned	   anything	   upon	   release	   it	  
could	  only	  mean	  that	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  know	  about	  phenomenal	  properties,	  not	  even	  
from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective.	  	  
	   If	   it	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   logically	   possible	   that	   phenomenal	   properties	   are	   causally	   or	  
functionally	   inert,	   as	   proposed	   in	   the	   epiphenomenalist	   argument,	   then	   a	   nomological	  
connection	   between	   them	   and	   physical	   properties	   cannot	   be	   established,	   and	   therefore	  
empirical	   evidence	   for	   psychophysical	   laws	   and	   the	   first	   person	   phenomenal	   knowledge	  
itself	  are	   jeopardized.	  This	   leaves	  only	  one	   	  alternative:	   the	  Knowledge	  Argument	   leads	   to	  
inconsistency	  in	  assuming	  causal	  inertness	  of	  phenomenal	  properties.	  
	   This	  reason	  is	  grounded	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  anti-­‐functionalisation	  argument	  given	  
by	   Michael	   Pauen	   (Pauen	   2006),	   which	   tries	   to	   show	   that	   it	   would	   not	   be	   possible,	   in	  
principle,	  to	  verify	  a	  nomological	  connection	  between	  phenomenal	  and	  physical	  properties,	  
if	   we	   accept	   the	  main	   premise	   of	   the	   Knowledge	   Argument.	   His	   argument	   is	   based	   on	   a	  
disconfirmation	   constraint,	   a	   principle	   that	   tells	   us	   that	   the	   experiment	   should	   be	   able	   to	  
provide	   counterevidence	   in	   a	   counterfactual	   situation	   where	   the	   starting	   hypothesis	   is	  
false/wrong	   in	   principle.	   The	   assumption	   of	   possible	   causal	   inertness	   of	   phenomenal	  
properties	   violates	   this	   principle;	   hence,	   empirical	   evidence	   of	   their	   existence	   cannot	   be	  
confirmed.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  in	  which	  psychophysical	  dissociations,	  like	  inverted	  
qualia	  or	  absent	  qualia,	   could	  be	   confirmed	  nor	   ruled	  out,	   if	  phenomenal	  properties	  were	  
causally	   inert.	  Likewise,	  “our	  first-­‐person	  knowledge	  of	  phenomenal	  states	  is	   jeopardized	  if	  
we	  assume	  that	  mental	  properties	  are	  causally	  inert”	  (Pauen	  2006,	  p.	  16).	  
	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  this	   is	   the	  gist	  of	  my	  analysis	  here,	   the	  very	   fact	   that	  Mary	  
learns	  something	  new	  only	  upon	  her	  release	  and	  that	  properties	  that	  she	  learns	  about	  could	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not	  be	  causally	  inert	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  concepts	  she	  acquires	  are	  based	  directly	  on	  
experience	  and	  also	  that	  they	  do	  not	  refer	  via	  modes	  of	  presentation	  that	  are	  based	  on	  the	  
descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  properties	  normally	  play.	  If	  it	  were	  otherwise	  we	  would	  not	  
even	   be	   able	   to	   detect	   those	   properties	   or	   they	  would	   have	   been	   contained	   or	   derivable	  
from	  the	  body	  of	  physical	  information.	  	  
3.6 Some	  issues	  with	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  
3.6.1 The	  Max	  Black’s	  infamous	  objection	  and	  modes	  of	  presentation	  
Ned	  Block	  claims	  (Block	  2007)	  that	  at	  its	  core,	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  is	  
about	  the	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  He	  claims	  that	  if	  we	  distinguish	  between	  cognitive	  modes	  
of	   presentation	   and	  metaphysical	  modes	   of	   presentation	   and	   recognize	   their	   dynamics	   in	  
various	   versions	   of	   the	   argument	   for	   property	   dualism,	  we	  will	   see	   that	   those	   arguments	  
pose	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  physicalism	  and	  that	  conceptual	  dualism	  can	  be	  true.	  Let	  me	  first	  make	  
the	  main	  move	  assumed	   in	  Block's	   argument	  and	   then	   I	  will	   fill	   in	   the	  details	  on	   the	  way.	  
Block	   starts	   off	   with	   the	   claim	   that	   is	   known	   as	   the	  Max	   Black's	   objection	   (Smart,	   1959).	  
Basically	  Max	  Black	  objected	  that	  if	  one	  is	  to	  postulate	  an	  identity	  between	  the	  phenomenal	  
and	  the	  physical	  then	  the	  concepts	  flanking	  the	  identity	  sign	  that	  deploy	  independent	  modes	  
of	   presentation	   are	   based	   on	   distinct	   properties	   in	   virtue	   of	   which	   these	   modes	   of	  
presentation	  differ.	  What	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  phenomenal	  concept	  needs	  
to	  have	  a	  phenomenal	  mode	  of	  presentation	  which	  ought	  not	  be	  physical,	  that	  is,	  it	  should	  
not	   be	   the	   property	   itself.	   Block	   argues	   that	   this	   view	   stems	   from	   the	   standard	   Fregean	  
approach	   to	   reference.	   For	   example,	   consider	   the	   identity	   statement	  
“Hesperus=Phosphorus”.	  Each	  concept	  flanking	  the	  identity	  sign	  has	  its	  own	  physical	  mode	  
of	  presentation,	  say	  Hesperus's	  mode	  of	  presentation	  is	  a	  property	  of	  appearing	  in	  the	  sky	  in	  
the	  morning	  at	  certain	  time.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Phosphorus's	  mode	  of	  presentation	  is	  some	  
other	  physical	  property,	  say	  a	  property	  of	  appearing	  in	  the	  sky	  in	  the	  evening	  at	  certain	  time.	  
This	   is	   what	   constitutes	   the	   metaphysical	   mode	   of	   presentation	   according	   to	   Block.	  
However,	   there	   is	   also	   the	   cognitive	  mode	   of	   presentation	   involved	   here,	   which	   is	   to	   be	  
understood	  in	  the	  standard	  Fregean	  way	  as	  cognitive	  significance.	  The	  cognitive	  significance	  
is	  used	   to	  explain	  why	   some	   identity	   statements	  are	   informative	  and	  why	   some	  other	  are	  
not.	  For	  example,	  the	  statement	  “Archie	  Leach	  is	  Carry	  Grant”	  seems	  more	  informative	  than	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“Archie	  Leach	  is	  Archie	  Leach”.	  According	  to	  the	  Fregean	  view	  the	  former	  statement	  is	  more	  
informative	   because	   of	   the	   tacit	   knowledge	   about	   the	   formal	   relations	   underpinning	   the	  
identity	  relation.	  	  
According	   to	   the	   standard	   anti-­‐materialist	   view,	   psychophysical	   identity	   ought	   to	  
have	  metaphysical	  and	  cognitive	  modes	  of	  presentation	  as	  in	  standard	  identity	  statements	  in	  
order	   to	  be	  true.	  Contrary	   to	   this	  view,	  Block	   	   (Block	  2007)	  argues	   that	   it	   shouldn't	  be	  the	  
case	  with	  the	  psychophysical	  identity.	  	  
The	   anti-­‐materialists	   seem	   to	   assume	   that	   the	   difference	   in	   cognitive	   modes	   of	  
presentation	  entail	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  However,	  this	  
does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  Block	  (Block	  2007)	  uses	  a	  brilliant	  example	  to	  show	  that	  the	  
difference	  in	  cognitive	  modes	  of	  presentation	  does	  not	  entail	  the	  difference	  in	  metaphysical	  
modes	   of	   presentation	   even	   in	   cases	   where	   it	   seems	   straightforwardly	   so.	   He	   asks	   us	   to	  
imagine	  a	  student	  of	  French	  language	  at	  the	  beginner’s	  level.	  One	  day	  his	  teacher	  shows	  him	  
a	  cat	  and	  explains	  that	  a	  French	  word	  for	  “cat”	  is	  “chat”.	  However,	  his	  absentminded	  teacher	  
later	  on	  the	  same	  day	  shows	  him	  the	  same	  cat	  and	  introduces	  the	  same	  word	  “chat”	  again.	  
The	   student	   then	   tacitly	   assumes	   that	   there	   is	   some	   biological	   or	   physical	   difference	  
between	  the	  French	  word	  “chat”	  associated	  with	  the	  first	  showing	  of	  a	  cat	  and	  the	  French	  
word	   “chat”	   associated	   with	   the	   second	   showing	   of	   the	   cat.	   But	   there	   is	   no	   relevant	  
biological	  or	  physical	  difference	  between	  two	  occurrences	  of	  “chat”/cat.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	  presentation	  between	  two	  occurrences	  
of	   “chat”/cat.	  There	   is	  only	  a	  difference	   in	  cognitive	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  However,	  our	  
student	  might	   think	   that	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   in	   the	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	   presentation,	  
whereas	  in	  fact	  there	  is	  no	  such	  difference	  in	  this	  case.	  	  This	  example	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  
the	  difference	   in	  the	  cognitive	  modes	  of	  presentation	  does	  not	  entail	   the	  difference	   in	  the	  
metaphysical	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  	  
The	  main	  strategy	  for	  Block	  (and	  for	  Loar	  as	  well)	   is	   if	  there	   is	  no	  plausibility	  to	  the	  
claim	  that	  cognitive	  modes	  of	  presentation	   implicate	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  
then	  physicalism	  skips	  the	  modal	  argument	  pitfalls.	  That	  is,	  the	  difference	  in	  cognitive	  modes	  
of	  presentation	  does	  not	  entail	  the	  difference	  in	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  thus	  
conceptual	  dualism	  is	  not	  jeopardized	  by	  the	  conceivability	  arguments.	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Let’s	   discuss	   now	   another	   very	   important	   issue	   connected	   with	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	  
strategy.	  This	  is	  the	  explanatory	  adequacy	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  	  	  
	  
3.6.2 Explanatory	  adequacy	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  	  
	  
As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   some	   of	   the	   main	   problems	   for	   the	  
phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  are	  Max	  Black’s	  objection	  (Block	  2007)	  and	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  
the	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomena	  concept	  strategy	  	  (Chalmers	  2007).	  	  
We	  have	  already	  discussed	  Max	  Black’s	  objection,	   so	   let’s	   turn	  now	  to	   the	   issue	  of	  
the	  explanatory	  adequacy	  of	  the	  phenomena	  concept	  strategy.	  	  
Chalmers	   claims	   that	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	   has	   to	   be	   committed	   to	   three	  
basic	  claims:	  	  
52.	  Human	  beings	  have	  a	  certain	  key	  feature	  C	  such	  as	  phenomenal	  concepts;	  
52.	  This	  feature	  C	  explains	  our	  epistemic	  situation	  in	  regard	  to	  different	  epistemic	  gaps,	  that	  
is	  phenomenal	  concepts	  explain	  the	  explanatory	  gap;	  
54.	  Finally	  C	  is	  explicable	  in	  purely	  materialistic	  terms.	  (Chalmers	  2007,	  p	  172)	  
He	  argues	  that	  physicalists	  cannot	  simultaneously	  hold	  thesis	  53.	  and	  thesis	  54.	  as	  true.	  
That	  is,	  if	  phenomenal	  concepts	  can	  explain	  why	  there	  is	  an	  epistemic	  gap,	  then	  they	  cannot	  
be	  explained	  in	  physicalistic	  terms	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  
For	  Chalmers	  this	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  link	  between	  conceivability	  and	  explanation,	  
instead	  on	   the	   link	  between	   conceivability	   and	  metaphysical	   possibility.	  As	  we	  will	   shortly	  
see,	  this	  maneuver	  does	  not	  help	  much	  his	  argument	  because	  it	  is	  basically	  an	  old	  argument	  
under	  a	  new	  guise,	  which	  is	  already	  answered	  by	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  His	  new	  
argument	   then	   goes	   like	   this	   (where	   “P”	   represents	   physical	   duplicate	   and	   “C”	   represents	  
phenomena	  concepts)	  :	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55.	  (P&~C)	  is	  conceivable,	  or	  (P&~C)	  is	  not	  conceivable;	  
	  56.	  If	  (P&~C)	  is	  conceivable,	  then	  C	  is	  not	  physically	  explicable.	  
57.	  If	  (P&~C)	  is	  not	  conceivable,	  then	  C	  cannot	  explain	  our	  epistemic	  situation.	  
─────────────────────────	  
58.	   Either	   C	   is	   not	   physically	   explicable,	   or	   C	   cannot	   explain	   our	   epistemic	   situation.	  
(Chalmers	  2007,	  p	  174)	  
Basically,	  Chalmers’s	  master	  argument	  against	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  is	  very	  
similar	   to	  Levine’s	  account	  of	   the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem	   (Levine	  2001).	  Whereas	  Levine	  
(Levine	   2001)	   claims	   that	   conceivability	   arguments	   fail	   to	   justify	   an	   inference	   from	  
conceivability	   to	   metaphysical	   possibility	   of	   zombies,	   they	   do	   so	   at	   the	   price	   of	   a	   gappy	  
identity,	   thus	   opening	   the	   explanatory	   gap22.	   Chalmers’s	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   argues	   that	  
either	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  are	  physically	  explicable,	  but	  that	  explanation	  does	  not	  help	  
us	  understand	  why	  there	  is	  the	  epistemic	  gap,	  or	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  explains	  
why	  there	  is	  the	  gap	  but	  it	  is	  not	  itself	  physically	  explicable.	  The	  trouble	  for	  the	  proponents	  
of	  the	  strategy	  is	  that	  for	  the	  approach	  to	  be	  true,	  both	  physical	  explanation	  of	  phenomenal	  
concepts	   and	   explanation	   of	   our	   epistemic	   situation	   based	   on	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts,	  
have	  to	  be	  true	  in	  his	  opinion.	  	  
Again,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  Chalmers	  believes	  that	  the	  only	  explanation	  
of	   why	   there	   is	   the	   epistemic	   gap,	   that	   is	   how	   is	   it	   possible	   for	   two	   concepts	   that	   use	  
different	  modes	  of	  presentation	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  property,	  is	  because	  the	  difference	  in	  
modes	  of	  presentation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  metaphysical	  difference	  in	  properties.	  Clearly,	  if	  the	  
only	  way	  to	  explain	  the	  epistemic	  gap	   is	  through	  the	  metaphysical	  difference	   in	  properties	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  pick	  out,	  then	  of	  course	  they	  cannot	  have	  a	  physical	  explanation.	  
Let’s	  go	  now	  into	  the	  details	  of	  Chalmers’s	  master	  argument.	  As	  always,	  his	  argument	  
takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  conceivability	  argument.	  He	  asks	  whether	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  there	  are	  
                                                
22 For the details see the chapter 2 
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creatures,	   say	   zombies,	   that	   lack	   the	   key	   feature	   of	   consciousness	   such	   as	   phenomenal	  
concepts.	   At	   this	   point	   his	   argument	   is	   not	   yet	   based	   on	   the	   metaphysical	   possibility	   of	  
zombies.	  There	  are	  only	  two	  possible	  answers	  to	  this	  question:	  either	  it	   is	  conceivable	  that	  
they	  lack	  phenomenal	  concepts	  or	  it	  is	  not	  conceivable.	  This	  allows	  for	  setting	  the	  argument	  
in	  a	  form	  of	  a	  dilemma.	  	  
Let’s	  see	  how	  he	  defends	  his	  two	  premises.	  	  
The	  support	  for	  the	  first	  premise	  stems	  from	  the	  considerations	  about	  the	  link	  between	  
conceivability	   and	   explanation,	   not	   as	   one	   might	   have	   expected	   from	   the	   link	   between	  
conceivability	   and	   metaphysical	   possibility.	   It	   seems	   to	   him	   that	   if	   one	   can	   conceive	   of	  
(P&~C)	   it	   means	   that	   there	   cannot	   be	   an	   explanation	   of	   phenomenal	   concepts	   in	   wholly	  
physical	   terms	   that	  makes	   it	   transparent	  why	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	   is	   true.	  More	  
precisely,	   the	   relationship	   between	   conceivability	   and	   explanation	   here	   is	   based	   on	  
Chalmers’s	   account	   of	   reductive	   explanation:	   to	   explain	   something	   reductively	   means	   to	  
make	  it	  transparent	  why	  certain	  higher-­‐level	  truths	  obtain	  given	  the	  lower-­‐level	  truths.	  If	   it	  
were	  conceivable	  that	  some	  lower-­‐level	  truths	  obtain	  without	  higher-­‐level	  truths	  obtaining	  
then	   the	   reductive	   explanation	   fails.	   Thus,	   the	   original	   explanatory	   gap	   persists	   (Chalmers	  
2007,	  p.	  174).	  	  
The	  second	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma	  says	  that	  if	  (P&~C)	  is	  not	  conceivable	  then	  phenomenal	  
concepts	  do	  not	  explain	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  The	  argument	  for	  this	  claim	  relies	  on	  the	  same	  
kind	  of	  reasoning	  as	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  first	  premise.	  It	  goes	  like	  this:	  	  
	  
 “59. If (P&~C) is not conceivable then zombies satisfy C; 
 60. Zombies do not share our epistemic situation; 




 62. If (P&~C) is not conceivable then C cannot explain our epistemic situation”. (Chalmers 
2007, p. 176) 
	  
Chalmers	  holds	  that	  premise	  60.	  is	  the	  drive	  of	  the	  argument.	  He	  claims	  that	  the	  premise	  
60.	   amounts	   to	   the	   following	   claim:	   (P&~E)	   is	   conceivable,	   where	   “E”	   stands	   for	   our	  
epistemic	  situation.	  	  
However,	  premise	  59.	  seem	  very	  much	  like	  a	  standard	  claim	  about	  the	  entailment	  from	  
conceivability	  to	  possibility.	  It	  says	  that	  if	  it	  is	  not	  conceivable	  for	  the	  physical	  facts	  to	  hold	  
without	   phenomenal	   facts	   holding	   then	   zombies	   have	   phenomenal	   concepts.	   In	   another	  
words,	  if	  an	  explanation	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	  is	  not	  a	  priori	  derivable	  from	  the	  physical	  
facts,	  then	  it	   is	  metaphysically	  possible	  for	  zombies	  to	  have	  phenomenal	  concepts	  or	  some	  
corresponding	   beliefs.	   Understood	   in	   this	   way,	   his	   argument	   brings	   us	   back	   to	  where	  we	  
started	  and	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  applies	  again.	  
	  
Let’s	  follow	  Chalmers	  in	  setting	  the	  argument	  that	  summarizes	  his	  overall	  approach	  here:	  
	  
“63.	  (P&~E)	  is	  conceivable;	  
64.	  If	  (P&~E)	  is	  conceivable,	  then	  (P&~C)	  is	  conceivable	  or	  (C&~E)	  is	  conceivable;	  	  
	  65.	  If	  (P&~C)	  is	  conceivable,	  P	  cannot	  explain	  C.	  	  
66.	  If	  (C&~E)	  is	  conceivable,	  C	  cannot	  explain	  E.	  	  	  
____________	  
67.	   P	   cannot	   explain	   C	   or	   C	   cannot	   explain	   E“	   (Chalmers	   2007,	   p.	   179).	   The	   conclusion	  
follows:	   either	   phenomenal	   concepts	   cannot	   be	   explained	   physically	   or	   phenomenal	  
concepts	  do	  not	  explain	  our	  epistemic	  situation.	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Here	  we	  are	  again	  at	  the	  same	  point	  that	  iterates	  throughout	  anti-­‐physicalist	  arguments.	  
The	  reason	  why	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  disrupted	  link	  between	  conceivability	  and	  
explanation	  is	  because	  anti-­‐physicalists	  tacitly	  assume	  that	  either	  for	  phenomenal	  concepts	  
to	  be	  explained	  physically	  Max	  Black’s	  objection	  will	  always	  apply	  –	   i.e.	  cognitive	  modes	  of	  
presentation	  will	  entail	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  or	  if	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts	  
are	  explainable	  physically	  they	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  modes	  of	  presentation	  that	  are	  based	  on	  
the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles,	  thus	  failing	  to	  explain	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  However,	  as	  
we	  have	  seen	   in	  our	  discussion	  on	   the	  metaphysical	  and	  cognitive	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  
this	  does	  not	  hold.	  To	  begin	  with,	  this	  disjunction	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  Chalmers’s	  argument	  
alone,	  instead	  it	  is	  tacitly	  assumed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  premises,	  and	  as	  far	  as	  I	  can	  see	  there	  is	  no	  
independent	  argument	  for	  this	  claim	  anywhere	  in	  his	  paper.	  There	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  justify	  it	  
through	   considerations	   about	   a	   link	   between	   a	   priori	   knowledge	   and	   explanation	   in	   the	  
famous	  debate	  between	  Chalmers	  &	  Jackson	  and	  Block	  &	  Stalnaker,	  but	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  later	  
on	  it	  fails.	  	  
Diaz-­‐Leon	   (forthcoming)	   makes	   a	   very	   similar	   point	   in	   criticizing	   this	   argument.	   She	  
claims	   that	   the	   task	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	   is	   not	   to	   explain	   our	   whole	  
epistemic	   situation,	   but	   only	   why	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   not	   a	   priori	   entailed	   from	   a	  
complete	   physical	   story.	   According	   to	   this	   interpretation	   then,	   the	   question	   should	   be	  
whether	  zombies	  that	  possess	  relevant	  phenomenal	  concepts	  could	  infer	  phenomenal	  truths	  
from	   the	  physical	   truths?	  Actually,	   there	   are	   two	  questions	   here:	   one	   is	  whether	   zombies	  
that	  possess	  phenomenal	  concepts	  could	  infer	  a	  priori	  phenomenal	  truths	  from	  the	  physical	  
truths,	   and	   the	   other	   is	   whether	   zombies	   possessing	   their	   own	   corresponding	   “zombie	  
phenomenal	  concepts”	  could	  infer	  a	  priori	  phenomenal	  truths	  from	  the	  physical	  truths.	  The	  
first	  one	  does	  not	  make	  much	  sense	  because	  zombies	  by	  definition	  cannot	  have	  phenomenal	  
concepts,	  so	  that	  case	  cannot	  be	  veridical.	  The	  second	  question	  comes	  down	  to	  the	  original	  
question	  of	  whether	  phenomenal	   truths	  are	  a	  priori	   inferable	   from	   the	  physical	   truths.	  Of	  
course,	  as	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  phenomenal	  concepts	  refer	  directly,	  not	  via	  contingent	  
properties	  so	  the	  psychophysical	  identity	  remains	  necessary	  and	  yet	  a	  posteriori.	  	  	   What	  
Chalmers	  seems	  to	  imply,	  according	  to	  Diaz-­‐Leon,	  is	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  
has	  to	  explain	  conceivability	  of	  zombies	  in	  terms	  of	  them	  not	  having	  states	  of	  which	  we	  have	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a	   substantive	   and	   determinate	   knowledge.	   In	   another	   words,	   there	   should	   not	   be	   any	  
epistemic	  gap	  in	  order	  for	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  to	  explain	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  
This	   seems	   rather	   excessive	   and	   problematic.	   Diaz-­‐Leon	   maintains	   that	   Chalmers	  
mischaracterizes	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   and	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy.	   	   This	   is	   very	  
much	   in	   line	   with	   my	   view	   of	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   and	   the	   overall	   approach	   of	   the	  
phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  	  
Another	   venue	   of	   responding	   to	   Chalmers’s	   argument	   we	   find	   in	   Balog’s	   forthcoming	  
paper	  (Balog	  forthcoming).	  Balog	  (forthcoming)	  argues	  that	  Chalmers’s	  argument	  can	  be	  laid	  
out	  in	  much	  more	  detail	  that	  would	  more	  precisely	  reflect	  physicalist	  commitment	  with	  the	  
phenomenal	   concept	   strategy.	   She	   unpacks	   the	   relevant	   premises	   according	   to	   the	  
distinction	   between	   phenomenal	   and	   physical	   characterizations	   of	   the	   phenomenal	  
concepts.	  In	  her	  view,	  the	  argument	  should	  go	  like	  this:	  	  
	  
“1Phen)	  If	  P&~CPhen	  is	  conceivable,	  then	  CPhen	  is	  not	  physically	  explicable.	  	  
1Phys)	  If	  P&~CPhys	  is	  conceivable,	  then	  CPhys	  is	  not	  physically	  explicable.	  	  
2Phen)	  If	  P&~CPhen	  is	  not	  conceivable,	  then	  CPhen	  cannot	  explain	  our	  epistemic	  situation.	  	  
2Phys)	   If	  P&~CPhys	   is	  not	  conceivable,	  then	  CPhys	  cannot	  explain	  our	  epistemic	  situation.”	  
(Balog	  forthcoming,	  p.	  12)	  
	  
One	  set	  of	  premises	  in	  here	  is	  vacuous.	  This	  is	  the	  set	  of	  premises	  1Phys)	  and	  2Phen).	  
Premise	  1Phys)	  basically	  says	  that	  if	  it	  were	  conceivable	  for	  the	  physical	  facts	  to	  hold	  without	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  (under	  physical	  characterization)	  holding,	  then	  phenomenal	  concepts	  
are	   not	   physically	   explicable.	   This	   is	   trivially	   true	   because	   if	   phenomenal	   concepts	   were	  
physically	   explicable	   then	   it	   would	   follow	   a	   priori	   that	   P&~CPhys	   is	   not	   conceivable.	   The	  
premise	  2Phen)	  is	  also	  already	  implied	  by	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  It	  basically	  says	  
that	  zombies	  without	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  conceivable.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  tenets	  
of	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy.	   Both	   claims	   are	   envisaged	   and	   contained	   in	   the	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phenomenal	   concept	   strategy.	   So	   the	   question	   arises	   now	   whether	   the	   other	   set	   of	  
premises,	   namely	   1Phen)	   and	   2Phys)	   are	   capable	   of	   undermining	   phenomenal	   concept	  
strategy?	  
Balog	   (Balog	   forthcoming)	   argues	   that	   the	   other	   combination	   of	   premises,	   namely	  
1Phen)	   and	   2Phys),	   is	   nontrivially	   true.	   Furthermore,	   she	   holds	   that	   the	   only	   way	   to	  
successfully	   explain	   our	   epistemic	   situation	   towards	   consciousness	   is	   by	   the	   phenomenal	  
concepts	  under	  phenomenal	  characterization,	  i.e.	  C-­‐phen.	  However,	  this	  characterization	  of	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  is	  not	  physically	  explicable,	  which	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  
admit.	  That	  is,	  this	  combination	  of	  statements	  does	  not	  pose	  any	  threat	  to	  physicalism.	  Let’s	  
see	  her	  argument	  for	  this	  claim.	  
	  
“1Gap)	  If	  there	  is	  an	  explanatory	  gap	  between	  P	  and	  C	  then	  C	  is	  not	  physically	  explicable.	  	  
2Gap)	   If	  there	   is	  no	  explanatory	  gap	  between	  P	  and	  C	  then	  C	  cannot	  explain	  our	  epistemic	  
situation	  “	  (Balog	  forthcoming,	  p.	  17).	  
	  
This	   is	   not	   a	   further	   criticism	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy;	   this	   is	   merely	  
restating	  the	  original	  explanatory	  gap	  argument	  already	  given	  in	  (Levine	  2001).	  1Gap)	  is	  the	  
point	   which	   all	   agree	   with.	   It	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   if	   C	   were	   physically	  
explicable,	   there	   would	   be	   no	   explanatory	   gap.	   Again,	   phenomenal	   concepts	   would	   have	  
been	  physically	  explicable	  and	  there	  would	  be	  no	  explanatory	  gap	   if	  phenomenal	  concepts	  
used	   modes	   of	   presentation	   based	   on	   the	   descriptions	   of	   causal	   roles	   their	   referents	  
normally	  play.	  Chalmers	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  additional	  or	  independent	  argument	  for	  these	  
two	  claims	  so	  I	  must	  conclude	  that	  his	  argument	  fails	  to	  show	  that	  phenomenal	  concepts	  do	  
not	  account	  for	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  	  
	  
His	  argument	  is	  very	  important	  for	  another	  reason.	  It	  accentuates	  the	  importance	  of	  
the	   issue	   of	   a	   priori	   knowledge	   and	   explanation	   in	   special	   cases	   such	   as	   psychophysical	  
identity.	   I	   will	   be	   dealing	   with	   it	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   where	   I	   will	   also	   provide	   my	   key	  
argument	  for	  the	  type	  B	  materialism.	  	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   have	   discussed	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	   as	   the	   most	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plausible	  answer	  to	  the	  conceivability	  arguments	  and	  to	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem.	  I	  have	  
analyzed	  the	  most	  relevant	  accounts	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept’s	  semantics,	  starting	  from	  
the	  recognitional	  concept	  through	   indexical	  quotational	  and	  finally,	  as	  the	  most	  developed	  
account,	  Papineau’s	  phenomenal	  concepts	  as	  a	  subclass	  of	  perceptual	  concepts.	  Apart	  from	  
that	  I	  used	  the	  inconsistency	  objection	  to	  the	  Knowledge	  Argument	  (the	  claim	  according	  to	  
which	  epiphenomenalism	  and	  the	  causal	  inertness	  of	  phenomenal	  properties	  cannot	  be	  held	  
together)	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	   is	   the	   best	   answer	   to	   the	  
conceivability	  arguments.	   In	  the	   last	  two	  sections	   I	  have	  discussed	  two	  major	   issues	  of	  the	  
strategy,	  i.e.	  the	  “Max	  Black’s	  objection”	  and	  the	  explanatory	  adequacy	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  
concepts	   and	   concluded	   that	   neither	   of	   these	   two	   objections	  manages	   to	   undermine	   the	  
phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   next	   chapter	   I	   will	   present	   my	   key	   argument	   against	   the	   explanatory	   gap	  
problem,	   and	   in	   the	   light	   of	   it	   discuss	   the	   issue	  of	  a	  priori	   knowledge	   and	   intelligibility	   of	  












4. CHAPTER	  4	  
4.1 The	  intuition	  of	  distinctness:	  how	  to	  resolve	  a	  brute	  disagreement	  
	  
“(Perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  contribution	  of	  experimental	  philosophy,	  then,	  is	  to	  
underscore	  the	  likelihood	  that)…	  various	  intuitions	  are	  not	  theory	  neutral,	  but	  products	  of	  
such	  theoretical	  commitments.	  If	  intuitions	  aren't	  widely	  shared	  by	  the	  folk	  and	  fit	  
conveniently	  with	  theories	  espoused	  by	  those	  who	  invoke	  the	  intuitions,	  it's	  natural	  to	  ask	  
whether	  the	  intuitions	  encapsulate	  those	  theories,	  rather	  than	  providing	  independent	  
support”	  (Rosenthal	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  	  
	  
	  
After	   three	   chapters	   of	   setting	   a	   stage	   I	   am	   now	   in	   a	   position	   to	   lay	   out	  my	   own	  
account	  against	  the	  conceivability	  arguments	  and	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem.	  Let	  me	  first	  
recapitulate	  what	  has	  been	  discussed	  so	  far	  to	  make	  my	  line	  of	  argument	  clearer.	  	  
One	   of	   the	   central	   and	   vexing	   philosophical	   issues	   concerning	   consciousness	   is	  
whether	  there	  could	  be	  an	  intelligible	  explanation	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  
undergo	   certain	   experiences	   and	   neural	   processes	   involved	   in	   those	   experiences	   (Nagel	  
1974;	  Levine	  1983,	  1993,	  2001).	  This	   issue	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  
problem.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   are	   philosophers	   who	   claim	   that	   such	   an	   explanation	  
cannot	   be	   made	   intelligible	   in	   physical	   terms,	   and	   furthermore	   it	   is	   a	   manifestation	   of	   a	  
metaphysical	  difference	  in	  properties	  (Jackson	  1982,	  1986;	  Chalmers	  1996).	  This	  position	  is	  
commonly	  known	  as	   the	  ontological	  gap.	  The	  best	   response	  to	  both	  gaps	   in	  my	  opinion	   is	  
the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  The	  proponents	  of	  the	  strategy	  concede	  the	  conceivability	  
of	   zombies	  and	   that	  Mary	   learns	  something	  new	  upon	  her	   release,	  but	  deny	   that	   zombies	  
are	   metaphysically	   possible	   and	   that	   what	   Mary	   learns	   is	   based	   on	   an	   additional	   non-­‐
physical	   property	   in	   the	  world.	   These	   claims	   are	   usually	   based	   on	   a	   particular	   account	   of	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  according	  to	  which	  they	  refer	  directly	  and	  not	  via	  descriptions	  of	  the	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causal	   roles	   properties	   normally	   play.	   But	   the	   most	   important	   reason	   for	   maintaining	  
conceptual	   dualism	   is	   the	   causal	   argument.	   They	   argue	   that	   psycho-­‐physical	   identity	   is	   a	  
proper	   identity	  that	  does	  not	  require	  further	  explanation,	  as	  with	  all	  proper	   identities,	  and	  
they	  further	  claim	  that	  the	  a	  posterioriti	  of	  psychophysical	  identity	  can	  be	  explained	  away	  by	  
means	   other	   than	   the	  modal	   semantics.	   For	   example,	   Papineau	   (Papineau	   2002)	   uses	   the	  
notion	  of	   the	  antipathetic	   fallacy	   to	  explain	   the	   intuition	  of	  distinctness	   that	   in	   fact	  drives	  
the	   anti-­‐physicalist	   arguments23.	   I	   am	   pretty	   much	   on	   the	   same	   page	   with	   Papineau	   as	  
regards	  this	  issue.	  	  
However,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   sharpen	   a	   distinction	   that	   I	   believe	   is	   not	   sufficiently	  
appreciated	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  that	  can	  help	  me	  better	  express	  what	  I	  think	  is	  the	  problem	  
here.	   It	   is	   the	   distinction	   between	   an	   epistemic	   gap	   and	   an	   explanatory	   gap.	  What	   is	   the	  
difference	  between	  an	  epistemic	  and	  an	  explanatory	  gap?	  We	  have	  an	  epistemic	  gap	  when	  
there	  are	  two	  or	  more	  ways	  of	  knowing	  something	  that	  are	   independent	  from	  each	  other,	  
i.e.	  one	  can	  know	  one	  thing	   in	  one	  way	  but	  cannot	  know	  the	  other	  thing	   in	  the	  same	  way	  
and	  vice	  versa.	  The	  explanatory	  gap	  arises	  when	  we	  cannot	  explain	  the	  epistemic	  gap.	  Here	  
is	  an	  example	  of	   the	  epistemic	  gap	  we	  find	   in	   the	  domain	  of	  consciousness.	  We	  can	  know	  
certain	   things	   objectively,	   that	   is,	   regardless	   of	   the	   perspective.	   For	   that	  we	   only	   need	   to	  
know	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  normally	  played	   in	  this	  domain.	  For	   instance,	  we	  
can	  know	  in	  this	  way	  that	  a	  person	  undergoes	  certain	  visual	  experiences.	  What	  we	  cannot	  
know	  in	  this	  way	  is	  what	  it	  is	  like	  for	  that	  person	  to	  undergo	  those	  experiences.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	   knowing	   what	   is	   it	   like	   to	   undergo	   some	   experience	   from	   our	   own	   first	   person	  
perspective	  will	  never	  enable	  us	  to	  know	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  casual	  roles	  that	  properties	  
of	  our	  own	  experience	  play.	  More	   intuitively:	  we	   can	   introspect	  as	  much	  as	  we	  want,	  but	  
that	  alone	  will	  never	  bring	  us	  to	  understanding	  of	  the	  activation	  in	  the	  V5	  cortical	  area.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  knowing	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  the	  V5	  cortical	  area	  and	  even	  following	  a	  path	  
from	  the	  light	  of	  certain	  wavelengths	  hitting	  the	  retina,	  through	  the	  optic	  nerve	  all	  the	  way	  
to	  the	  integration	  areas	  will	  never	  tell	  us	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  see	  colours.	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  
an	  epistemic	  gap.	  	  
                                                
23	  For	  the	  details	  see	  the	  chapter	  three.	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An	   epistemic	   gap	   is	   simply	   a	   situation	   that	   we	   find	   when	   considering	   conscious	  
experiences	  from	  the	  first	  and	  from	  the	  third	  person	  perspectives.	  In	  the	  former	  case	  we	  use	  
concepts	   that	   refer	   directly,	   i.e.	   phenomenal	   concepts,	   and	   in	   the	   latter	   case	   we	   use	  
concepts	  that	  refer	  via	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  or	  functional	  roles.	  What	  distinguishes	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  from	  other	  kinds	  of	  concepts	  that	  are	  based	  on	  direct	  reference	  is	  the	  
fact	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   use	   phenomenal	   states	   themselves	   as	   their	   mode	   of	  
presentation.	  The	  explanatory	  gap	  goes	  a	  bit	  further	  than	  that.	  It	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  in	  
our	  understanding	  of	   the	  epistemic	   gap.	   Levine	   (Levine	  2001)	   argues	   that	   there	  are	  a	   few	  
equally	  legitimate	  ways	  of	  explaining	  the	  epistemic	  gap.	  According	  to	  one	  of	  the	  approaches	  
a	  difference	   in	  modes	  of	  presentation	  reflects	  a	  metaphysical	  difference	   in	  properties.	  The	  
other	   approach	   would	   be	   to	   come	   up	   with	   some	   independent	   argument	   for	   conceptual	  
dualism	   while	   simultaneously	   maintaining	   ontological	   monism.	   The	   phenomenal	   concept	  
strategy	   seems	   to	   be	   doing	   exactly	   that.	   Nonetheless,	   each	   one	   of	   these	   approaches	   to	  
answering	   the	   epistemic	   gap	   inevitably	   opens	   an	   explanatory	   gap24	   according	   to	   Levine	  
(Levine	  2001).	  	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	  would	   like	   to	   argue	   that	   conceivability	   arguments	   fail	   to	   establish	  
their	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	   consequences	  without	   invoking	  some	  additional	   tacit	  
assumptions.	  I	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem	  seems	  to	  arise	  precisely	  due	  to	  
the	  same	  intuitions	  underlying	  conceivability	  arguments.	  One	  of	  my	  main	  aims	  in	  this	  section	  
is	  to	  show	  that	  once	  these	  additional	  intuitions	  are	  unmasked,	  the	  dispute	  between,	  on	  the	  
one	  side	  property	  dualists,	  epiphenomenalists	  and	  mysterians,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  inflationist	  
physicalists/conceptual	   dualists	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   a	   brute	   disagreement	   which	   cannot	   be	  
resolved	  by	   introducing	  any	   further	  arguments	   that	  are	  based	  on	   the	  analysis	  of	  meaning.	  
Instead,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  brute	  disagreement	  about	  intuitions	  that	  needs	  to	  
be	   explained	   away	  by	   some	   independent	   accounts	   such	   as	   the	  quality	   space	  model	   that	   I	  
discuss	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
	  
	  
                                                
24	  For	  the	  details	  of	  this	  account	  see	  the	  second	  chapter.	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4.2 The	  ontological	  gap	  
Let’s	  start	  with	  the	  ontological	  gap.	  Basically,	  what	  is	  claimed	  by	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  
if	  the	  phenomenal	  is	  not	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical,	  then	  phenomenal	  properties	  
are	  further	  properties	  of	  the	  world.	  Formally	  the	  argument	  goes	  like	  this:	  
20.	  The	  fact	  that	  conscious	  experience	  exists	  is	  a	  positive	  fact;	  
21.	  Conscious	  experience	  is	  not	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical;	  
22.	  If	  there	  are	  positive	  facts	  that	  are	  not	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical	  facts,	  then	  
physicalism	  is	  false;	  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
23.	   Physicalism	   is	   false	   and	   phenomenal	   properties	   are	   further	   properties	   of	   the	   world.	  
(Chalmers	  1996)	  
Premise	  21.	  is	  obviously	  the	  most	  problematic	  one	  in	  the	  argument25.	  The	  argument	  
for	  premise	  21.	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  
73.	  The	  phenomenal	  is	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical	  
74.	  If	  the	  phenomenal	  is	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical,	  	  then	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  
physical	  properties	  occur	  without	  the	  phenomenal	  properties	  occurring	  is	  not	  possible.	  
	  75.	  A	  situation	   in	  which	   the	  physical	  properties	  occur	  without	   the	  phenomenal	  properties	  
occurring	  is	  not	  possible.	  (MP	  73,	  74)	  
	  76.	  A	  situation	   in	  which	   the	  physical	  properties	  occur	  without	   the	  phenomenal	  properties	  
occurring	  is	  conceivable.	  
77.	  If	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  physical	  properties	  occur	  without	  the	  phenomenal	  properties	  
occurring	  is	  conceivable,	  then	  it	  is	  possible.	  
                                                
25	  Much	  of	  the	  current	  discussions	  in	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  focus	  on	  this	  premise.	  
 112 
78.	  A	   situation	   in	  which	   the	  physical	   properties	  occur	  without	   the	  phenomenal	   properties	  
occurring	  is	  possible	  (MP	  75,	  76)	  
	  79.	  A	  situation	   in	  which	   the	  physical	  properties	  occur	  without	   the	  phenomenal	  properties	  
occurring	  is	  possible	  and	  is	  not	  possible	  (75,	  78)	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
The	  phenomenal	  is	  not	  logically	  supervenient	  on	  the	  physical.	  
	   The	  same	  point	  can	  be	  made	  in	  yet	  another	  argument	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  phenomenal	  
and	   physical	   facts.	   It	   is	   the	   famous	   knowledge	   argument	   (Jackson	   1982,	   1986).	   As	   we	  
remember,	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  thought	  experiment	  involving	  a	  brilliant	  neuroscientist	  Mary.	  She	  
is	  confined	  to	  a	  black	  and	  white	  room	  and	  all	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  her	  are	  only	  in	  these	  
two	  shades.	  It’s	  important	  to	  note	  that	  she	  has	  a	  normal	  vision,	  the	  same	  as	  anyone	  who	  can	  
see	  the	  other	  colours.	  She	  is	  educated	  and	  she	  learns	  everything	  there	  is	  to	  know	  about	  the	  
neurophysiology,	   neurophysics,	   neurobiology,	   etc.	   of	   colour	   vision.	   In	   other	   words,	   she	  
knows	   all	   the	   positive	   empirical	   facts	   about	   colour	   vision.	   Once	   she	   is	   released	   from	   the	  
room	   and	   sees	   a	   ripe	   tomato	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   as	   the	   argument	   goes,	   it	   seems	   rather	  
obvious	   that	   she	   learns	   some	   new	   facts	   that	   were	   not	   contained	   or	   inferable	   from	   the	  
positive	   empirical	   facts	   that	   she	   knew	  while	   still	   in	   the	   room.	   She	   learns	  what	   is	   it	   like	   to	  
have	   a	   visual	   experience	   of	   red.	   Now,	   the	   physicalists	   are	   committed	   to	   the	   thesis	   that	  
positive	  physical	  facts	  exhaust	  all	  the	  facts.	  If	  physicalism	  were	  true	  she	  should	  have	  known	  
even	  the	  phenomenal	  facts	  solely	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  her	  knowledge	  of	  the	  physical	  facts.	  So	  
the	  argument	  formally	  goes	  like	  this:	  
As	  we	  recall	  from	  the	  first	  chapter,	  the	  argument	  is	  formalized	  as	  follows:	  
“13.	   Mary	   (before	   her	   release)	   knows	   everything	   physical	   there	   is	   to	   know	   about	   other	  
people;	  
14.	  Mary	  (before	  her	  release)	  doesn’t	  know	  everything	  there	  is	  to	  know	  about	  other	  people	  
(because	  she	  learns	  something	  about	  them	  on	  her	  release);	  
Therefore,	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15.	   There	   are	   truths	   about	   other	   people	   (and	   herself)	  which	   escape	   the	   physicalist	   story”	  
(Jackson	  1986,	  p.	  293).	  
Naturally,	   the	   premises	   and	   the	   conclusion	   of	   this	   argument	   have	   been	   vigorously	  
debated	  over	  the	  years.	  Even	  Jackson	  himself	  has	  changed	  his	  mind	  about	  the	  interpretation	  
of	   the	   thought	   experiment.	   The	   main	   point	   of	   disagreement	   concerns	   whether	   the	  
knowledge	   she	   gains	  upon	   release	   is	   the	   knowledge	  of	   a	   further	  property	  or	  whether	   she	  
learns	  about	  an	  old	  property	  under	  a	  different	  mode	  of	  presentation.	  	  
Regardless	  of	  whether	  someone	  claims	  that	  she	  doesn’t	   learn	  anything,	  or	  that	  she	  
learns	   a	   new	   fact	   but	   it	   doesn’t	   reflect	   a	   new	   property,	   etc.,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   way	   one	  
interprets	  the	  argument	  depends	  on	  some	  tacit	  assumptions.	  The	  matter	  at	  hand	  seems	  to	  
be	  a	   case	  of	  a	  brute	  disagreement.	   I	  will	   return	   to	   this	  point	  after	   recapitulating	   the	  main	  
aspects	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem.	  
	  
4.3 The	  underlying	  intuitions	  	  
Conceptual	  dualists26	   claim	   that	  ontologically	   there	   is	  only	  one	  property	  under	   two	  
distinct	   modes	   of	   presentation.	   One	   mode	   involves	   descriptions	   of	   the	   causal	   roles,	   the	  
other	   involves	  direct	  reference	  wherein	  the	  referent	   is	  co-­‐instantiated	  with	  the	  occurrence	  
of	  a	  property	  or	   its	   recreation	   in	   imagination.	   Levine	  asks	   isn’t	   this	  arbitrary	   (Levine	  2001,	  
2006)?	   He	   maintains	   that	   even	   if	   materialism	   (ontological	   monism)	   were	   true,	   the	   other	  
mode	   of	   presentation	   of	   the	   same	   physical	   property	   involves	   some	   further	   properties	   in	  
virtue	   of	   which	   it	   is	   different	   from	   the	   physical	   concept.	   This	   in	   effect	   does	   not	   help	   the	  
phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  to	  completely	  remove	  confusion	  over	  psychophysical	  identity.	  
However,	  as	  we	  remember	  from	  the	  section	  on	  Max	  Black’s	  objection,	  this	  does	  not	  have	  to	  
be	   the	   case.	   Block	   (Block	   2007)	   has	   persuasively	   shown	   that	   identity	   statements	   involving	  
                                                
26	  Proponents	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	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concepts	   that	   are	   based	   on	   the	   different	  modes	   of	   presentation	   do	   not	   necessarily	   entail	  
metaphysical	   difference	   in	   properties.	   He	   argued	   that	   it	   could	   be	   that	   the	   difference	   is	  
merely	  in	  the	  two	  cognitive	  modes	  of	  presentation27.	  Let’s	  go	  step	  by	  step	  here	  and	  see	  what	  
exactly	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  problem	  and	  how	  to	  remedy	  it.	  
Papineau	  (Papineau	  2002,	  2007)	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  no	  gap	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  
psychophysical	   identity.	  Although	   it	   is	  non-­‐explanatory	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  genuine	   identities	  
do	  not	  require	  explanations,	  once	  we	  realize	  it	  is	  a	  brute	  identity	  the	  confusion	  vanishes.	  He	  
admits	   though	   that	   on	   a	   first	   pass	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   gap	   in	   our	   understanding	   of	  
psychophysical	  identity,	  but	  he	  explains	  it	  away	  by	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  antipathetic	  fallacy28.	  In	  
this	  case	  the	  sharper	  distinction	  between	  an	  epistemic	  gap	  and	  an	  explanatory	  gap	  is	  really	  
handy.	  One	  might	  say	  that,	  according	  to	  Papineau’s	  account,	  there	   is	  an	  epistemic	  gap	  but	  
no	  explanatory	  gap,	  or	  if	  there	  is	  an	  explanatory	  gap	  it	  is	  a	  trivial	  gap	  arising	  from	  the	  non-­‐
explanatory	   nature	   of	   proper	   identities.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Levine	   claims	   that	   even	   if	   he	  
accepts	   phenomenal	   concept	   semantics	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   problem	   remaining	   in	   the	  
intelligibility	  of	  explanations.	  He	  asks	  why	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  neuronal	  activity	  coincides	  with	  
what	   is	   it	   like	   to	  be	   in	   that	  state,	  or	  why	  should	  neural	  states	   feel	   the	  way	  they	  do	  or	   like	  
anything	   at	   all?	   Papineau	   concedes	   on	   this	   because	   of	   the	   vague	   nature	   of	   phenomenal	  
concepts29.	  Do	   these	  questions	  make	   sense?	   Is	   it	  possible	   to	  give	  an	   intelligible	  answer	   to	  
any	  of	  them?	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  of	  answering	  questions	  such	  as	  these.	  	  
One	  way	  would	  be	  to	  say	  that	  for	  example	  in	  the	  natural	  kinds	  cases,	  we	  can	  infer	  or	  
know	  a	  posteriori	  why	   certain	  micro	  properties	   are	   accompanied	  or	   give	   rise	   to	  particular	  
macro	  properties	  because	  the	  concepts	  involved	  use	  modes	  of	  presentation	  that	  are	  based	  
on	   the	   descriptions	   of	   the	   causal/functional	   roles	   to	   connect	   to	   their	   referents.	   Once	  we	  
know	  those	  descriptions	  we	  can	  work	  out	  the	  details	  of	  an	  explanation.	  We	  cannot	  use	  the	  
                                                
27	  The	  case	  of	  a	  student	  of	  French	  who	  thinks	  he	  has	  learned	  two	  French	  words	  for	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  cat	  
whereas	  in	  fact	  there	  is	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  cat	  under	  two	  different	  cognitive	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  
28	  For	  the	  details	  see	  the	  third	  chapter	  the	  section	  of	  Papineau’s	  account	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  
29	  This	  will	  be	  the	  topic	  of	  my	  whole	  fifth	  chapter,	  so	  I	  will	  leave	  it	  here	  on	  just	  a	  mention.	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same	  method	  to	  ascertain	  how	  phenomenal	  states	  are	  linked	  to	  neural	  states,	  if	  we	  accept	  
that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   refer	   directly.	   However,	   we	   might	   have	   some	   other	   indirect	  
means	  at	  our	  disposal	  to	  ascertain	  the	  aposterioriti	  of	  psychophysical	  identity.	  We	  could	  say	  
that	  modes	  of	  presentation	  based	  on	  direct	  reference	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  a	  posteriori	  
necessity	  of	  psychophysical	  identity.	  What	  makes	  this	  proposal	  plausible	  is	  that	  we	  have	  very	  
good	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  physicalism	  is	  true,	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  causal	  argument30.	  
The	   other	   way	   of	   responding	   to	   the	   objections	   against	   the	   intelligibility	   of	  
explanation	  offered	  by	  psychophysical	  identity	  could	  be	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  what	  drives	  
the	  questions	  of	  intelligibility	  of	  explanation	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  some	  sort	  of	  an	  
independent	  account	  of	  the	  intuition	  of	  distinctness	  inspired	  by	  Papineau’s	  (Papineau	  2002)	  
notion	  of	  “	  antipathetic	  fallacy”.	  	  
In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  work	  out	  a	  bit	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  explanation	  
for	  the	  ease	  of	  explicating	  my	  own	  position.	  	  
4.4 The	  intelligibility	  of	  explanations	  in	  the	  new	  light	  
	   Papineau	   (Papineau	  1996,	   1998,	   2002,	   2006)	   says	   that	   it	   is	   unintelligible	   to	   ask	   for	  
further	   explanation	   of	   genuine	   identities,	   because	   even	   in	   the	   case	   of	   natural	   kind	  
reductions/identities	  identity	  itself	  is	  posited	  as	  a	  brute	  fact	  and	  what	  is	  further	  explained	  is	  
why	  the	  instantiation	  of	  certain	  properties	  satisfies	  the	  referent	  of	  either	  a	  pre-­‐theoretical	  or	  
a	  theoretical	  term.	  If	  the	  explanations	  involved	  with	  the	  identities	  were	  not	  like	  this	  then	  the	  
explanatory	   gap	   would	   emerge	   in	   all	   kinds	   of	   identities	   and	   even	   identities	   based	   on	  
descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles.	  	  
Levine	  (Levine	  2001)	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  says	  that	  it	  is	  unintelligible	  how	  phenomenal	  
and	   physical	   concepts	   could	   refer	   to	   the	   same	   properties,	   however,	   what	   seems	   merely	  
                                                
30	  “(1)	  Conscious	  mental	  occurrences	  have	  physical	  effects.	  
(2)	  All	  physical	  effects	  are	  fully	  caused	  by	  purely	  physical	  histories.	  
(3)	  The	  physical	  effects	  of	  conscious	  causes	  aren’t	  always	  overdetermined	  by	  distinct	  causes.	  
Therefore,	  physicalism	  is	  true.	  “	  (Papineau	  2002,	  pp.	  17-­‐18)	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unintelligible	  is	  why	  we	  think	  that	  the	  occurrence	  of	  certain	  neural	  states	  is	  represented	  via	  
our	  sensory	  and	  psychological	  concepts.	  
Levine	  claims	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  
the	   epistemological	   explanation.	   This	   is	   because	   an	   appeal	   to	   the	   brain	   processes	   in	  
explaining	  why	  I	  have	  a	  particular	  phenomenal	  experience	  of	  “reddish”	  quale	  when	  looking	  
at	   a	   ripe	   tomato	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   explain	  why	   I	   have	   that	   particular	   quale	   or	   any	   other	  
quale	  for	  that	  matter.	  He	  goes	  even	  further	  and	  states	  that	  an	  epistemological	  explanation	  
of	  the	  brain	  processes	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  there	  should	  be	  a	  reddish	  quale	  that	  there	   is.	  
(Levine	  2001,	  p.	  7)31.	  	  
Furthermore,	  if	  they	  were	  indeed	  metaphysically	  distinct	  then	  it	  would	  have	  perhaps	  
been	  unintelligible	  why	  they	  are	  identical.	  Given	  that	  they	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing	  then	  it	  
doesn’t	  make	  sense	  to	  ask	  this	  question.	  Why	  does	  Levine	  not	  accept	  that	  the	  same	  property	  
can	  be	  picked	  out	  in	  two	  different	  ways?	  The	  matter	  again	  concerns/relates	  to	  intuitions	  and	  
brute	   disagreement.	   Levine	   doesn’t	   conclude	   they	   are	  metaphysically	   distinct,	   instead	   he	  
seems	  to	  start	  with	  that	  intuition.	  	  
Levine	   (1983,	   p	   357)	   claims	   that	   psychophysical	   identity	   leaves	   an	   explanatory	   gap	  
that	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds.	  He	  says	  that	  we	  don’t	  encounter	  
the	   explanatory	   gap	  with	   natural	   kinds	   because	   the	   explanation	   is	   fully	   intelligible	   as	   it	   is	  
given	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  descriptions	  of	   the	   causal	   roles	  properties	   standardly	  play.	   To	  put	   it	  
differently,	  the	  explanation	  given	  in	  these	  terms	  exhausts	  all	  there	  is	  to/to	  know	  about	  the	  
notion	  of	  a	  given	  natural	  kind.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  with	  qualia,	  because	  the	  concept	  of	  pain,	  if	  
based	  on	  a	  description	  of	  causal	  roles,	  does	  not	  exhaust	  all	  there	  is	  to/to	  know	  about	  pain,	  
thus	   opening	   the	   explanatory	   gap.	   This	   is	   because	   there	   is	   something	   about	   pain	   that	   is	  
knowable	  only	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective	  and	  as	  such	  in	  principle	  cannot	  be	  derived	  
from	  or	  contained	   in	  a	  description	  of	  causal	   roles.	  Contrary	   to	  Levine’s	  claims,	   it	  has	  been	  
argued	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  that	  the	  causal	  roles	  descriptions	  do	  not	  in	  fact	  exhaust	  all	  
there	  is	  about	  a	  given	  property	  but	  in	  fact	  help	  us	  understand	  why	  certain	  concepts	  satisfy	  
                                                
31	   For	   the	   difference	   between	   metaphysical	   and	   epistemological	   modes	   of	   presentation	   see	   the	   second	  
chapter.	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the	  descriptions	  associated	  with	  the	  instantiation	  of	  the	  respective	  properties.	  Now,	  Levine	  
argues	   that	  an	  explanation	  that	   is	  based	  on	  descriptions	  of	   the	  causal	   roles	   leaves	  out	   the	  
what-­‐is-­‐it-­‐like	   element	   of	   the	   experience	   thus	   opening	   the	   explanatory	   gap.	   I	   agree	   that	  
explanations	   of	   phenomenal	   consciousness	   involving	   descriptions	   of	   the	   causal	   roles	  may	  
seem	  explanatory	  inadequate.	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  section	  on	  the	  inconsistency	  
objection	  to	  the	  knowledge	  argument,	  if	  phenomenal	  properties	  were	  causally	  inefficacious	  
then	  we	  wouldn’t	  know	  about	  them	  from	  either	  the	  first	  or	  the	  third	  person	  perspective.	  So	  
this	   feature	   of	   phenomenal	   knowledge	   is	   perfectly	   utilized	   in	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	  
strategy	  and	  perhaps	  stands	  as	  an	  independent	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  this	  strategy.	  	  
Let’s	  get	  back	  to	  the	  main	  line	  of	  argumentation.	  Levine	  writes	  in	  his	  (Levine	  1983,	  p.	  
359)	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  an	  explanation	  of	  C-­‐fiber	  firing	  that	  tells	  us	  why	  it	  feels	  the	  way	  
it	  does.	   If	   that	   is	   the	  case	  then	   it	  becomes	  conceivable	  straight	  off	   that	  C-­‐fiber	   firing	  could	  
occur	   without	   anything	   it	   is	   like	   to	   be	   in	   that	   state.	   The	   physicalist	   would	   not	   want	   to	  
embrace	  this	  consequence	  because,	  if	  physicalism	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  has	  to	  be	  necessarily	  true,	  
so	  the	  counterfactual	  claim	  of	  their	  coming	  apart	  should	  not	  be	  possible.	  So	  he	  departs	  from	  
Kripke’s	   original	   metaphysical	   point	   and	   claims	   that	   it’s	   possible	   that	   we	   could	   have	   a	  
characterization	   of	   qualia	   that	   would	   make	   it	   equally	   incoherent	   to	   imagine	   that	   C-­‐fiber	  
firing	   occurs	   without	   pain	   quale,	   thus	   blocking	   the	   entailment	   from	   conceivability	   to	  
metaphysical	  possibility.	  However,	   the	  claim	  that	   there	   is	  nothing	   in	   the	  description	  of	  “C-­‐
fiber	  firing”	  that	  determines	  or	  explains	  why	  it	  feels	  that	  way,	  amounts	  to	  saying	  that	  what	  it	  
is	  like	  to	  be	  in	  pain	  is	  not	  exhaustively	  analyzable	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  
roles	  of	   the	  underlying	  physical	  processes.	  Of	  course,	   “the	  C	   fiber	   firing”	  does	  not	  capture	  
“what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  in	  pain”	  because	  the	  latter	  we	  know	  in	  a	  substantial,	  determinate	  and	  
direct	   way,	   and	   it	   can	   only	   be	   known	   in	   that	   way,	   whereas	   to	   know	   the	   former	   only	  
descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  would	  suffice.	  	  
	  As	  Papineau	  (Papineau	  2007)	  rightly	  notes,	   the	  often	  used	  examples	  of	  the	  natural	  
kinds	   identities	   in	   the	   anti-­‐physicalist	   claims,	   are	   not	   in	   fact	   examples	   of	   the	   scientific	  
explanations	  of	  identities.	  That	  is,	  these	  explanations	  do	  not	  amount	  to	  explaining	  why,	  say,	  
water	   is	  H2O,	   it	  would	  not	  make	  much	  sense.	  They	   rather	  serve	   to	  explain	  why	  water	  has	  
some	  further	  properties	  like	  being	  colorless,	  odorless,	  tasteless,	  etc.	  We	  are	  explaining	  why	  
the	  pre-­‐theoretical	  notion	  satisfies	  the	  causal	  roles	  descriptions	  to	  which	  we	  associate	  it.	  So,	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even	  in	  the	  natural	  kinds	  cases	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  do	  not	  explain	  the	  identity	  
itself.	   If	   we	   accept	   that	   phenomenal	   concepts	   refer	   directly,	   not	   via	   descriptions	   of	   their	  
causal	  roles,	  then	  why	  would	  we	  concede	  on	  the	  requirement	  that	  the	  brute	  identity	  of	  the	  
phenomenal/neural	  have	  a	  further	  explanation	  either?	  Given	  that	  proper	  identities	  are	  brute	  
identities	  that	  do	  not	  require	  further	  explanation,	  and	  given	  that	  psychophysical	   identity	   is	  
one	  of	  them,	  it	  actually	  doesn’t	  make	  it	  intelligible	  to	  ask	  for	  further	  explanations.	  
If	   neurobiological	   explanations	   that	   use	   concepts	   that	   refer	   via	   descriptions	   of	   the	  
causal	   roles,	  do	  not	  make	   it	   intelligible	  why,	   say,	  C-­‐fiber	   firing	   feels	   the	  way	   it	  does	  and	   if	  
phenomenal	  concepts,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  explain	  how	  the	  same	  property	   is	  picked	  out	  by	  
two	  different	  concepts,	  then	  what	  explains	  why	  the	  C-­‐fiber	  firing	  feels	  the	  way	  it	  does?	  One	  
way	  to	  tackle	  this	  issue	  is	  Papineau’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  intuition	  of	  distinctness	  in	  terms	  of	  
antipathetetic	  fallacy32.	  	  
Faced	   with	   this	   dilemma	   we	   can	   argue	   that,	   although	   there	   is	   an	   epistemic	   gap	  
between	  natural	  kinds	  and	  phenomenal	  kinds,	  there	  is	  no	  gap	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  their	  
identity,	  even	  though	  brute	  identities	  are	  in	  a	  sense	  non-­‐explanatory.	  	  
Papineau	  persuasively	  shows	  that	  psychophysical	  identity	  is	  inexplicable	  as	  a	  proper	  
kind	  of	   identity.	  However,	  he	  concedes	   that	   the	  epistemic	  gap	  exists.	  This	   situation	   I	   think	  
fits	   perfectly	  with	   the	   sharper	   distinction	   between	   the	   epistemic	   gap	   and	   the	   explanatory	  
gap	  mentioned	  earlier.	  Phenomenal	  concepts	  refer	  directly	  not	  via	  causal	  roles	  descriptions,	  
this	  makes	  psychophysical	  identity	  as	  inexplicable	  as	  the	  other	  identities	  in	  science	  (because	  
in	  those	  cases	  we	  are	  not	  explaining	  the	   identity	  via	  causal	  roles,	  but	  why	  concepts	  satisfy	  
causal	  roles	  of	  the	  further	  properties).	  	  
We	  mentioned	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section	  that	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  problem	  has	  
three	  main	  aspects:	  one	  is	  conceptual-­‐given	  that	  natural	  kind	  concepts	  refer	  via	  descriptions	  
of	   their	   causal	   roles	   it’s	   not	   clear	   how	   phenomenal	   concepts	   would	   pick	   out	   physical	  
properties;	  the	  second	  aspect	  is	  modal-­‐given	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  is	  not	  explicable	  in	  terms	  
of	  causal	  roles,	  then	  the	  contingency	  of	  the	  psychophysical	  identity	  seems,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  
                                                
32	  For	  the	  details	  see	  the	  chapter	  three.	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epistemically	  possible;	  and	  the	  third	  is	  that,	  given	  the	  semantics	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts,	  is	  
it	  still	  intelligible	  to	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  psychophysical	  identity.	  	  
Papineau’s	   theory	   answers	   very	   plausibly	   to	   all	   three	   aspects,	   but	   would	   it	   be	  
possible	   to	   come	   up	   with	   an	   independent	   analysis	   of	   the	   third	   aspect?	   Namely,	   in	   his	  
arguments	   he	   combines	   the	   semantics	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   based	   on	   direct	  
reference	   with	   explanatory	   asymmetry	   in	   order	   to	   reject	   a	   priori	   characterization	   of	  
physicalism,	  i.e.	  the	  characterization	  according	  to	  which	  phenomenal	  facts	  should	  be	  a	  priori	  
derivable	  from	  the	  complete	  physical	   facts.	   In	  the	  following	  sections	   I	  shall	  be	  examining	  a	  
brute	  disagreement	  of	   intuitions	  underlying	   the	  explanatory	   gap.	   In	   the	   final	   section	   I	  will	  
provide	  another	  take	  on	  intelligibility	  of	  explanations	  and	  a	  priori	  derivation.	  	  
4.5 The	  brute	  disagreement	  	  
Finally,	  we	  have	  come	  to	  the	  point	  where	  central	  problem	  can	  be	  articulated.	  Let	  me	  
sketch	  two	  main	  aspects	  of	  the	  problem.	  
A)	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  nor	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  two	  ways	  in	  
which	   we	   conceptually	   grasp	   physical	   and	   phenomenal	   properties,	   the	   former	   by	  
descriptions	   of	   their	   causal	   roles	   and	   the	   latter	   by	   direct	   reference,	   reflect	   two	  
metaphysically	  distinct	  properties.	  Standardly,	  arguments	  that	  corroborate	  this	  claim	  rely	  on	  
the	   intuitions	   one	   starts	   with	   and	   some	   additional	   assumptions.	   The	   really	   problematic	  
intuitions	   are	   the	   starting	   intuitions.	   Even	   the	   language	   used	   to	   set	   up	   the	   problem	   is	  
dualistic.	  For	  example:	  how	  do	  physical	  properties	  give	  rise	  to	  phenomenal	  properties,	  etc.	  If	  
they	  are	  the	  same	  then	  one	  doesn’t	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  other.	  They	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing.	  
The	  mere	  fact	  that	  we	  have	  a	  different	  cognitive	  access	  to	  the	  brain	  processes	  and	  to	  “what	  
it	  is	  like”	  to	  undergo	  them	  does	  not	  itself	  make	  it	  obvious	  that	  there	  are	  two	  metaphysically	  
distinct	   things.	   There	   are	   no	   a	   priori	   reasons	   to	   assume	   that	   they	   are	   distinct.	  When	   the	  
matter	   at	   hand	   is	   about	   fundamental	   intuitions,	   then	   no	   further	   argument	  would	   help	   to	  
resolve	  the	  issue.	  This	   is	  the	  case	  with	  a	  brute	  disagreement.	  What	  is	   instead	  needed	  is	  an	  
account	  that	  would	  explain	  away	  those	  intuitions.	  	  
 120 
B)	   The	   second	   issue	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   explanations.	   It	   is	   usually	  
argued	  that,	  even	  if	  phenomenal	  properties	  were	  in	  fact	  physical	  properties	  but	  picked	  out	  
in	   different	   ways,	   it	   would	   still	   remain	   puzzling	   why	   certain	   neurobiological	   states	   are	  
accompanied	   by	   particular	   phenomenal	   states	   or	   any	   other	   states	   at	   all	   for	   that	   matter.	  
However,	   if	   there	   is	   no	   independent	   argument	   against	   the	   claim	   that	   there	   being	   two	  
distinct	  ways	  of	  picking	  out	  the	  same	  property	  is	  compatible	  with	  truth	  of	  physicalism,	  then	  
again	   this	   issue	   reflects	   the	   same	   case	   of	   a	   brute	   disagreement	   in	   tacit	   assumptions.	   The	  
same	  point	  about	  different	  modes	  of	  presentation	  applies	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  explanation	  as	  well.	  
Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  come	  up	  with	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  priori	  
derivation	  from	  basal	  truths,	  an	  explanation	  that	  is	  itself	  based	  on	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  or	  
functional	   roles,	   I	   suggest	  we	   look	   for	   another	   independent	  explanation	  of	   the	  apparently	  
disrupted	  link	  between	  conceivability	  and	  explanation.	  	  
Let	  me	  give	  an	  illustration	  of	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  the	  brute	  disagreement.	  
	  
4.6 The	  tacit	  assumptions	  
Even	  if	  thought	  experiments	  in	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  had	  bearing	  on	  our	  understanding	  
of	   psychophysical	   identity	   it	   would	   not	   be	   because	   certain	   intuitions	   that	   drive	   the	  
experiment	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  true,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  tacit	  additional	  assumptions	  involved.	  
If	  we	  vary	  these	  tacit	  assumptions	  and	  keep	  the	  core	  of	  a	  thought	  experiment	  constant,	  we	  
get	   radically	   different	   conclusions.	   The	   question	   arises,	   what	   is	   the	   use	   of	   thought	  
experiments	  and	  intuitions	  if	  they	  themselves	  don’t	  change	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  argument?	  
We	  need	  to	  rethink	  the	  whole	  issue.	  	  
Take	   for	   example	   the	   knowledge	   argument	   (KA).	  What	   follows	   from	   the	   KA	   alone	  
depends	  on	  some	  additional	  assumptions.	  Let’s	  have	  another	  look	  at	  the	  original	  Knowledge	  
Argument.	  As	  we	  recall	  it	  goes	  like	  this:	  
“13.	   Mary	   (before	   her	   release)	   knows	   everything	   physical	   there	   is	   to	   know	   about	   other	  
people;	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14.	  Mary	  (before	  her	  release)	  doesn’t	  know	  everything	  there	  is	  to	  know	  about	  other	  people	  
(because	  she	  learns	  something	  about	  them	  on	  her	  release);	  
Therefore,	  	  
15.	   There	   are	   truths	   about	   other	   people	   (and	   herself)	  which	   escape	   the	   physicalist	   story”	  
(Jackson	  1986,	  p.	  293).	  
The	  conclusion	  in	  15.	  does	  not	  follow	  merely	  from	  the	  assumptions	  that	  she	  knows	  
all	   the	  physical	   facts	  and	  that	  she	   learns	  something	  new	  upon	  release.	  The	  argument	   itself	  
does	   not	   warrant	   that	   conclusion	   without	   the	   additional	   assumptions	   about	   modes	   of	  
presentation.	  	  	  
It	   seems	   that	   the	   argument	   profits	   on	   different	   readings	   of	   the	   notions	   “knowing	  
everything	   physical”	   and	   “learning	   something	   new”.	   Namely,	   Jackson	   seems	   to	   tacitly	  
assume	  that	  concepts	  which	  we	  use	  to	  infer	  new	  facts	  from	  the	  physical	  facts	  can	  only	  rely	  
on	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  as	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  Perhaps	  that	  might	  be	  true	  if	  
one	   wanted	   to	   infer	   new	   facts	   directly	   from	   the	   physical	   facts	   solely	   on	   the	   ground	   of	  
descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles.	  However,	  a	  mere	  fact	  that	  Mary	  learns	  something	  new	  does	  
not	  justify	  an	  assumption	  that	  what	  she	  learns	  about	  escapes	  physicalists	  story.	  It	  could	  be	  
the	  case	  that	  what	  she	  learns	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective	  is	  not	  directly	  inferable	  from	  
the	   body	   of	   physical	   information,	   because,	   as	  we	   saw	   in	   the	   chapter	   on	   the	   phenomenal	  
concepts,	  the	  concepts	  we	  use	  to	  think	  about	  our	  experiences	  from	  the	  person	  perspective	  
refer	  directly,	  and	  cannot	  have	  a	  priori	  connections	  with	  the	  material	  properties,	  thus	  cannot	  
be	  inferred	  from	  a	  scheme	  of	  causal	  roles	  anyway.	  I	  would	  be	  inclined	  to	  say	  that	  not	  much	  
in	   the	   argument	   depends	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   she	   learns	   something	   new,	   but	   rather	  
depends	  on	  some	  assumptions	  about	  a	  relation	  between	  conceptual	  semantics	  and	  a	  theory	  
of	  explanation.	  	  
For	  example,	  if	  we	  grant	  that	  Mary	  learns	  something	  new	  and	  characterize	  physicalism	  
as	  an	  identity	  thesis	  that	  is	  based	  on	  distinct	  conceptual	  semantics,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  based	  
on	  direct	  reference	  and	  on	  the	  other	  based	  on	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles,	  then	  it	  is	  
reasonable	   to	   conclude	   that	   conceptual	   dualism	   (ontological	   monism)	   or	  
representationalism	   are	   true.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   a	   characterization	   of	   physicalism,	   which	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employs	   conceptual	   semantics	   based	  only	  on	   reference	   via	   causal	   roles,	   gives	  us	  property	  
dualism	  or	  epiphenomenalism.	  	  
This	  argument	  seems	  to	  establish	  merely	  epistemic	  gap,	  i.e.,	  given	  the	  premises	  alone	  
one	  can	  only	  conclude	  that	  there	  are	  two	  distinct	  ways	  of	  knowing	  something.	  A	  conclusion	  
that	   there	   are	   truths	   about	   Mary	   and	   other	   people	   which	   escape	   the	   physicalist	   story	  
requires	   an	   additional	   assumption	   according	   to	   which	   physicalists	   have	   to	   rely	   only	   on	  
concepts	  that	  use	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  as	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  However,	  that	  
assumption	  is	  not	  warranted	  merely	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  learns	  something	  new.	  
As	   we	   can	   see,	   when	   the	   core	   of	   the	   knowledge	   argument	   remained	   the	   same	  
whereas	   assumptions	   about	   the	   modes	   of	   presentation	   were	   varied	   we	   got	   significantly	  
different	  conclusions.	  The	  question	  immediately	  arises:	  do	  we	  have	  any	  reason	  to	  prefer	  one	  
set	  over	  the	  other	  set	  of	  the	  additional	  assumptions?	  Perhaps	  we	  do.	  	  
The	   point	   is	   that	   the	   KA	   can	   support	   all	   positions:	   conceptual	   dualism	   and	  
epiphenomenalism	  and	  property	  dualism.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  what	  we	  conclude	  from	  these	  
arguments	  depends	  strongly	  on	  the	  assumptions	  we	  start	  with.	  One	  might	  of	  course	  say	  that	  
we	  use	  philosophical	  arguments	  to	  test	  our	   intuitions,	  but	  as	  my	  analysis	  shows,	   the	  same	  
argument	  can	  support	  even	  opposed	  positions.	  We	  can	  of	  course	  come	  up	  with	  some	  even	  
more	  ingenious	  arguments	  to	  test	  our	  intuitions,	  but	  no	  arguments	  would	  resolve	  a	  clash	  of	  
brute	   intuitions.	   The	   question	   that	   I	   would	   like	   to	   raise	   here	   is:	   do	   these	   intuitions	  
encapsulate	  theoretical	  commitments	  rather	  than	  serving	  as	  an	  independent	  support	  for	  the	  
claims	  in	  the	  arguments?	  I	  would	  be	  inclined	  to	  say	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  probably	  true.	  As	  David	  
Rosenthal	  puts	  it:	  
“Perhaps	   the	  most	   significant	   contribution	   of	   experimental	   philosophy,	   then,	   is	   to	  
underscore	  the	  likelihood	  that	  various	  intuitions	  are	  not	  theory	  neutral,	  but	  products	  of	  such	  
theoretical	  commitments.	   If	   intuitions	  aren't	  widely	  shared	  by	  the	  folk	  and	  fit	  conveniently	  
with	  theories	  espoused	  by	  those	  who	   invoke	  the	   intuitions,	   it's	  natural	   to	  ask	  whether	  the	  
intuitions	   encapsulate	   those	   theories,	   rather	   than	   providing	   independent	   support”	  
(Rosenthal	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  	  
In	  my	   opinion,	  what	   is	   needed	   instead	   is	   an	   account	   that	  would	   explain	   away	   the	  
underlying	  intuitions.	  Chalmers’s	  account	  is	  that	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  reflects	  or	  is	  based	  on	  the	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ontological	   gap;	   Papineau	   had	   offered	   an	   interesting	   account	   for	   the	   antimaterialst’s	  
intuition	  of	  distinctness	  (Papineau	  2002)33.	  That	  is	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  two	  ways	  we	  think	  
about	  consciousness	  reflect	  two	  metaphysically	  different	  properties.	  He	  calls	  it	  the	  intuition	  
of	  distinctness.	  Perhaps	  in	  this	  case	  we	  could	  come	  up	  with	  an	  independent	  account	  for	  the	  
intuition	  of	  distinctness.	  The	  central	  strategy	  should	  then	  move	  from	  arguments	  for	  certain	  
positions	  to	  accounts	  that	  explain	  away	  the	  intuitions	  that	  underlie	  those	  arguments.	  	  
As	   we	   remember,	   according	   to	   Levine	   (Levine	   2001)	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   problem	  
arises	   because	   we	   don’t	   know	   why	   certain	   brain	   states	   are	   accompanied	   by	   particular	  
phenomenal	  states.	  It	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  mystery.	  However,	  once	  we	  realize	  that	  we	  don’t	  
know	  the	  causal	  roles	  of	  phenomenal	  properties	  based	  on	  knowledge	  of	  physical	  properties	  
because	  phenomenal	  properties	  don’t	  refer	  via	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  
it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   the	   only	   remaining	   job	   is	   to	   explain	   away	   the	   “intuition	   of	  
distinctness”,	   i.e.	   to	   explain	   away	   why	   we	   assume	   or	   have	   a	   feeling	   that	   phenomenal	  
concepts	  ought	  to	  refer	  via	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles.	  	  
Even	   the	   question	   whether	  Mary	   learns	   something	   new	   does	   not	   follow	   from	   the	  
argument	   itself	   or	   from	   the	   intuitions	   alone.	   It	   depends	   on	   tacit	   additional	   assumptions	  
about	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  If	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  way	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts	  pick	  out	  
their	  referents	  should	  be	  based	  on	  descriptions	  of	  their	  causal	  roles,	  then	  two	  avenues	  are	  
open.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  she	  should	  not	  have	  learned	  anything	  new	  because	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  
derive	   or	   to	   infer	   the	   phenomenal	   facts	   from	   the	   physical	   facts	   only	   if	   we	   had	   complete	  
enough	   information	   about	   physical	   facts.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   she	   could	   have	   learned	  
something	  new,	  but	   in	  this	  case	  what	  she	   learned	   is	  not	  physical	   information,	  because	   if	   it	  
were	  she	  should	  have	  been	  able	  to	  infer	  it	  from	  the	  basal	  physical	  facts	  and	  descriptions	  of	  
the	   causal	   roles.	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   crucial	   step	   from	   learning	   something	   new	   to	  
learning	  about	  a	  new	  metaphysically	  distinct	  property	  would	  require	  an	  additional	  argument	  
that	  is	  not	  provided	  in	  the	  Knowledge	  Argument.	  	  
                                                
33	   I	  have	  discussed	  this	   idea	   in	  part	   in	  the	  first	  chapter	  and	  at	  greater	   length	   in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  For	  the	  
details	  see	  the	  section	  on	  Papineau’s	  account	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	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However,	   if	   we	   assume	   that	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   refer	   directly,	   not	   via	  
descriptions	   of	   their	   causal	   roles,	   we	   get	   a	   totally	   different	   story.	   On	   this	   account,	   Mary	  
learns	   something	   new	   that	   was	   not	   inferable	   from	   the	   physical	   facts	   simply	   because	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  do	  not	  use	  descriptions	  of	  their	  causal	  roles	  as	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  
and	  thus	  cannot	  be	  inferred	  in	  that	  way.	  	  
Now,	   the	   first	   option	  does	  not	   allow	   for	   differentiating	  between	  an	  eliminativists34	  
interpretation	  on	  the	  one	  side	  and	  the	  epiphenomenlist/property	  dualist35	  interpretation	  on	  
the	  other.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  conceptual	  dualist	  option	  seem	  to	  address	  very	  well	  both	  
why	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   not	   contained	   in	   nor	   inferable	   from	   the	   body	   of	   physical	  
information	   and	   how	   their	   existence	   is	   compatible	  with	   physicalism.	  One	   could	   stop	   right	  
here	   and	   say	   that,	   for	   example,	   the	   explanatory	   principle	   of	   “the	   inference	   to	   the	   best	  
explanation”	   or	   Ockham’s	   razor	   suggests	  which	   one	   of	   the	   two	   interpretations	   should	   be	  
preferred.	   Of	   course	   it	   is	   the	   conceptual	   dualist’s	   interpretation.	   But	   we	   might	   go	   even	  
further	   and	   consider	   the	   reasons	   why	   the	   property	   dualist	   interpretation	   should	   be	  
favoured,	  put	  forward	  by	  Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	  (Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	  2001).	  They	  believe	  
that	  there	  has	  to	  be	  some	  a	  priori	  element	   in	  the	  reductive	  explanation	  on	  which	  we	  base	  
the	  necessity	  of	  even	  the	  a	  posteriori	  identities.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  no	  such	  analysis	  should	  be	  
required	   for	   the	   psychophysical	   identity	   as	   it	   is	   not	   universally	   required	   for	   some	   of	   the	  
standard	  cases	  of	  reductive	  explanation	  of	  natural	  kinds	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999).	  	  
An	   argument	   for	   conceptual	   dualism	   then,	   might	   stem	   from	   considerations	   of	  
conceptual	   analysis	   and	   intelligibility	   of	   explanation.	   I	   have	   in	  mind	   Block	   and	   Stalnaker’s	  
analysis	   of	   the	   account	   of	   reductive	   explanation	   given	   by	   Chalmers	   and	   others	   (Chalmers	  
1996;	  Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	  2001;	  Levine	  2001).	  They	  assume	  that	  identifying	  explanans	  and	  
explanandum	  via	   conceptual	   analysis	   is	   universally	   applicable	   to	   all	   cases	   of	   the	   reductive	  
explanation	   of	   natural	   kinds,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   available	   for	   psychophysical	   identity.	   Block	   and	  
Stalnaker	   persuasively	   demonstrate	   that	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   with	   many	   examples	   of	   the	  
reductive	   explanation	   of	   natural	   kinds.	   Furthermore,	   in	   these	   cases	   we	   find	   successful	  
                                                
34	   Eliminitavists	   maintain	   that	   there	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   qualia	   and	   that	   folk	   psychology	   miss-­‐describes	  
experiences.	  
35	  Chalmers	  is	  the	  main	  proponent	  of	  this	  position	  as	  it	  was	  discussed	  in	  the	  first	  chapter.	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reductive	   explanation	  without	   relying	   on	   conceptual	   analysis.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case	   then	  why	  
would	   conceptual	   analysis	   be	   required	   for	   psychophysical	   identity?	   It	   seems	   as	   if	   our	  
preferences	  over	   the	   tacit	   assumptions	   involved	   in	   the	  brute	  disagreement	  we	  mentioned	  
earlier	  should	  swing	  us	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy.	  I	  need	  to	  elaborate	  on	  
these	  claims	  before	  concluding	  my	  key	  argument.	  	  
	  
4.7 A	  priori	  derivation	  and	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  explanations	  
Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999)	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  two	  main	  claims	  
associated	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  consciousness.	  One	   is	   the	  claim	  about	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  
problem,	   i.e.	   that	   any	   physicalist	   or	   functionalist	   notion	   of	   consciousness	   leaves	   out	   the	  
fundamental	   feature	   of	   consciousness,	   the	   what-­‐it-­‐is-­‐likeness	   of	   experience.	   According	   to	  
some	  philosophers	  this	  gap	  is	  closable	  if	  we	  acquire	  relevant	  concepts	  (Nagel	  1974),	  others	  
claim	   that	   the	   gap	   is	   not	   closable	  because	   it	   reflects	   a	   fundamental	   part	   of	   consciousness	  
which	   is	   not	   physically	   or	   functionally	   analyzable	   (Chalmers	   1996;	   Chalmers	   and	   Jackson	  
2000;	  Jackson	  1982)	  because	  of	  its	  non-­‐physical	  nature.	  The	  concept	  of	  consciousness	  is	  not	  
functionally	   analyzable	   therefore	   zombies,	   creatures	   that	   are	   our	   physical	   and	   functional	  
isomorphs	  but	  who	  lack	  phenomenal	  consciousness,	  are	  metaphysically	  possible.	  The	  other	  
claim	   about	   consciousness	   is	   that	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	   consciousness	   is	   not	   available.	  
Conceptual	   analysis	   in	   this	   case	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   analysis	   according	   to	   which	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  a	  priori	  derivable	  from	  the	  complete	  microphysical	  description.	  	  
These	   two	   claims	   are	  mutually	   dependent.	   Specifically,	   the	   lack	   of	   availability	   of	   a	  
conceptual	  analysis	  of	  consciousness	  stems	  from	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  consciousness,	  
this	  sets	   it	  apart	  from	  other	  physical	  phenomena.	   It	  should	  be	  fairly	  uncontroversial	  to	  say	  
that,	   if	   consciousness	   were	   functionally	   analyzable,	   there	   would	   be	   no	   explanatory	   gap;	  
psychophysical	   identity	   would	   be	   considered	   as	   any	   other	   identity	   of	   natural	   kinds.	   The	  
controversial	   issue	   according	   to	   Block	   and	   Stalnaker	   (Block	   and	   Stalnaker	   1999,	   p.	   2)	   is	  
whether	   such	  an	  analysis	   is	   required	   to	   close	   the	  gap.	  According	   to	   some	  philosophers,	   in	  
particular	   Chalmers	   and	   Jackson	   (Chalmers	   and	   Jackson	   2001),	   such	   an	   analysis	   is	   not	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possible	   to	   give	   therefore	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   cannot	   be	   closed.	   Let’s	   follow	   Block	   and	  
Stalnaker	  and	  call	  this	  the	  conceptual	  analysis	  thesis.	  	  
When	   it	   comes	   to	   explaining	   natural	   kind	   phenomena	   Levine	   (Levine	   1993)36	  
maintains	  that	  it	  involves	  basically	  two	  phases.	  One	  phase	  consists	  of	  working	  out	  the	  causal	  
or	   functional	   roles,	   and	   once	   this	   is	   done	   one	   can	   a	   priori	   identify	   explanans	   and	  
explanandum.	   The	   other	   step	   is	   an	   empirical	   one	   where	   one	   actually	   has	   to	   find	   out	  
empirically	  what	  the	  causal	  or	   functional	  roles	  are,	  or	   finding	  the	  fillers	  of	  these	  roles.	  The	  
problem	  of	  course,	  according	  to	  Levine,	  is	  that	  no	  such	  analysis	  is	  available	  for	  phenomenal	  
consciousness.	  I	  might	  add	  that	  this	  is	  because	  phenomenal	  concepts	  pick	  out	  their	  referents	  
directly,	   so	   knowledge	  of	   their	   causal	   or	   functional	   roles	   does	   not	   figure	   anywhere	   in	   the	  
workings	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts37.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  first	  step	  of	  the	  Levine’s	  two-­‐
step	  program	  is	  totally	  missing	  in	  this	  case.	  We	  can’t	  analyze	  phenomenal	  concepts	  in	  terms	  
of	  causal	  roles	  because	  they	  do	  not	  pick	  out	  their	  referents	  via	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles.	  
As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  when	  discussing	  the	  vagueness	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts,	  
this	   should	   not	   pose	   a	   problem	   for	   physicalism	   as	   it	   only	  means	   that	   the	   intelligibility	   of	  
explanation	  regarding	  psychophysical	   identity	   is	   to	  be	  sought	  elsewhere,	  not	   in	  conceptual	  
semantics.	  	  
As	   it	   was	   said,	   the	   really	   controversial	   issue	   here	   is	   whether	   such	   a	   conceptual	  
analysis	   is	   always	   available	   even	   for	   the	   natural	   kinds	   cases.	   In	   another	  words,	   Block	   and	  
Stalnaker	   (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  p	  14)	  hold	   that	   such	  an	  analysis	   is	   in	   fact	  not	  always	  
available	   for	   other	   successful	   reductive	   explanations	   of	   natural	   kinds.	   Block	   and	   Stalnaker	  
(Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999)	  cast	  serious	  doubts	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  closing	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  
would	   require	   a	   priori	   conceptual	   analysis	   as	   proposed	  by	   Levine	   (Levine	   1993),	   Chalmers	  
(Chalmers	  1996)	  and	  Chalmers	  and	   Jackson	   (Chalmers	  and	   Jackson	  2000).	  They	  argue	   that	  
Levine’s	  and	  other’s	  arguments	  only	  show	  that	  such	  an	  analysis	  might	  be	  required	  but	  not	  
that	   it	  must	   be	   required.	   Basically,	   Chalmers	   and	   Jackson	   use	   only	   examples	   that	   already	  
involve	  a	  priori	  conceptual	  analysis	  but	  they	  are	  silent	  on	  other	  cases	  of	  natural	  kinds	  that	  
                                                
36	  (Chalmers	  1996)	  and	  (Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	  2000)	  position	  themselves	  along	  these	  lines	  of	  thinking	  as	  well.	  
37	  For	  the	  details	  see	  the	  second	  and	  the	  third	  chapters.	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are	   based	   on	   successful	   reductive	   explanations	   that	   do	   not	   involve	   a	   priori	   conceptual	  
analysis.	   Block	   and	   Stalnaker	   consider	   examples	   of	   natural	   kinds	   in	  which	   the	   explanatory	  
gap	  was	   closed	   but	   no	   a	   priori	   conceptual	   analysis	  was	   available.	   Such	   an	   example	   is	   the	  
“explanatory	  gap”	  in	  explaining	  life	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  pp.	  14-­‐16).	  In	  explaining	  what	  
life	   is	   we	   analyze	   the	   concept	   of	   “life”	   in	   terms	   of	   functional	   roles	   such	   as	   digestion,	  
reproduction,	   locomotion,	   respiration	  and	  so	   forth.	  However,	   it	  might	  have	  happened	  that	  
some	   living	   organisms	   never	   digested,	   respired,	   reproduced	   or	   moved,	   some	   tree-­‐like	  
creatures	  perhaps,	  but	  were	  still	  alive.	  Perhaps	  they	  used	  some	  alternative	  processes	  instead	  
of	  digestion,	  reproduction,	  locomotion,	  respiration,	  etc	  to	  survive.	  This	  example	  shows	  that	  
the	  concept	  of	  life	  is	  not	  a	  priori	  analyzable	  in	  terms	  of	  digestion,	  reproduction,	  locomotion,	  
respiration,	   etc.	   In	   effect,	   it	   shows	   that	   to	   close	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   on	   life	   no	   a	   priori	  
conceptual	   analysis	   is	   required.	  As	   the	   authors	   put	   it:	   “Closing	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   in	   the	  
case	  of	   life	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  any	  analytic	  definition	  of	   'life',	  but	  rather	   is	  a	  matter	  of	  
showing	  how	  living	  things	  around	  here	  work”	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  p.	  15).	  	  
Basically,	  Jackson	  and	  Chalmers	  believe	  that	  a	  priori	  conceptual	  analysis	  can	  take	  two	  
forms:	  one	  form	  of	  analysis	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  derivation	  from	  the	  microphysical	  truths,	  the	  other	  
form	   is	   in	   terms	   of	   reference	   fixing	   definitions,	   like	   the	   well	   known	   cases	   of	   “water”	   or	  
“heat”.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  argue	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  two	  versions	  of	  
conceptual	  analyses	  apply	  universally	  to	  all	  varieties	  of	  natural	  kind	  reductive	  explanations.	  
	  The	   problem	   with	   Jackson	   and	   Chalmers’	   view	   concerning	   reductive	   explanations	  
and	   a	   priori	   analysis	   is	   that	   they	   seem	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   connect	   a	  
microphysical	  description,	  such	  as	  “H2O”	  or	  “molecular	  kinetic	  energy”,	  with	  the	  concepts	  of	  
macro	   phenomena,	   such	   as	   “	   water”	   or	   “	   heat”	   is	   through	   conceptual	   analysis.	   If	   an	  
explanation	  of	   identity	  statements	  relied	  solely	  on	  the	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles	   it	  would	  
merely	  amount	  to	  establishing	  a	  correlation.	  However,	  properly	  understood,	  identity	  allows	  
for	  transferring	  explanatory	  and	  causal	  force	  to	  the	  new	  facts,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  with	  mere	  
correlations.	   So	   it	   is	   legitimate	   to	   ask	   a	   question	  why	   certain	   correlations	   hold,	   e.g.	   if	   the	  
relation	  between	  “H2O”	  and	  “water”	  were	  a	  mere	  correlation	  and	  not	  a	  proper	  identity,	  then	  
it	  would	  make	   sense	   to	   ask	  why	   they	   are	   correlated,	   etc.	  However,	   if	   they	  were	   identical	  
there	  is	  nothing	  more	  to	  it	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  explained.	  Consider	  this	  example.	  Imagine	  there	  
were	  two	  independent	  literary	  societies,	  one	  studying	  the	  work	  of	  Samuel	  Clemens	  and	  the	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other	  studying	   the	  work	  of	  Mark	  Twain.	  By	  coincidence,	  both	  societies	  organize	  an	  annual	  
meeting	   in	   the	   same	  hotel	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time.	  At	   some	  point	   during	   the	  dinner	   in	   the	  
restaurant	   both	   groups	   chose	   to	   gather	   after	   the	   conference	   and	   someone	   from	   the	  
“Clemens”	   group	   drops	   a	   document	   that	   describes	   the	   life	   and	  work	   of	   Samuel	   Clemens.	  
Someone	   from	   the	   “Twain”	   group	   picks	   it	   up	   and	   astonished	   says:	   “what	   an	   amazing	  
correlation,	  the	  life	  and	  work	  of	  Samuel	  Clemens	  is	  the	  same	  as	  of	  Mark	  Twain!”	  	  Note	  that	  
in	  this	  case	  it	  makes	  perfect	  sense	  to	  ask	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  a	  correlation.	  However,	  once	  
it	   is	   ascertained	   that	   “Mark	  Twain=Samuel	  Clemens”	   it	   doesn’t	  make	   sense	   to	   ask	   for	   any	  
further	  explanations,	  because	  identities	  don’t	  have	  explanations	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  
p.	  24).	  	  
The	   examination	   of	   the	   claim	   that	   a	   proper	   reductive	   explanation	   requires	  
conceptual	   analysis	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   priori	   derivation	   from	  microphysics	   shows	   that,	   even	   if	  
there	  were	  some	  a	  priori	  analysis	  of	  the	  macro-­‐concepts	  available,	  the	  whole	  strategy	  would	  
fail	   because	   the	   analysis	   would	   not	   be	  made	   in	   terms	   of	  microphysical	   claims	   (Block	   and	  
Stalnaker	  1999,	  p.	  28).	  
Consider	  this	  argument	  pattern	  as	  an	  illustration:	  
	  
“78.	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  earth	  is	  covered	  with	  H2O.	  
79.	  H2O	  is	  the	  stuff	  that	  plays	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  causal	  role	  in	  explaining	  our	  use	  of	  the	  word	  
'water'.	  
80.	  Therefore,	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  earth	  is	  covered	  with	  water.	  
The	  assumption	  must	  be	  that	  the	  inference	  from	  78.	  and	  79.	  to	  80.	  is	  now	  mediated	  by	  the	  
following	  conceptual	  analysis:	  
81.	  Water	  is	  the	  stuff	  that	  plays	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  causal	  role	  in	  explaining	  our	  use	  of	  the	  word	  
'water'.”	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  pp.	  25-­‐26).	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The	  crucial	   step	   in	   the	  argument	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	  grant	   that	  80.	   follows	  a	  priori	  
from	   the	   premises	   78.	   and	   79.	   is	   of	   course	   hidden	   premise	   81.	   However,	   81.	   is	   not	   a	  
conceptual	  truth	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  “water”.	  At	  best	  it	  is	  an	  abbreviation	  of	  an	  a	  
posteriori	  and	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  causal	  role	  of	  water,	  but	  their	  account	  
provides	   no	   reason	   to	   assume	   that	   eventually	  we	  will	   be	   able	   to	   fill	   in	   the	   appropriate	   a	  
priori	  analysis	  of	   the	   term	  “water”.	   	   For	  all	  we	  know	  some	  other	   liquid	  might	  have	  played	  
that	  role.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  granting	  for	  a	  moment	  that	  an	  a	  priori	  conceptual	  analysis	  can	  
be	   found	   in	  a	  premise	   like	  81.,	   then	  there	   is	  nothing	   that	  would	  prevent	   the	  same	  kind	  of	  
analysis	  pattern	  for	  psychophysical	  identity.	  
If	  this	  kind	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  is	  available	  for	  natural	  kinds	  like	  in	  the	  first	  analysis	  
pattern	   then	   it	   is	   also	   available	   for	   cases	   involving	   phenomenal	   concepts.	   Furthermore,	   it	  
certainly	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  natural	  kinds	  
and	  the	  analysis	  of	  phenomena	  concepts.	  	  
	  
Consider	  this	  example:	  	  
	  
82.	  C-­‐fibre	  firing	  is	  taking	  place	  in	  Jones	  at	  time	  t.	  
83.	  C-­‐fibre	  firing	  is	  the	  process	  that	  plays	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  causal	  role	  in	  explaining	  our	  use	  of	  
the	  word	  'pain'.	  
84.	  Therefore,	  pain	  is	  taking	  place	  in	  Jones	  at	  time	  t.	  
The	  inference	  from	  82.	  and	  83.	  to	  84.	  is	  justified	  by	  the	  following	  quite	  trivial	  instantiation	  of	  
our	  account	  of	  reference:	  
85.	  Pain	   is	  the	  process	  that	  plays	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  causal	  role	   in	  our	  use	  of	  the	  word	  'pain'	  
(Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  p.	  26).	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The	   Block	   and	   Stalnaker	   examination	   of	   the	   account	   of	   conceptual	   analysis	   and	  
reductive	   explanation	  proposed	  by	   Levine,	   Chalmers	   and	   Jackson	   shows	   that	   possibility	   of	  
zombies	  poses	  no	  threat	  to	  physicalism	  because	  no	  a	  priori	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  microphysical	  
descriptions	  is	  required	  to	  reductively	  explain	  mental	  phenomena.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  either	  the	  
meaning	   of	   concepts	   is	   not	   a	   priori	   analyzable	   or	   it	   is	   not	   analyzable	   in	   terms	   of	  
microphysical	   descriptions.	   Remember,	   zombies	   posed	   a	   threat	   to	   physicalism	   in	   the	   first	  
place	   only	   because	   it	  was	   argued38	   that	   even	   a	   posteriori	   necessary	   statements	   require	   a	  
priori	  analysis	  of	  the	  meanings	  of	  their	  concepts	  at	  some	  stage.	  So	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  only	  way	  
to	  save	  the	  conceptual	  analysis	  strategy	  is	  by	  bypassing	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  priori	  analysis	  in	  terms	  
of	  microphysical	   descriptions	   and	   trying	   instead	   to	   find	   an	   a	   priori	   analysis	   of	  meaning	   in	  
some	  other	  terms.	  	  
This	   point	   also	   applies	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   explanations	   because	   it	  
seems	  that	  Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	  hold	  that	  an	  intelligible	  reductive	  explanation	  must	  follow	  
a	  priori	  from	  the	  microphysical	  description.	  This	  assumption	  is	  actually	  the	  main	  motivation	  
for	  their	  move	  from	  the	  epistemological	  plain	  to	  the	  metaphysical	  one	  in	  the	  conceivability	  
argument.	  Namely,	  that	  what	  is	  merely	  conceivable	  is	  metaphysically	  possible.	  	  
Moving	  on.	   In	  order	   to	   justify	  conceptual	  analysis,	  Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	   (Chalmers	  
and	   Jackson	  2000)	  appeal	   to	  analysis	   through	   the	   two-­‐dimensional	   framework	  by	   claiming	  
that,	   instead	   of	   the	   a	   priori	   analysis	   of	  macro-­‐physical	   concepts	   in	   terms	   of	  microphysical	  
descriptions,	   the	   concepts	   get	   their	   meanings	   through	   the	   special	   nature	   of	   primary	   and	  
secondary	   intensions39.	  As	  we	   shall	   see,	   this	  move	  does	  not	  help	   to	  establish	   that	  a	  priori	  
conceptual	  analysis	  is	  required	  for	  natural	  kinds	  concepts	  or	  phenomenal	  concepts	  either.	  	  
As	  Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  put	  it:	  
“The	  two-­‐dimensional	  account	  does	  nothing	  at	  all	  to	  motivate	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  
an	  a	  priori	  accessible	  conceptual	  component	  of	  content”	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  p	  30).	  
                                                
38	  For	  the	  details	  see	  chapter	  one	  section	  on	  conceivability	  arguments	  and	  chapter	  two	  section	  on	  intelligibility	  
of	  explanations.	  
39 For	  the	  details	  of	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  framework	  see	  the	  first	  chapter	  section	  on	  the	  2D	  argument. 
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  As	   we	   remember	   from	   the	   section	   on	   the	   two-­‐dimensional	   argument,	   Chalmers	  
provides	   an	   interpretation	   of	   two-­‐dimensional	   semantics	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	   distinction	  
between	  primary	  and	  secondary	  intensions	  of	  meaning.	  A	  secondary	  intension	  is	  a	  function	  
that	   reflects	   how	   the	   reference	   is	   fixed	   in	   a	   counterfactual	   world	   considered	   as	   actual	  
(centred).	   We	   know	   it	   from	   the	   Kripkean	   cases:	   a	   secondary	   intension	   of	   “water”	   in	   the	  
actual	   (centred)	  world	   is	   “H2O”,	  whereas	  at	  Twin	  Earth	  considered	  as	  actual	   (centred)	   it	   is	  
“XYZ”.	  A	  primary	   intension	  on	   the	  other	  hand	   is	  a	   function	   that	   is	  determined	  by	  how	  the	  
reference	  would	  have	  been	  fixed	  in	  a	  given	  world	  considered	  as	  actual	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  
1999,	  p.	  33).	  One	  can	  know	  the	  primary	  intension	  of	  a	  given	  concept	  and	  still	  be	  ignorant	  of	  
the	   secondary	   intension,	   because	   the	   secondary	   intension	   varies	   from	   possible	   world	   to	  
possible	  world,	   note,	   secondary	   intension	   is	   a	   function	   of	   how	   the	   reference	   is	   fixed	   in	   a	  
possible	   world	   considered	   as	   actual	   (centred).	   In	   this	   sense	   then,	   the	   primary	   intensions	  
should	   represent	   the	  a	  priori	  part	  of	   the	  concept’s	   content	   that	   remains	  unchanged	  when	  
considered	   through	   possible	   worlds.	   The	   primary	   intension	   understood	   in	   this	   way	  
represents	  the	  description	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  that	  played	  the	  central	  part	   in	  the	  discussion	  
on	  conceptual	  analysis,	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  representing	  the	  a	  priori	  part	  of	  the	  
two-­‐dimensional	  analysis.	  	  
We	   can	   see	   now	   how	   the	   two-­‐dimensional	   framework	   is	   supposed	   to	   answer	   the	  
worries	  that	  conceptual	  analysis	  generated.	  In	  particular,	  worries	  about	  how	  a	  microphysical	  
description	  enables	  a	  priori	   inference	  to	  macro	  phenomenal	  concepts	  through	  descriptions	  
of	  the	  causal	  roles.	  	  	  
Consider	  a	  familiar	  example	  wherein	  X	  is	  a	  primary	  intension	  that	  is	  known	  a	  priori:	  
	  
86.	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  globe	  is	  covered	  by	  H2O.	  
87.	  H2O=	  the	  satisfier	  of	  X	  (the	  primary	  intension	  of	  'water').	  
88.	  Water	  =	  the	  satisfier	  of	  X.	  
89.	  Therefore,	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  globe	  is	  covered	  by	  water.	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  p.	  37)	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For	   this	   argument	   to	  work	  87.	  has	   to	  be	  a	  microphysical	   truth	  and	  88.	  has	   to	  be	  a	  
conceptual	   truth.	   In	   other	   words,	   87.	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   an	   empirical	   claim	   whereas	   88.	  
should	  be	  a	  priori	  inferable	  from	  87.	  However,	  the	  argument	  does	  not	  warrant	  that,	  at	  least	  
unless	  we	  assume	  that	  all	  the	  facts	  are	  derivable	  or	  contained	  in	  the	  microphysical	  facts.	  But	  
this	  claim	  seems	  pretty	  debatable.	  For	  consider	   the	   following	  case.	  Suppose	  there	  are	  two	  
possible	  worlds	  that	  are	  microphysically	  indiscernible,	  call	  them	  W-­‐earth	  and	  W-­‐super	  earth.	  
On	  what	  ground	  can	  we	  suppose	  that	  a	  microphysical	  description	  of	  W-­‐earth	  describes	  only	  
and	  uniquely	  the	  W-­‐earth?	  Given	  that	  primary	  intensions	  are	  just	  functions	  it	  could	  happen	  
that,	  given	  different	  inputs	  to	  otherwise	  indiscernible	  possible	  worlds,	  the	  primary	  intension	  
of	   water	   at	   W-­‐earth	   leads	   to	   H2O	   but	   at	   W-­‐super	   earth	   the	   primary	   intension	   leads	   to	  
something	  else.	  If	  this	  is	  correct	  then	  the	  primary	  intension	  of	  water	  although	  a	  fact,	  would	  
not	  be	  a	  microphysical	  fact.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case	  then	  we	  have	  disrupted	  the	  inference	  between	  
microphysical	   descriptions	   to	   a	   priori	   analysis	   thus	   begging	   the	   question	   why	   the	   same	  
pattern	  of	  analysis	  can’t	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  that	  involves	  C-­‐fibre	  firing	  and	  pain?	  It	  seems	  
that	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  prevents	  us	  from	  applying	  the	  same	  pattern	  of	  analysis	  as	  long	  as	  
we	   stick	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   two-­‐dimensional	   semantics	   according	   to	   which	   the	  
primary	   intensions	  are	  derivative	  from	  the	  actual	  and	  possible	  secondary	   intensions	  at	  any	  
given	  possible	  world	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  p.	  41).	  	  
Here	  is	  how	  Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  put	  this	  point:	  
“90.	  Pyramidal	  cell	  activity	  was	  rampant	  in	  medieval	  prisons.	  
	  91.	  Pyramidal	  cell	  activity	  =	  the	  satisfier	  of	  the	  primary	  intension	  of	  'pain'.	  
92.	  Pain	  =	  the	  satisfier	  of	  the	  primary	  intension	  of	  'pain'.	  
Therefore,	  
93.	  Pain	  was	  rampant	  in	  medieval	  prisons.	  
	  
Our	   point	   is	   that	   there	   could	   be	   compelling	   motivation	   for	   91.	   and	   that	   92.	   has	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whatever	  a	  priori	  status	  88.	  above	  has.”	  (Block	  and	  Stalnaker	  1999,	  p.	  44).	  	  
This	  sort	  of	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  framework	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  
account	   of	   how	   to	   isolate	   the	   a	   priori	   component	   of	   the	   reductive	   explanation.	   It	   rather	  
seems	  as	  if	  it	  is	  merely	  assumed.	  Together	  with	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  conceptual	  analysis	  
thesis	  this	  shows	  that	  the	  reductive	  explanation	  of	  natural	  kinds	  does	  not	  universally	  require	  
a	  priori	  derivation	  of	  macro-­‐physical	  concepts	  from	  microphysical	  descriptions.	  This	  claim	  is	  
based	  on	  the	  consideration	  of	  cases	  of	  conceptual	  analysis	  in	  which	  either	  a	  macro-­‐physical	  
concept	   is	   not	   inferred	   from	   the	   microphysical	   description	   or	   if	   it	   is	   based	   on	   the	  
microphysical	  description	  then	  the	  inference	  is	  not	  a	  priori.	  Similar	  points	  can	  be	  applied	  for	  
the	   two-­‐dimensional	   framework	   which	   tries	   to	   evade	   the	   just	   mentioned	   difficulties	   of	  
conceptual	  analysis	  by	  introducing	  a	  primary	  intension	  of	  meaning	  that	  captures	  the	  a	  priori	  
part	   of	   the	   descriptions	   of	   causal	   roles.	   If	   the	   primary	   intension	   is	   determined	   by	   the	  
secondary	  intension,	  then	  in	  this	  case	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  is	  the	  case	  merely	  on	  
the	  grounds	  of	  the	  microphysical	  descriptions.	  	  
If	  neither	  of	   these	  methods	  provide	  an	  account	   that	   is	  universally	  applicable	   to	   the	  
natural	   kinds,	   then	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   it	   could	   not	   work	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
psychophysical	   identity.	   My	   point	   here	   then	   is	   if	   proper	   identities	   don’t	   require	   further	  
explanations,	  and	  if	  we	  use	  identities	  to	  explain	  some	  further	  properties,	  i.e.	  to	  transfer	  the	  
explanatory	   and	   causal	   force	   onto	   these	   further	   properties,	   then	   a	   justification	   of	   the	  
intelligibility	   of	   such	   an	   explanation	   should	   be	   sought	   somewhere	   aside	   of	   in	   the	   a	   priori	  
derivation	   from	   microphysical	   descriptions.	   The	   real	   justification	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   a	  
reductive	   explanation	   of	   phenomenal	   consciousness	   is	   to	   be	   found	   in	   the	   issue	   of	   why	  
thinking	  that	  intelligible	  explanation	  requires	  employment	  of	  modes	  of	  presentation	  that	  are	  
based	  on	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles.	  As	  we	  have	  just	  seen,	  if	  a	  justification	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  
a	  priori	  derivation	  from	  microphysical	  descriptions,	  with	  or	  without	  isolating	  the	  a	  priori	  part	  
of	  meaning	  through	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  framework/through	  two-­‐dimensional	  frameworks,	  
fails,	  then	  it	  should	  be	  found	  somewhere	  else.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  right	  place	  to	  start	  looking	  is	  
the	   structure	   of	   relations	   among	   sensory	   concepts,	   qualitative	   concepts,	   phenomenal	  
concepts,	  neurobiological	  concepts,	  neuroanatomical	  concepts,	  and	  psychological	  concepts,	  
etc.	   On	   my	   proposal	   this	   structure	   of	   relations	   can	   be	   outlined	   by	   using	   a	   quality	   space	  
model.	  More	  about	  that	  will	  be	  said	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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My	  agenda	  in	  this	  chapter	  was	  to	  show	  that	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	  presentation	  play	  
no	  role	  in	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  explanations	  that	  involve	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  I	  would	  rather	  
claim	   that	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   suppose	   that	   a	  merely	   epistemic	   difference	   between	   the	  
concept	  of	  experience	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective	  and	  the	  neurobiological	  concept	  of	  
experience	  can	  be	  explained	  away	  solely	  by	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  If	  such	  an	  
explanation	  is	  not	  based	  exclusively	  on	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  
prima	  facie	  reason	  not	  to	  accept	  conceptual	  dualism	  while	  maintaining	  ontological	  monism.	  I	  
tried	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  are	  no	  a	  priori	  reasons	  to	  accept	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  a	  priori	  
derivation	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	   from	  the	  microphysical	  description	  should	  be	   required	  
for	   an	   intelligible	   explanation	   of	   psychophysical	   identity.	   Thus	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   only	  
remaining	   thing	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   explained	   is	   the	   intuition	   of	   distinctness	   and	   why	  
conceptual	   dualism	   stands	   better	   off.	   For	   that	   I	   introduced	   my	   “brute	   disagreement”	  
account.	   To	  explain	   away	   this	   brute	  disagreement	   I	   propose	   to	  use	   a	  quality	   space	  model	  
that	  would	  tease	  out	  a	  structure	  of	  relations	  among	  the	  diverse	  kinds	  of	  concepts	  that	  are	  
used	  in	  the	  study	  of	  phenomenal	  consciousness.	  I	  will	  be	  discussing	  the	  quality	  space	  model	  












5. CHAPTER	  5	  
	  
5.1 Intuitions	  of	  distinctness	  and	  quality	  space	  
	  
“However	  much	  we	  know	  about	  our	  cerebral	  innards,	  and	  however	  varied	  the	  examples	  of	  
human	  pain	  we	  are	  given,	  there	  will	  still	  be	  a	  number	  of	  distinct	  material	  properties	  which	  
this	  sort	  of	  research	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  decide	  between	  as	  the	  material	  essence	  of	  pain.	  “	  
(Papineau	  2002,	  p	  177)	  
	  
	  
5.2 The	  vagueness	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	  as	  a	  constraint	  for	  studying	  phenomenal	  
consciousness	  empirically	  
	  
As	   it	   has	   been	   established	   so	   far	   in	   our	   discussion,	   an	   a	   posteriori	   link	   between	   a	  
material	   property	   and	   the	   concept	   that	   picks	   it	   out	   is	   to	   be	  determined	  empirically.	   If	  we	  
accept	   that	   physicalism	   can	   be	   set	   up	   as	   a	   psychophysical	   identity	   thesis,	   that	   is	   as	   an	   a	  
posteriori	  necessary	  thesis,	  and,	  given	  that	  phenomenal	  concepts	  have	  no	  a	  priori	  links	  with	  
physical	  properties,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  determine	  which	  particular	  material	  property	   is	  picked	  
out	  by	  any	  particular	  phenomenal	  concept.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  physicalism	  were	  true	  then	  each	  
phenomenal	   concept	   ought	   to	   refer	   to	   some	  particular	  material	   property,	   however,	   given	  
that	  phenomenal	  concepts	  do	  not	  use	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles	  to	  pick	  out	  their	  referents	  
it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  to	  set	  up	  an	  empirical	  enquiry	  about	  which	  phenomenal	  concept	  picks	  out	  
which	  particular	  material	  property.	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We	  could	  for	  example	  try	  identifying	  the	  material	  referent	  of	  a	  phenomenal	  concept,	  
say	   of	   the	   concept	   “pain”,	   by	   mirroring	   introspective	   reports	   of	   each	   case	   of	   “pain”	  
individually	   with	   the	   particular	   phenomenal	   concept,	   and	   creating	   a	   comprehensive	  
database	  for	  such	  cases.	  However,	  regardless	  of	  how	  labour	  intensive	  and	  unpromising	  this	  
approach	   may	   seem,	   there	   is	   a	   more	   obvious	   shortcoming	   built	   into	   it.	   Namely,	   this	  
approach	  would	  not	   allow	  us	   to	   generalize	  over	  other	   animals,	   robots	  or	   extraterrestrials,	  
unless	   of	   course,	  we	   examine	   each	   of	   them	   individually.	   This	   is	   not	  merely	   a	   technical	   or	  
methodological	   obstacle	   that	   can	   be	   eventually	   solved,	   but	   rather	   a	   principled	   issue	   that	  
stems	   from	   the	   vagueness	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   themselves	   and	   is	   in	   principle	  
unsolvable.	   As	   we	   remember	   from	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   Knowledge	   Argument	  
established	   that	  what	  Mary	   learns	  upon	  her	   release	   is	  not	  based	  on	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  
roles,	   for	   if	   it	  were,	   she	   should	  have	  been	   able	   to	   know	   it	  while	   still	   in	   the	   room.	  On	   the	  
other	  hand,	   she	   could	   sit	   in	   front	  of	   a	  pile	  of	   ripe	   red	   tomatoes	   as	  much	  as	   she	   likes	   and	  
introspect	  her	  experiences	  of	   the	  red	  colour,	  but	   that	  would	  never	  enable	  her	   to	   infer	   the	  
descriptions	   of	   the	   causal	   roles	   involved.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   descriptions	   of	   causal	   roles	  
would	   never	   tell	   us	   what	   it	   is	   like	   to	   feel	   pain,	   because	   knowing	   that	   requires	   actually	  
undergoing	   such	   an	   experience.	   Phenomenal	   concepts	   refer	   directly	   and	   her	   knowledge	  
about	  what	  she	  introspects	  is	  substantive	  and	  determinate.	  Although	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
experience	   from	   the	   first	   person	  perspective	   is	   substantive	   and	  determinate,	   phenomenal	  
concepts	  are	  vague,	  because,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  said,	  they	  have	  no	  a	  priori	  connections	  with	  their	  
material	  properties.	  This	   is	   the	  reason	  why	  direct	  mapping	  between	  phenomenal	  concepts	  
and	  material	  properties	  is	  not	  possible.	  	  
Direct	  mapping	  of	  introspective	  reports	  onto	  the	  MRI	  or	  PET	  scans	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  
can	  be	  extremely	  useful	  for	  enhancing	  a	  scheme	  of	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles.	  That	  
is	   to	   say,	   it	   can	   be	   very	   useful	   for	   working	   out	   the	   psychological	   concepts	   involved.	  
Psychological	  concepts	  are	  very	   important	   for	   finding	  material	  properties	  corresponding	  to	  
appropriate	  phenomenal	  concepts	  because	  they	  furnish	  the	  database	  with	  the	  descriptions	  
of	  the	  causal	  roles	  that	  we	  need	  to	  get	  the	  research	  off	  the	  ground	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
The	  relation	  between	  phenomenal	  concepts	  and	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  is	  complex.	  On	  
the	   one	   hand,	   because	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   vague,	   qualia	   inversions	   are	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conceivable	  but	  not	  metaphysically	  possible40.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  due	  to	   the	  phenomenal	  
concepts’	   vagueness	   we	   can’t	   know	   why	   certain	   phenomenal	   states	   are	   accompanied	   by	  
certain	   brain	   states,	   remember	   they	   have	   no	   a	   priori	   connections	   with	   the	   material	  
properties	   and	   they	   do	   not	   refer	   using	   descriptions	   of	   causal	   roles.	   But,	   because	   of	   the	  
phenomenal	  concepts’	  vagueness,	  the	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  certain	  phenomenal	  properties	  
are	  correlated	  with	  certain	  neural	  or	  physical	  properties	  should	  not	  stem	  directly	   from	  the	  
phenomenal	   concepts	   themselves,	   as	   it	   does	   in	   the	   case	  of	   natural	   kinds	   concepts.	  As	  we	  
remember,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds	  the	  concepts	  use	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles,	  and	  so,	  
based	   on	   these	   descriptions,	   we	   can	   in	   principle	   know	   which	   concept	   is	   associated	   with	  
which	  property.	  Since	  we	  don’t	  have	  anything	  like	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	  
because	  they	  refer	  directly,	  unmediated,	  an	  account	  that	  would	  explain	  which	  phenomenal	  
concept	   is	   associated	   with	   which	   property	   cannot	   stem	   directly	   from	   the	   conceptual	  
semantics	   as	   with	   the	   case	   of	   natural	   kinds.	   Obviously	   we	   need	   an	   account	   independent	  
from	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts’	   semantics	   to	   explain	   which	   phenomenal	   concept	   is	  
associated	  with	  which	  material	  property.	  I	  suggest	  using	  a	  quality	  space	  model	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  
analysis	   of	   different	   psychological	   concepts	   in	   this	   area	   that	   would	   helps	   us	   better	  
understand	  why	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  expected	  to	  refer	  via	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles.	  
This	   expectation	   is	   in	   my	   understanding	   of	   what	   Papineau	   (Papineau	   2002)	   calls	   “the	  
intuition	  of	  distinctness”.	  	  
The	  way	   in	  which	  Papineau	  portrays	   the	   intuition	  of	  distinctness	   inclines	   towards	  a	  
sociological/anthropological	   explanation	   of	   it	   encapsulated	   in	   his	   famous	   “anti-­‐pathetic	  
fallacy”41	  (Papineau	  1993).	  The	  reason	  for	  introducing	  the	  anti-­‐pathetic	  fallacy	  comes	  mainly	  
from	  the	  causal	  argument	  for	  physicalism	  (Papineau	  2002).	  Papineau	  argues	  that	  there	  can’t	  
be	   any	   other	   reason	   for	   not	   accepting	   conceptual	   dualism,	   given	   the	   causal	   argument,	  
except	  a	  mere	  intuition	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  our	  thinking	  about	  consciousness.	  	  
As	   we	   remember,	   Papineau’s	   causal	   argument	   is	   a	   really	   powerful	   argument,	  
however,	   it	  only	  gives	  us	   really	  strong	  reasons	   to	  hold	   that	  physicalsim	   is	   true.	  But	   it	  does	  
                                                
40	  For	  the	  details	  see	  chapter	  two,	  section	  on	  the	  non-­‐ascriptivism.	  
41	  For	  the	  details	  see	  the	  chapter	  three.	  
 138 
not	  follow	  directly	  from	  the	  argument	  that	  conceptual	  dualism	  is	  true42.	  For	  that	  we	  need	  an	  
independent	  argument	  or	  account.	  Conceptual	  dualism	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  of	  explaining	  the	  a	  
posteriori	   necessary	   nature	   of	   psychophysical	   identity.	   So	   although	   we	   have	   very	   good	  
reasons	   to	   believe	   that	   physicalism	   is	   true,	   we	   nevertheless	   need	   an	   argument	   for	  
conceptual	   dualism.	   The	   issue	   at	   stake	   concerns	   the	   vagueness	   of	   phenomenal	   concepts.	  
That	   is,	   the	   truth	   of	   the	   conceptual	   dualism	   implies	   vagueness	   of	   phenomenal	   concepts,	  
which	  in	  effect	  amounts	  to	  saying	  that	  we	  cannot	  know	  precisely	  which	  physical	  property	  is	  
associated	  with	  which	  phenomenal	  concept.	  	  
	   This,	   however,	   is	   a	   different	   issue	   from	   what	   Levine	   calls	   the	   issue	   of	   the	  
unintelligibility	  of	  explanation.	  It	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  do	  not	  know	  why	  
certain	  brain	  states	  are	  followed	  by	  certain	  mental	  states,	  or	  any	  states	  at	  all.	  According	  to	  
the	  phenomenal	  concepts	  strategy,	  such	  an	  answer	  is	  impossible	  to	  give	  in	  principle	  because	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  don’t	  refer	  via	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles	  as	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  
On	  this	  understanding,	  according	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy,	  we	  will	  never	  be	  able	  
to	   pinpoint	   the	   exact	   “neural	   correlate	   of	   consciousness”	   directly	   from	   the	   phenomenal	  
concepts.	   But	   this	   claim	   only	   amounts	   to	   saying	   that	   an	   account	   of	   which	   phenomenal	  
concept	   is	  connected	  to	  which	  material	  property	   is	   to	  be	  sought	  somewhere	  other	  than	   in	  
the	  semantics	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts	  directly,	  i.e.	  such	  an	  account	  should	  be	  external	  
to	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts	  themselves.	  	  
	   Perhaps	   there	   is	  another	  way	   to	  answer	   this	  worry.	  A	  way	   that	   is	  different	   from	   the	  
model	   of	   conceptual	   analysis	   or	   a	   priori	   derivation	   from	   microphysical	   descriptions,	  
proposed	   by	   Levine,	   Jackson	   and	   Chalmers43.	   Perhaps	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   structure	   of	  
relations	   among	   concepts	   in	   the	   relevant	   areas	   of	   science	   that	   are	   trying	   to	   capture	   the	  
phenomenal	  character	  would	  point	  towards	  a	  criterion	  for	  which	  theories	  are	  better	  suited	  
to	  the	  task.	  	  	  
                                                
42 It only follows that phenomenal and physical causes are identical.  
 
43	  For	  the	  details	  see	  the	  last	  section	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter.	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   Positing	   phenomenal	   concepts	   is	   supposed	   to	   secure	   the	   a	   posteriori	   necessity	   of	  
psychophysical	   identity	   and,	   given	   the	  built-­‐in	   vague	  nature	  of	   phenomenal	   concepts,	   this	  
cannot	   tell	   us	   why	   certain	   physical	   properties	   are	   identical	   with	   particular	   phenomenal	  
properties.	   Identities	   don’t	   do	   that	   kind	   of	   explanatory	   work.	   What	   the	   identity	   does	   is	  
transfer	   explanatory	   and	   causal	   force	   onto	   some	   further	   properties	   (Block	   and	   Stalanker	  
1999).	  On	   the	  other	   hand,	   the	  quality	   space	  model	   that	   does	  not	   directly	  map	  qualitative	  
character/phenomenal	   properties	   onto	   perceptible	   properties/physical	   properties,	   but	  
rather	   allows	   for	   the	   mapping	   of	   the	   structures	   of	   resemblance	   between	   two	   or	   more	  
properties	   of	   multiple	   sensory	   modalities	   and	   further	   among	   multiple	   conceptions	   that	  
capture	  those	  modalities,	  can	  help	  us	  distinguish	  why	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  expected	  to	  
refer	  via	  descriptions	  of	  their	  causal	  roles	  in	  order	  to	  be	  fully	  explanatory.	  On	  my	  proposal,	  
given	  the	  difficulty	  of	  constructing	  a	  straightforward	  quality	  space	  for	  particular	  modalities	  
of	  sensory	  experience,	  such	  as	  pain,	  there	  could	  be	  different	  levels	  of/within	  quality	  space,	  
there	   could	   be	  multiple	   quality	   space	   axes	  within	   a	   single	   quality	   space	   axis	   so	  we	   could	  
zoom	   into	  and	  zoom	  out	  of	   the	  structure	  of	   their	   functional	   roles.	  Before	  working	  out	   the	  
details	   of	   such	   a	   quality	   space	   I	   need	   to	   examine	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   intuitions	   of	  
distinctness	  and	  the	  vagueness	  constraint,	  which	  I	  do	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
	  
5.3 The	  intuition	  of	  distinctness	  and	  the	  vagueness	  constraint	  
According	   to	   the	  account	  of	   the	  phenomenal	   concept	   (at	   least	  Papineau’s	  account,	  
which	   claims	   that	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   vague	   because	   they	   have	   no	   a	   priori	  
connections	   with	   material	   properties),	   the	   quality	   space	   model	   is	   incompatible	   with	   the	  
phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  because	  some	  versions	  of	  the	  quality	  space	  model,	  e.g.	  Clark	  
(Clark	   2000),	   presuppose	   that	   there	   could	   be	   a	   direct	   mapping	   between	   phenomenal	  
properties	  and	  material	  properties	  and	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  semantics	  of	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  can	  be	  bypassed	  in	  that	  way.	  But	  can	  we	  make	  a	  use	  of	  a	  model	  that	  is	  
only	   technically	   inspired	   by	   quality	   space/the	   quality	   space	   model	   but	   which	   differs	  
significantly	   inasmuch	   as	   it	   tries	   to	   map	   different	   psychological	   concepts,	   that	   is,	   the	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concepts	  of	  consciousness	  that	  are	  based	  on	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal/functional	  roles	  
and	  itself	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  own	  quality	  spaces?	  Can	  we	  use	  such	  a	  model	  in	  
explaining	  away	  the	  so-­‐called	  “intuition	  of	  distinctness”?	  Perhaps	  we	  can.	  	  
Even	   if	  Chalmers,	  Levine	  and	  Jackson	  were	  right	  about	  the	  universal	  applicability	  of	  
the	  a	  priori	  entailment	  thesis	  to	  reductive	  explanations	  of	  natural	  kinds,	  it	  wouldn’t	  have	  any	  
bearing	  on	  psychophysical	   identity	   because	   it	   relies	   on	   a	   completely	   different	   explanatory	  
model.	   Namely,	   we	   do	   not	   explain	   the	   a	   posteriori	   necessary	   status	   of	   psychophysical	  
identity	  by	  an	  appeal	  to	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles,	  as	  we	  do	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds,	  we	  
do	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  roles	  of	  proper	  identities	  in	  intelligible	  explanations.	  Since	  phenomenal	  
concepts	  use	  direct	  modes	  of	  presentation	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  have	  a	  priori	  connections	  
with	  material	  properties,	  they	  are	  ultimately	  vague	  in	  their	  nature.	  This,	  however,	  requires	  
them	  to	  have	  an	  account	  which	  explains	  why	  one	  would	  assume,	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  that	  they	  
are	  supposed	  to	  use	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  roles	  as	  modes	  of	  presentation	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
fully	   explanatory.	   This	   in	   my	   understanding	   is	   the	   “intuition	   of	   distinctness”.	   Perhaps	   we	  
could	  explain	  this	  intuition	  away	  by	  studying	  the	  psychological	  concepts	  used	  in	  this	  area	  and	  
their	   links	   to	   other	   concepts	   of	   consciousness	   that	   are	   also	   based	   on	   some	   kind	   of	  
description	   of	   causal	   or	   functional	   roles.	   Perhaps	   by	   studying	   specifically	   psychological	  
concepts	   instead	   of	   the	   standardly	   used	   natural	   kind	   concepts	   we	   could	   come	   closer	   to	  
completely	  removing	  the	  sense	  of	  puzzlement	  associated	  with	  psychophysical	  identity	  based	  
on	  proper	  phenomenal	   concepts.	   For	   such	  a	   task	   I	  propose	   to	  use	  a	  variant	  of	   the	  quality	  
space	  model	  that	  would	  not	  map	  phenomenal	  properties	  directly	  onto	  material	  properties,	  
but	  instead	  analyze	  different	  psychological	  concepts	  within	  a	  quality	  space.	  The	  structure	  of	  
the	  resemblance	  and	  the	  difference	  in	  each	  of	  these	  domains	  should	  paint	  a	  clearer	  picture	  
of	  why	  phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  also	  expected	  to	  refer	  only	  by	  using	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  
roles	   as	  modes	   of	   presentation.	   In	   this	  way	   the	   intuition	   of	   distinctness	   can	   be	   explained	  
away.	  	  
The	   intuition	  of	  distinctness	   is	   a	   complex	  notion.	   It	   can	  be	   formulated	  as	  a	   specific	  
issue	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  general	  claim	  of	  dualistic	  intuitions.	  We	  could	  say	  that	  it	  is	  an	  intuition	  
according	  to	  which	  all	  intelligible	  explanations	  must	  rely	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  necessity	  stemming	  
from	   a	   priori	   derivation	   from	   some	   more	   basic	   level	   such	   as	   microphysics.	   In	   my	  
understanding,	   it	   is	   the	   intuition	   according	   to	   which	   reductive	   explanations	   or	   identities	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must	  be	  based	  on	  modes	  of	  presentation	  that	  involve	  descriptions	  of	  causal	  roles	  in	  order	  to	  
be	  fully	  explanatory.	  As	  we	  remember	  from	  the	  last	  section	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  Levine,	  
Chalmers	  and	  Jackson	  maintain	  that	  psychophysical	   identity	  must	  be	  based	  on	  such	  modes	  
of	  presentation	  because,	   in	   their	  opinion,	  necessary	   statements	   require	  a	  priori	  derivation	  
from	   (complete)	  microphysical	   descriptions	  or	   a	  priori	   analysis	  of	  meaning.	  As	   it	   has	  been	  
shown	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   no	   such	  analysis	   is	   required	   for	   the	   cases	   that	   involve	   the	  
identities	  of	  natural	  kinds	  so	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  that	  it	  should	  be	  required	  for	  psychophysical	  
identity.	  Furthermore,	  a	  requirement	  for	  such	  analyses	  does	  not	  stem	  from	  the	  explanatory	  
gap	   account	   or	   from	   anti-­‐physicalist	   arguments	   alone,	   it	   is	   rather	   stipulated	   as	   a	   tacit	  
assumption	   in	   those	  arguments	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  
intuition.	  	  
As	   it	   was	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   third	   chapter,	   the	   explanation	   of	   the	   intuition	   of	  
distinctness	  may	   take	  different	   forms	   that	   are	  not	  mutually	   exclusive.	   Papineau	   (Papineau	  
2002)	  offers	  an	  explanation	  of	  this	  intuition	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  conceptual	  fallacy	  and	  calls	  it	  the	  
“antipathetic	  fallacy”,	  that	  is	  a	  fallacy	  of	  failing	  to	  recognize	  that	  it	  is	  coherent	  to	  think	  that	  a	  
concept	   can	   have	   two	   different	   modes	   of	   presentation.	   Papineau’s	   main	   motivation	   for	  
favouring	  conceptual	  dualism	  over	  property	  dualism,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  causal	  
argument	   (Papineau	   2002).	   I	   concur,	   that	   is	   a	   very	   persuasive	   reason,	   but	   perhaps	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  reinforce	  it	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  concepts	  in	  other	  areas	  relevant	  for	  the	  study	  
of	   consciousness.	   In	   that	   way	  we	   get	   an	   independent	   argument	   for	   favouring	   conceptual	  
dualism	  over	  other	  alternatives.	  	  	  
Furthermore,	   I	  also	  believe	  that	  we	  need	  something	   like	  a	  quality	  space	  model	  that	  
would	  at	  least	  rule	  out	  qualia	  inversion	  cases.	  Phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  incapable	  of	  doing	  
that	  simply	  because	  of	   their	  vague	  nature,	   i.e.	  because	  they	  don’t	   refer	  via	  descriptions	  of	  
the	  causal	  roles.	  If	  one	  were	  to	  consider	  a	  scheme	  of	  causal	  roles,	  one	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  
find	   phenomenal	   concepts	   in	   there.	  Of	   course,	  we	   can	   stipulate	   their	   correlation	   but	   that	  
would	  not	  prevent	  undetectable	  qualia	  inversion	  cases.	  	  
As	  we	   shall	   see	   in	   a	  moment,	   the	   key	   problem	   that	   the	   standard	   Clark’s	  model	   of	  
quality	   space	   fails	   to	   address	   is	   how	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   psychophysical	   identity	   can	   be	   a	  
posteriori	   necessary.	   He	   seems	   to	   be	   merely	   presupposing	   that	   physicalism	   is	   true	   and	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basically	   develops	   a	   model	   of	   psychological	   concepts.	   He	   distinguishes	   between	   sensory	  
properties	  and	  qualitative	  properties	  but	  also	  maintains	  that	  these	  should	  not	  be	  connected	  
with	   particular	   conceptual	   content.	   This	   distinction	   places	   his	   whole	   approach	   within	   the	  
domain	   of	   psychological	   concepts	   because	   on	   this	   view	   direct	   mapping	   between	   sensory	  
properties	  and	  qualitative	  properties	   is	   supposed	   to	  bypass	   the	   issues	  of	   causality	  but	   still	  
act	  as	  a	  scheme	  of	  the	  functional	  roles.	  	  
The	  quality	   space	  model	   is	  meant	   to	   address	   the	   issues	   surrounding	   sensed	   colour	  
location	   as	   well	   as	   the	   problem	   of	   metamers,	   objects	   with	   different	   wavelengths	   of	  
reflectance	  that	  we	  perceive	  as	  the	  same	  colour.	  Obviously,	  defining	  colours	  solely	  in	  terms	  
of	   wavelengths	   does	   not	   cut	   the	   mustard	   here	   because,	   as	   we	   will	   ascertain	   when	  
considering	  Rosenthal’s	  account	  of	  quality	  space,	  such	  a	  model	  would	  be	  single	  dimensional	  
and	  would	  not	  allow	  for	  properly	  distinguishing	  properties	  on	  the	  axis.	  	  
Aside	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  direct	  empirical	  study	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	  due	  to	  
their	  peculiar	  vague	  nature,	  the	  quality	  space	  model	  can	  provide	  valuable	  information	  about	  
which	  theory	  of	  consciousness	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  true.	  
Before	  trying	  to	  answer	  these	  questions	  let	  me	  first	  examine	  what	  I	  consider	  to	  be	  a	  
generic	  model	  of	  quality	  space.	  	  
	  
5.4 Clark’s	  model	  of	  quality	  space	  
The	  best	  illustration	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  quality	  space	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  quality	  space	  
model	   for	   colour	   vision	   proposed	   by	   Austen	   Clark	   (Clark	   2000).	   Roughly	   put,	   the	   quality	  
space	   model	   uses	   the	   geometrical	   ordering	   of	   sensory	   properties	   to	   explain	   how	  
phenomenal	  properties	  and	  qualitative	  properties	  match	  and	  how	  we	  come	  to	  the	  structure	  
of	   their	   ordering.	   For	   example,	   according	   to	   Clark	   (Clark	   2000)	   the	   quality	   space	   model	  
answers	   the	   spectrum	   inversion	   arguments	   by	   making	   any	   such	   inversion	   detectable.	  
Although	  Clark’s	  quality	  space	  model	  is	  envisaged	  with,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  wrong	  aim,	  that	  is,	  to	  
directly	  map	  phenomenal	  properties	  onto	  qualitative	  properties	  thus	  bypassing	  the	  issues	  of	  
the	   phenomenal	   concepts’	   semantics,	   it	   might	   serve	   as	   an	   independent	   account	   of	   the	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intuition	  of	  distinctness	  involved	  within	  psychophysical	  identity.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  although	  
quality	   space	   has	   been	  mainly	   developed	   for	   the	   study	   of	   colour	   vision	   and	   emotion,	   we	  
could	  also	  apply	   it	   to	  pain	  by	  modifying	  Aydede	  and	  Price’s	  experiential-­‐phenomenological	  
approach	  (Aydede	  and	  Price	  2006).	  To	  make	  this	  idea	  clearer,	  I	  need	  to	  lay	  out	  the	  original	  
quality	  space	  model	  in	  some	  detail.	  	  
The	  quality	  space	  model	  “Clark”	  style	  tries	  to	  avoid	  issues	  of	  conceptual	  semantics	  by	  
directly	   mapping	   the	   phenomenal	   properties	   to	   neurobiological	   properties	   in	   the	   quality	  
space.	  On	  this	  view	  then,	  we	  don’t	  even	  need	  to	  know	  what	  the	  phenomenal	  properties	  are,	  
for,	   however	  we	  define	   them	  beforehand,	   it	  would	   not	  matter	   because	   they	   are	   identical	  
with	   the	   physical	   or	   neurobiological	   properties	   ontologically.	   We	   only	   need	   to	   find	   their	  
place	  in	  the	  quality	  space	  and	  this	  is	  how	  we	  explain	  their	  a	  posteriori	  necessity.	  	  
Clark	   suggests	   that	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   could	   be	   mapped	   within	   the	  
quality	  space	  constituted	  by	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  geometrical	  space	  that	  consists	  of	  arrays	  
of	  hue,	  saturation	  and	  brightness.	  It	  is	  very	  important	  how	  we	  interpret	  the	  qualities	  in	  the	  
space.	   The	  model	   hinges	   strongly	   on	   the	   distinction	   between	   phenomenal	   properties	   and	  
qualitative	   properties.	   Following	   Sellars	   (Sellars	   1963)	   and	   terminologically	   more	   relevant	  
Strawson	   (Strawson	   1989),	   Clark	   (Clark	   2000)	   distinguishes	   these	   two	   notions	   in	   the	  
following	   way:	   phenomenal	   properties	   characterize	   how	   things	   that	   are	   objects	   of	  
experience	  appear,	  whereas	  qualitative	  properties	  are	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  internal	  states	  in	  
virtue	  of	  which	  objects	  of	  experience	  appear	  as	   they	  do.	  Furthermore,	   internal	   states	   that	  
qualitative	   properties	   are	   properties	   of,	   as	   it	   were,	   determine	   phenomenal	   properties	  
because	  things	  appear	  to	  us	  in	  a	  way	  they	  do	  in	  virtue	  of	  these	  internal	  states.	  	  
Quality	   space	   should	   not	   be	   understood	   as	   being	   constituted	   by	   the	   stimuli,	   but	  
rather	   by	   the	   qualities	   stimuli	   present.	   In	   a	   word,	   same	   stimulus	   may	   present	   different	  
qualities,	  or	  disparate	  stimuli	  might	  present	   the	  same	  quality	   in	  quality	   space.	  That	   is	  why	  
the	   quality	   space	   cannot	   consist	   of	   stimuli.	   The	  main	   point	   is	   that	   the	   differences	   among	  
qualities	  cannot	  be	  cashed	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  differences	  in	  stimuli.	  It	  is	  rather	  the	  case	  that	  we	  
look	  for	  differences	  within	  the	  quality	  space	  and	  their	  ordering	  along	  the	  geometrical	  axes	  
that	  constitute	  quality	  space.	  Clark	  suggests	  that	  the	  way	   in	  which	  qualities	  are	  ordered	   in	  
the	   geometrical	   space	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   features	   of	   appearance	   that	   generate	   the	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structure	   of	   ordering.	   These	   are	  matching,	   discriminability	   and	   relative	   similarity.	   On	   this	  
account	  it	  would	  be	  expected	  that	  qualities	  that	  are	  more	  similar	  to	  one	  another,	  fall	  closer	  
in	   the	  quality	   space.	  Discriminations	  among	   stimuli	  help	   to	  order	   the	  qualities	   that	   stimuli	  
present.	  	  
I	   am	   confident	   that	   the	   quality	   space	   model	   can	   be	   constructed	   for	   any	   kind	   of	  
experience	  including	  pain.	  	  
For	   example,	   a	   multi-­‐dimensional	   quality	   space	   of	   pain	   might	   include	   several	  
geometrical	  axes	  of	  perceived	  phenomenal	  qualities,	  the	  McGill	  pain	  questionnaire	  (Melzack	  
and	  Torgerson	  1971),	  sensory	  axis,	  behavioural	  axis	  and	  cognitive	  axis.	  Furthermore,	  each	  of	  
these	  axes	  can	  be	  described	  by	   its	  own	  quality	  space	  model,	   for	  example,	   the	  sensory	  axis	  
might	  have	  several	  axes:	  spatial,	  that	  maps	  the	  body	  location,	  temporal	  that	  marks	  timing	  of	  
pain,	  which	   in	   turn	  can	  be	  explained	  by	   the	   type	  of	  nerve	   fibres	  and	  myelinization.	   In	   this	  
way	   we	   get	   an	   outline	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   experience	   which	   in	   effect	   is	   fortified	   by	   the	  
perceptual/phenomenal	  concept	  semantics	  and	  which	  can	  help	   to	  understand:	  on	   the	  one	  
hand,	  how	  the	  intuition	  of	  distinctness	  stems	  from	  the	  structure	  of	  experience	  and	  why	  its	  
grip	  is	  so	  strong;	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  what	  makes	  it	  intelligible	  that,	  metaphysically,	  there	  
is	  only	  one	  property	  under	  two	  different	  modes	  of	  presentation.	  
To	   fully	   appreciate	   the	   idea	   of	   quality	   space	   let’s	   consider	   another	   account	   of	   the	  
quality	  space	  model	  (Rosenthal	  2010).	  	  
	  
5.5 Rosenthal’s	  account	  of	  the	  quality	  space	  model	  
Rosenthal	   makes	   a	   very	   interesting	   point	   (Rosenthal	   2010)	   about	   the	   intuitions	  
underlying	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   and	   the	   conceivability	   arguments.	   He	   argues	   that	   these	  
problems	   rely	   on	   a	   very	   impoverished	   conception	  of	   consciousness,	  which	   only	   takes	   into	  
account	   consciously	   aware	   access	   to	  mental	   qualities	   but	   says	   nothing	   about	   qualities	   of	  
which	  we	  are	  not	  consciously	  aware	  but	  which	  affect	  our	  mental	  processing	  nevertheless.	  He	  
finds	   a	   support	   for	   these	   claims	   in	   cases	   such	   as	   blindsight	   and	  masked	   priming,	   both	   of	  
which	   are	   based	   on	   cases	   in	   which	   people	   find	   themselves	   unable	   to	   report	   perceiving	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anything	  but	  still	   react	  or	  behave	   in	  a	  way	  as	   if	   they	  actually	  perceived	  something44.	   If	  we	  
based	  our	  conception	  of	  what	  is	  conceivable	  solely	  on	  how	  things	  appear	  in	  experience,	  we	  
are	  at	  risk	  of	  conflating	  what	  merely	  appears	  conceivable	  with	  what	  is	  actually	  conceivable.	  
This	   further	  means	   that	   conceivability	   of	   qualia	   inversion	   cases	   rests	   on	   an	   impoverished	  
conception	   of	   conceivability	   that	   only	   operates	   with	   the	   consciousness	   based	   notion	   of	  
conceivability.	  	  
Rosenthal	   argues	   that	   we	   have	   access	   to	   mental	   qualities	   not	   only	   through	  
consciousness,	   but	   also	   through	   their	   role	   in	   perception.	   According	   to	   this	   distinction	   he	  
classifies	   theories	   of	   mental	   qualities	   into	   two	   groups:	   the	   consciousness	   based	   and	   the	  
perceptual	   role	  based.	  The	  consciousness	  based	   theories	  claim	   that	   the	  only	  way	  we	  have	  
access	  to	  mental	  qualities	  is	  through	  consciousness,	  whereas	  perceptual	  role	  theories	  claim	  
that	   mental	   qualities	   are	   the	   properties	   in	   virtue	   of	   which	   we	   make	   perceptual	  
discriminations.	  Perceiving	  then	  warrants	  that	  the	  inversion	  cases	  of	  mental	  qualities	  cannot	  
occur	   undetected	   and	   it	   does	   so	   because	   the	   structure	   and	   ordering	   of	   mental	   qualities	  
matches	  the	  structure	  and	  ordering	  of	  perceptible	  properties,	  not	  the	  individual	  properties	  
on	   either	   side.	   Provided	   that	   perceiving	   can	   also	   occur	   at	   the	   unconscious	   level	   it	   also	  
warrants	   that	   this	   detection	   is	   made	   from	   the	   third	   person	   perspective,	   or	   at	   least	  
independently	   from	   the	   first	   person	   perspective.	   This	   is	   a	   tremendous	   advantage	   of	   the	  
quality	   space	  model	   because,	   as	  we	   recall,	   the	   qualia	   inversion	   cases	  were	   thought	   to	   be	  
possible	  only	  because	  we	  had	  no	  other	  access	   than	  conscious	  access,	   i.e.	  only	  access	   from	  
the	  first	  person	  perspective.	  Empirical	  evidence	  that	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  discriminating	  
mental	   qualities	   can	   occur	   without	   conscious	   awareness	   include	   cases	   of	   blindsight	   and	  
experiments	   with	   masked	   priming,	   in	   masked	   priming	   subjects	   cannot	   report	   seeing	  
anything,	  but	  nonetheless	  the	  stimulus	  affects	  their	  mental	  processing.	  (Rosenthal	  2010,	  p.	  
7),	  in	  the	  case	  of	  blindsight,	  something	  very	  similar	  happens.	  Due	  to	  some	  injury	  or	  damage	  
in	  the	  V1	  primary	  visual	  cortex,	  people	  report	  not	  being	  able	  to	  perceive	  any	  visual	  stimuli,	  
but	  are	  nonetheless	  able	  to	  react	  to	  presented	  objects	  or	  to	  navigate	  through	  the	  room	  as	  if	  
they	   were	   seeing	   them.	   On	   this	   understanding,	   an	   access	   to	   mental	   qualities	   can	   be	  
completely	   independent	   from	   consciousness	   and	   in	   fact	   can	   occur	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  
                                                
44	  I	  will	  explain	  these	  in	  a	  short	  while	  below.	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conscious	   awareness	   of	   those	   qualities	   altogether.	   This	   feature	   of	   the	   perceptual	   role	  
approach	  to	  mental	  qualities	  has	  essential	  links	  to	  perception-­‐not	  just	  to	  consciousness.	  	  
On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  consciousness	  based	  approach	   is	   the	   familiar	  approach,	  we	  
are	   able	   to	   discriminate	   among	   stimuli	   only	   by	  way	   of	   their	   appearance	   through	   the	   first	  
person	  perspective.	  The	  perceptual	  role	  approach	  instead	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  ordering	  of	  
the	   mental	   qualities	   in	   virtue	   of	   which	   we	   are	   able	   to	   discriminate	   among	   perceptible	  
properties,	   according	   to	   their	   relative	   similarity.	   Rosenthal	   maintains	   that	   the	   perceptual	  
role	  approach	   is	   superior	   to	   the	  consciousness-­‐based	  approach	  because	   it	   can	  account	   for	  
the	  qualities	  usually	  not	  consciously	  accessible	  but	  still	  affecting	  our	  mental	  processing	  and	  it	  
also	  prevents	  undetectable	  qualia	  inversion	  cases.	  	  
In	   my	   opinion,	   Rosenthal’s	   approach	   seems	   to	   fall	   into	   a	   general	   category	   of	  
psychological	   concepts,	   because	   it	   only	   deals	   with	   descriptions	   of	   functional	   roles.	   I	   also	  
agree	   with	   Rosenthal	   about	   the	   claim	   that	   intuitions	   that	   are	   used	   as	   data	   in	   thought	  
experiments	   and	   conceivability	   arguments	   encapsulate	   theories	   as	   opposed	   to	   providing	  
independent	   support	   for	   them.	   Furthermore,	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   does	   not	   only	   concern	  
intuitions	  but,	  more	  importantly,	  how	  the	  concepts	  in	  this	  area	  work.	  Although	  in	  my	  opinion	  
intuitions	  play	  an	  important	  role	  as	  tacit	  assumptions	  in	  these	  arguments,	  the	  primary	  target	  
should	  be	  explaining	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  and	  thus	  solving	  the	  explanatory	  gap.	  The	  epistemic	  
gap,	  that	  I	  have	  discussed	  in	  much	  greater	  detail	  earlier,	  concerns	  the	  conceptual	  semantics	  
employed	  when	  we	   think	  about	  mental	  qualities,	  or	   in	   terminology	  accepted	   in	   this	  work:	  
phenomenal	   properties,	   from	   the	   first	   person	   perspective	   and	   from	   the	   third	   person	  
perspective.	  The	  explanatory	  gap	  arises	  when	  we	  cannot	  explain	  the	  epistemic	  gap.	  The	  real	  
challenge	  then	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  physicalism	  could	  be	  true	  given	  the	  epistemic	  gap,	  i.e.	  how	  
conceptual	  dualism	  could	  be	  true.	  Although	   I	  agree	  that	   the	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  
would	   probably	   fall	   within	   the	   consciousness-­‐based	   approach,	   I	   think	   that	   Rosenthal’s	  
general	  approach	  deals	  only	  with	  the	  psychological	  concepts,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  appropriately	  
address	   the	   explanatory	   gap	  problem.	  As	  we	   remember,	   phenomenal	   concepts	   have	  no	   a	  
priori	  connections	  with	  material	  properties,	  and	  thus	  are	  vague	  in	  their	  very	  nature.	  If	  we	  try	  
to	   use	   a	   framework	   according	   to	   which	   mental	   qualities	   and	   perceptible	   properties	   are	  
ordered	  according	   to	   their	   relative	  similarities	  and	  differences	   in	   the	  quality	  space,	  we	  are	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basically	   dealing	   with	   descriptions	   of	   functional	   roles,	   this	   immediately	   places	   the	   whole	  
approach	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  psychological	  concepts.	  	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   I	   also	   agree	   with	   Rosenthal	   that	   we	   need	   a	   theory	   that	   will	  
account	   for	   both	   conscious	   and	   unconscious	   perception.	   However,	   given	   that	   this	   whole	  
approach	   is	   only	   about	   the	   psychological	   concepts	   I	   will	   not	   go	   into	   details	   of	   the	   other	  
arguments	  in	  Rosenthal’s	  paper,	  because	  it	  would	  lead	  us	  astray	  from	  the	  discussion	  I	  want	  
to	  pursue	  here.	   I	  would	  instead	  like	  to	  focus	  on	  his	  account	  of	  the	  quality	  space	  that	  I	  find	  
really	   invaluable	   for	  my	   own	   arguments.	   He	  makes	   two	   really	   important	   distinctions.	   The	  
first	  one	  concerns	  the	  general	  nature	  of	  the	  quality	  space	  model.	  He	  puts	  it	  like	  this:	  
“…Nor	  must	   the	  quality	   spaces	   for	  mental	  qualities	   reflect	  properties	  of	   the	  neural	  
processes	  that	  subserve,	  or	  may	  even	  be	  identical	  with,	  those	  mental	  qualities.	  The	  relevant	  
quality	   spaces	   reflect	   only	   the	   similarities	   and	   differences	   among	   mental	   qualities	  
determined	   by	   a	   creature's	   ability	   to	   discriminate	   among	   various	   perceptible	  
properties”(Rosenthal	  2010	  p	  11).	  	  
In	  this	  way	  he	  assures	  that	  the	  quality	  space	  model	  is	  not	  about	  the	  direct	  mapping	  of	  
individual	   phenomenal	   properties	   onto	   individual	   physical	   properties45,	   but	   rather	   an	  
independent	  method	  for	  their	  detection.	  As	  I	  said,	  this	  approach	  would	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  
of	   psychological	   concepts,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   we	   talk	   about	   conscious	   or	   unconscious	  
perception46.	  It	  tries	  to	  avoid	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  phenomenal	  concepts,	  which	  I	  think	  is	  a	  
good	  strategy	  given	  their	  vague	  nature	  and	  the	  implausibility	  of	  direct	  mapping,	  and	  instead	  
focuses	  on	  an	   independent	  account	  of	   the	  description	  of	   the	   functional	   roles	  phenomenal	  
and	  physical	  properties	  play	  in	  a	  quality	  space,	  which	  in	  my	  opinion	  is	  the	  right	  way	  to	  deal	  
with	   psychological	   concepts.	   And	   this	   is	   of	   invaluable	   importance	   for	   my	   own	   general	  
approach.	  	  
His	   other	   point	   concerns	   the	   intuitions	   underlying	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   and	   the	  
conceivability	  arguments.	  I	  could	  not	  put	  it	  better	  than	  Rosenthal	  himself:	  	  
                                                
45	  Which	  as	  I	  argued	  cannot	  be	  done	  due	  to	  the	  vague	  nature	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  
46	  Because	  it	  only	  deals	  with	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  functional	  roles	  in	  either	  way.	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“Perhaps	   the	  most	   significant	   contribution	   of	   experimental	   philosophy,	   then,	   is	   to	  
underscore	  the	  likelihood	  that	  various	  intuitions	  are	  not	  theory	  neutral,	  but	  products	  of	  such	  
theoretical	  commitments.	   If	   intuitions	  aren't	  widely	  shared	  by	  the	  folk	  and	  fit	  conveniently	  
with	  theories	  espoused	  by	  those	  who	   invoke	  the	   intuitions,	   it's	  natural	   to	  ask	  whether	  the	  
intuitions	   encapsulate	   those	   theories,	   rather	   than	   providing	   independent	   support”	  
(Rosenthal	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  	  
This	  passage	  brilliantly	  encapsulates	  the	  whole	   idea	  of	  my	  project.	  Although	   I	  don’t	  
start	   with	   some	  method	   or	   already	   available	   research	   from	   experimental	   philosophy	   that	  
would	   undermine	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   intuitions,	   I	   instead	   start	   by	   analyzing	   the	   anti-­‐
physicalist	  arguments	  and	  showing	  that	   there	   is	  nothing	   in	   the	  arguments	  themselves	  that	  
prevents	  us	  from	  drawing	  conclusions	  that	  contradict	  each	  other47.	  We	  can	  leave	  it	  for	  some	  
other	  occasion	  to	  discuss	  his	  other	  claims	  in	  the	  paper	  and	  focus	  now	  on	  his	  account	  of	  the	  
quality	  space	  model.	  	  
Rosenthal’s	  basic	  idea	  of	  the	  quality	  space	  model	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  
it	   is	   a	   function	  of	   discrimination	  between	   two	  perceptible	   properties.	   To	   discern	   between	  
perceptible	   properties	   a	   creature	   must	   be	   in	   some	   states	   whose	   differences	   in	   virtue	   of	  
which	  a	  creature	  discerns	  perceptible	  properties	  reflect	  the	  differences	  between	  perceptible	  
properties.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  for	  Rosenthal	  (Rosenthal	  2010)	  these	  states	  need	  not	  
be	  conscious,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  about	  cases	  in	  which	  
people	  are	  able	  to	  make	  discriminations	  of	  which	  they	  are	  not	  consciously	  aware.	  The	  quality	  
space	  model	   captures	   the	   differences	   and	   similarities	   between	  perceptible	   properties	   and	  
discriminatory	  states	  and	  gives	  us	  a	  structure	  of	  relations	  within	  these	  two	  domains	  that	  can	  
be	  mapped	  onto	  one	  another.	  	  	  
The	  point	  at	  which	  Rosenthal	  departs	  from	  Clark’s	  standard	  model	  is	  that	  he	  includes	  
spatial	   properties	   such	   as	   size,	   shape,	   and	   distance	   as	   well.	   Now,	   the	   spatial	   properties	  
perceived	  by	  different	  sensory	  modalities,	  such	  as	  shape,	  colour,	  distance	  and	  location,	  are	  
the	  discriminations	  of	  the	  same	  perceptible	  property,	  however,	  the	  states	  we	  go	  into	  when	  
discerning	  them	  are	  different.	  	  
                                                
47	  See	  the	  chapter	  four.	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The	   quality	   space	   model	   according	   to	   Rosenthal’s	   interpretation	   is	   not	   meant	   to	  
show	   how	   mental	   qualities	   or	   the	   phenomenal	   character/properties	   map	   onto	   the	  
perceptible	   properties,	   but	   rather	   how	   the	   model	   reflects	   a	   creature’s	   abilities	   to	   make	  
qualitative	   discriminations,	   consciously	   aware	   or	   not.	   On	   this	   interpretation,	   the	   quality	  
space	  model	   is	   supposed	   to	  accommodate	   the	   resemblance	  between	  mental	  qualities	  and	  
perceptible	   properties	   that	   is	   based	   on	   a	   creature’s	   ability	   to	   discriminate	   qualities	   in	   the	  
first	  place.	  Furthermore,	  the	  model	  then	  is	  not	  committed	  to	  denying	  the	  existence	  of	  two	  
types	  of	  properties	  but	  rather	  to	  accommodating	  the	  structure	  of	  resemblance	  between	  the	  
two	   domains.	   The	   main	   point	   of	   this	   interpretation	   of	   the	   model	   is	   that	   there	   is	   no	  
resemblance	  between	  individual	  properties	  but	  rather	  a	  resemblance	  at	  the	  level	  of	  families	  
of	  properties	   (Rosenthal	  2010,	  p	  12).	  The	  central	  point	   in	  the	  Rosenthal’s	   interpretation	  of	  
the	   quality	   space	  model	   is	   the	   distinction	   between	   a	   consciousness	   role	   and	   a	   perceptual	  
role	   of	   qualitative	   discriminations.	   Rosenthal	   rightly	   argues	   that	   the	   quality	   space	   model	  
renders	   qualia	   inversion	   cases	   nonsensical	   because,	   given	   the	   asymmetrical	   topology	   of	  
quality	  space,	  undetectable	  inversions	  are	  impossible.	  
As	  we	   remember,	   qualitative	   discriminations	   occur	   on	   both	   consciously	   aware	   and	  
consciously	   unaware	   levels.	   The	   model	   maps	   the	   structure	   of	   resemblance	   between	  
properties	  on	  either	  side,	  but	  not	  individual	  properties	  onto	  each	  other.	  This	  feature	  of	  the	  
model	   precludes	   undetectable	   qualia	   inversion	   cases.	   The	   key	   point	   here	   is	   that	   all	  
discrimination	   according	   to	   Rosenthal	   can	   occur	   both	   at	   the	   unconscious	   level	   and	   at	   the	  
conscious	   level.	   However,	   the	   intuitions	   about	   conceivability	   of	   zombies	   and	   about	   the	  
explanatory	  gap	  pertain	  only	  to	  the	  conscious	  level,	  so	  the	  quality	  space	  model	  must	  account	  
for	  the	  discriminations	  occurring	  at	  the	  conscious	  level.	  	  
On	   Rosenthal’s	   view	   (Rosenthal	   2010)	   the	   quality	   space	   does	   not	   rely	   on	   the	  
discrimination	  of	  the	  physical	  properties	  of	  the	  stimuli,	  e.g.	  wavelengths	  of	  light	  or	  frequency	  
of	   sound,	   etc,	   for	   such	   a	   quality	   space	  would	   be	   single-­‐dimensional	   and	   the	   properties	   of	  
either	  side	  of	  the	  axis	  would	  seems	  indistinguishable,	  but	  rather	  reflects	  relative	  similarities	  
and	   differences	   among	   mental	   qualities	   that	   the	   creature	   is	   able	   to	   discriminate	   among	  
perceptible	  properties	  (Rosenthal	  2010,	  p.	  11).	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If	   there	   were	   nothing	   about	   the	   mental	   qualities	   but	   their	   location	   in	   the	   quality	  
space,	   then	   visual	   and	   auditory	   space	   would	   seem	   identical/indistinguishable	   (Rosenthal	  
2010,	  p.	  13).	  	  	  
In	  the	  final	  section	  of	  his	  paper	  Rosenthal	  considers	  higher	  order	  awareness	  (HOA)	  to	  
argue	  that	   the	  perceptual	   role	   theory	   in	  combination	  with	   the	  HOA	   is	  more	  plausible	   than	  
the	   consciousness	   based	   one,	   because	   it	   accounts	   for	   the	   perceived	   but	   consciously	   not	  
registered	  stimuli.	  But	  as	  I	  said	  I	  will	  not	  be	  disusing	  that	  part	  of	  his	  paper	  because	  it	  is	  out	  of	  
scope	  of	  my	  argument.	  	  
Having	  presented	  a	  general	  framework	  in	  which	  the	  empirical	  study	  of	  phenomenal	  
coconsciousness	  can	  proceed	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  briefly	  examining	  some	  details	  of	  how	  the	  quality	  
space	   might	   look	   for	   pain.	   I	   believe	   that	   a	   similar	   approach	   can	   be	   used	   for	   other	  
touchstones	  of	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
5.6 The	  quality	  space	  for	  pain	  
The	  quality	  space	  model	  encounters	  problems	  straight	  off	  when	  one	  tries	  to	  apply	   it	  to	  
other	   touchstones	   of	   phenomena	   consciousness.	   To	   begin	   with,	   the	   model	   should	   be	  
universally	   applicable	   to	   all	   experiences	   that	   involve	   something	   it	   is	   like	   to	   be	   in	   that	  
state/having	  that	  experience.	  Clearly,	  there	  is	  something	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  in	  pain	  or	  undergoing	  
certain	   emotion.	   Is	   this	  model	   universally	   applicable	   to	   these	   two	   kinds	   of	   states	   as	  well?	  
David	  Rosenthal	  points	  out48	  a	  quality	  space	  of	  emotion	  would	  need	  to	   involve	   intentional	  
content	  in	  addition	  to	  qualitative	  character,	  which	  would	  clearly	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  than	  
the	   standard	   cases	   of	   visual	   perception,	   but	   feasible	   nevertheless.	   What	   about	   pain?	  
Although	   there	   is	   something	   it	   is	   like	   to	   be	   in	   pain,	   there	   is	   some	  quality	   associated	  with	  
pain,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   at	   all	   whether	   pain	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   perception	   and	   whether	   mapping	   of	  
qualitative	  properties	  onto	  perceptible	  properties	  even	  makes	  sense	   in	   this	  case.	   It	   should	  
not	  be	  controversial	  that	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  construct	  a	  quality	  space	  model	  for	  pain,	  then	  
                                                
48	  He	  remarked	  this	  in	  a	  correspondence.	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it	  would	  be	  capable	  of	  accounting	  for	  pain	  dissociation	  syndromes	   like	  painfulness	  without	  
pain	   and	   pain	   without	   painfulness	   (Grahek	   2007),	   as	   it	   is	   capable	   of	   detecting	   spectrum	  
inversions	   in	   the	   classical	   Clark’s	  model	   (Clark	   2000)	   and	   in	   Rosenthal’s	  model	   (Rosenthal	  
2010).	   In	   this	   case	   the	   detection	   is	   only	   at	   the	   conscious	   level,	   but,	   as	   in	   the	   inverted	  
spectrum	   cases,	   it	   should	   involve	   an	   integration	   of	   the	   first	   person	   and	   the	   third	   person	  
approaches.	  There	  are	  several	  issues	  associated	  with	  constructing	  a	  quality	  space	  model	  for	  
pain.	  Here	  is	  the	  list	  of	  some	  the	  issues:	  
a)	  What	  are	   the	  properties	   in	   virtue	  of	  which	  we	  are	  able	   to	  make	  discriminations	  among	  
perceptible	  properties	  of	  pain?	  
b)	  What	  are	  the	  perceptible	  properties	  of	  pain?	  
c)	  How	  many	  axes	  the	  quality	  space	  of	  pain	  there	  should	  be	  and	  what	  they	  should	  consist	  of?	  
d)	  What	  are	  the	  modalities	  of	  pain?	  
e)	  Can	  we	  construct	  a	  quality	  space	  for	  all	  modalities	  of	  pain?	  
	  	   I	  won’t	  try	  giving	  a	  definitive	  and	  comprehensive	  answer	  to	  these	  questions	  because	  
that	   would	   require	   another	   whole	   book.	   I	   would	   rather	   like	   to	   point	   out	   some	   issues	  
associated	  with	  constructing	  a	  quality	  space	  for	  pain	  and	  only	  gesture	  towards	  what	  I	  believe	  
to	  be	  the	  right	  answer	  to	  them.	  	  
When	   it	   comes	   to	  qualitative	  properties	  of	  pain	   there	  are	   several	   issues	  associated	  
with	  it.	  To	  begin	  with,	  can	  we	  have	  unconscious	  pain-­‐the	  pain	  we	  are	  not	  consciously	  aware	  
of,	   like	   in	  the	  case	  of	  masked	  priming	  or	  the	  blindsight?	  In	  a	  word,	  can	  we	  make	  the	  same	  
distinction	   between	   consciousness	   based	   and	   perceptual	   role	   based	   theories	   of	   pain	   as	  
Rosenthal	  suggested	  for	  colour	  vision?	  Does	  this	  distinction	  break	  down	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pain	  
and	  would	  it	  matter	  if	  it	  does?	  Perhaps	  this	  distinction	  does	  not	  matter	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pain.	  
As	   it	   turns	   out,	   pain	   is	   an	   extremely	   complex	   phenomenon	   and	   studying	   it	   in	   terms	   of	  
psychological	   concepts	   can	   afford	   us	   some	   really	   valuable	   insights	   about	   the	   relation	  
between	   phenomenal	   concepts	   and	   psychological	   concepts	   of	   pain.	   After	   all,	   the	   quality	  
space	  is	  all	  about	  the	  psychological	  concepts	  so	  even	  though	  dissociations	  between	  sensory	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and	  affective	   components	  of	  pain	  happen	  only	  at	   the	   conscious	   level,	  we	  can	   still	   use	   the	  
quality	  space	  to	  describe	  the	  functional	  roles	  that	  properties	  play.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  several	  other	  aspects	  of	  pain	  that	  would	  require	  their	  
own	  quality	  spaces	  and	  then	  each	  of	  these	  quality	  spaces	  can	  enter	  the	  generic	  quality	  space	  
for	   pain	   as	   a	   single	   axis.	   For	   example,	   according	   to	  Melzack	   and	  Wall	   (Melzack	   and	  Wall	  
1996,	   p.	   137)	   there	   are	   three	   main	   psychological	   aspects	   of	   pain:	   sensory-­‐discriminative,	  
motivational-­‐affective,	  and	  cognitive-­‐evaluative.	  Essential	  element	  in	  all	  of	  these	  interactions	  
is	  descending	  inhibitory	  control	  mechanisms,	  because	  it	  influences	  the	  overall	  experience	  of	  
pain	  by	  modulating	  afferent	  impulses.	  Now,	  each	  one	  of	  these	  aspects	  could	  require	  its	  own	  
quality	  space	  and	  also	  be	  an	  axis	  in	  a	  more	  general	  quality	  space.	  	  
Speaking	  of	   the	  variations	  of	  pain	  perception,	   there	  have	  been	  several	   studies	   that	  
suggest	  that	  the	  pain	  perception	  depends	  on	  a	  cultural	  background	  (Bates	  1987),	  and	  even	  
on	  previous	  painful	  experiences	  (Melzack	  and	  Wall	  1996).	  
Another	   important	   issue	   stems	   from	   considerations	   concerning	   pain	   dissociation	  
syndromes.	   Grahek	   (Grahek	   2007)	   argues	   that	   pain	   without	   painfulness	   and	   painfulness	  
without	  pain	  are	  the	  only	  genuine	  pain	  dissociation	  syndromes.	  Given	  that	  perhaps	  there	  is	  
no	  unconscious	  pain,	  after	  all	  it	  is	  its	  biological	  and	  evolutionary	  role	  to	  alert	  us	  and	  keep	  us	  
from	  further	  harm,	  what	  could	  the	  axes	  of	  qualitative	  properties	  of	  pain	  consist	  of?	  Perhaps	  
we	  could	  combine	  two	  approaches,	  that	  are	  actually	  very	  similar,	  to	  determine	  that.	  On	  one	  
approach	  we	  determine	  the	  multiple	  clusters	  of	  qualities	  across	  different	  modalities	  of	  pain	  
by	   using	   the	  McGill	   pain	   questionnaire.	  On	   the	   other	  we	   use	   a	  method	   of	   horizontal	   and	  
vertical	  techniques	  of	  experimentally	  studying	  phenomenology	  to	  tease	  out	  a	  subjective	  feel	  
by	  using	  Aydede’s	  method49.	  We	  combine	   these	   two	  axes,	  which	  on	   the	  other	  hand	  could	  
consist	  of	   several	   other	   axes.	   The	  main	  difference	   to	   the	  quality	   space	   for	   colour	   vision	   is	  
that	   the	  quality	   space	   for	  pain	   takes	  as	  perceptible	  properties	  kinds	  of	   tissue	  and	  damage	  
instead	  of	  physical	  processes	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  inflicting	  the	  damage	  and	  are	  in	  effect	  
external	  to	  the	  body.	  The	  dependence	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  tissue	  and	  the	   location	  of	  damage	   in	  
the	  tissue	  are	  highly	  variable	  even	  if	  kinds	  of	  fibres	  innervating	  the	  tissue	  remain	  constant.	  
                                                
49	  I	  will	  come	  to	  this	  in	  a	  short	  while	  below.	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For	   example,	   deep	   tissue	   pains	   are	   perceived	   with	   inaccurate	   localization	   and	   superficial	  
pains	  are	  perceived	  more	  precisely	  (Melzack	  and	  Wall	  1996).	  To	  capture	  these	  sophisticated	  
difference	  we	  need	  to	  go	  into	  some	  details	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  studying	  pain	  empirically.	  	  
Consider	  for	  example	  the	  gate	  theory	  of	  pain.	  According	  to	  Mezack	  and	  Wall	  (Mezack	  
and	  Wall	  1965)	  a	  pain	  sensation	  is	  modulated	  in	  the	  spinal	  cord	  before	  it	  is	  processed	  in	  the	  
brain	  and	  before	  any	  motor	  response	  can	  take	  place.	  Specifically,	   they	  have	  proposed	  that	  
the	  stimulation	  from	  the	  skin	  evokes	  neural	  impulses	  that	  go	  into	  three	  physiologically	  very	  
different	  areas	  of	  the	  spinal	  cord.	  The	  impulses	  are	  sent	  to:	  cells	  of	  the	  substantia	  gelatinosa	  
in	   the	   dorsal	   horn,	   the	   dorsal	   –column	   fibers	   that	   project	   toward	   the	   brain	   and	   the	   first	  
central	  transmission	  cells	  (T)	  in	  the	  dorsal	  horn	  (Melzack	  and	  Wall	  1965,	  p.	  974).	  Melzack	  and	  
Wall	  propose	  that	  the	  substantia	  gelatinosa	  serves	  as	  a	  gate	  control	  system	  that	  modulates	  
ascending	  nerve	  impulses	  before	  they	  reach	  and	  affect	  the	  T	  cells.	  The	  ascending	  patterns	  in	  
the	   dorsal	   column	   control	   triggering	   and	   activation	   of	   the	   selective	   brain	   processes	   that	  
modulate	   or	   influence	   the	   gate	   control	   system.	   Finally	   T	   cells	   activate	   neural	  mechanisms	  
that	   are	   responsible	   for	   response	   and	   perception	   (Melzack	   and	   Wall	   1965,	   p.	   974).	   The	  
perception	  of	  pain	  evoked	  by	   skin	   stimulation,	   in	   their	   view,	   is	  determined	  by	   these	   three	  
systems.	   In	   this	  way	   the	   gate	   controls	   both	   the	   bandwidth	   of	   the	   gate	   and	   also	   impulses	  
coming	  from	  the	  brain	  as	  a	  response	  to	  noxious	  stimuli.	  This	  further	  means	  that	  there	  is	  an	  
inhibitory	   and	   excitatory	   system	   of	   pain	   in	   place	   that	   controls	   how	  we	   perceive	   the	   pain	  
stimuli.	  So	  what	  are	   the	  properties	   in	  virtue	  of	  which	  we	  are	  able	   to	  make	  discriminations	  
among	  perceptual	  properties	  of	  pain?	  It	  is	  a	  difficult	  issue,	  but	  perhaps	  we	  could	  get	  closer	  
to	   answering	   it	   by	   examining	   some	   proposals	   on	   how	   to	   use	   introspective	   reports	   about	  
quality	  of	  pain	  in	  clinical	  settings.	  	  
Consider	  for	  example	  the	  Aydede	  and	  Price	  method	  of	  experimental	  procedure	  that	  
scientists	   can	   use	   themselves	   when	   engaging	   into	   the	   introspective	   experiments	   (Aydede	  
and	   Price	   2006).	   Instead	   of	   experimental	   they	   are	   calling	   it	   the	   experiential	   approach,	  
because	   essentially	   it	   relies	   on	   the	   first	   person	   experiential	   reports.	   They	   divide	   their	  
experimental	  method	   into	   two	  phases:	   the	  horizontal	  phase	  and	   the	  vertical	  phase.	   In	   the	  
horizontal	   phase	   introspective	   reports	   of	   the	   trained	   subjects	   are	   aimed	   at	   characterizing	  
relations	   of	   the	   overall	   conscious	   experience	   without	   attempting	   to	   relate	   them	   to	   brain	  
structures	  (Aydede	  and	  Price	  2006,	  p.	  259).	  In	  the	  vertical	  phase	  experiments	  try	  to	  discover	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relations	   between	   the	   brain	   activity	   and	   the	   results	   from	   the	   first	   phase.	   For	   example,	  
subjects	  are	  asked	  to	  undergo	  the	  same	  stimulation	  procedure	  while	  scanned	  at	   the	  same	  
time.	   This	   approach	   is	   destined	   to	   failure	   if	   Aydede	   and	   Price	   believe	   that	   it	   can	   directly	  
bypass	  the	  conceptual	  issues	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  and	  especially	  skip	  over	  the	  vagueness	  
constraint	   of	   phenomenal	   concepts.	   They	   seem	   to	  be	   arguing	   exactly	   for	   that.	  However,	   I	  
find	  their	  approach	  useful	  because	  it	  can	  reinforce	  the	  quality	  space	  for	  pain	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  
understood	  that	  it	  pertains	  only	  to	  psychological	  concepts.	  	  
Aydede	  and	  Price’s	  horizontal/vertical	  approach	  can	  suitably	  accompany	  clinical	  and	  
diagnostic	   methods	   such	   as	   the	  McGill	   pain	   questionnaire	   (Melzack	   and	   Torgerson	   1971;	  
Melzack	  2005;	  Dubuisson	  and	  Melzack	  1975),	  which	   is	  basically	  used	   in	  clinical	  settings	   for	  
measuring	  the	  quality	  of	  pain.	  Melzack	  and	  Torgerson	  have	  proposed	  to	  categorize	  and	  scale	  
common	  words	  used	  to	  describe	  pain	  according	  to	  their	  intensity	  and	  dimensions.	  What	  they	  
have	   found	   is	   that	  categories	  and	  dimensions	   in	  different	  people	  are	  grouped	   in	   the	  same	  
relative	  dimensions.	  Words	  that	  describe	  pain	  are	  categorized	  into	  several	  classes	  according	  
to	  their	  modality.	  For	  example,	  one	  class	  consists	  of	  words	  describing	  sensory	  quality	  of	  pain	  
(e.g.	  descriptions	  in	  terms	  of	  spatial,	  thermal,	  temporal,	  pressure	  and	  similar	  properties),	  the	  
other	  class	   is	  about	  affective	  qualities	  of	  pain,	  e.g.	   tension	   fear	  and	  such;	   the	  third	  class	   is	  
the	   evaluative	   one,	   it	   consists	   of	   words	   describing	   subjective	   overall	   intensity	   of	   pain	  
experience	   (Melzack	   and	   Torgerson	   1971,	   p.	   51).	   They	   have	   run	   an	   experiment	   with	  
diagnosed	   patients	   and	   the	   result	   was	   that	   words	   from	   different	   dimensions	   tend	   to	  
consistently	   cluster	   together	   in	  a	  proto	  quality	   space	   for	  pain50.	   This	  model	  only	   seems	   to	  
capture	  the	  qualitative	  and	  subjective	  side,	  although	  one	  of	  the	  dimensions	  is	  about	  sensory	  
discriminations,	   it	   is	  only	  about	  their	  perceived	  quality.	  The	  model	  does	  not	  mention	  what	  
Rosenthal	  calls	  “perceptible	  properties”.	  Perhaps	  the	  three	  dimensions	  of	  this	  quality	  space,	  
i.e.	   sensory,	   affective	   and	   evaluative	   can	   be	   accompanied	   by	   the	   phenomenal-­‐phyiscal	  
dimension	  proposed	  by	  Aydede	  and	  price	  (Aydede	  and	  Price	  2006)	  and	  comprise	  an	  axis	  in	  a	  
multi-­‐dimensional	   and	   multi-­‐level	   general	   quality	   space	   for	   pain	   that	   would	   allows	   us	   to	  
zoom	  into	  and	  out	  of	  the	  actual	  descriptions	  of	  the	  functional	  roles	  for	  different	  modalities	  
and	   dimensions	   of	   pain	   thus	   further	   allowing	   us	   to	   see	   why	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	  
                                                
50	  They	  don’t	  call	  it	  quality	  space,	  but	  basically	  it	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  a	  quality	  space.	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expected	   to	   refer	  via	  descriptions	  of	  causal	   roles.	  This	  would	  explain	  away	   the	   intuition	  of	  
distinctness.	  	  
Another	  important	  aspect	  of	  pain	  is	  its	  sensory/physical	  location	  and	  intensity.	  That	  is	  
to	  say,	  issues	  of	  the	  perceptible	  properties	  of	  pain.	  Perhaps	  we	  could	  think	  of	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  
specialized	  and	  specific	  neural	   fibers	   instead	  of	   in	   terms	  of	  damage	  or	   in	   terms	  of	  noxious	  
stimuli.	  There	  are	  three	  major	  groups	  of	  fibers:	  A-­‐beta	  or	  large	  myelinated,	  A-­‐delta	  or	  small	  
myelinated,	  and	  C	  or	  unmyelinated	  fibres.	  Each	  one	  of	  these	  transmits	  impulses	  at	  different	  
speeds51	  which	  affects	  the	  sensation	  of	  pain.	  The	  intensity	  of	  pain	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	  
of	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   specific	   and	   on	   the	   other	   specialized	   nerve	   fibers.	   The	   difference	  
between	  the	  two	  comes	  down	  to	  this:	  specific	  fibers	  usually	  perform	  a	  single	  or	  unique	  task.	  
On	   the	  other	  hand	   specialized	   fibers	   can	  perform	  several	   kinds	  of	   related	   tasks.	  However,	  
some	   studies	   using	   neuronography52	   have	   shown	   that	   there	   is	   no	   simple	   relationship	  
between	  a	  type	  of	  fibre	  and	  a	  quality	  of	  sensation	  (Melzack	  and	  Wall	  1996,	  p.	  157).	  That	  is	  to	  
say	   that	   there	   are	   no	   “pain”	   fibres,	   but	   only	   fibres	   specialized	   to	   respond	   only	   to	   the	  
intensity	  of	  stimulation.	  This	  further	  means	  that	  the	  quality	  space	  for	  pain	  might	  also	  come	  
very	  useful	  in	  studying	  this	  kind	  of	  issue.	  	  
The	   list	   of	   issues	   grows	   exponentially	   when	   one	   is	   faced	   with	   such	   a	   complex	  
phenomenon	   as	   consciousness.	   However,	   the	   case	   of	   quality	   space	   for	   pain	   shows	   that	  
psychological	  concepts	  in	  this	  area,	  that	  are	  based	  on	  descriptions	  of	  functional	  roles,	  do	  not	  
necessarily	   work	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   physical	   concepts	   or	   concepts	   of	   natural	   kinds.	  
Considerations	   about	   the	   quality	   space	   and	   psychological	   concepts	   bring	   us	   closer	   to	   an	  
understanding	   of	  why	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   expected	   to	   refer	   via	   descriptions	   of	   the	  
causal	  roles	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  why	  they	  should	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  refer	  in	  that	  way.	  	  
Considered	   in	   this	   way	   it	   becomes	   apparent	   that	   the	   whole	   point	   of	   studying	  
psychological	   concepts	   instead	  of	  natural	  kinds	  and	  physical	   concepts	   is	   that	  psychological	  
                                                
51	  Depending	  on	  the	  myelnization.	  Myelinated	  fibres	  transmit	  impulses	  faster	  than	  the	  unmyelinated	  ones.	  
52 Neuronography	  is	  an	  experimental	  technique	  of	  tracking	  fibre	  activity	  and	  perceived	  sensation	  by	   inserting	  
microelectrodes	  into	  human	  nerves	  and	  recording	  the	  impulses	  in	  all	  the	  sensory	  afferent	  pathways. 
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concepts	  can	   reveal	  unique	  complexity	  of	  consciousness	  phenomena	  while	  also	  preserving	  






















I	  began	  my	  discussion	  with	  the	  considerations	  about	  what	  is	  the	  proper	  way	  to	  even	  
start	  thinking	  about	  consciousness.	  I	  argued	  that	  instead	  of	  discussing	  the	  available	  doctrines	  
beforehand,	  we	  should	  ask	  ourselves	  what	  are	  the	  most	  basic	  assumptions	  that	  we	  can	  make	  
about	  consciousness.	  Once	  we	  formulate	  these	  assumptions	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  come	  up	  with	  
the	   most	   plausible	   characterization	   of	   the	   way	   to	   think	   about	   consciousness.	   I	   have	  
discussed	   Papineau’s	   causal	   argument	   (Papineau	   2002)	   and	   concluded	   that	   the	   most	  
plausible	   doctrine	   about	   consciousness	   is	   physicalism	   thought	   of	   as	   an	   identity	   thesis	  
according	   to	   which	   mental	   states	   are	   identical	   with	   brain	   states	   or	   some	   higher	   order	  
physically	  realized	  states.	  Once	  I	  settled	  the	  starting	  position	  I	  continued	  by	  examining	  some	  
of	  the	  most	  important	  arguments	  against	  this	  position.	  In	  the	  first	  two	  chapters	  I	  restrained	  
myself	  from	  providing	  any	  extensive	  criticism	  of	  these	  arguments	  because	  I	  wanted	  to	  make	  
it	  as	  clear	  as	  possible	  what	  are	  the	  original	  claims.	  I	  have	  decided	  to	  approach	  to	  these	  issues	  
by	  gradually	  branching	  out	  towards	  a	  “big	  picture”	  and	  develop	  my	  own	  position	  steadily.	  Of	  
course	   I	   occasionally	   give	  out	  my	  own	  position	   in	   the	   first	   two	   chapters,	   but	   I	   offer	   really	  
thorough	  criticism	  from	  the	  third	  chapter	  onwards.	  	  
In	  the	  first	  chapter	  I	  begin	  with	  Nagel’s	  account	  of	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  (Nagel	  1974).	  He	  
claims	   that	   the	   main	   feature	   of	   consciousness	   is	   that	   there	   is	   something	   it	   is	   like	   to	   be	  
conscious	  for	  a	  given	  creature.	  This	  “what	   it	   is	   like”	  aspect	  of	  consciousness	  will	  always	  be	  
left	  out	  from	  any	  functionalist	  or	  reductive	  explanation	  of	  consciousness	  because	  it	  can	  only	  
be	  known	  from	  the	  first	  person	  perspective	  of	  a	  given	  sentient	  being.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  theory	  
of	  the	  subjective	  aspect	  of	  consciousness	  is	  always	  tied	  to	  a	  certain	  point	  of	  view,	  namely	  the	  
first	   person	   perspective,	   which	   cannot	   be	   eliminated	   from	   a	   reductive	   explanation	   in	   the	  
same	  way	   as	   it	   can	   in	   the	   case	   other	   natural	   phenomena.	  Here	  we	   have	   a	   version	   of	   the	  
epistemic	  gap	  that	  I	  already	  mentioned.	  He	  basically	  claims	  that	  there	  are	  two	  epistemically	  
distinct	   ways	   of	   knowing	   something.	   Knowing	   things	   in	   one	   way	   does	   not	   enable	   one	   to	  
know	   things	   the	   other	   way.	   That	   is,	   we	   can	   know	   about	   the	   neural	   underpinnings	   of	  
conscious	  experience	  from	  the	  third	  and	  objective	  point	  of	  view,	  but	  to	  conceptualize	  it	  from	  
the	  first	  person	  perspective	  we	  need	  to	  be	  that	  very	  organism.	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The	  proto-­‐knowledge	  argument	  in	  Nagel’s	  account	  can	  best	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  claim	  that	  
the	   knowledge	  of	   all	   the	  physical	   or	   functional	   facts	   about	   the	  brain	  does	  not	   entail	   facts	  
about	  the	  what-­‐it-­‐is-­‐like	  of	  experience,	  for	  such	  a	  knowledge	  would	  require	  one	  to	  become	  a	  
creature	   whose	   experiential	   perspective	   we	   are	   talking	   about.	   As	   I	   said	   earlier,	   I	   didn’t	  
discuss	  or	  criticize	   in	  greater	  detail	   the	  arguments	   in	  the	  first	  chapter	  because	   I	  wanted	  to	  
present	  them	  in	  their	  original	  form.	  I	  gave	  out	  hints	  here	  and	  there	  about	  my	  own	  position	  in	  
these	  matters,	  but	  I	  don’t	  develop	  them	  until	  chapter	  three	  and	  after	  it.	  	  
After	   that	   I	   go	  on	  and	  present	   the	  Knowledge	  Argument	   (Jackson	  1982,	  1986).	  The	  
argument	  formally	  looks	  like	  this:	  	  
“13.	   Mary	   (before	   her	   release)	   knows	   everything	   physical	   there	   is	   to	   know	   about	   other	  
people;	  
14.	  Mary	  (before	  her	  release)	  doesn’t	  know	  everything	  there	  is	  to	  know	  about	  other	  people	  
(because	  she	  learns	  something	  about	  them	  on	  her	  release);	  
Therefore,	  	  
15.	   There	   are	   truths	   about	   other	   people	   (and	   herself)	  which	   escape	   the	   physicalist	   story”	  
(Jackson	  1986,	  p.	  293).	  
From	  this	  Jackson	  concludes	  that	  the	  fact	  she	  learns	  upon	  release	  cannot	  be	  based	  on	  
some	  physical	  properties,	  because	  if	  there	  were	  physical,	  she	  should	  have	  known	  them	  while	  
still	   in	   the	   room.	   Thus	   if	   phenomenal	   properties	   exist	   and	   are	   not	   physical,	   then	  
epiphenomenalism	  must	  be	  true	  concludes	  Jackson	  (Jackson	  1982).	  	  
I	   argued	   in	   chapters	   three	   and	   four	   that	   this	   conclusion	   is	   not	   warranted	   by	   the	  
Knowledge	  Argument	   itself,	   and	   it	   fails	   to	  establish	   that	   the	  physical	   and	   the	  phenomenal	  
are	  metaphysically	  distinct.	  To	  do	  that,	  he	  needs	  some	  further	  tacit	  assumptions	  about	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  concepts	  operate.	  He	  seems	  to	  be	  relaying	  solely	  on	  the	  intuitions	  in	  this	  case,	  
which	  makes	  the	  argument	  very	  problematic.	  	  
In	  the	  third	  section	  of	  the	  first	  chapter	  I	  presented	  Kripke’s	  modal	  argument	  against	  the	  
identity	  thesis	  (Kripke	  1980).	  His	  basic	  point	  is	  that	  identities	  must	  be,	  if	  true	  at	  all,	  necessary	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true.	  Psychophysical	  identity	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  posteriori	  necessary	  like	  any	  other	  identity	  
of	  the	  natural	  kinds.	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  kinds	  identities	  we	  can	  conceive	  of	  their	  
falling	  apart,	  for	  example	  that	  heat	  is	  not	  identical	  with	  molecular	  motion.	  If	  we	  can	  conceive	  
of	  their	  falling	  apart	  they	  are	  not	  necessary	  but	  contingent	  on	  Kripke’s	  account.	  He	  says	  that	  
this	  merely	  seems	  contingent	  and	  we	  explain	  it	  away	  as	  a	  misdescription.	  What	  we	  actually	  
mean	   by	   this	   is	   not	   that	  molecular	  motion	   is	   not	   identical	   with	   heat,	   but	   that	   something	  
other	   than	  molecular	  motion	   could	  have	  produced	  a	   sensation	  of	  heat.	  However,	   such	  an	  
analysis	   is	  not	  available	  for	  psychophysical	   identity,	  because	  what	  seems	  like	  pain	  is	   in	  fact	  
pain,	  so	  when	  we	  conceive	  of	  their	  falling	  apart	  they	  really	  fall	  apart,	  we	  cannot	  dismiss	  it	  as	  
a	  misdescription.	  Here	  we	  have	  a	  very	  important	  point	  about	  inference	  from	  conceivability	  
to	  metaphysical	   possibility.	   This	   point	   has	   been	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  many	   vigorous	   debates	   in	  
philosophy	  of	  mind	  and	  metaphysics	  and	  it	  has	  been	  a	  common	  ground	  for	  attacking	  Kripke’s	  
argument.	  Furthermore,	  this	  issue	  is	  of	  central	  importance	  for	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  account,	  
because	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  second	  chapter,	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  does	  warrant	  only	  entailment	  
from	  conceivability	  to	  epistemic	  possibility.	  	  
In	   the	   next	   section	   I	   discussed	   further	   attempts	   to	   fortify	   this	   position	   by	   David	  
Chalmers	   (Chalmers	   1996).	   He	   tried	   to	   justify	   Kripke’s	   conclusion	   by	   introducing	   the	  
argument	   based	   on	   the	   supervenience	   thesis	   and	   two-­‐dimensional	   semantics.	   Chalmers’s	  
account	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  in	  this	  way:	   if	  the	  phenomenal	   is	  not	   logically	  supervenient	  on	  
the	   physical,	   and	   the	   physical	   domain	   is	   causally	   closed,	   then	   phenomenal	   properties	   are	  
distinct	  properties	  from	  the	  physical	  properties.	  He	  provides	  another	  independent	  argument	  
for	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   phenomenal	   is	   not	   supervenient	   on	   the	   physical,	   i.e.	   the	   zombie	  
argument.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  his	  arguments	  alone	  that	  supervenience	  based	  
characterization	   of	   physicalism	   is	   better	   than	   identity	   based	   characterization.	   I	   won’t	   be	  
discussing	  his	  account	  of	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  modal	  semantics	  here,	  because	  I	  already	  did	  
that	  on	  two	  different	  occasions	  in	  the	  dissertation53.	  
In	  the	  second	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  account	  (Levine	  1983,	  1993,	  2001).	  
I	  tried	  to	  follow	  Levine	  in	  all	  sophisticated	  distinctions	  he	  makes	  and	  I	  discussed	  notions	  of	  
                                                
53 See the last two sections of the first chapter and the last section of the fourth chapter. 
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thick	   and	   thin	   concepts	   and	   thick	   and	   thin	   conceivability,	   gappy	   and	  non-­‐gappy	   identities,	  
and	   so	   forth.	   His	   distinction	   between	   thick	   and	   thin	   concepts	   is	   very	   important	   for	   the	  
phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	   because	   it	   appeals	   to	   the	   crucial	   difference	   between	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  and	  the	  natural	  kinds	  concepts.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  thick	  concepts	  are	  like	  
phenomenal	   concepts,	   substantive	   and	   determinate	   about	   their	   own	   content,	   although	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  are	  vague	  considered	  from	  the	  third	  person	  perspective	  because	  they	  
don’t	  have	  a	  priori	  connections	  with	  the	  material	  properties.	  Thin	  concepts	  are	  like	  natural	  
kinds	   concepts,	   they	   are	   not	   determinate	   and	   substantive.	   Levine	   argues	   that	   identities	  
containing	   thick	   concepts	   cannot	   be	   fully	   explanatory,	   as	   they	   cannot	   account	   for	   the	  
twofold	   task	   of	   intelligible	   explanations.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   gappy	   identities,	   cannot	   identify	  
explanans	  with	  the	  explanandum	  because	  thick	  concepts	  use	  direct	  and	  determinate	  modes	  
of	  presentation	  and	  thus	  cannot	  appeal	  to	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  or	  functional	  roles	  
in	  identifying	  the	  explanans	  and	  the	  explanandum.	  I	  argued	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter	  that	  an	  
explanation	  of	  the	  psychophysical	  identity	  containing	  thick	  concepts	  (phenomenal	  concepts)	  
only	   seems	   unintelligible	   because	   of	   the	   tacit	   additional	   assumptions.	   After	   all,	   if	   Levine	  
accepts	  that	  physicalism	  formulated	  as	  an	  identity	  thesis	  is	  true,	  then	  he	  also	  have	  to	  accept	  
that	  identities	  are	  not	  explanatory.	  	  
In	   the	   third	   chapter	   I	   finally	   come	   to	   the	   point	  when	   I	   could	   discuss	   the	  main	   and	  
most	   plausible	   response	   to	   the	   explanatory	   gap-­‐it	   is	   the	   phenomenal	   concept	   strategy	  
(Stoljar	   2005).	   According	   to	   the	   strategy	   phenomenal	   concepts	   are	   a	   special	   kind	   of	  
concepts,	  which	  unlike	  natural	  kinds	  concepts	  refer	  directly,	  or	  as	  Hill	  and	  McLaughlin	  put	  it:	  	  
“The	   reference-­‐fixing	   property	   that	   is	   associated	   with	   a	   theoretical	   concept	   is	  
identical	  with	  the	  property	  to	  which	  the	  concept	  refers.	  “	  (Hill	  and	  McLaughlin	  1999,	  p.	  452)	  
I	  then	  go	  on	  and	  discuss	  several	  different	  accounts	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  I	  begin	  
with	   Loar’s	   account	   of	   recognitional	   phenomenal	   concepts	   (Loar	   2002)	   and	   finish	   with	  
Papineau’s	  account	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts	  as	  a	  subclass	  of	  perceptual	  concepts	  that	  only	  
use	  a	   linguistic	   form	  of	  a	  demonstrative	  but	  are	  not	   themselves	  demonstratives	   (Papienau	  
2007).	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   also	   discussed	   the	   inconsistency	   objection	   to	   the	   Knowledge	  
Argument,	   i.e.	   that	   one	   cannot	   coherently	   hold	   both	   epiphenomenalism	   true	   and	  
phenomenal	  properties	  causally	   inefficacious.	   If	   they	  were	   in	   fact	  causally	   inefficacious	  we	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would	   never	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   detect	   them	   or	   to	   know	   about	   them.	   This	   argument	   is	  
supposed	   to	  corroborate	   the	   first	  premise	  of	   the	  causal	  argument	   (Papineau	  2002).	   In	   the	  
rest	   of	   the	   third	   chapter	   I	   discuss	   two	   important	   objections	   to	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts,	  
one	   is	   “Max	   Black’s	   objection”	   (Block	   2007)	   and	   the	   other	   is	   physical	   explicability	   and	  
explanatory	  adequacy	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  Max	  Black’s	  objection	  consists	  of	  the	  claim	  
that	  two	  different	  modes	  of	  presentation	  must	  reflect	  two	  distinct	  properties.	  I	  argued	  along	  
the	  same	  line	  as	  Ned	  Block	  (Block	  2007)	  that	  such	  objection	  presupposes	  that	  the	  difference	  
in	   cognitive	   modes	   of	   presentation	   entails	   the	   difference	   in	   metaphysical	   modes	   of	  
presentation,	  which	   does	   not	   have	   to	   be	   the	   case.	   I	   consider	   an	   example	   of	   a	   student	   of	  
French	  language	  who	  learns	  that	  a	  French	  word	  for	  “cat”	  is	  “chat”	  by	  being	  shown	  the	  same	  
cat	  as	  an	   illustration	  on	  two	  different	  occasions	  and	  thus	  he	  thinks	  there	  are	  two	  different	  
meanings	  of	  “chat”.	  The	  example	  shows	  that	  actually	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  cognitive	  modes	  
of	  presentation	  associated	  with	  each	  occurrence	  of	  the	  same	  cat,	  but	  the	  difference	  stems	  
from	   the	   one	   and	   the	   same	   metaphysical	   mode	   of	   presentation.	   The	   second	   objection	  
concerns	  physical	  explicability	  and	  explanatory	  adequacy	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts.	  Chalmers	  
(Chalmers	   2007)	   argues	   that	   if	   phenomenal	   concepts	  were	  physically	   explicable	   then	   they	  
are	   not	   able	   to	   explain	   the	   explanatory	   gap	   and	   vice	   versa.	   I	   argued	   that	   Chalmers’s	  
argument	  does	  not	  undermine	  phenomenal	  concept	  strategy	  because	  it	  merely	  restates	  the	  
explanatory	  gap	  problem.	  Namely,	  phenomenal	  concepts	  refer	  directly	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  
have	  a	  priori	  connections	  with	  the	  material	  properties.	  If	  they	  had	  a	  priori	  connections	  with	  
the	  material	  properties	  there	  would	  be	  no	  epistemic	  gap	  and	  consequently	  no	  explanatory	  
gap.	  	  
In	  the	  fourth	  chapter	  I	  developed	  my	  key	  argument.	   I	  argued	  that	  although	  there	  is	  
the	  epistemic	  gap	  it	  is	  not	  inexplicable.	  Some	  philosophers	  (Chalmers	  1996,	  2007;	  Chalmers	  
and	  Jackson	  2001;	  Levine	  1983,	  1993,	  2001)	  argue	  that	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  epistemic	  gap	  
must	   come	   from	   the	   identity	   itself.	   I	   however	   argue	   that	   it	   doesn’t	   have	   to	   be	   the	   case,	  
especially	  if	  we	  take	  into	  account	  vague	  nature	  of	  phenomenal	  concepts,	  or	  as	  I	  call	  it	  in	  the	  
fifth	  chapter	   the	  vagueness	  constraint.	   In	   this	  chapter	   I	  also	  argued	  that	   the	  conceivability	  
arguments	  and	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  account	  rely	  on	  some	  intuitions	  that	  are	  in	  fact	  in	  need	  
of	   explanation.	   The	   intuitions	   in	   question	   are	   about	   the	   requirement	   that	   phenomenal	  
concepts	  have	  to	  use	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  or	  functional	  roles	  as	  modes	  of	  presentation	  
in	  order	  to	  be	  fully	  explanatory.	  I	  called	  this	  issue	  a	  brute	  disagreement	  about	  intuitions	  and	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argued	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  by	  the	  available	  arguments	  but	  by	  an	  account	  that	  would	  
explain	  those	  intuitions	  away.	  I	  urged	  that	  the	  issue	  at	  stake	  is	  a	  version	  of	  Papineau’s	  notion	  
of	  “intuition	  of	  distinctness”	  (Papineau	  2002).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  discussed	  the	  role	  
of	  a	  priori	  derivation	  and	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  intelligibility	  of	  explanation.	  	  
Finally,	   in	   the	   fifth	   chapter	   I	   examined	   a	   prospect	   for	   the	   empirical	   study	   of	  
phenomenal	   consciousness54.	   I	   started	  off	  with	  discussing	   the	   vagueness	   constraint	   of	   the	  
phenomena	   concepts	   for	   the	   empirical	   study	   of	   phenomenal	   consciousness.	   As	   I	   have	  
concluded	  in	  the	  fourth	  chapter,	  phenomenal	  concepts	  have	  no	  a	  priori	  links	  to	  the	  material	  
properties	   and	   therefore	   are	   vague.	   Another	   way	   to	   put	   this	   would	   be	   to	   say	   that	  
phenomenal	  concepts	  use	  direct	  modes	  of	  presentation	  and	  thus	  cannot	  be	  directly	  mapped	  
in	   the	   scheme	   of	   the	   causal	   or	   functional	   roles.	   Instead	   of	   trying	   to	   find	   directly	   the	  
corresponding	  material	   properties	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   concepts	   I	   argued	  we	   should	   use	   a	  
quality	  space	  model	  to	  analyze	  psychological	  concepts	  in	  this	  area	  and	  try	  to	  understand	  why	  
are	  phenomenal	  concepts	  expected	  to	  refer	  via	  descriptions	  of	  the	  causal	  or	  the	  functional	  
roles.	  I	  discussed	  Clark’s	  version	  of	  the	  quality	  space	  for	  colour	  (Clark	  2000)	  and	  Rosenthal’s	  
account	  of	   the	  quality	   space	   (Rosenthal	   2010)	   and	   then	  proposed	  my	  own	  account	  of	   the	  
quality	  space	  for	  pain.	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  quality	  space	  for	  pain	  would	  be	  a	  real	  challenge	  but	  
nevertheless	  feasible.	  Some	  of	  the	  main	  problems	  with	  the	  quality	  space	  for	  pain	  would	  be	  
discerning	  how	  many	  axes	  it	  should	  have	  and	  which	  modalities	  should	  be	  represented	  in	  it.	  	  
Clearly,	   this	   is	  not	   the	   last	  word	  on	   this	   topic,	  but	   the	   reader	  should	   take	   two	  very	  
important	   morals	   from	   my	   discussions.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   that	   we	   cannot	   use	   empirical	  
evidence	   to	   solve	   the	   philosophical	   problems	   directly.	   And	   the	   second	   is	   that	   the	   most	  
reasonable	   way	   to	   use	   empirical	   evidence	   when	   considering	   philosophical	   problems	   is	   to	  
analyze	  how	  the	  specific	  explanations	  work	  in	  a	  relevant	  area	  and	  how	  specific	  concepts	  in	  
these	  areas	  relate	  to	  other	  relevant	  concepts.	  	  
	  
                                                
54 I insist here on the specific aspect of consciousness, and that is why I write “phenomenal consciousness” 
instead of just “consciousness” because empirical study of some other aspects of consciousness is not that 
intractable as in the case of phenomenal consciousness. I already mentioned Chalmer’s distinction between 
hard and easy problems of consciousness. That is why I think it is important to emphasize that we are talking 
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